ARP158 Battle of Brandywine

Last week, I left off with the British Army commanded by General Howe, having landed in Maryland, skirmished with the continentals in Delaware, and then moved westward into Pennsylvania in a march toward Philadelphia.  The Continentals under General Washington pivoted from Delaware into Pennsylvania.  They deployed along Brandywine Creek, prepared to confront the British advance there.

Brandywine Creek is a relatively small waterway that begins with the merger of two smaller creeks about thirty miles west of Philadelphia.  It then flows down to Wilmington, Delaware, before merging with the Christiana Creek and then into the Delaware River.  It is not big enough to sail ships, but was deep enough in most places during this era to prevent men from fording across.

Continental Defenses

That said, there were a number of fords along the creek where an army could cross. The Continentals deployed around those fords and planned to force the enemy to cross that water in the face of enemy fire if it wanted to advance.

Battle of Brandywine

General Washington believed the most likely crossing point would be at Chadds Ford, a small village in Pennsylvania, about two miles north of the border with Delaware.  By September 9, 1777, his Continentals had secured the Chadds Ford, as well as two other fords just upstream from Chadds.

They also secured Pyle’s Ford to the south in Delaware.  This left flank of the Continental Army included divisions commanded by Major Generals Anthony Wayne and Nathanael Greene, along with Pennsylvania militia.  Major Generals John Sullivan, Adam Stephen, and Lord Stirling took command of the heights above Chadds Ford which covered the army’s right flank.  Beyond their divisions further north, Colonel Moses Hazen covered two smaller fords further upriver, Buffington’s Ford and Wistar’s Ford (aka Shunk’s Ford).  In the event of enemy movement toward those fords, the nearby reinforcements of the army’s right flank could be deployed there.  Buffington’s Ford was actually north of the place where the Brandywine splits into two smaller branches. To reach that, the enemy would have to ford both the west branch and the east branch of the creeks to reach the Continental’s side.

British Lines

On the British side General Wilhelm von Knyphausen and marched his Hessians to Kennett Square, only a few miles from Chadds Ford where the Americans were already deployed.  General Howe did not realize that Knyphausen would move so quickly and expected him to camp several miles further back.

Gen. Wilhelm von Knyphausen
(from Wikimedia)

By the time Knyphausen received Howe’s orders, he had already set up camp in Kennett Square and had no interest in marching backward several miles that night.  Instead, he ordered his army to camp without campfires in hopes of keeping their position a secret from the enemy.  By the morning of September 10, Howe’s Regulars also reached Kennett Square.  The entire army of about 15,000 Regulars and Hessians was united and ready.

General Howe was not going to charge into battle without getting the lay of the land.  Although he landed in Maryland with few detailed maps or intelligence about the area, He had been working with local Tories to get what he needed.

Joseph Galloway, who had opted to confirm his loyalty to the King after attending the First Continental Congress, had fled from his home near Philadelphia to join the British in New York City.  He had traveled with Howe to Maryland and served as a local guide. Howe also received guidance from other local residents, including many Quakers, who lived in the area and knew the area well.  On top of that, Howe sent out scouts to determine enemy positions.  So the two armies sat on September 10, as Howe gained intelligence and finalized his plans.

The Battle Begins

On the morning of September 11, General von Knyphausen marched an army of about 6800 mostly Hessian soldiers toward Brandywine Creek.  Although the day would be a hot one, the morning was still chilly and a dense fog hid much of the two armies from each other.  The hilly terrain also made it difficult to track the enemy.  Leading the column was Ferguson’s riflemen and the Queen’s Rangers, a loyalist militia regiment.  Both Ferguson’s riflemen and the Queen’s Rangers wore green coats, resulting in them being mistaken for Hessians during much of the battle.

Brandywine Battle map (from Wikimedia)

That same morning, as the British and Hessians began their march, American General William Maxwell had sent scouts across the Brandywine to track enemy movements.  An American company was eating some breakfast at Welch’s Tavern when Ferguson’s riflemen and the Queens Rangers approached. The two sides exchanged fire as the Americans withdrew. These first shots were fired around 9:00 AM.

Maxwell’s Continentals continued to harass the advancing British in a series of ambushes as the column moved toward the Brandywine.  The few hundred Americans could not halt the British advance.  Their intent was to harass the enemy until they reached the Brandywine, where the Americans would make their stand.  As the battle moved slowly toward the creek, both sides took casualties.  Ferguson’s riflemen proved their worth as they picked off retreating Americans.  Among those wounded was a young captain from Virginia named John Marshall, the future Chief Justice.

By around 10:30 AM, Knyphausen’s main column had reached Brandywine Creek.  Rather than attempt to cross, he brought up his artillery and simply fired across the creek at the enemy.

General Washington was observing the battle through a telescope from a house a short distance from the battle.  It became clear that the force attacking them was not the entire British Army.  Many of his generals feared that the army in front of them was simply meant to amuse them while another force marched around in a flanking maneuver to attack them from a different direction. This was exactly the same tactic Howe had used against them on Long Island.

Washington sent out scouts in search of another enemy column, but received frustratingly inconclusive intelligence.  In fact, General Howe had left camp before dawn and before General Knyphausen began his march.  Howe moved his regulars north.  Washington considered several options.  One was that Howe was attempting a flanking maneuver on the Continental right flank. Another was that Howe was simply keeping the Continentals busy while he marched his army out to Lancaster to seize food and supplies that were stored there.  A third possibility was that Howe had marched north in order to get Washington to send part of his own army north to find Howe.  Then, Howe could double back, join Knyphausen, and crush Washington’s divided army.

By noon, Washington had decided that if Howe’s army really had marched north, they would not participate in the day’s battle.  It would take them too long to find an unguarded ford upstream and march back south.  Washington maintained a strong right flank in case they did show up there, but also began to send regiments across the Brandywine to engage with the enemy.  If he could defeat Knyphausen’s division before Howe arrived, he could then focus all of his army on Howe’s division and defeat the divided army in detail.

Before he could commit his army to the attack, General Sullivan sent intelligence which he received from Major Spear, that there was no sign of the enemy to the north.  If that was true, Howe was likely doubling back to meet up with Knyphausen.  Fearing that, Washington opted not to commit his army to an attack across the creek, but held in his defensive positions.  Washington also recalled Lord Stirling and General Stephen’s divisions to move from the right flank back to the center so that the army could be united against an expected full-on British assault across the creek.

Howe’s Flanking Maneuver

Washington’s intelligence, however, proved incorrect.  General Howe had, in fact, marched more than half of his army north, leaving in the pre-dawn hours before von Knyphausen began his march to the Brandywine.  As many officers guessed, von Knyphausen’s attack was a feint to distract the Continentals while Howe’s larger force could move into position to attack the American right flank.

Washington, Lafayette at Brandywine (from British Battles)

Howe took advantage of local information from Tories to march his army six miles to the north on back roads.  He crossed the Brandywine north of where it forked into two branches.  He crossed both the west branch and east branch of the Brandywine at unguarded fords.  One of the Hessian officers leading his column, Johann Ewald, noted that the army had to pass through a narrow ravine where a few hundred defenders could have held the army at bay for hours.  He was concerned about a possible ambush as he marched his men through.  But the Americans were nowhere to be found.  General Howe had moved his entire division of about eight thousand soldiers onto the east bank and prepared to attack the American right flank from the north.  Howe had marched north about eight miles north to get around the army.

By the time Howe had gotten his army across the Brandywine, it was a little after 1:00 PM.  A local, who supported the patriots, spotted the army and galloped down to inform General Washington.  At first, Washington was convinced of his earlier intelligence that said the British were not to his north, and brushed off the information as an excited local who was exaggerating what he saw.  However, after receiving several more reports, Washington realized he was in trouble, that Howe was about to crash into his right flank and crush the. Continental Army.

Washington redeployed the divisions under Stephen and Stirling to move back to the north and reinforce the right flank.  He ordered General Sullivan to advance on Howe’s army and engage the enemy.  The Continental divisions that had been recalled earlier, had to run back to their positions to the north in order to meet the enemy.  Stephen and Stirling marched their men over three miles in less than half an hour.

The American defenses were still in chaos when the British advance corps came within eyesight of the Americans, less than a mile away.  General Howe could have ordered a charge and scattered the disorganized Continentals.

Regulars rest before going into battle (from history on net)

Instead though, Howe ordered his army to rest and have lunch.  Howe sat with his officers for half an hour to an hour.   They enjoyed tea and talked over their options.  Instead of taking advantage of the surprised and disorganized American defenses, Howe gave them time to organize their lines.  This is just another example of General Howe taking a pause just when he is about to deliver the death blow, and why some of his detractors argue that Howe had no intention of winning this war.

Again, I don't think Howe deliberately sabotaged the British cause.  His men had just marched a grueling seventeen miles and were tired and hungry.  Giving them a short rest before charging into battle might help them to fight better.  Further, it is unclear whether Howe appreciated how disorganized the American lines were, and how much that time would give them to set their defenses.

Birmingham Hill

Taking advantage of the short reprieve, the Americans deployed a defensive line along Birmingham Hill.  General Stephen commanded the right flank.  General Lord Stirling commanded the center.  General Sullivan commanded the left flank.  Stephen and Stirling got their men into place relatively easily.

Brandywine Battlefield (from British Battles)

Sullivan’s division had to march through heavily forested and rocky terrain, meaning that it took the soldiers longer to get into position and could not see the other divisions’ positions as they were forming.  By the time Sulllivan had established his line, he realized he was too far forward and had left a large gap between his division and the Stirling’s center.  Sullivan rode off to meet with Stirling and make sure they were coordinated in their defense.  He left his second in command, the French General Preudhomme de Borre in command of his division.  General de Borre did not speak English and did not really command the respect of his subordinates, leading to further command problems.

While Sullivan was still away from his division, General Howe launched his attack around 4:30 PM.  Stirling and Stephen’s divisions stood firm and repelled several assaults on their positions over the next hour and a half of intense fighting.  Howe had left most of his artillery with Knyphausen, meaning that this had to be primarily an infantry assault.  British grenadiers and others among Howe’s best regiments pushed back the soldiers from Sullivan’s division and threatened the American left flank.

During the fighting, General Washington, along with General Lafayette arrived on the scene and assessed the situation.

British Take the Field

At the same time Howe’s forces were storming Birmingham Hill, General Knyphausen, who had been distracting the Americans all day near Chadd’s Ford, heard the distant gunfire and understood that Howe was attacking.  With that, Knyphausen ordered his division, which was nearly half of the entire British Hessian force, to storm across the Brandywine and take the American position.  Since Washington had moved most of the defenders to Birmingham Hill, Knyphausen only had to contend with a smaller force, composed mostly of militia.  This force, under the command of General Anthony Wayne, and supported by Generals Maxwell and John Armstrong, could not hold off Knyphausen’s assault.

General Washington realized that the two pronged attack meant that both lines were about to fail.  He had held in reserve General Greene’s division to reinforce whichever line needed it.  But even if he deployed Green to one of these two lines, the other would certainly fall.  Instead, Washington ordered Green to move into a defensive position where he could form a rear guard action for the retreating army.  Greene rushed his men into position, marching about three miles in just over half an hour.

Continental lines at Brandywine (from British Battles)

As the American divisions defending Birmingham Hill gave way and retreated, Howe’s forces advanced.  At the same time, Wayne’s defenders along the Brandywine also retreated, giving Knyphausen control of the battlefield there.

As Howe continued his advance, hoping to capture the American army, he ran into Greene’s line, which had been reinforced by many of the soldiers retreating from Birmingham Hill.  Howe attempted to roll up the right flank of Greene’s defensive line as the soldiers put up a solid defense.  Casimir Pulaski, the Polish officer with the Continentals, saw this and organized an impromptu American cavalry charge into the British infantry advance, thus forcing the British to halt their attack.  Pulaski had only arrived in America a few months earlier.  Congress was still debating whether to give him a commission, so technically, he had no command authority.  But at Washington’s request, he organized and led this critical cavalry charge anyway.

With the surprisingly strong American defensive line and with dusk approaching, Howe called off his offensive and allowed the Continentals to retreat from the field.

Aftermath

With nightfall, the Battle of Brandywine ended.  With about 30,000 soldiers engaged on both sides, this would be one of the largest battles of the American Revolution.  The British reported nearly 600 casualties, which is probably an under count.  The Americans estimated they inflicted over 2000 British casualties, which is probably an over count.  The true number is probably closer to the British number, but likely a little higher.

Especially hard hit was Ferguson’s regiment and the loyalist regiment of Queen’s Rangers.  These units had led Knyphausen’s column and took the brunt of the American ambushes as the column advanced.  Captain Ferguson himself was shot in the arm and risked amputation for several weeks.  His arm never fully recovered.

There are no good records of the American casualties.  Most estimates are that they were about double that of the British, about 1200-1300.  About a third of those were captured prisoners, although almost all of those captured were also wounded on the field.  Thanks to General Greene’s rearguard action, almost all of the Americans who were able to walk, or run, were able to escape capture.  The Americans did lose quite a few cannons, including several that they had captured from the enemy at Trenton a few months earlier.

Wounding of Lafayette (from British Battles)

General Lafayette took a ball in the leg late in the day.  It proved to be a relatively minor wound that would allow him to return to duty rather quickly.  After the battle, Captain Ferguson reported that he had seen two American officers on the field whom we could have shot from his position with his rifle.  However, since the officers had their backs turned toward him, he considered the shot to be dishonorable and did not take it.  Later, from the description and known position in the battle, Ferguson became convinced that he had had General Washington in his sights, possibly while conferring with Pulaski.  Even so, he said later he did not regret his decision not to shoot.  Sniping at officers was considered murder by many officers at the time.

The highest ranking officer who died over the encounter was not even on the field.  On the day before the battle, French General Philippe du Coudray, who sought to become the Continental commander of artillery, jumped on a horse in Philadelphia and rode out to join the Continental Army in the field.  As he crossed the Schuylkill River, either on a ferry or a pontoon bridge, accounts differ, his horse got spooked and jumped into the river.  With du Coudray caught in the horse’s stirrups, both horse and rider drowned.  Later, his body was recovered and buried in Philadelphia.

With the battle at an end, General Howe and General Knyphausen made camp near the battlefield and rested their army.  General Washington and the Continentals spent another sleepless night making their escape from the British Army.  Despite the loss, Washington put the best face on the day, reporting to Congress: "despite the day's misfortune, I am pleased to announce that most of my men are in good spirits and still have the courage to fight the enemy another day."

- - -

Next Episode 159 Battle of the Clouds

Previous Episode 157 Head of Elk & Cooch's Bridge

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via Venmo, Zelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)

Click here to see my Patreon Page

You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

An alternative to Patreon is SubscribeStar.  For anyone who has problems with Patreon, you can get the same benefits by subscribing at SubscribeStar.

Click here to go to my SubscribeStar Page



Further Reading

Websites

Virtual Marching Tour, Brandywine: https://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/tobrandywine.htm

Battle of Brandywine: https://www.americanheritage.com/encounter-brandywine

Battle of Brandywine Creek: https://www.britishbattles.com/war-of-the-revolution-1775-to-1783/battle-of-brandywine-creek

Letter From Washington To John Hancock, 11 September 1777: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-11-02-0190-0009

Casimir Pulaski: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/casimir-pulaski

Montrésor, John, and G. D. Scull. “Journal of Captain John Montrésor, July 1, 1777, to July 1, 1778, Chief Engineer of the British Army.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 5, no. 4, 1881, pp. 393–417. www.jstor.org/stable/20084519

Fyers, Evan W. H. “GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S OPERATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1777. The Battle on the Brandywine Creek—11 September—and the Action at Germantown—4 October.” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 8, no. 34, 1929, pp. 228–241. www.jstor.org/stable/44232285

“COUNT CASIMIR PULASKI AT THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE.” The American Catholic Historical Researches, vol. 7, no. 4, 1911, pp. 381–383.  www.jstor.org/stable/44374975

ESLING, CHARLES H. A. “WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS AT THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE, IN THE HOUSE OF JOHN HOLAHAN, A CATHOLIC.” The American Catholic Historical Researches, vol. 3, no. 4, 1907, pp. 356–358. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44374708

Sanborn, Paul J. “The Battle of Brandywine: An Intelligence Evaluation of General George Washington's Tactical Operations During The Battle Along The Brandywine, 11 September 1777.” American Intelligence Journal, vol. 16, no. 2/3, 1995, pp. 69–80. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44326518

Sullivan, Thomas. “Before and after the Battle of Brandy-Wine. Extracts from the Journal of Sergeant Thomas Sullivan of H.M. Forty-Ninth Regiment of Foot.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 31, no. 4, 1907, pp. 406–418. www.jstor.org/stable/20085398

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Hooton, Francis C.The Battle of Brandywine with its lines of battle, Wm. Stanley Ray, 1900.

Lewis, Charlton Thomas Lafayette at Brandywine, Chester County Historical Society, 1896.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965 (borrow only)

Townsend, Joseph Some account of the British army, under the command of General Howe; and of the battle of Brandywine, on the memorable September 11th, 1777, and the adventures of that day, Townsend Ward, 1846.

Trussell, John B.B. Jr. The Battle of Brandywine, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1992.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Harris, Michael C. Brandywine: A Military History of the Battle that Lost Philadelphia but Saved America, September 11, 1777, Savis Beatie, 2014 (book recommendation of the week).

Kauffman, Gerald J. and Michael R. Gallagher The British Invasion of Delaware, Aug-Sep 1777, lulu.com, 2013.

McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign Vol. 1, Stackpole Books, 2006.

Mowday, Bruce September 11, 1777: Washington's Defeat at Brandywine Dooms Philadelphia,  White Mane, 2002.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Pioneer Press, 1980 (orig. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

ARP157 Head of Elk & Cooch's Bridge

When we last left the Howe brothers in Episode 150.  They had loaded up their army aboard hundreds of ships and sailed off from New York out into the Atlantic Ocean in July 1777.  For several weeks no one was quite sure where they were going until the British landed at Head of Elk, Maryland (today Elkton).  To get there, the fleet had to sail to the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, past Norfolk Virginia, then back up through the bay, into the Elk River before finally landing.  The fleet led by Admiral Richard Howe in the HMS Eagle, skipped the traditional landing areas, moving up muddy bottomed rivers, to find a remote site as far up the waters as the ships would go.

The Eagle Has Landed

In the very early pre-dawn hours of August 25, 1777 the British Army began to disembark at Head of Elk.  In order to surprise the Americans, Howe had avoided the well-defended Delaware Bay.  He had also avoided all of the established ports in the Chesapeake that would have made the landing much easier.

Head of Elk was a tiny hamlet without a large port.  The water in the area was shallow and muddy.  The British ships of the line could not simply pull up to a port and disembark their soldiers.  The weary men, who had been stuck aboard ship for six weeks, had to climb down onto smaller boats to row ashore.  Much of the army unloaded at Turkey Point, a small ferry on the Elk River.  The process of moving more than fifteen thousand soldiers ashore, along with their equipment, was a slow and tedious process.  The Howe brothers were fortunate that the Americans did not confront them at the landing site.  Fighting a battle while disembarking could easily have become a nightmare for the British.  The ships were also vulnerable with no room to maneuver.

British Fleet offloads at Turkey Point

By the end of a long day, a large portion of the army still remained aboard ship.  While those who had landed began to settle into camps and scout out the area, many more still spent another night on the water.  Aside from the thousands of men, there were many tons of equipment, including hundreds of cannons and tens of thousands of cannon balls, not to mention food, tents, and other supplies.  Loading the ships had taken weeks.  Unloading them in days was a backbreaking process.  The British did not know when the Americans might attack and wanted to get moving as quickly as possible.

By the end of the second day, Tuesday, most of the army had unloaded, including all the horses.  More than half of the 320 horses that had been loaded onto ships in New York and died before the Maryland landing.  Poor food and conditions made survival difficult.  Many of the horses still alive would need time to recuperate. Many of the soldiers were not in much better shape.  Twenty-seven soldiers had died during the six week voyage, and many more were sick.  Even for those not bed-ridden, weeks of poor conditions below deck with meager rations meant that they needed time to recover.  It would still be several more days before all the arms and equipment, including the tents for the soldiers, would be unloaded.

To make things worse for most of the soldiers, who did not yet have their tents, a terrible rain soaked the men.  They had to scrambled to build crude shelters for themselves.  A large amount of British gunpowder was also water damaged.

The trip to Maryland from New York had required the men to remain on board for as long as a typical cross Atlantic trip from Britain usually took.  For all of that effort, the British army still faced about a fifty mile march to Philadelphia.  Three months earlier, the British army had encamped in Brunswick, New Jersey, only sixty miles northeast of Philadelphia.  When they were in New Brunswick, the Continental Army was behind them and nothing stood between the British and Philadelphia.  Now that they had moved to Maryland, Washington had time to move his army into position to defend the city.

Americans Meet the Enemy

General Washington had received word that the British were in the Chesapeake preparing to land about two days before the actual landing.  He had marched his Continental Army through Philadelphia on their way to the south in order to meet the enemy.

British route of attack (from Brandywine Battlefield)

By the evening of August 25, hours after the British had begun their debarkation, the Continentals set up camp at Wilmington Delaware, about 20 miles from the British landing point.  Rather than attacking immediately, General Washington sent out orders for Pennsylvania and Delaware militia to join the Continentals in Wilmington and prepare for an attack.  His men were tired after a two day march from their camp north of Philadelphia and needed to rest before they could engage with the enemy.  Some of his soldiers were still marching into town. Washington also did not have much good intelligence about the enemy.

That evening, Washington held a council of war with some of his top officers to decide whether they should attack the following day, or wait.  Our source for the meeting comes from a British officer who got the information from an aide of another officer who had attended the meeting, so third-hand information.  But according to that source, the French and German officers argued that they should strike right away while the British were still getting unloaded.  The American officers counseled to wait.  They needed to find out exactly what strength they were facing, continue to gather their own forces, and preferably force Howe to attack the Americans at a location of the American’s choosing.

Washington agreed to wait on any attack.  The next morning, August 26, General Washington set out personally to reconnoiter the enemy.  With him were General Greene, the Marquis de Lafayette, and a new brigadier general, George Weedon.

George Weedon

Back in Episode 131, I mentioned that congress had appointed a whole pack of new generals, including nine brigadiers in one day.  One of those new appointees was George Weedon.  Since this is the first time I’ve had cause to mention him, I’ll give him a short introduction.

George Weedon (Wikimedia)

Weedon was born in Virginia to a minor plantation owner.  He received a commission during the French and Indian war, rising to the rank of lieutenant-captain by the end of the war.  Following the war, he married, and took over his wife’s family’s tavern near Fredericksburg.  Weedon was acquainted with Washington, not only through his military service, but also because Washington was a frequent patron of his tavern.  Weedon was also the brother in law of Hugh Mercer.  The two men had married sisters.

Weedon was an outspoken patriot at his tavern.  One English traveler noted that Weedon was “very active and zealous in blowing the seeds of sedition.”  In 1774, he and Mercer formed an independent militia company of patriots.  Once the war began, Weedon took a commission as a lieutenant colonel in the Third Virginia Regiment which soon was incorporated into the Continental Army.  In the first year of the war, Weedon’s regiment remained in Virginia, defending attacks led by Royal Governor Lord Dunmore.  When the Continentals moved to New York, Weedon’s regiment joined them.

Weedon distinguished himself, participating in the crossing of the Delaware. Washington put him in command of moving the Hessian prisoners back to Pennsylvania after the battle of Trenton.  As part of Congress’ plan to greatly enlarge the Continental Army following the Princeton victory, Weedon received his commission as brigadier general.

Scouting the British

Washington’s small company reached a hill about two miles from the enemy camp, where they could view the British.  That afternoon, a terrible rain storm caused the generals to take shelter in a nearby farmhouse, where they spent the night.  Everyone agreed that it was a great risk.  If an informer word got back to the British that Washington was nearby without his army, it would have been an easy step to capture him, much like they had done to Charles Lee the previous year.  Washington’s luck held out though.  His small troop left at dawn the following morning and rode back to the American lines.  Later that day, General Howe set up command in the same house.  There is also a story that both General Howe and General Washington at one point spotted each other both on hills about one mile apart, both men carefully watching the other.

Over the next few days, both armies continued to consolidate and maneuver.  The British and Hessian scouts scoured the area for supplies and friendly locals.  General Washington continued to survey the land personally, looking for ground to set up a proper defense, as well as figure out exactly what path the British army might take.

Village of Wilmington, DE (from Soc. of Cincinnati)

Part of Washington’s problem in setting a defense was that he was not sure where the British might move.  The almost certain end goal was Philadelphia.  But Howe could move his army up the coast of the Delaware River, and rely on the support of the British Navy as it also worked its way up the river.  Another possibility was that the British could move on Lancaster, where there were large amounts of relatively unguarded stores and supplies. There were also hundreds of British and Hessian prisoners of war being held in that area.

Such a large scale raid across the farms and villages to the west of Philadelphia would have made the landing in the Chesapeake Bay much more sensible.  Otherwise, why didn’t Howe simply march across New Jersey? That would have been much faster and forced the same sort of confrontation with Washington’s Continentals.  Washington also feared a possibility that the British might try a two pronged attack, with Howe moving on Philadelphia from the south While General Henry Clinton marched a second British Army out of New York City to attack Philadelphia from New Jersey.  It was even possible that General Burgoyne might march through New York in time to join up with a final three-pronged push on Philadelphia.

British Advance

In truth, the British did not even seem sure of exactly what they would do next.  General Howe left a few regiments at Turkey Point to defend the fleet as it slowly made its way back out to the Chesapeake.  General Howe and Admiral Howe agreed that the fleet would sail back to the Delaware Bay and up the Delaware River where the army and navy would meet again at New Castle, Delaware.  But as we will see, that never happened.  British officers complained that they had no maps of the area and no intelligence about the enemy or the locals.  Since the few horses they had were too sick to ride, they had no cavalry to reconnoiter the area.  Hopes of attracting many local loyalists to assist the army quickly faded.

Despite these setbacks, the British had no choice but to move forward.  Even before the entire British Army had made it to land, the British began to explore the area around them.  Some of the first troops off the ships were Howe’s best light infantry, grenadiers, and Hessian jaegers.  The soldiers began to scout the area for miles around, looking for food and forage.  They also prepared to meet with local Tories, who they were told were common in the area.  However, they found most of the land abandoned.  Much of the area was still an unsettled wilderness.  Locals had largely abandoned the region, going into hiding.

General Howe had issued strict orders to prevent his soldiers from marauding the region.  A key part of his plan was returning the King’s peace to the region and convincing people so disposed to support the regulars in their efforts to reclaim the region.  On August 27, two days after the landing began, Howe published another one of his declarations offering pardon to any rebels who surrendered and took an oath to support the King.

Howe’s hungry soldiers were more concerned about finding food.  They did capture some abandoned farm animals, and also hunted the abundant wildlife in the region.  Some of the Hessian jaegers reported good hunting, but so much effort without rest after leaving the ships resulted in several of them dying from heatstroke.

They were also interested in plunder.  As Captain John André put it, “There was a good deal of plunder committed by the Troops, notwithstanding the strictest prohibitions.” One soldier was accused of chopping off the fingers of a local woman in order to steal her rings.  General Howe issued orders to execute any soldier found leaving camp without orders or found with plunder.

Howe’s orders to execute his own soldiers for plundering was not the only concern for British and Hessian soldiers. On August 31, one officer recorded that his men had found two regulars on the side of the road with their throats slit. Two other grenadiers were found hanged.  In each of these cases the victims were believed to have been plundering people’s homes.  None of this seemed to discourage continued attacks on whatever small villages or isolated farms that the armies could find.  One British officer in a letter home noted the pervasive and shocking level of plundering.  In his letter, he expressed concern that someday these lawless British soldiers might return home and be unleashed on the English countryside.  Of course, plundering was not one-sided, on September 4, Washington included an angry rant about his own soldiers plundering local civilians, saying there would be no mercy for any offenders who were caught.

Battle of Cooch’s Bridge

Plundering aside, Howe was eager to get his army on the move.  He had tried to send out scouts almost as soon as the first soldiers had landed, but torrential rain and the condition of his soldiers delayed any large movements for several days.  It would be more than a week before his army began to make any significant movements.

The scouts, mostly Hessians, who did venture out found a hostile welcome. Local militia fired on a Hessian advance force at Gilpin’s Bridge.  The militia destroyed the bridge and pulled back.  Militia did report capturing nearly 100 prisoners and deserters as they picked off small groups of foraging parties.  Some smaller groups were not captured, but simply ambushed and killed.

To assist with the harassment of the British, Washington put together a temporary regiment of 700 riflemen, one hundred pulled from each of the seven Continental brigades.  He put this special force under the command of General William Maxwell.  Normally, this sort of duty would have been covered by Daniel Morgan’s riflemen, but Washington had dispatched Morgan to upstate New York to assist with the defense against General Burgoyne’s northern army, still on the march at this same time.  The riflemen were supplemented by another three hundred militia to occupy Iron Hill, the high ground near Cooch’s Bridge in Delaware.  This was about six miles northeast of the Head of Elk, and about fifteen miles south of Washington's main encampment in Wilmington, Delaware.

Battle of Cooch's Bridge (from Delaware Way)

Iron Hill gave a good view of the whole region, from the Delaware River to the east, to the Head of Elk Landing where the British fleet had just landed.  It sat on the southwestern side of the Christiana Creek, where some officers had recommended that Washington make his stand.  Instead, Washington remained with the main army further back near Wilmington.  He relied on Maxwell to make the first engagement.

On September 3, Hessian jaegers approached Iron Hill.  While they were still miles away, they ran into an ambush.  Skirmishers on both sides engaged in a running battle back to the hill, where the bulk of Maxwell’s Continentals had entrenched themselves for a defense.  About 450 jaegers approached the roughly 1000 defenders.  As the two sides fired on each other, another 1300 British grenadiers and other regulars marched up to support the jaegers.

The two sides engaged in a firefight lasting most of the day, about seven hours.  There is sometimes a popular myth that the British always fought in lines and did not hide behind trees or other cover as the Americans did.  In truth both sides used both traditional and nontraditional tactics as the circumstances dictated.  Descriptions of the jaeger assault on Iron Hill have Hessian soldiers crawling on the bellies in the underbrush as they moved forward, taking shots at the enemy when the opportunity arose.

As the battle progressed, the British brought up three cannons to use against the Continentals.  The Continentals had no artillery, but were able to keep the enemy at bay with their rifles.  The Americans, however, did not carry extra ammunition, and over the course of the day simply ran out of bullets.

Later in the day, General Howe had personally joined the front lines.  He ordered the Hessians to storm the hill and drive off the Americans.  There is an account of some fierce hand to hand fighting on the hill, although the casualty rates for the day do not seem to suggest it.  The Continentals held Cooch’s Bridge until the soldiers on Iron Hill had a chance to cross.  The British then stormed the bridge, driving back the Continentals.  According to British reports, the Americans fled back toward Wilmington in poor order, abandoning their wounded.

Casualties for what later became known as either the Battle of Cooch’s Bridge or the Battle of Iron Hill are, as usual, much in dispute.  Some British accounts list only three killed and twenty wounded.  Other accounts say as many as thirty were killed and a similar number wounded.  One eyewitness says ten wagons full of wounded moved back to the main British camp.  American reports say they had about twenty killed and another twenty wounded. But British reports state that they buried 41 American bodies.

Whatever the exact numbers, the fighting at Cooch’s Bridge would be the only battle to take place in Delaware during the course of the war.  Washington braced for a British assault in Delaware on his lines near Red Clay Creek.

Instead, General Howe gave up on his plans to meet up with the British Navy at New Castle on the Delaware River.  After taking Iron Hill, Howe remained in place for several days, using the hill to reconnoiter the region.  The Americans sent skirmishers to harass British outposts over the next few days but made no attempt to retake the hill.

On September 8, before dawn, the British and Hessians packed up, marched through Newark, Delaware and continued north to Hockessin.  This was around Washington’s right flank.  At that point, the British could have chosen to assault the Americans and push them back against the Delaware River.  Howe sent a force that came within two miles of Washington’s lines, giving the impression that might be the plan.

However, Howe had no intention of attacking Washington on the ground of Washington’s choosing.  Instead, Howe turned his army northwest, moving into Pennsylvania.  By avoiding a battle, Howe could have simply marched miles to the west, and then north toward Philadelphia.  The Continentals had no real defenses along this route.

In order to avoid this, Washington had to march his soldiers west, taking up a position along the Brandywine River.  That is where the Continentals made their new plan to make a stand against the British Army.

- - -

Next Episode 158 Battle of Brandywine 

Previous Episode 156 The Siege of Fort Henry

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via Venmo, Zelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)

Click here to see my Patreon Page

You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

An alternative to Patreon is SubscribeStar.  For anyone who has problems with Patreon, you can get the same benefits by subscribing at SubscribeStar.

Click here to go to my SubscribeStar Page



Further Reading

Websites

Virtual Marching Tour of the American Revolutionary War, The Philadelphia Campaign 1777:
https://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/elk.htm

George Weedon: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/george-weedon

George Weedon: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/george-weedon

Howe Declaration Aug. 27, 1777: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/rbc/rbpe/rbpe10/rbpe109/1090320a/1090320a.pdf

Delaware in the American Revolution:
https://societyofthecincinnati.org/pdf/downloads/exhibition_Delaware.pdf

Ecelbarger, Gary "George Washington's 1777 Wilmington, Delaware, Headquarters: Insights to an Unmarked Site" Journal of the American Revolution, https://allthingsliberty.com/2020/05/george-washingtons-1777-wilmington-delaware-headquarters-insights-to-an-unmarked-site

The Battle of Cooch’s Bridge: https://revolutionarywar.us/year-1777/battle-coochs-bridge

The Battle of Cooch’s Bridge: https://www.myrevolutionarywar.com/battles/770903-coochs-bridge

Letter from George Washington to Major General John Armstrong, Sr., 25 August 1777, Founders Online, National Archives https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-11-02-0057

Letter from George Washington to John Hancock, 25 August 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-11-02-0061

Sullivan, Thomas. “Before and after the Battle of Brandy-Wine. Extracts from the Journal of Sergeant Thomas Sullivan of H.M. Forty-Ninth Regiment of Foot.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 31, no. 4, 1907, pp. 406–418. www.jstor.org/stable/20085398

Baurmeister, Carl, et al. “Letters of Major Baurmeister during the Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 59, no. 4, 1935, pp. 392–419. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20086940

W. H. Moomaw. “The Denouement of General Howe's Campaign of 1777.” The English Historical Review, vol. 79, no. 312, 1964, pp. 498–512. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/560990

Ecelbarger, Gary “Washington’s Head of Elk Reconnaissance: A New Letter (and an Old Receipt)”
Journal of the American Revolution, April 16, 2020: https://allthingsliberty.com/2020/04/washingtons-head-of-elk-reconnaissance-a-new-letter-and-and-old-receipt

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Proceedings at the unveiling of the monument at Cooch's Bridge, Historical Society of Delaware, 1902.

Hooton, Francis C.The Battle of Brandywine with its lines of battle, Wm. Stanley Ray, 1900.

Kauffman, Gerald J. and Michael R. Gallagher The British Invasion of Delaware, Aug-Sep 1777, lulu.com, 2013 (Univ. Del. website).

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965 (borrow only)

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Harris, Michael C. Brandywine: A Military History of the Battle that Lost Philadelphia but Saved America, September 11, 1777, Savis Beatie, 2014.

Kauffman, Gerald J. and Michael R. Gallagher The British Invasion of Delaware, Aug-Sep 1777, lulu.com, 2013 (book recommendation of the week).

McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign Vol. 1, Stackpole Books, 2006.

Mowday, Bruce September 11, 1777: Washington's Defeat at Brandywine Dooms Philadelphia,  White Mane, 2002.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Pioneer Press, 1980 (orig. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

ARP156 The Siege of Fort Henry

We are still working our way through August 1777 where so much has been happening.  Much of it has been in upstate New York as General Burgoyne made his way from Canada toward Albany. I’ve mentioned in earlier episodes that a big part of the British war effort was making use of their Indian allies throughout North America.

British-Native American Relations 

The relationship between the British government and North American tribes during this period is one that is often ignored or misunderstood by casual students of the Revolutionary War.  I think many have expressed a belief that the British pretty much ignored the Indians and kept separate from them most of the time.  Every so often a pompous British general would give some condescending speech to the native tribes when the British needed them to go to war, or to take more of their land, but otherwise, there was not much interaction.

Fort Henry (from Wikimedia)

This was not the case.  Like any effective empire, the British government maintained regular relations with native tribes through Indian agents.  I’ve already mentioned Sir William Johnson, who was an Iroquois agent for decades and who was important during the French and Indian War.  I also mentioned his son and nephew, John Johnson and Guy Johnson who continued his work during the Revolution and who were actively involved in supporting the Burgoyne campaign in 1777.  These are only a couple of examples of hundreds of men who worked as Indian agents for the British Empire.

Indian agents were effectively ambassadors, whose purpose was to maintain relations between the British and local tribes.  But unlike most ambassadors, who leave the home country for a few years, go to work in a foreign embassy, and then return home, Indian agents generally devoted their lives to the position.  These are men who had been adopted into tribes, often took native wives and began families whose children would also often serve as Indian agents themselves.  They lived fully within the tribes, sharing the same hardships and challenges that faced the rest of the tribe members.

This brings me to another canard.  Many people tend to think of Indians as a nomadic people who lived as savages and had minimal interactions with the European colonists, and that most of those interactions were in wartime.  This also was not the case.  There were some tribes who did move about more than others, although these tended to be further west and typically involved following regular annual patterns of migration for food gathering.  But a great many tribes lived in one place.  Many natives owned private land, built plantations, and lived much like the colonists.  Some even owned black slaves.  They often grew cash crops for sale in Britain, and had extensive interactions with the neighboring colonists.

I’m not saying the natives lived in the same integrated communities as the Europeans.  That was pretty rare.  But the groups did have pretty close relationships in most cases for purposes of trade and to prevent any disputes from getting out of hand.

In part because of the longstanding relationships of British agents with their tribes, most native groups tended to support the British.  This was not just because agents regularly provided tribes with gifts and other benefits, which they did, but also because agents convinced many tribal leaders, truthfully, that the British government was the one thing standing between these tribes and groups of colonists who wanted to push them off their lands.  Colonists had for decades been trying to push westward and settle new lands and their colonial populations grew. The main thing preventing them from doing so was policy from London that prevented western settlements that would likely result in more warfare with the natives.

Native Populations

Way back in Episode 4, I gave an overview of the native tribes that were relevant to the colonists in this era.  For a quick recap, the Algonquin speaking tribes had been pushed back into Canada in the decades before the war.  Their rivals, the Iroquois, were centered in upstate New York.  The Iroquois confederacy was made up of six tribes which had come to dominate territory as far south as North Carolina and as far west as Illinois by developing a trading relationship, first with the Dutch, then with the British, which gave them access to guns and other technology.  This allowed them to dominate their neighbors.

Gen. Burgoyne addressing Tribal Chiefs (from art com)

As I’ve discussed in recent episodes, the Revolution divided the Iroquois, with many of the larger tribes ultimately siding with the British.  Two smaller tribes backed the patriots.  This schism led to the end of the Iroquois Confederacy as a regional power.

Historically, the Iroquois claimed neutrality, but tended to favor the British and support British policy.  They took on the role of chief negotiator with the British on behalf of other tribes that they claimed to control.  Other mid-Atlantic tribes, such as the Delaware, Mingo, and Shawnee, had been forced to move west as the Iroquois ceded their lands to the colonists.  These tribes tried to keep the peace most of the time because they simply did not have the power to resist without being destroyed.  However, they were generally hostile toward the colonists who had pushed them off their native lands and always looked for an opportunity to prevent further encroachments.

Farther to the south, the Cherokee dominated the areas in the western Carolinas.  The Cherokee had risen up and attacked in early 1776 at the instigation of British agents.  The patriots had crushed the Cherokee and forced them to cede even more land and move further west, see Episode 102.

South of the Cherokee were the Creek, who had some involvement in Georgia, but largely left the fighting to the Seminole in Florida who supported the British.

As I discussed back in Episode 151, the British had tried to involve native warriors as part of what became known as the Saratoga Campaign into upstate New York. More than a thousand warriors participated directly with the British and Germans in that campaign.

But aside from those warriors, British agents also attempted to stir up other warriors that would hopefully distract the Americans and force them to deploy more soldiers elsewhere.  This would improve the chances for Burgoyne’s expedition in upstate New York.

Beginning in late 1776 and into 1777, Delaware and Mingo warriors began a series of attacks on settlers in the Ohio valley. They did not have the numbers to strike eastward at larger settlements, but frontier villages in what is today Ohio and Kentucky fell victim to a great many attacks.

One common tactic would be to attack an isolated farm or just kill a farmer out in his field.  When the local militia assembled and tried to chase down the killers, they would retreat, giving the indication that they were a small group of renegades.  They would let the militia chase them for miles until they led the militia into an ambush of a much larger group of Indians.  The warriors would then fall on the militia, which had ventured too far from the protection of their forts.

Edward Hand

To combat the native warrior threat, General Washington assigned General Edward Hand to protect the American frontier.  Hand moved his command to Fort Pitt, modern day Pittsburgh.

Edward Hand had been born in Ireland in 1744.  He attended Trinity College in Dublin where he received enough medical training to become a surgeon’s mate with the British regulars.  In 1767, his regiment sailed to Philadelphia where Ensign Hand was stationed at Fort Pitt with the British Army.

Gen. Edward Hand
(from Rockford Plantation)

In 1774, he had resigned his commission and moved to Lancaster to begin a medical practice.  A year later he got married.  Around that same time, he also took up a leading role in Pennsylvania’s patriot movement, forming a regiment of Associators.

Hand was among the first Pennsylvanians to join the Siege of Boston.  He took a commission as a lieutenant colonel in Colonel William Thompson's 1st Pennsylvania Regiment.  One of the first regiments of riflemen to join the New England Army after George Washington took command.  Hand became Colonel of the First Continental Regiment.

During the British invasion of New York in 1776, Hand commanded a group of twenty-five soldiers who held off 4000 British trying to land at Throg’s Neck, see Episode 112.  That defense was only possible because of the British leadership’s ridiculous choice of a landing site, but still an impressive feat.  Remember also Colonel Hand was second in command of a brigade defending Trenton when General Cornwallis was attempting to retake the town.  After the French General Fermoy simply turned his horse and ran way, it was Hand to took command and commanded the delaying action that prevented the British from entering Trenton until shortly before dusk.

Ohio Valley

A few months after his leadership in the Princeton Campaign, Congress promoted Hand to brigadier general and sent him to Fort Pitt in his first independent command.  Congress tasked him with handling the hostile Indian attacks all along the frontier.  Congress had planned to provide General Hand with two thousand soldiers and supplies to embark on a campaign through Indian territory and wipe out tribal villages and food stores as had been done with the Cherokee War in the western Carolinas a few months earlier (see Episode 102).

By the summer of 1777, the native violence in the Ohio Valley was not seen as pervasive enough to justify an all-out patriot attack.  At the time, only a small number of warriors were on the warpath.  An all-out assault on native lands might actually increase the level of hostility against frontier settlers.  As a result, Congress called off the campaign, but left General Hand at Fort Pitt with a smaller garrison, ready to respond as needed.

Col. Henry Hamilton
(from Wikimedia)

At the same time, British agents were doing their best to motivate local tribes in the Ohio Valley to attack the patriot settlements.  Agents visited tribal councils, handed out muskets, scalping knives, war paint, and other necessities for a campaign, and encouraged warriors to attack.  In Detroit, British Colonel Henry Hamilton, no relation to Alexander Hamilton, offered to pay for patriot scalps if warriors returned with them.  He became known among the Indians as “hair buyer.”

In some areas, native warriors took control of frontier areas, guaranteeing the safety of anyone who declared allegiance to the King.  All others were told to leave within a week or be massacred.  Many patriots fled as a result.  Much of this happened in western New York and had been expected to be applied further south in the Ohio Valley.  But after the defeat at Fort Stanwix, most of the native leaders abandoned the effort.

Even so, local tribes, the Wyandot, Shawnee, Mingo, and Delaware, did continue their attacks in the Ohio Valley.  Settlers who remained, typically remained in or near forts that provided protection against Indian raids.  One such fort was Fort Henry in what is today Wheeling, West Virginia.

Colonists had built the fort in 1774, during the violence with the natives that eventually became Lord Dunmore’s War (see Episode 44).  At the time, it was called Fort Fincastle which was one of the Royal Governor, Lord Dunmore’s titles: Viscount Fincastle.  After Independence, Patriots renamed the fort after the new Governor of Virginia, Patrick Henry.  It was a small wooden stockade meant to hold a few dozen people.  It was bounded by a river on two sides, as well as a ravine on the third side, meaning it could only be attacked from the east.

The Siege

General Hand sent out a warning in early August that there was a good chance of an Indian attack.  Most of the locals took shelter in Fort Henry, and local militia began patrolling for Indian warriors.  After several weeks of finding nothing and with harvest season upon them, many of the locals returned home

On September 1, 1777, one local man, who we only know as Mr. Boyed, and his slave rode out to tend to their horses.  They ran into an ambush near the fort, where six warriors attacked them.  Boyd was shot dead, but his slave returned to the fort.

Receiving word of the attack, Captain Samuel Mason and his company of fourteen soldiers rode out from Fort Henry to track down the small group of Indian attackers.  The company found the six warriors retreating into the fog, and pursued them.  Suddenly, the troop found itself surrounded by a much larger Indian ambush into which the smaller group had lured them.  The Indians massacred and scalped the militia, with only two of them managing to escape and run back to the fort, pursued by warriors.

Hearing the sound of gunfire, another militia captain at the fort, Captain Joseph Ogle, rode out with another company to provide support to Captain Mason’s returning company.  However, Ogle’s men ran into the same raiding party that had already massacred Mason’s company and were now turning on them.  Most of Ogle's company was killed although the captain and a few of his men were able to take cover and eventually make their way back to the fort.

The situation inside the fort was pretty desperate.  With most of the militia defenders killed in the initial ambush the fort only had twelve men to defend the fort and about eighty women and children.

The attackers were led by a Wyandot Chief named Pamoacan, and with about 200 warriors from various local tribes.  They also had with them an Indian agent.  As the warriors took up positions around the fort and waved the scalps of the garrison’s former comrades, the British agent marched up to the fort with a drummer signaling parlay.  He announced that he could guarantee the King’s protection to those inside the fort if they surrendered immediately.  Otherwise, the warriors would storm the fort and kill everyone.

The fort commander, Colonel David Shepard, refused the offer.  With that, the warriors attempted to storm the fort by battering down the main door.  They were unable to do so.  Both sides kept up a heavy rate of fire for the rest of the day and overnight.  The twelve defenders inside the fort had women reloading their guns as they shot, in order to keep up a higher rate of fire than their small numbers would ordinarily allow.

The following day, September 2, the warriors attempted to use a battering ram to knock down the front gate, but the door held.  They also tried to set fire to the forts walls, but again the defenders drove them back. Late that day, the warriors pulled back to organize for a final assault on the fort.

McCulloch’s Leap

Things looked pretty bleak for those inside the fort, but that evening, a group of militia reinforcements arrived by canoe.  Colonel Andrew Swearengen and fourteen soldiers slipped into the fort under cover of darkness, doubling the size of the garrison.  A short time later, another group of forty mounted militia rushed past the surprised warriors and into the fort.  The fort defenders opened the doors to let in the reinforcements.

However, as the Indians pursued, they had to shut the doors before the commander of the reinforcements, Major Samuel McCulloch could make it inside.  McCulloch turned his horse toward the pursuing Indians and managed to dash through their lines without being harmed.  As he rode past his attackers, he ran into another Indian raiding party which left him surrounded.

McCulloch's Leap (from Wikimedia)

Warriors surrounded McCulloch on three sides, with a cliff preventing him from escaping on the fourth.  Considering his options, McCulloch opted for the cliff.  According to contemporary stories, McCulloch spurred his horse and leaped off the cliff.  The Indians rushed up to the edge, expecting to see a dead horse and rider at the bottom.  Instead, they saw McCulloch had somehow landed safely and ridden away.  The event later became celebrated in local lore as “McCulloch’s Leap”

Now, if you are skeptical that a horse and rider could jump off a 300 foot cliff and simply ride away, you are not alone.  My suspicion is that it was a very steep hill which McCulloch was able to ride down with a combination of good horsemanship and luck.  In any event, he did survive and escape.

The Siege Ends

The warriors returned their attention to the fort.  Where they had once faced twelve defenders, they now faced more than sixty.  Although they still outnumbered the garrison by more than three to one, Indians were never good at assaulting forts, and did not want to press their luck.

Fort Pitt (from Wikimedia)

They spent the night dancing and demonstrating in front of the fort to terrify the occupants.  The next day, the warriors burned all of the outbuildings, crops, animals and anything else of value that they could not take with them.  As they did this, some of the attackers continued to fire on the fort, but did not attempt an all out assault on the walls as they had done the two previous days.  Chief Pamoacan withdrew his warriors and went in search of other targets.

Casualties of the siege are again contradictory by source, but somewhere between fifteen and twenty-five militia were killed in the attack, with another five or so wounded.  The Indians suffered at least one dead and nine wounded, although since the natives carried off their dead and wounded and did not keep good records, casualties might have been higher.

Aftermath

Following the siege, Virginia’s Governor Henry and General Hand both wanted to begin the campaign against the native villages that they had planned months earlier.  However, Congress simply could not spare the soldiers at the time.  This was in the middle of the Saratoga Campaign in New York and General Howe’s assault on Philadelphia. Those campaigns took precedence over the frontier.

The patriot offensive in revenge for Fort Henry would have to wait.  The campaign against the natives would take place the following year in 1778, but that is going to have to wait for a future episode.  For the moment, General Hand retrenched his small force at Fort Pitt, and waited for the right time to act.

Next Week: General Howe finally lands his army in Maryland and begins his advance on Philadelphia.

- - -

Next  Episode 157 British Landing & Cooch's Bridge

Previous Episode 155 Battle of Bennington

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via Venmo, Zelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)

Click here to see my Patreon Page

You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

An alternative to Patreon is SubscribeStar.  For anyone who has problems with Patreon, you can get the same benefits by subscribing at SubscribeStar.

Click here to go to my SubscribeStar Page



Further Reading

Websites

General Edward Hand: http://www.jlgh.org/Past-Issues/Volume-13-Issue-1/Gen-Edward-Hand.aspx

Stevens, Paul L. “‘To Keep the Indians of the Wabache in His Majesty's Interest’: The Indian Diplomacy of Edward Abbott, British Lieutenant Governor of Vincennes, 1776–1778.” Indiana Magazine of History, vol. 83, no. 2, 1987, pp. 141–172, www.jstor.org/stable/27791068 (free to read with registration)..

The Fort Henry Story: https://www.ohiocountylibrary.org/wheeling-history/the-fort-henry-story-by-klein-and-cooper/3699

The Story of Fort Henry: http://www.wvculture.org/history/journal_wvh/wvh1-2.html

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Callahan, James M. History of West Virginia, The American Historical Society, 1923.

De Hass, Wills History of the early settlement and Indian wars of Western Virginia, H. Hoblitzell, 1851.

Stone, William L. Border Wars of the American Revolution, Vol. 1, Harper & Brothers, 1845.
by Stone, William L. (William Leete), 1792-1844

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Calloway, Colin G. The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities, Cambridge Univ. Press,

Calloway, Colin G. The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, the First Americans, and the Birth of the Nation, Oxford Univ. Press, 2018

Graymont, Barbara The Iroquois in the American Revolution, Syracuse Univ. Press, 1972

Waller, George M. American Revolution in the West, Burnham, Inc. Publications, 1976.

Williams, Glenn F. Year of the Hangman: George Washington's Campaign Against the Iroquois, Westholme Publishing, 2005

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.