Sunday, November 29, 2020

ARP177 Republic of Vermont

In March 1778, the Vermont legislature was elected and met for the first time.  This was significant because no one, not even the other thirteen states, recognized Vermont as an independent state.

I mentioned, almost in passing, back in Episode 131, that Vermont had declared its own independence in January of 1777.  The Continental Congress, and just about everyone else outside of Vermont, ignored the declaration.

The main reason for ignoring it was that it was divisive.  The Continental Congress was doing everything it could to keep the thirteen states united.  It did not want to highlight a matter of local contention between the states.

Vermont Territory Disputed

To explain, why, perhaps a little background would be helpful.  In the colonial era, the exact territorial borders of many colonies were ill-defined and sometimes contradictory.  New York thought that its eastern border was the Connecticut river.  This was based on the original land grant to the Duke of York from the King in 1664.  

Flag of the Vermont Republic
(from Wikimedia)
New Hampshire believed that its western border went all the way to Lake Champlain, and was roughly as far west as the western border of Massachusetts.  This was based on a decree by King George II in 1740.  Therefore, the area between Lake Champlain and the Connecticut river was in dispute by both colonies.

Of course, none of this really mattered until any colonists began to settle in the territory.  In the 17th Century, the area was also claimed by France as part of Quebec.  The French established Fort Ste. Anne to help secure their claim.  The first British settlers in 1724 came from Connecticut.  

This disputed inland territory mostly remained the home of Native Americans until after the French and Indian War.  Then, at the end of that war in 1763, there were an estimated 300 colonists living in the region.  Governor Benning Wentworth of New Hampshire began selling land grants to colonists shortly after King George II’s decree of 1740.  Land speculators purchased land, but did not really settle in the area until after the French and Indian War. 

In the 1760’s, settlement really began in earnest as thousands of New England colonists moved into the area holding New Hampshire land grants that they had purchased.  This greatly concerned New York, which still believed it controlled the area and had a number of wealthy and influential land owners with New York claims to the same land.

Charter to Duke of York
In 1764, New York got a ruling from the King’s Privy Council in London that its border was, in fact, the Connecticut River and that all the disputed territory belonged to New York.  In making this claim, however, the New York officials downplayed the fact that New Hampshire had already settled much of the land.  Further, the Privy Council order gave New York jurisdiction over the territory, but did not say explicitly that private property owners holding land there as a result of New Hampshire land grants were null and void.  The Privy Council simply focused on establishing clear jurisdiction going forward.

New York took the ruling to mean that the Privy Council confirmed that they had always controlled the region and that the New Hampshire land grants were null and void.  It began selling more land to New York speculators and evicting settlers with New Hampshire grants as squatters.  In 1767, the Privy Council issued another ruling stating that it had not nullified all the New Hampshire grants and that New York could not just resell people’s farms to others.

New York continued to try to enforce its land claims and ignored those of New Hampshire.  It attempted to evict settlers and settle new communities holding New York claims. The settlers with New Hampshire grants resisted, giving rise to the Green Mountain Boys.  I discussed this in more detail back in Episode 38.

After the outbreak of war in 1775, the New Hampshire grant-holders in the disputed land tended to flock to the patriot side and seized Fort Ticonderoga under Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold. New York land claimants tended to be loyalists.  Thus the fight over the land became part of the Revolutionary war.  

Vermont Independence

The patriots, in January 1777, met in the village of Westminster to declare that the disputed territory was neither part of New Hampshire nor New York but was its own new territory known as New Connecticut.  This new territory would respect New Hampshire land grant claims, but going forward would be entirely independent of either state.  

No one paid much attention at the time since the war with Britain was the focus for everyone.  Later that same year, on June 2, delegates met again in Westminster.  They changed the name from New Connecticut to Vermont, using a derivation for the French words for “green mountain”.  They then agreed to meet again on July 4.  On that first anniversary of the US Declaration of Independence, the delegates agreed to draft a constitution, which they adopted four days later on July 8, 1777.

Thomas Young

The independence movement was a group project, with no one person to be credited as the father of Vermont.  However, I want to highlight a couple of key figures in Vermont’s birth.  One was a man who did not even live in the area.

Dr. Thomas Young was born in New York. He was the son of Irish immigrants.  He studied medicine and began a career as a physician.  In some ways he was a radical product of his era.  He was known for his deism, rejecting much of the traditional religions of the day in favor of rationalism.  He was also a longtime proponent of land justice.  One of his big issues had to do with the way elites controlled the masses through the control of land.  His Irish roots probably had a lot to do with that.  British law controlled who could or could not own land in Ireland, ensuring that the Protestant elite held economic power over their Catholic tenant farmers.

Young saw a similar pattern emerging in the disputed lands that became Vermont when the New York colonial government tried to prevent people from settling the new lands.  He was friends with Ethan Allen.  The two men even collaborated on a book about reason. In 1764, Young wrote a pamphlet called Reflections on the Disputes Between New York, New Hampshire and Col. John Henry Lydius which attacked New York’s policies on the ownership of the disputed lands.

I’m not sure if it was because of this publication, but shortly after this, Young left New York for Boston. There, he was a member of the Sons of Liberty and a leading member of the radical committee of correspondence.  He became good friends with Samuel Adams and was an early radical leader of the patriot cause.

Many believe Young was a key organizer of the Boston Tea Party.  However, like many leaders, he created an alibi for himself during the actual destruction of the tea.  At the time, he was giving a lecture at the Old South Meeting House on the bad health effects of drinking tea.  It was important for known radical leaders to have alibis during the actual destruction of the tea so that officials did not try to prosecute them for participation in that crime.

Even so, as tensions in Boston grew following the Tea Party, threats on radical leaders grew.  A few months later, in 1774, Young was attacked on the street, allegedly by British soldiers, and left for dead.   He survived, and shortly afterward, fled to Rhode Island and eventually settled in Philadelphia.

Although he only arrived in Philadelphia in 1775, Young involved himself immediately in the radical politics of the city.  He participated in the efforts that year to throw out the old colonial legislature and replace it with a new one, along with a new radical state constitution.

In April of 1777, Young wrote an open letter addressed to the inhabitants of Vermont which is generally credited with inspiring the patriot committee to change the name of their state from New Connecticut to Vermont. The letter also encouraged them to draw heavily on the radical Pennsylvania Constitution when creating their own.  He enclosed a copy of Pennsylvania’s constitution with his letter.

Vermont Constitution

The Vermont Constitution was very much caught up in the patriot ideology of the day. It was one of the most radical of its time.  Much of it was taken from the radical Pennsylvania Constitution, but in some ways it was even more radical.

It also borrowed from the Declaration of Independence, stating 

THAT all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.

The Vermont Constitution explicitly banned adult slavery.  It granted the right to vote with no property requirements.  A man who was 21 or older could vote if they lived in the state for one year and took an oath to vote according to his conscience.  It even set up a system of public schools.  It followed the unique Pennsylvania model of creating a legislature with only one house.  It also dispersed executive power to a governor and council.

Vermont Constitution
Having drafted a Constitution in July, 1777, the whole thing got tabled as attention turned to the invading British Army led by General John Burgoyne.  Then in December, the Committee finally got things back on track and announced that elections under the new constitution would take place on the first Tuesday in March, 1778.

The problem was that neither New York, New Hampshire, Britain, nor the Continental Congress recognized Vermont’s declaration of independence nor its constitution.  On January 20, 1777, less than a week  after the state declared itself independent, the President of the New York Convention warned the Continental Congress that it would not accept the dismemberment of its state.  Any attempt to recognize Vermont would result in New York leaving the Continental Congress and end New York’s support for the Congress.  New York already had a pretty sizable loyalist population.  This action could very well push New York back into the loyalist camp and have them throw their support behind the British army in Canada.

The last thing Congress wanted was to create this kind of internal dissension while they were in the middle of the war with Britain.  As a result, everyone outside of Vermont refused to recognize Vermont.  Congress dismissed the petition for recognition in June 1777 and made clear that they were not in any way in favor of a new independent state of Vermont.

Around this same time, the Vermont delegates were writing their constitution.  Also, General Burgoyne’s army was capturing Fort Ticonderoga and marching his soldiers along what Vermonters claimed was their western border.  They continued to press on with the creation of their new government despite the imminent military threat from invading armies.

While combating the British, the other states simply ignored the new Vermont government.  New Hampshire General John Stark formed his militia army and marched through Vermont to fight the Battle of Bennington on the authority of the New Hampshire legislature.  Many in Vermont joined in this fight, but not under any color of the Vermont legislature.  Whatever claims politicians were making in Westminster were largely ignored as the war swept through the land.

Even so, Vermont continued its efforts to establish self-government.  Based on the 1777 Constitution, the people held elections and seated their first legislature in March 1778.  They elected Thomas Chittenden as their first governor.

Thomas Chittenden

Thomas Chittenden was born in Salisbury Connecticut.  He lived most of his life there, serving as a justice of the peace, a member of the colonial assembly, and a colonel in the colonial militia. He moved to what would become Vermont in 1774, at the age of 44.  By this time, his children had already grown to adulthood.  Even so, Chittenden purchased his property from the owner of a New Hampshire land grant and moved to start a new life in Vermont with his adult children.  

He and a friend purchased a large tract of land to be settled by their families.  They moved to the wilderness area along the Onion River (today called the Winooski River) where they set about building a house and clearing the land. Chittenden established himself as a community leader.

Thomas Chittenden
When the war began, Chittenden traveled to Philadelphia to see what Congress would do about protecting them from attack.  Congress basically told him he was on his own.  Chittenden was forced to abandon his farm and move his family south where they would be less vulnerable to attack.  Chittenden became President of the Bennington Committee of Safety, organizing for the patriot cause.

In September 1776, Chittenden met with other leaders at Dorset to discuss the idea of Vermont independence.  This led to the January 1777 declaration and the June 1777 constitution.  Chittenden, as the leading political advocate, became the state’s first governor in March 1778.  Chittenden would prove highly popular and would be reelected to consecutive one-year terms for more than a decade. After a short break, he would also serve as Governor for a few more years after Vermont joined the Union.

Ira Allen

I also can’t complete an episode on the founding of Vermont without at least mentioning Ira Allen, sometimes called the founder of Vermont.  Ira Allen was the younger brother of Ethan Allen.  He joined his brother in the New Hampshire Grants in 1770 and fought with the Green Mountain Boys.  He participated in the attack on Fort Ticonderoga in 1775 and at the siege of Quebec.

Ira Allen
After the British took back Canada in the spring of 1776, Allen returned to his home and got more directly involved in the Vermont independence movement.  He attended the conventions and became an ally of Thomas Chittenden, strongly opposing any further political affiliation with New York.  He served as secretary of the Committee of Safety, which served as the de facto government until the implementation of the constitution.

Allen became one of the leading advocates for Vermont independence. When, in May 1776, the Continental Congress advocated for states to form their own governments because the royal governments had failed to protect the interests of the people, Allen used that same logic to argue that New York had failed to protect the interests of the people of the Grants.  Therefore, they were entitled to set up a new government that would protect those interests.  Although Congress never intended for Vermont to set up its own government, Allen effectively used Congress’ resolutions to convince his neighbors that Congress would be supportive of this effort at self-government.  It helped to convince people to support the movement.  Of course the fact that New York’s new constitution reaffirmed its land claims in Vermont and the application of quitrents on those living there also affirmed the desire of many to declare independence from New York.

With Burgoyne’s invasion, Allen worked to coordinate defenses, mostly with New Hampshire and General Stark.  He did what he could do to assist with men and supplies, even though his position was given no formal recognition by other state leaders.  Following the first state election in 1778, Allen served as state treasurer.  The state got most of its revenue by seizing the property of loyalists and selling it at auction.

Allen would continue to serve Vermont in a variety of ways in the following years, efforts that will have to be the topic of future episodes.

New Hampshire Secession

Vermont officials fighting for their recognition as an independent republic would go on for years.  It was not just New York that opposed this.  In the summer of 1778, sixteen towns on the eastern side of the Connecticut River in New Hampshire voted to secede from New Hampshire and join the Republic of Vermont.  

The argument the towns used was that the Continental Congress’ Declaration of Independence, removing British rule reverted everything to a state of nature.  It was, therefore, the right of the people to choose their own government and form their own allegiances.  They were not bound to New Hampshire based of some border drawn by the Privy Council in London.  They could choose to be a part of whatever government they wanted.

This caused the Governor of New Hampshire to go apoplectic and write a letter to Vermont Governor Chittenden, demanding he disavow this action.  Chittenden discussed the matter in council and sent Ethan Allen to Philadelphia to gauge the opinion of the patriot leadership.  Allen returned to say that if Vermont provoked a fight with New Hampshire by trying claim lands east of the Connecticut River, that the other states would likely band together to annihilate the new Vermont Republic instead of just ignoring it.  

After several more months of debate, Vermont eventually decided to reject the request of the towns on the east bank of the Connecticut to join them. It formally accepted that the Connecticut river was the state’s eastern border and that it would make no claims on other lands outside of that area.  Those towns who voted to join Vermont would remain part of New Hampshire.

None of this ended claims from New York, New Hampshire, and even Massachusetts that Vermont was part of their states.  But it did return to the tense standoff where Vermont was able to govern itself and everyone else simply refused to recognize it.

So the Republic of Vermont was born and began governing itself, mostly based on its ability to defend itself from its neighbors and everyone’s unwillingness to have this political fight in the middle of a war with Britain.  The controversy over Vermont’s existence as an independent state would continue for many years.  Vermont would never seat a delegation at the Continental Congress or the Constitutional Convention.  It would only be several years after the adoption of the US Constitution that Vermont would finally receive recognition as an independent state.  But that would be well into the future

Next week, we’ll return occupied Philadelphia, where the British raids into southern New Jersey lead to the Hancock Bridge Massacre.

- - -

Next Episode 178 Hancock's Bridge Massacre 

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Further Reading


Raymond, Allen "Benning Wentworth's Claims in the New Hampshire-New York Border Controversy" Proceedings of the Vermont Historical Society, Winter, 1975:

The Vermont Republic:

Hendricks, Nathaniel The Experiment in Vermont Constitutional Government:

Henry, Bruce. “Dr. Thomas Young and the Boston Committee of Correspondence.” Huntington Library Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 2, 1976, pp. 219–221. JSTOR,

Constitution of Vermont - 1777:

Steward, Matthew “The Original Tea Partier Was an Atheist” Politico Magazine, Sept. 1, 2014

Letter of Thomas Young to the Inhabitants of Vermont, April 11, 1777:

Maier, Pauline. “Reason and Revolution: The Radicalism of Dr. Thomas Young.” American Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, 1976, pp. 229–249. JSTOR,

Graffagnino, J. Kevin. “‘The Country My Soul Delighted in’: The Onion River Land Company and the Vermont Frontier.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 65, no. 1, 1992, pp. 24–60. JSTOR,

Aichele, Gary J. “Making the Vermont Constitution: 1777-1824” Vermont Historical Society, 1988:

Free eBooks
(from unless noted)

Chipman, Daniel A Memoir of Thomas Chittenden, the First Governor of Vermont, Middlebury: Self-Published, 1849. 

Collins, Edward Day A History of Vermont, Boston, Ginn & Co. 1903.

Edes, Henry “Memoir of Dr. Thomas Young 1731-1777” Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Vol. XI: 

Wilbur, La Fayette Early history of Vermont, Jericho, Vt.: Roscoe Printing House, 1899

Books Worth Buying
(links to unless otherwise noted)*

Van De Water, Frederic F. The Reluctant Republic Vermont, 1724-1791, Literary Licensing,  2012.

Wilbur, James B. Ira Allen, Founder of Vermont, 1751 - 1814, Houghton Mifflin, 1928

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, November 22, 2020

ARP176 Sinking the Randolph

I’ve been neglecting the navy for some time now.  My last episode on the topic was Episode 137, when Lambert Wickes raided ships around the British isles.

Off the North American coast, the British Navy continued to dominate the seas without serious challenge until the French Navy arrived. After its first raid on the Bahamas in early 1776, the Continental Navy accomplished little more than raiding unprotected merchant vessels carrying goods to the British Army, or going after the occasional smaller navy ship when an opportunity presented itself.  Much of the fleet was bottled up in Rhode Island, trapped there by the British fleet.

Esek Hopkins Goes Home

You may recall from back in Episode 84, that Commodore Esek Hopkins headed the Continental Navy.  His fleet was trapped in Narragansett Bay for many months by the British fleet.  Hopkins had come under heavy criticism for his failure to leave the bay before the British arrived and for his refusal to attempt an engagement with the British.

The Randolph

Congress had never really liked Hopkins.  They had censored him in 1776 for his failure to obey the instructions they had given him to attack the British Navy.  Instead, he had sailed off to the Bahamas.  Never mind that their orders would have been suicide.  Congress censored the Commodore, but then allowed him to continue his command.

By early 1777, many were calling for Hopkins removal.  In February, several of his officers referred charges against Hopkins to the Continental Congress.  Some of the charges seem rather silly.  They included swearing and speaking ill of Congress’ Maritime Committee.  I know it’s hard to imagine a sailor who swears.  Even during the Revolutionary War era, it was quite common and did not ordinarily result in formal charges against a top ranking officer.  Similarly, many other officers made derogatory remarks about Congress and the Marine Committee, so that did not seem outlandish either.  But Congress did take them seriously and pursued them.

Other charges were more serious, such as the abuse of prisoners of war.  Although under scrutiny, the complaints did not note a departure from the way other ship commanders treated prisoners who were unwilling to serve aboard ship.  The other major complaint was his failure to recruit enough sailors for the fleet.

It was a fact that the navy did not have enough recruits.  The biggest problem was that the states had granted letters of marque to thousands of privateer ships.  Any competent sailor would earn far more on a privateer vessel and would not be subject to as severe discipline.  So the navy was simply unable to compete for recruits.  In short, Congress wanted a miracle worker, and Hopkins wasn’t performing any miracles.

In response to the charges against him, Hopkins arrested one of the officers who had brought charges to Congress’ attention.  Lieutenant Richard Marvin faced a court martial as a result of the charges he sent to Congress.  In April, the Court found Marvin guilty and dishonorably discharged him from service.

Hopkins did not know it by that time, but Congress had already suspended his service.  In March, the Continental Congress, still in Philadelphia, held hearings on the charges against Hopkins without informing him.  On March 26, Congress suspended Hopkins from service.  It took several weeks for the Commodore to learn of Congress’ decision.

Esek Hopkins had received his command largely due to the support of his brother Stephen Hopkins, who was a delegate to the Continental Congress.  Stephen left Congress in September 1776, shortly after Congress had censured Esek for his failure to follow Congress’ instructions on his first mission.  Stephen’s resignation was purportedly for health reasons. He was suffering from trembling hands, what was, at the time, called a palsy.  It’s not clear if the actions against his brother had anything to do with his resignation.

His departure left Esek without a friend in Congress.  After Congress suspended him in March 1777, one would expect that he would have traveled to Philadelphia to confront these charges personally.  We don’t know exactly why, but Esek opted not to do so.  Very likely the reason was that he did not think he would get a fair hearing before Congress.  On January 2, 1778 Congress formally dismissed Hopkins from service, without ever granting him a hearing in person or even requesting his presence to discuss the charges.

Hopkins responded by bringing a libel suit against his accusers for defamation.  The defamation trial took place later in 1778 with a jury verdict for the defendants.  Hopkins was ordered to pay costs.  Even so, Hopkins still retained a local popularity.  He was elected to the Rhode Island legislature, where he served on the State’s War Committee.

Congress did not bother to name a new Commander of the Continental Navy.  Instead, it issued orders directly to ship captains, or gave them a fair amount of discretion to go do whatever they could.

John Adams Goes to France

By the time of Hopkins’ removal from office in January 1778, John Adams was long gone from Congress.  He had taken his leave in early November 1777 to return home to Massachusetts.  Congressional service was grueling and did not even pay enough to cover his personal expenses while serving.  After two and a half years of service, Adams had had enough.  He returned home and resumed the private practice of law.  

Before he left, his colleagues suggested that they might need him to serve in France.  Silas Deane was being recalled. Benjamin Franklin was old and could possibly fall ill.  Nobody really trusted Arthur Lee.  Adams’ fellow delegates believed they needed him in Paris.  Adams though demurred.  He did not speak French and was one of the least diplomatic delegates already.  Serving as an ambassador to France would not play to his strengths.

After returning home though, Adams received notice that Congress had appointed him anyway.  He could have refused.  Thomas Jefferson had refused the same appointment a year earlier.  But Adams believed his services were important to the cause. Besides, his return home was hurting his public reputation.  Rumors began to spread that he had been forced to leave Congress.  Failure to accept this position might hurt his public reputation further.

John Quincy Adams

In February 1778, Adams boarded the Navy ship Boston captained by Samuel Tucker.  Adams opted to leave his wife Abigail and his young children on the farm in Massachusetts.  Congress would not pay for his family’s expenses, only his.  Adams also thought the journey would be too difficult and dangerous.  Besides, he needed Abigail to continue running the family farm.  Instead, he took only his oldest son, ten year old John Quincy Adams, who would serve as his aide.

Also aboard the ship were two other young men.  William Vernon, Jr. a recent college graduate and the son of a member of the Maritime Committee.  Vernon was headed to France to start a career in international trade.  Joining them aboard ship was Jesse Deane, the eleven year old son of Silas Deane, the man that Adams was to replace.  Adams was responsible for the three of them during the voyage.

The Boston was a substantial ship for the Continental Navy.  It had thirty guns, although Adams thought it had too many guns for the size of the ship.  Adams was never shy about expressing his opinions to anyone.  He peppered Captain Tucker with suggestions about ship discipline, cleanliness, organization, and host of other things.  Since Adams was a VIP, Tucker had to do his best to accommodate and comply with Adams’ many suggestions.  

Adams, who had never been at sea before, also got rather seasick for much of the journey.  The ship did have to outrun a few British warships during the crossing.  Tucker debated fighting them.  However, his priority was to get Adams safely to France.  Therefore he avoided any combat.  

Following this trip, Captain Tucker would command the Boston for several more years, capturing numerous prizes and doing battle with the British Navy.  His avoidance of a fight on this trip was due to his duty, not any desire to avoid combat.  When the Boston got closer to the French coast, it came across a British privateer, the Martha, with fourteen guns.  With Adams’ permission the Boston captured the ship and took it as a prize.

A few hours later, the Boston chased down another merchant ship, although it turned out to French.  Before they realized that, the Boston fired a warning shot which resulted in the cannon exploding.  Adams had to help carry an injured lieutenant below deck for surgery, and held him down while the surgeon amputated the young officer’s leg.  Despite their efforts, the man died a week later.

As they approached the French coast, the Boston came within range of two large British men of war.  Everyone feared capture, but the ships did not attack.  Instead, they simply sailed on past them in the other direction.  A few days later, a local French pilot informed the men that France and Britain had gone to war only four days earlier.  By the last week of March, Adams was safely ashore in France.

The French public welcomed Adams and his party enthusiastically.  War had just begun and everyone was still caught up in the thrill of fighting for American liberty.  Adams and his party were toasted and feted wherever they went.  The thing that irked him most was that everyone kept confusing him with his cousin Samuel Adams.

Adams made his way by coach to Paris in a mere four days.  There, he met up with the rest of the American Commissioners and immediately got caught up in all the internal dissension between Lee, Franklin, Deane, and Izard.  That will be the topic of a future episode.   For now, it was enough that John Adams arrived in France, made his introductions to the Compte de Vergennes at Versailles, and embarked on his new career as a diplomat.

Nicholas Biddle

Aside from the navy ships trapped in New England, and those shuttling VIPs like Adams, a few ships were actually trying to engage the British.  One such ship was the Randolph, captained by Nicholas Biddle.  He was the son of a wealthy and prominent merchant family in Philadelphia.  At age thirteen, Biddle took a position aboard a merchant vessel headed for the West Indies.  Seven years later, in 1770, he took a commission in the Royal Navy as a midshipman.  After three years, he resigned his commission to participate in the Arctic expedition to the North Pole, along with Skeffington Lutwidge, a British Navy officer I mentioned back in Episode 145, and another junior officer by the name of Horatio Nelson.

Capt. Nicholas Biddle

When the war began in 1775, Biddle offered his services to Pennsylvania, and took command of a small row galley on the Delaware River named the Franklin.  In December, he received one of the first commissions as captain in the new Continental Navy.  He commanded the fourteen gun Andrew Doria, which was part of the fleet that Commodore Hopkins took to the Bahamas.

Biddle was one of the captains who criticized Hopkins’ command on that mission.  His criticism of the Commodore’s competence led, in part, to Congress’ censure of Hopkins later that year.  While Hopkins then got trapped in Narragansett Bay, Biddle remained at sea.  He sailed as far north as Newfoundland in search of British shipping.  His mission was so successful, that he returned with a skeleton crew of only five sailors.  The rest had been deployed as prize crews on all the ships he had captured.

The Randolph

Upon his successful return to Philadelphia, Congress rewarded the young captain with the command of the newly-completed Randolph. The ship was named after Peyton Randolph, who served as President of the First Continental Congress, and for a few months on the Second Continental Congress.  Although he had taken some sick leave, he had returned and then dropped dead while still serving in Congress in Philadelphia in October 1775.

The Randolph was a 32 gun frigate with a crew of over 300.  It was one of America’s larger ships, but still nothing that could compete with British ships of the line.  In October 1776 Captain Nicolas Biddle took command of the Randolph.  By that time, the twenty-six year old Biddle had already spent half of his life at sea.

Biddle received his appointment in July 1776, a week after Congress declared independence.  However, he did not take command until mid-October.  His first obstacle was assembling the crew for such a large warship.  As I said, most sailors were serving aboard privateers and had no interest in joining the navy.  In order to fill the ship’s crew, Biddle had to take British sailors being held as prisoners in Philadelphia.  These were not volunteers. The soldiers assigned to escort the new sailors to their ship had to fire their guns into the prison windows in order to force the reluctant recruits out of the prison and aboard ship.

On its maiden voyage the Randolph escorted a merchant fleet out of Delaware Bay, with ships headed for France and the West Indies.  Having gotten the ships to sea, the Randolph sailed north in search of a British frigate that had been capturing New England merchant ships.

While at sea, the new ship faced a number of construction problems.  During a storm at sea, the ship’s foremast broke off.  As the crew attempted a repair, lightning struck the mainmast, causing it to splinter and fall into the ocean.

On top of everything else, a fever broke out among the crew, killing some and leaving many more unfit for duty.  Around this time, the British sailors who had become part of the crew, attempted to mutiny and take control of the ship. Biddle and his officers were able to restore control and arrest the ringleaders.

The Randolph made it to Charleston, South Carolina on March 11, 1777 where she put in for repairs. It took two months to complete the repairs, during which time the ship lost a large portion of its crew to desertion and disease. Biddle had to offer bounties to attract more crew members before they could finally leave port on August 16.  As they left the harbor, the Randolph boarded the Fair American and took off two crewmembers who had previously deserted the Randolph for work aboard the merchant ship.

In early September, the Randolph spotted a twenty gun loyalist privateer called the True Briton.  That ship was traveling with four other ships that it had already captured.  The group was on its way to New York with rum, sugar, salt and other supplies for the British army.  Instead, Biddle delivered the ships to Charleston.

After that successful mission, the Randolph remained in Charleston for most of the winter, putting itself in dry dock to have its hull scraped for barnacles.

In February, 1778, the Randolph formed a convoy with four smaller South Carolina navy ships, the General Moultrie, Notre Dame, Fair American, and Polly.  This fleet would attempt to confront British warships that were preventing merchants from leaving harbor.  The group escorted a fleet of ships leaving Charleston Harbor, but failed to find the British.  After the merchant ships went on their way, the fleet continued its search for the British Navy.

They did come across a damaged New England ship that a British privateer was bringing to the British port at St. Augustine.  Biddle burned the ship since they could not bring it to port and did not want to let it fall into enemy hands.  For two more weeks, the fleet sailed around finding nothing.  On March 4, they captured a small schooner from New York that was headed to Granada.  Biddle turned it into a tender ship for the fleet.

Battle with the Yarmouth

A few days later on March 7, spotted another ship on the horizon. By the time the ship caught up to them that evening, they discovered it was a British ship of the line.  The Yarmouth with sixty-four guns, twice as many as the Randolph.  Its guns were also much larger, meaning they had greater range and could do more damage.  The experienced captain, Nicholas Vincent, would go on to become an admiral.

The Yarmouth and Randolph
Captain Biddle ordered his other ships to flee while he engaged.  He raised his ships colors and immediately opened fire on the Yarmouth.  By at least one account, the Randolph managed to get four broadsides into the Yarmouth while the British could return only one.  One of the ships that had been in the convoy with the Randolph, the eighteen gun General Moultrie also remained to attack the Yarmouth.  Unfortunately, the less experienced crew ended up hitting the Randolph, apparently wounding Captain Biddle in the leg.  Biddle remained in command, issuing orders from a deck chair.

Despite this setback, the smaller Randolph seemed to be getting the better of the fight, knocking out one of the Yarmouth’s masts and damaging her sails.  Then, about fifteen minutes into the fight, the Randolph suddenly exploded, presumably her munitions magazine was either hit or someone set it off.

The deafening explosion completely destroyed the ship and its crew.  The Yarmouth was close enough that it suffered some damage from the explosion, and reported chunks of the Randolph as large as six feet long crashing onto the deck.  A British officer also reported that the Randolph’s ensign was flung onto their ship from the explosion.

The Yarmouth set out after the smaller ships, but was too badly damaged to give chase.  The British had suffered five killed and twelve wounded.  Five days after the battle, the Yarmouth came across some wreckage, and took aboard four survivors.  As it turned, out these men were survivors of the Randolph explosion.  The men had survived on rainwater only for several days until rescued.  Out of a crew of over three hundred, those four would be the only survivors.

Next week, we return to America to cover the Republic of Vermont.

- - -

Next Episode 177 The Republic of Vermont 

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Further Reading


Esek Hopkins:

The Randolph:

The Yarmouth:

Action off Barbados:

Clark, William Bell, and Nicholas Biddle. “The Letters of Captain Nicholas Biddle.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 74, no. 3, 1950, pp. 348–405. JSTOR,

Free eBooks
(from unless noted)

Adams, Charles Francis Adams and John Quincy Adams The Life of John Adams, Vol. 1, J.B. Lippincott and Co. 1871.

Allen, Gardner Weld A Naval History of the American Revolution, Vol.I, Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Co. 1913.

Clark, William Bell; Morgan, William James; Crawford, Michael J. (eds) Naval documents of the American Revolution, Vol. 8, Washington: Dept. of the Navy, 1964.

Field, Edward Esek Hopkins, commander-in-chief of the continental navy during the American Revolution, 1775 to 1778, Providence : Preston & Rounds Co. 1898

James, William A full and correct account of the chief naval occurrences of the late war between Great Britain and the United States of America, London: T. Egerton, 1817

Maclay, Edgar S. A History of the United States Navy, from 1775 to 1898, New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1898.

Books Worth Buying
(links to unless otherwise noted)*

Clark, William Bell Captain Dauntless: The Story of Nicholas Biddle of the Continental Navy, Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1949 (book recommendation of the week).

McGrath, Tim Give Me a Fast Ship: The Continental Navy and America's Revolution at Sea, NAL Caliber, 2014. 

Smith, Paige John Adams, Vol. 1, Doubleday & Co. 1966.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Thursday, November 19, 2020

AR-SP04 Michael C. Harris - Germantown

Michael J. Troy: Michael, welcome to the American Revolution podcast. We're happy to have you.

Michael C. Harris: Well, thank you for having me.

MJT: So why specifically Germantown? What prompted you to write a book about the Battle of Germantown? 

MCH: For those who don't know, I wrote a book on Brandywine previously. And I had worked at Brandywine for the state of Pennsylvania. And when I started working there, I was discouraged that there weren't good research files. There really wasn't a good history on the battle as a starting point as for somebody who's working there. And so that project started as a process to correct that problem and to dispel the many myths that I found surrounding Brandywine. 

It never was an intention to continue that story into a second book. But as I was promoting the first book, there was a lot of interest for people that came to hear me in Revolutionary War history written on the common soldiers level, at the tactical level, that wasn't just generalities about political and social issues. But that dove into deeper military issues. It’s just not that common American Revolutionary history. So I kind of decided to think through the research files  and start working on what's in a sense of second volume to Brandywine, covering more the Philadelphia campaign. 

MJT: Yeah, that's what I really like. You take both of your books together: your book on Brandywine and your book on Germantown. It's a pretty thorough coverage of the Philadelphia campaign, generally.  It doesn't just go over those two battles as isolated incidents. It's part of the continuum from New York to the Chesapeake to Philadelphia for the British. 

Michael C. Harris
So let's start at the beginning of the campaign. Why do you think general Howe took forever to start the campaign that year? He really didn't even leave New York until mid July, and then didn't get down to the Chesapeake and actually land his troops until the end of August. Typically, a military campaign would start in the spring. Why didn't he do that? 

MCH: Well, they do, in a sense, start in the spring.  There is some minor maneuvering in northern New Jersey. And it was the battles of trading Princeton, Washington went in the winter quarters up in northern New Jersey, in that mountainous area around Morristown. 

Washington had to rebuild his army. The army that fought in 1776 had one-year enlistments. They were expiring, actually during the Trenton and Princeton operations.  The army was bleeding troops throughout that whole operation. So they're really starting over almost from scratch, creating new regiments and new brigades and new divisions. Many of the guys that are recruited in ‘77 had not even fought the previous year. So they're starting from scratch. 

And so Washington kind of held up in those mountains, because he was protected there. And Howe does initially maneuver up around the Raritan river, where New Brunswick, New Jersey is today trying to get Washington out of the mountains and draw him into an open fight. And there are some minor skirmishing.  There a minor engagement of a place called Short Hills in June of 1777. But all that's really minor, and he really doesn't get Washington out of the mountains. 

The other thing though, the other reason he's going to wait, is he's actually waiting for word that John Burgoyne, who's leading an army out of Canada, a British army out of Canada, had reached Fort Ticonderoga.  He kind of wanted to make sure that they at least got that far before he takes the majority of the army in New York and leaves. And so there's a combination of things. He tries to march overland and that doesn't work. And he's also waiting for word from going. And that's really when he starts loading the ships to go south. 

And then, there's kind of a second part to that, you know, why do they go to the Chesapeake, the fleet leaves New York Harbor in mid-July, they actually enter Delaware Bay down around Cape May, at the end of July, around July 31. And they could have come up the Delaware River and landed in Wilmington, or just south of Chester come to me, and we choose not to do that. 

It gets a little complicated, in the weeds here. Howe had said before he left New York, he told the government that he would only come up with our river, if Washington's army had yet to cross the Delaware River like they were still in New Jersey. And when it gets to the Delaware Bay, there was a naval Captain named Andew Hammond, who was in command of blockading squadron for the British fleet in the Delaware. And he reports to Howe, and his brother Richard who commands the fleet, the Howe brothers, that Washington is across the river, which was an incorrect report.  Washington was not across the river. They had gotten to the river just above New Jersey, but they had not crossed yet. So it was a false report. 

Andrew Snape Hammond
(from Wikimedia)

And so based on that false report, Howe up. I'm not going up here then and they go back out to sea. They're going to spend another month at sea to get around the Delmarva Peninsula, before landing in the northern Chesapeake where the Elk River empties into the Chesapeake, a place called Turkey Point, just outside Elkton, Maryland today. And that's August 25. So they spent almost another month at sea, and they land roughly twenty miles west of where they could’ve landed a month previously. 

It's a stunning decision. And it's a decision that really dooms Burgoyne. Because, the moment that they go back out to sea, there's no possibility of anybody returning to assist Burgoyne and down the road, you're gonna have this battle Saratoga and Burgoyne’s going to surrender an army.

MJT I think a lot of people question that decision both then and now. Why didn't he land in Delaware Bay and just march up from there? When he went out to sea and he had to sail all the way down to Virginia and back up the Chesapeake, that cost him weeks where his men were getting sick and dying aboard ship.  He lost half of his horses aboard ship. It just didn't make any sense to anyone. I never understood it.

MCH: He's going to resign at the end of this campaign. And he has to testify before Parliament. And the official reason he gives the Parliament is that he went to attack the supply depots in the backcountry before getting Philadelphia. Well, the problem with that argument before Parliament is that the moment they land, every decision he makes is about reconnecting with the fleet on the Delaware River. Because the British have a constant supply issue throughout the war. An inland army can never venture far from a navigable river because they need the supply ships to supply the army.

MJT: That’s what happened to Burgoyne.

MCH: Yeah, that’s exactly what happened to Burgoyne.  And so the moment they land, every decision he makes through northeastern Maryland, northern Delaware, southeastern Pennsylvania is how to reconnect with the fleet. He never goes after the backcountry, never. Washington's afraid he will and makes his own decisions based on that fear. But Howe, I don't think I've ever had an intention of really going back there. 

Johnny Burgoyne
So then the question begs why did he do it? And, you know, I could speculate The problem is Howe’s personal papers are gone. His wife burns them after he dies. And all we have is his official reports and his testimony before Parliament, and his true feelings aren't going to be revealed in those official documents. 

I mean, I speculate that he's mad at Burgoyne.  Burgoyne had gone home during the winter previously, and basically proposed the plan of campaign for 1777, where he was going to lead that army south, and Howe was supposed to lead an army North and they were supposed to meet in Albany. 

And the fact that Burgoyne basically went behind Howe’s back and got approval for that plan without Howe’s input. I can't prove it, but I think it rankled him.  And I think he didn't care what happened to Burgoyne. Again, I can't prove that. 

MJT: No, but that theory does make sense. I mean, Burgoyne ticked off a lot of people, including General Guy Carlton and General Clinton by basically going back to London saying these guys are all grannies and cowards who aren't willing to push ahead. And I could do it. So put me in charge, even though I'm a junior general to them. 

MCH: Exactly, So I mean, again, I think that plays into it. And he had to have an official reason for abandoning Burgoyne. I think he makes up the backcountry story. I think he needed a reason in hindsight for why everything went down. 

Because by the time he resigns, Burgoyne’s already surrendered.  He officially sends in his resignation letter like late October. I think it's post-Saratoga. It’s definitely after Germantown.  But he technically stays in command until the following spring when he takes a ship home. But he submitted his resignation before several of the operations around the forts and the Whitemarsh operation. 

MJT: I think Howe was never happy with the amount of troops he had. Even when they were giving him record amounts in ‘76, he wasn't completely happy. And it sounded like he really wanted to resign because they just they wouldn't give him the troops to complete the job. 

Let's assume for a minute that Howe wasn't deliberately trying to tank the British success in America. He could have let it in southern Delaware and gone from there. One reason I think was he wanted to avoid being attacked while he was landing his troops, which makes sense. 

William Howe
MCH: The problem with that theory is well, okay, he was given the impression that Washington's across the river. That doesn't mean Washington is in Delaware. You know, even if Washington was across, he would have been basically up around where New Hope is today. He wasn't even in Philadelphia yet. In my opinion, even if Hammond’s report was accurate, let's assume that argument for a moment, Howe could have landed in Wilmington, or a place called Reedy Island, just south of Chester, Pennsylvania, within a day or two of entering the Delaware Bay, and there was nothing Washington could do about it. 

MJT: Right. 

MCH: So Howe made bad decisions. If he really wanted to win the war, he was making bad decisions.

MJT: Yeah. But that also brings up the idea that, since, he did give Washington all that additional time by sailing around to the Chesapeake. Washington probably could have hit him once he realized where he was landing like, why didn't Washington want to be that aggressive

MCH: I don't think he was ready. Remember, the army's being rebuilt. And he's also short one of his divisions. When the army moves south, they actually left John Sullivan’s division in northern New Jersey, in case Howe came back that way, basically to keep an eye on things up there. And they don’t rejoin the army until, I want to say it's either late August or early September, while they're in northern Delaware. So, at that point, but the point I'm making is when Howe actually lands, Sullivan’s not back with the army yet. 

The other issue is the day Howe lands, Washington is still north of Philadelphia. He had camped for a long while while along the Neshaminy Creek on the north side of Philadelphia. And he doesn't actually march through the city and start moving into the Delaware into northern Delaware until seeing the appraiser landed. So he wasn't even a position to even think about attacking the day that they landed. 

MJT The British get a few days or a couple of weeks before they start marching. Washington is in Wilmington, Delaware, and Howe moves up, they have a small skirmish, at Cooch’s bridge, which Delaware people are always excited about because that's their one battle, and then moves a little bit west and of course, goes up the Brandywine Creek and that's where we have the first major battle of this campaign. What do you think each side did right or wrong at Brandywine? 

MCH: Okay, so let's start with a British. The British did almost everything right, with the possible exception of the tail end of the battle without pursuing defeated Americans. That's the one thing you do wrong. Because they don't really pursue Washington's retreat marking for the next morning. By then it's too late. But other than that, they effectively use locals for intelligence. They knew the road network. They executed their game plan almost to perfection. 

Basically, it's a repeat of the same plan that they used on Long Island at the battle Brooklyn Heights, Battle of Long Island, depending on how you want to refer to that.  It's the seventh time he executed a flanking maneuver against Washington successfully. Every time Washington doesn't figure it out. So I mean, ultimately, they did everything right, except the very end, they don't really pursue and you could argue that they retired.  Darkness was setting in.  They didn’t have enough cavalry with the army to effectively pursue them. You can make all those arguments. But that's one thing I would argue that they did wrong. 

The Americans, on the other hand, from a leadership standpoint, let's talk about the common soldiers in a second, did everything wrong. They do not use locals effectively to learn the road network and the actual costs and points that were available to the British Army. They don't even use senior officers in the army to learn the road network. They don't use senior officers that live in the area to go out and scout when they start to get reports that there's a flanking maneuver. They use people from other parts of the country that do not know the roads or the farms in the area. I would argue that Washington’s decision making the entire day are poor. I don't think he makes one right decision the entire day. 

That said, I think the common soldiers in the army do not get enough credit in that battle. Because, despite the mistakes that all the senior leadership make throughout the day, it ain’t their fault they lose. In fact, of the three divisions that rushed to the north to try to confront the flanking maneuver, two of those three divisions actually fight well.  If they weren't so outnumbered, I don't know if the British push them off that hill. So you know, despite that this is pre-Valley Forge and it's a fairly new army and they are growing and learning. I don't think a comment soldiers do that poorly at Brandywine. I don't think you get enough credit, but their senior leadership failed them in a battle. 

MJT:I guess one decision Washington did make right that day was the decision to get out of there in time before the army was captured. After that, Howe sat in Brandywine for, I think over a week

MCH: five days 

MJT Five days, okay. Was that because his army was still exhausted from the voyage and for marching up from the Chesapeake? 

MCH: No, there's several times throughout the campaign where they're going to stop for four, five, or six days. The main reason is, not that they're tired, they kind of dealt with that while they were still down in northeastern Maryland, and Delaware. The real issue is they have a shortage of supplies. So the fresh food ran out on the voyage. Their salted beef and hard bread were rotted and moldy by the time they landed. And then the other factor, which you mentioned earlier, is their livestock, the vast majority of it die on the wage. 

Brandywine Battlefield
So they have a shortage of draught animals for moving wagons and artillery, etc. to the point where they’re  going to spend multiple times through the campaign, stopped so they can raid the countryside for supplies and horses. They do right after they land, they do it in northern Delaware, right before the battle of Cooch’s bridge. They do it again, at Brandywine.  They're going to do it for the Battle of the Clouds.  They do it multiple times. So they can send out these foraging  parties and gather hopefully what they need. 

The other reason that specifically the Brandywine, that they're going to stop, Howe needs to create a reconnection with the fleet. So while they're stopped, he's going to send a detachment, the first of many he's going to make over the next few weeks, to seize Wilmington and garrison Wilmington, for a connection point when a fleet comes back around from Chesapeake Bay.  So that's another reason they're going to be stalled and they need to evacuate the wounded. I mean there’s a lot of reasons. They ship their wounded to Wilmington, with that detachment, you get them off the battlefield. So there's multiple factors but the main one is its a supply issue.

MJT: So after Brandywine, while the British are foraging and doing what they're doing, taking Wilmington, Washington retreats all the way back across the Schuylkill River to Philadelphia, sees that British aren’t pursuing him, and then finds his way back, wanders back toward the army again, leading to the Battle of the Clouds. Do you want to talk about that a little bit? 

MCH: Yeah, Let's start with the maneuvering first and why.  First of all, he had to get out of there. The reason they fight Brandywine is it was a natural defensive barrier between the British Army in Philadelphia. 

I know for those of you that may live in the area, it's hard to imagine the Brandywine defensive barrier today. But back then the Brandywine was deep. I mean, just to give you a sense, the fords where you could walk across, were chest-deep. So it was a barrier to an army. So once they lose that fight, the only other natural defensive barrier between the British and Philadelphia now is the Schuylkill River.  Because in the 18th century, Philadelphia sat on a peninsula and formed by the Schuylkill and the Delaware River.  It’s not like today where it was on both sides of the Schuylkill River.  Compared to today it was a fairly small city, you know, on that narrow peninsula. 

And so Washington now knew he had to get into position and he had to rest and regroup.  But he also had to get a position to block the crossings of the Schuylkill River. So the very complicated maneuvering he does over those five days that the British stay at Brandywine is the night. The morning after the battle, he retreats up through upper Darby, crosses Schuylkill River roughly where 30th Street Station is today, and marches out Ridge Pike and camps in the Germantown area, actually, the day after the battle.  They’re going to spend a couple days there regrouping, resupplying, shipping off their wounded, etc.  Then they start to maneuver back into that blocking position. 

So off the top of my head, I think it's the 13th, it might be the 14. I don’t have it right in front of me. But they start to move out of Germantown. They cross at Levering’s Ford which is where Manayunk is today, and then they start maneuvering out roughly what was the Lancaster road and 18th century but it's roughly US 30, route 30, heading west. And so by the morning or by the evening of September 15, just four days after Brandywine, they have maneuvered into the area known as the Great Valley, roughly where Immaculata College is today.  And they are in that valley. And that valley is formed by something called the South Valley hills and the North Valley hills. And so the morning of the 16th. Washington's plan is, he wants to maneuver the army up onto the South Valley hills to block access to the road junctions in the great valley that leaves to the Schuylkill River Ford. That was the point of getting into that position. 

What he doesn't know is that in the morning on the 16th, William Howe has now decided to get moving again. And his army is going to come up two different roads, well ultimately three different roads, to converge on that south valley hill from the south. And neither army really realizes this is happening, but they're using the same road to get up onto the hill. And it's an unexpected engagement, they kind of run into each other. 

And you have this clash. It becomes known as a battle the clouds really, because this massive rainstorm breaks out, ruining ammunition on both sides. And so there is some minor skirmishing but it never develops into a full-scale battle that it could have, because all the ammunition gets ruined in this windswept rain, into these guys’ cartridge boxes. And that's why it's known as the battle of the  clouds. 

And it's really two separate agents on two different roads separated by a mile, mile and a half.  It's not like a rolling stand up engagement like you would think of as like at a Brandywine or a Germantown. The two very isolated little skirmishes that never develop into a full scale gave up because of that rainstorm. 

MJT: It could have been a very serious battle. But…

MCH: Yeah, it could have, yeah.

MJT: After that Washington, I guess, thinks better of his advance and pulls back across the Schuylkill river again. But he does leave an attachment behind, which ends up in the British rear near Paoli. Want to talk about what happened there.

MCH: Because of the ammunition situation, the night of the Battle of the Clouds, the army initially retreats to Yellow House, which was a tavern it'll later be a hospital facility during a Valley Forge campaign.  Today it’s known as Chester Springs or not yellow house, Yellow Springs, I'm sorry, Yellow Springs. Today it’s known as Chester Springs. I actually think it's not until they get there, that they realize how bad the ammunition situation is.  And so it's going to force him to retreat even farther west.  All the way out to Warwick Furnace and Reading Furnace, all the way out in northwestern Chester County to get access to their supply depots and a new supply of ammunition. 

When they make the decision to go that far west Anthony Wayne’s division is ordered to remain behind and keep an eye on British Army. And they're ultimately going to camp actually outside of the modern town of Malvern. It's known as the battle of Paoli because of Paoli tavern, but it’s not actually in the town of Paoli today. 

Battle at Paoli
So they're left behind and while Wayne is sort of hanging out behind the British Army, Washington regroups to get that resupply, and then he maneuvers back across the Schuylkill River. They cross at Parker's Ford, which is where, again if you are familiar with the Philadelphia area, it's where Linfield Road crosses towards Limerick if you're coming from the south side of the Schuylkill, there’s a bridge there today.  And then he moves into a blocking position stretched from roughly modern day Royer’s Ford all the way out to modern day Norristown. The army’s kind of spread out watching all these fords again, almost like what happened at Brandywine. They're spread out watching multiple fords. 

And the plan was, Washington's thought process was, that as the British were attempting to cross the river, Wayne was going to strike their rear. That's why he was waiting back there. The problem is the British intercept the messages between Washington and Wayne.  The British, know the plan. The other problem is the loyalists in Chester County inform Howe of exactly, or not exactly, roughly where Wayne was camped. And so Howe wants to cross the river but, he doesn't want Wayne in his rear while he's doing it. 

So on the night of September 20-21, he orders a detachment to go assault Wayne's camp. And what’s sort of a myth about the battle is that these guys were caught in their beds and stabbed and burned to death and all that other stuff. And some of these things do happen. But they're not caught in their beds. That's a myth. 

Wayne actually does get a report that the British are coming for him in the middle of the night. And he actually gets his division in line to march out of there. The problem was he wanted his supply wagons and artillery to lead the column, instead of being at the back, and one of those artillery pieces, overturns and blocks the way out through the fences. And so the infantry is all lined up in a column to march when the British hit them. 

And so in some ways, it's not totally I mean, Wayne was trying to get out of there. And so these British come swarming out of the woods and they catch these guys in the marching column and not a line of battle.  It becomes vicious. I mean, there is some violence and there is some massacres, where guys are stabbed dozens of times.  The British were just playing with them in  a weird sort of way. And so Wayne does extricate his division, but he gets chewed up and chopped up, and it becomes known as this Paoli massacre and Battlefield. 

MJT: So with Wayne's army out of the way, at least as far as the British are concerned, at this point, they do go ahead and cross the Schuylkill. And it seems like this time Washington is trying to learn from his lessons because when they move up river to try to flank around him again, he follows them, but then they kind of come back and zip across the river from where he was in the first place. 

MCH: I my opinion, it’s funny I’ve been talking to another historian lately about this, Washington overreacts. He was lined up in a perfect position. And on the 23rd I think it September 23, the British send a column west down what’s today Route 23 towards Phoenixville, because they knew of a factory down there making gun locks for the American army. And he wanted to destroy that facility. And Washington scouts, and the militia report back, that they’re moving west, but it was just a detachment.

Washington, I think, panics because Brandywine is still very fresh in his mind. And he knows that there's fords farther west, he's really not keeping an eye on and I think he overreacts.  He pulls his guys away from the fords around Norristown and modern day Oakes to shift west, thinking the British are heading that way. And of course, it's really not what Howe’s intent was. But because they opened up all those lower fords, Howe’s able to cross. I think it's the night of the 23rd into the 24th. They cross at Fatlands Ford, which is roughly behind where the chapel is in Valley Forge Park is today, and basically marching into Norristown, camp for a day before occupying Germantown. 

MJT: Howe ends up taking a few more days before he actually takes Philadelphia proper.  It’s hard to imagine for people who know Philadelphia today, but Philadelphia, at the time, was really went from about South Street, to Race Street and maybe out to about seventh or eighth Street. That was really Philadelphia at the time. 

MCH: Yeah, it wasn't very big. Basically, you pretty much nailed that, you got the dimensions about right there. 

MJT: Usually you think you cross the Schuylkill River, as you said before, you think you're in Philadelphia, which you would be today.  But back then, you were still miles away from the city. And Germantown, of course is part of Philadelphia today as well, was well outside of town in 1777. So General Howe finally enters Philadelphia on September 26, takes possession of the city, but he leaves the majority of the army in Germantown, correct?

MCH: It starts to get complicated. So they move into Germantown on September 25. And then he starts creating detachments. So he had already sent troops to Wilmington. We talked about that earlier. The next chunk of troops that are going to be detached are the occupying force for Philadelphia.  

Now, Howe does not go with them. Charles Cornwallis is going to lead that column. And it's a significant chunk of the troops. It's several elite regiments, grenadiers are going to go and a lot of the artillery is going to go to officially occupy Philadelphia.  And then on October, either September 30 or October 1. He's going to send two more regiments from Germantown, the 10th and the 42nd of foot to Chester, because he wants those two regiments to be ferried across the river by the fleet, which has now returned to the Delaware, to attack a fortification called Billingsport in southern New Jersey, which is near modern-day Paulsboro because Howe needs to start eliminating the obstacles to the fleet, and their ability to get to Philadelphia.  Because there's obstructions in the river. And there were three fortifications keeping the fleet from moving up the river. And so that was like step one, to opening up the river to the fleet. 

And so Washington spies are doing a very good job of informing him of all these detachments from the army at Germantown. So that the troops that are left in Germantown, at this point, or that army that's left there, is a shadow of the army that fought at Brandywine, because of all these detachments from that force. 

Washington, in the meanwhile, has actually, if nothing else, has replaced his losses from Brandywine and the other engagements we've talked about.  Because a brigade of Connecticut troops that were not at Brandywine have now joined the army, and New Jersey and Maryland militia, have now joined the army that we're not at Brandywine. And so I actually think the army that was assembled prior to Germantown is fairly equal in size to the force he had at Brandywine.

The problem is, how many of them are able bodied? How many of them actually make the march into Germantown? That's what's debatable. I don't think the entirety of those 15,000 troops make the attack. I think a lot of them are sick. I also know from the records that they left a significant detachment to watch the camp equipment, as camp guards from where they left from. So the traditional number of about 11,000, they make the attack, probably isn't that far off. But on paper, they were probably close to equal what they were at Brandywine. And so they significantly outnumber that British force at Germantown. Washington knew that. And he takes a gamble.  He's going to attack.

MJT: Washington comes up with what's been later criticized as a hopelessly complicated attack plan with multiple columns. And this was not unusual for Washington, he tried to do the same thing at the back of Trenton and on other occasions. Why was he so intent on trying these really complex plans with an army that was not particularly skilled or experienced, and how to work out for him? 

MCH: That's a good question. And I mean, I don't know 100% why he did it. But let's start with how it turns out.  Despite what later historians will claim, you know, I've obviously done a lot of research on it. It's not true. I mean, those five columns, well at least four of the five, yes, they are going to use five different roads. That's true. But despite what most histories say, from what I could find in the records, all of those columns got to where they were supposed to in the middle of the night, over roads, they were unfamiliar with, roughly within 10 to 15 minutes of each other, which is admirable 18th century when you don’t have radios and GPS, and you're doing it in the middle the night. So the plan actually worked, and he actually crushed two thirds of the British  troops that were there before things turned sour.  And I’m sure we’re goin to talk about that in a second. Things, they worked. 

Now why does he do it? Why does he make a complicated plan? Well think about 18th century roads, that maybe are a cart width or a wagon width wide, they're not like modern roads, they're not paved, it's dark, it's the middle of the night. Getting 11,000 troops from your camp, to where you want to attack and be able to deploy them in a manner where they can all attack at once -  You can't use one road to do that, and surprise the British Army. 

You're going to have to use multiple roads to be able to deploy that force in such a way that they can assault at roughly the same moment.  Yes, it's complicated, but I think there was a necessity to do that. 

MJT: The other question I guess I had was, Why Germantown? Why did he attack there? Was he hoping to distract the British from their plans to clear the Delaware River? Did he really hope to retake Philadelphia? 

MCH: At this point, I don't think it has to do with the river.  That's going to come later. And I think it's a bit far fetched to think he was gonna retake Philadelphia in one fell swoop. But I think he was under an incredible amount of pressure, politically, to get a win. 

There are at least, off the top of my head, three or four councils of war, from the moment they recross the Schuylkill. So after the Battle of the Clouds, once they're across the Schuylkill, they're going to over that roughly, two week period, there's at least three or four councils of war where Washington proposes to his senior officers to attack and he keeps getting voted down. So he's looking for an opportunity, probably from about September 22-23 on. 

It's not until they get those Connecticut reinforcements that he gives a majority of the division commanders to say, Okay, let's give this a try. And that takes place on October 2, I think it is, while they're camped on the Methacton Hills northwest of Germantown.   That's when he devises the plan, and then they leave the night of the third to attack the morning of the fourth. So he's basically waiting for the Okay, the support of his commanders.  But I think if he could have gotten there, okay, earlier, he would have done it earlier. 

Now, what's the ultimate goal? That was part of the question, right? I think the ultimate goal was to destroy the force at Germantown. I don't think all, in that same day they could have gotten Philadelphia too. But if they could have destroyed the force of Germantown, and forced them to retreat into Philadelphia, remember Philadelphia sits on a peninsula. If they could have blocked the land approaches to the city and maintained the river forts from the British, so the fleet couldn’t resupply and reinforce that army, he could have starved them out of the city and forced their surrender. I think that's a long term goal. But we'll never know because he doesn't win that battle. But he will continue to try to maintain those forts, and try to starve them out of the city. 

MJT: So the columns hit Germantown. It's a cloudy, foggy, dew-ridden morning. sightlines are pretty limited. It seems like the British intentions are pretty much taken by surprise. What goes wrong?

MCH: Well, I mean, things were going right. There was a reserve division that was not initially engaged, of New Jersey, North Carolina troops. And the plan was, after the initial success, to rotate out the units that started the fight, replace them with these fresh troops. And to keep the attack going.  Allow the troops that started the fight to get resupplied with ammunition, and then ultimately, they would be able to rejoin the fight over time. 


And what goes wrong is that senior leadership gets completely wrapped up with this issue at a house called Cliveden, the country retreat of Benjamin Chew. And what goes down is, during the initial successes, as they’re routing and pushing back British units, a couple companies of the 40th of foot led by Colonel Thomas Musgrave are getting swept up in this attack, and they run into the house for protection. 

While they're in the process of blocking the windows and doors and stuff, and getting ready to defend the house, the Americans keep going.  They push past it, I don't think initially realize they even had guys in that house, because they push well beyond that house, into the center of Germantown, very close to where the market square in Germantown is. 

And it's not until Timothy Pickering, the Army's Adjutant General, is ordered to ride forward and tell the advanced units to slow down the rate of fire because of the ammunition issues. He delivers that order and on his ride back up Germantown Avenue.  He gets shot at from the house. And he's like, whoa. And so about what’s today now, I guess it's like two blocks north of the house. There's a house. the Billmeyer House, which stood at the time.  But at the time, it was all open ground from the Billmeyer House to Cliveden. And so even with the fog and things, the senior leadership gathered outside this Billmeyer House to discuss what to do and because that was the house closest to Cliveden, because it was all open up between those two buildings at the time. 

Pickering comes back and he rides back to this argument going on. And really arguments developed between Henry Knox, the Army's chief of artillery and Pickering, the Army's Adjutant General, there's other officers there too. But I get the sense they’re the two arguing the most.

Knox claims, you can't leave what he calls a castle in our rear. We must deal with that before continuing the fight. And Pickering’s argument is this battling ain’t over.  Let's not worry about that, because we need to deal with what's in our front, because this is far from decided. And there's a huge debate. And ultimately, Washington is going to side with Knox.  I’m not clear why.  Knox is not a trained military man. He basically got his position from the fact that he had pulled a bunch of cannons from Fort Ticonderoga and brought them to Boston. And by that sheer thing he's made brigadier general, chief of 

artillery, you know, he's not anybody with great knowledge or expertise when it comes to military matters

MJT: Right, he was a bookstore owner before the war.

MCH: Yes,  

If for whatever reason, Washington has put a lot of trust in him.  We can debate what really went down at that argument. But that's the decision that's made. And there's gonna be multiple ways that they attempt to draw those British troops out of that house. They first send an officer with a white flag to summon the surrender.  He gets shot, mortally wounded.  He's going to die. They then try to pound the house with artillery. Well, the light field guns that were with the American army were never going to be able to cave in the walls of that house. If you've never been there, it’s very thick sandstone walls.  

Americans storm the Chew House
(from Fandom)

They then deploy that reserve division that was meant to continue the attack forward, to confront the house, the North Carolinians, the New Jerseyans.  And I actually think if they ended up just one or two of those regiments to keep an eye on things, they could have still sent the rest of that division forward.  They don't do that. I also argue in the book, I don't think there was actually an order to assault the house. I think Matthias Ogden and Elias Dayton kind of do that on their own. I don't think there was an actual order to do it. But you know, we did debate that another time too. But the first and third New Jersey regiments are going to attack up the lane to Cliveden to try to take over the house, and they basically start getting picked off in the yard the house. They did not gain entry to the house, and that fails in a bloody mess in the front yard of the house. 

The next thing they try to do is they're going to try to burn them out. And they move a wagon with hay loaded on it up to the side of this stone house, now mind you.  They try to burn them out and that will fail. And more senior staff officers are mortally wounded. John Laurens is going to take a round in the shoulder trying light that hay on fire. John Lauren's father, of course, will very soon be the president of Congress, Henry Laurens. So all their efforts are going to fail. 

And what's really important here is while all this is happening, the troops that had advanced deep into Germantown to start to hear all the shooting to their rear. And a combination of factors are going to happen. They are starting to run out of ammunition.  They hear shooting in their rear. There's fog. They don't really know what's happening behind them, and units start to peel off and start to move back in the opposite direction. You start to get friendly fire incidents when this happens. And it allows the British to regroup and reinforce the areas of the line that had been collapsed. 

And so, as all these units start to draw up towards the fight at Cliveden, the British counter attack.  And they're going to retake all the ground they lost and drive the Americans out of Germantown. It really all hinges on those decisions made to attack Cliveden or deal with Cliveden. 

MJT: That obviously was a major source of confusion that day.  There was a great deal of confusion in other parts of the field as well. I know General Adam Stephen’s troops ended up firing on other American troops in the midst of the fog.  After the battle. Stephen is accused of drunkenness and malperformance of duty and all sorts of things and ends up getting kicked out of the army essentially. Do you think that was fair? I mean, it seems like there was a lot of problems on that day and he was not the only one. 

MCH: That's a great question. Let's do some background here. He is accused of drunkenness. But when you read the court martial documents, he's not found guilty of drunkenness. That's a hard thing to prove in an army of drinkers. But he's actually convicted of conduct .. I don’t actually remember the exact language.

MJT It was “conduct unlike an officer.”

MCH: Actually it's because he's not with his troops. There's at least three documented incidences during the course of the battle where he's giving orders to men that aren’t under his man, creating a great deal of confusion. I think the most egregious of those is during the retreat, Anthony Wayne assembles a rearguard in Whitemarsh, where St. Thomas Church is today, at the intersection of Bethlehem Pike and Route 73, up in the Whitemarsh area.  They assemble a rearguard there because of the British pursuit.  Wayne scratches together a force and Stevens just rides up and orders them away. That's one of three documented ones where he's getting orders, he shouldn’t be giving. So ultimately, the real true reason he's thrown out of the army is for conduct unbecoming, basically. 

Adam Stephen

Now why right? That's the big mystery question.  Is what he did any worse than what others did? There's four major court martials in the aftermath of Germantown. John Sullivan is court martialed for Brandywine and exonerated. William Maxwell is court martialed for Brandywine and the Battle of the Clouds, accused of drunkenness, and exonerated. Anthony Wayne is court martialed for Paoli and exonerated. Steven is the only one that gets thrown out of the army. 

So why, right? My guess is, I can't prove it. They needed to find a spot for Lafayette. Congress made him a two star general. Now he gets wounded at Brandywine while not actually in command of anybody. He's getting ready to come back to the army and they’ve got to find a spot for him.  Politically, they have to find a spot for him. And I actually make an argument in the appendix of the new book where I do the court martial, I think it has a lot to do with that. Stephen is a two star general. 

Now those other guys that got court martialed, only John Sullivan was a two star general. And Sullivan, I mean, there was no proof against Sullivan. There's no way they could have done that to Sullivan. Stephen, they could make an argument that he was causing issues, and it would shockingly create a spot for Lafayette.  And when Lafayette returns, that's the division he gets. He ends up commanding Virginians.

MJT:  I've always felt like Washington never really liked Stephen from the beginning. They knew each other back to the beginning of the French and Indian War. They got along, but they were very different personalities. 

MCH: Yeah, true. 

MJT: Washington was very prim and proper, elite, chain of command, formality.  Stephen was really the opposite of that. And I think also, Steven almost screwed up the raid on Trenton by sending soldiers to hit the British right before the surprise attack. So I think Washington felt Stephen had several strikes against him already, which set him up for being a fall guy when he failed again at Germantown. 

MCH: Sure. I mean, yes, all that's true, but was he doing anything any worse than anybody else? He's only one of two general officers thrown out of the army the whole War. The only other one being Charles Lee in the aftermath of Monmouth, which you could argue his actions were far worse than what Stephen did. We could do a whole discussion just on that. 

MJT: You’re right. But I think we could agree that, if they were looking for somebody to put where ... to put Lafayette, Stephen was the weakest link. 

MCH: Yeah. 

MJT: So in the attack on Germantown, Washington used militia for the far left and far right flanks of his attack. They did not do so well. Was that a good idea? 

MCH: Yes, they don’t do well.  It's not their fault that Americans lose that fight. The Pennsylvania militia is the far right of the attack, basically attacking down Ridge Road through Manayunk, supposed to cross at the mouth of the Wissahickon Creek and that Wissahickon Gorge, and assault the left flank of the British camp.  That was what they were supposed to do.

British at Germantown 

If you’ve ever gone - I'm going to depend them a little bit here. If you ever go into the Germantown area and visit Wissahickon park, and walk those trails where this all happened. That’s a gorge.  If you ever drove up Kelly drive along the Wissahickon, it's a gorge.  It's not easy terrain to attack across, and they're up against Hessian jaegers, which are an elite force. 

I'm not saying they did exactly what they were supposed to do. But the task assigned to them was not an easy one. They do get to where they're supposed to.  They do engage the jaegers, but don't make much of an effort to cross the bridge that was there across the Wissahickon and really occupy the left flank of the first force, but prevent them from sending reinforcements to the center of the line. They do not do that. So of all the units, I would argue that at Germantown, they perform the worst. They do get to where they’re supposed to. They do engage.  But they don't really push the issue. 

Now I actually disagree with other histories of the battle, the Maryland and New Jersey militia, which are on the far left - most histories of the battle make it sound like they don't even get there, or they don't fight. I don't agree with that. There's enough circumstantial evidence. And there's enough evidence in the casualty reports, and in pension records, and in British accounts, that they engaged somebody over there. And it wasn't Greene's column. 

I actually argue, in a new book, that the Maryland and Jersey militia do engage with the Queen's Rangers and elements of the British were Brigadier Guards. Now. They don't push them back. They don't really find a lot of success, but they are engaged. They do suffer casualties, which tells me they got to where they're supposed to. But again, they're not the reason that they lose the battle either. They actually do keep troops from reinforcing James Grant’s British division, which got crushed by Nathaniel Greene attack. I mean, that division was utterly crushed and driven into Market Square in Germantown. And the fact that the Maryland and Jersey militia were occupying some elements of the British force, those years couldn't come in and save Grant’s division. So I kind of don't agree with most other histories of the battle, except when it comes to the Pennsylvania militia. 

MJT: The British do effectively counter-attack and the Continentals are forced to withdraw.  Washington ends up setting up a new camp for defense at Whitemarsh, which is fairly close to Germantown. It's only a few miles away. It looked like he was gearing up for another fight. Do you think at that point, the Continental Army was really a condition for another battle?

MCH: How I do I want to answer that? no. Let's keep it simple. There's going to be a long stretch from about mid-October to mid-November, where really the focus of the campaign becomes the river forts: Fort Mifflin and Fort Mercer. 

Whitemarsh (from Wikimedia)

For the good good chunk of that time period. Yes, Washington is encamped roughly in the Whitemarsh area.  For some of that he's a little bit farther north. But for most of that he's in the Whitemarsh area. It's not until really after Fort Mifflin is forced to be abandoned. And then, as a result, Fort Mercer is abandoned, that the ground that Washington is on becomes a factor. It's pretty good ground. In fact I was out there yesterday, starting to work on a new project. Looking at the ground, it's significant terrain, it's not easily assaulted by an attacking force. 

But there's a lot going on there. The army that had fought under him at Brandywine and Germantown is regrouping. But this is now post-Saratoga. So the army that captures Burgoyne is slowly coming down and joining the main army, Washington's army. The bulk of Saratoga force will also be at Valley Forge. So there's a lot of new units being amalgamated into the force that had served throughout the rest of the campaign. So there’s a lot going on at Whitemarsh. Like they're reconstructing the army. They're regrouping.  They also need to decide where their winter quarters are going to be. At this point. I'm not convinced Washington thought there would be another fight, but they need to decide where to camp for the winter. 

It's Howe who decides he wants to try to get another fight in. It's Howe that’s going to lead a column out on December 6 and 7th to try to draw Washington into another fight. I don't think Washington is seeking a fight at that point. He's forced In one.  It turns into a relatively minor engagement over two days, over the sixth and seventh. It's mostly militia that's involved, with the exception of Daniel Morgan's riflemen.  The main army, the Continental line up on what’s today called Militia Hill and Camp Hill, they're not engaged. It's really just the militia and Daniel Morgan’s riflemen. And that's really the last, well I shouldn’t say that, there's going to be another  engagement. That's the last stage of involving the main armies. 

MJT: That’s the last intentional engagement.  They run into each other at Matson’s Ford.  I just thought it was provocative that Washington picked a position so close to the British that point that he was almost inviting attack. 

MCH: Well, keep in mind, he's still trying to starve them out. So the closer he is to Philadelphia, the less ground the British have to forage from. 

MJT: And as you say, to his credit, he picked really good defensive ground. So, If they did actually try to hit him there. They could have had another Bunker Hill on their hands. 

MCH: It’s significant ground. I was walking it quite a bit yesterday with another historian. It would not have been a good position for the British to attack. Let me just put it that way. 

MJT: So after the British come out, they have an almost battle at Whitemarsh, they do go into winter quarters at Valley Forge and that pretty much ends the fighting for the season. How does Germantown fit into the larger story of the war? I mean, how important was it to the course of the war? 

MCH: Stunningly I was kind of shocked by this when I was doing my research and trying to summarize the importance in the epilogue.  There are documents in Franklin's papers, and John Adams’ papers, even in French governmental papers.  It's almost like Germantown gets as much credit as Saratoga for the French Alliance, which is kind of stunning when you think about it, because it’s a loss. 

However, think about it this way. It was the first time Washington took the main Continental Army and attacked the main British Army. The only other time he attacked prior to that was Trenton and Princeton. And that was against detachments. That wasn't against the whole British Army. So I actually think it had more significance that, yes, they had captured an army at Saratoga, but the fact that Washington was willing to do that. I think it said a lot in those negotiations over in Paris. 

MJT: I think the French, were not so concerned about the Americans winning as much as they were concerned about them not losing. In other words, they wanted the war to go on and on and on and distract the British for a long time. And Washington's decision to attack Germantown after losing Brandywine and losing possession of Philadelphia, told the French that they weren't going say, “Oh, we lost our capital. We give up”. They're just going to keep hitting the British and hitting them again and hitting them again.  Win or lose that fight is going to go on. And that's exactly what the French wanted to hear.

MCH: Yeah, I would agree with that.

MJT: You did a lot of great research on Germantown on your book. And quite frankly, I did not find a good book on Germantown, unfortunately, when I was writing my episode on Germantown, which came out about a month before your book was released. So obviously, you didn't have a lot of great, great books to rely on when you were writing yours, either. Where did you find most of your research? Or where did you find a lot of inspiration for this work? 

MCH: Well, luckily, when I was working on Brandywine, I was sort of smart enough that when I did stumble on something, I copied, like I would just copy somebody's letter about Brandywine. I was copying everything. So I had put together pretty good files after Brandywine, or during Brandywine. And then I could augment it as I was pursuing Germantown. 

In some ways it's easier now because so much stuff is digitized and online. So in some ways it's easier now than it was 10-15 years ago. But in another way, Revolutionary War research is so hard because it's scattered. There's Hessian documents in Germany, and it's in German.  There's French documents in France, and it's in French.  The British stuff is not all in one place. A lot of these officers were lords or became lords later in life, or were the children of lords. And their papers are scattered castles and manor houses all over Great Britain. And so it's not all centralized. It's the same here, depending on what repository of family donated papers to, you go on between the New York Historical Society, the Massachusetts Historical Society, the Library of Congress, to the William Clements library at the University of Michigan, you know, it's scattered. Yeah. So, it involves some travel.  It involves long hours in smelly repositories. Yep. Because it's not easy. It's scattered.

MJT: So are you working on anything new these days?

MCH: I'm in the very early stages. I mean, Germantown just came out. Yeah. And I'm mentally taking a break. Although I told you yesterday, I was traipsing some ground with another historian, who is working on his own project, but our stuff is overlapping a little bit. And so we decided to get together a couple times now. 

But ultimately, once you read Germantown, or what you've read Germantown, you realize he doesn't finish the story.  It basically ends right in the aftermath of Germantown. I originally intended to take that story up to October 20, which is the day the British withdrew that camp from Germantown. My original goal was to end there and the editing didn’t like that. So the last chapter was changed significantly. And then they were right. So, there needs to be a third volume, at least a third volume, that covers the fight for the two forts, Mercer and Mifflin, the engagement at Whitemarsh, and all the maneuvering that takes place to get them to Valley Forge. So ultimately, there's going to be a third book. just I haven't really, truly started yet. Just sort of in the preliminary stages here. 

MJT: Yeah, you’re entitled to some time off after finishing Germantown. 

MCH: So, probably around Christmas time when I’m on winter break, I'll start digging in. Really, I’ve got to start with Fort Mercer because I really have the first chapter written because it was originally going to be the last chapter of Germantown. So I really got to start diving in on my Fort Mercer research. That's where it’s going to start. 

MJT: Alright, well Michael,. I really appreciate you taking the time to speak with me today. Your book, again is:  Germantown, A Military History of the Battle for Philadelphia, October 4 1777, which just came out, what, last month? 

MCH: Yeah, like the middle of September it got released 

MJT: Mid-September? Okay, yeah, it's really good. I love it. It really fills a hole in a lot of writing that I've seen on the war. So I heartily recommend it.

MCH: Well, thank you for having me. It was fun.

- - -

Books by Michael C. Harris:

Germantown a Military History of the Battle for Philadelphia, October 4th, 1777. Savas Beatie, 2020.

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