Our May 2026 American Revolution Round Table was joined by four special guests:
Alex Robb, Washington Crossing Historic Park, PA
Mark Sirak, Washington Crossing State Park, NJ
Mark Turdo, Old Barracks Museum, NJ
Will Krakower, Princeton Battlefield State Park, NJ
Each of them shared their preparations for the 250th anniversaries taking place later this year. Each of their sites have seen major upgrades that will make the anniversary celebrations more memorable, and will also add permanent improvements to the historical sites.
You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber. This is an option making monthly pledges. Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.
Imagine walking through a major city and seeing crowds of people seething in anger to the point where they were guillotining or burning in effigy, the Chief Justice of the United States. This happened in many towns and cities across America in the summer of 1795. The focus of their wrath was Chief Justice John Jay. This was not over any Supreme Court decision. Instead, it was over a treaty that Jay had negotiated with Britain to prevent another war between the two countries. This would become known as the Jay Treaty - perhaps the most hated treaty in all of American history.
To understand the reasons for this level of hatred, we need to understand why the US needed the treaty, and why it was so controversial. As we’ve discussed over the last few episodes, pretty much all of Europe was at war with France in the early 1790s following the French Revolution.
The US, still struggling under debts from the Revolutionary War, was in no mood to get involved in a new war. President Washington desperately tried to maintain US neutrality. That would prevent the necessity to spend money on a wartime army and navy, while still trying to maintain the trade necessary to fund the government through tariffs. It was with this concern that Washington sent John Jay to Britain to negotiate a treaty.
Need for Negotiations
The friction between Britain and the US never really ended after the Revolutionary War. Many in Britain thought that the 1783 peace treaty was just a temporary measure so that they could stop fighting in America and focus on the war with France and Spain. Over time, these British leaders believed that the former colonies would find themselves in trouble without a large power to protect them, and would want to return to the British Empire. As a result, these advocates wanted to keep the new United States in as miserable of a condition as possible, until they made the decision to return.
The British had never given up their outposts in the Northwest territory. These outposts continued to supply the Native American population with guns and encouraged them to resist encroachment from the American settlers. Britain had also barred American ships from trading with the British West Indies, thus crippling American trade.
When Britain went to war with France, it pushed the matter even further. In June of 1793, the British government ordered its navy to seize any neutral ships carrying food to sell to France. In November, Britain expanded its orders to seize neutral ships trading with French colonies as well. These colonies had become major US trading partners. As a result, the British seized hundreds of ships in early 1794. On the ships it captured, it continued to impress American sailors into British service.
British aggression was not limited to the high seas. It also increased hostilities on the frontier. In early 1794, Canada’s Governor, Guy Carleton, now called Lord Dorchester, told a delegation of Indians that he expected a new war to break out between the US and Britain. For several years the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, John Graves Simcoe, had been calling for the establishment of a buffer state controlled by Native Americans, in western those lands ceded to America in the peace treaty. British forces still maintained their outpost at Detroit. They pushed this further, by building a new Fort Miamis, which is near modern day Toledo, Ohio.
Congress, which still had no navy, and not much of an army, could do little about any of this. At the end of March, Congress closed all American ports for 30 days, essentially ending all foreign trade. The reasoning was that American ships trading with anyone other than Britain would likely be seized, and America wanted to stop trade with Britain in hopes that it would encourage Britain to change its policies. Over the following weeks, the Democratic-Republicans in Congress, led by James Madison, pushed for a sequestration of debts to Britain. Essentially, if an American business owed money to anyone in Britain, they would have to give that money to the US government instead, so that it could be used to pay for the damages inflicted by the British. The Federalists managed to kill the proposal.
America’s Ambassador to Britain, Thomas Pinckney, had no diplomatic experience before he got there. The South Carolinian had served as a Continental officer during the war He was elected governor after the war and led South Carolina through ratification of the US Constitution. He had been in London for a little over a year when things really began to heat up. As Ambassador, he protested Britain’s growing presence in US frontier territories, the seizure of neutral US merchant ships, and the impressment of US sailors.
Britain’s foreign minister, Lord Grenville, seemed unconcerned by these protests. He pushed back, arguing that the US had failed to live up to the peace treaty, and had still not allowed the collection of British debts in America. Britain had no real need to be concerned since the US had no military to back up its protests with any sort of force. Pinckney’s reports back to America made clear Britain had no intention of changing its policies and that British officials were unconcerned that the US might declare war on Britain.
Jay’s Appointment
President Washington knew that diplomacy was his only option. War with Britain would be a disaster. He needed to send someone to London who could negotiate some way out of this. The problem was that the US did not have much of a diplomatic corps.
Benjamin Franklin, of course was dead by this time. John Adams had spent years at the Court of St. James, but he was already Vice President. Despite this experience, Washington did not really trust Adams as a good negotiator. He floated the idea to several people who argued that Adams would be a bad choice.
Washington also considered sending Thomas Jefferson, who had resigned as Secretary of State at the end of 1793. Advisors counseled against Jefferson’s appointment. He was too pro-French and did not seem politically aligned with the President’s goals. There were similar criticisms made about appointing James Madison.
The US Ambassador to France Gouverneur Morris had already traveled to London for negotiations. The British essentially dismissed him as too combative and too pro-French. The choice had to be someone who would be a little more aligned with British interests.
Washington considered giving the job to Alexander Hamilton. Although Hamilton had no real diplomatic experience, he seemed capable and was strongly aligned with the faction that wanted a better relationship with Britain. By this time, however, Hamilton had become a political lightning rod. His appointment would have invited strong Republican opposition. Washington wanted a Federalist, but not someone that controversial. He eventually turned to John Jay.
Jay had been part of the team that negotiated the final peace treaty with Britain. He had spent years serving in Europe and then as the Secretary of Foreign Affairs for the Confederation Congress. Jay would also be acceptable to Britain.
In 1786, Jay had written a report for the Confederation Congress justifying Britain’s continued occupation to frontier posts because the US had refused to allow British recovery of debts against American merchants in US courts. Jay’s report had been meant to encourage Congress to take further steps to allow the collection of debts and was meant to remain secret. But for some inexplicable reason, Jay gave a copy of his report to the British Ambassador. This report made its way to London. It told British officials that Jay was amenable to the British position. The Americans did not know this, but it weakened Jay’s negotiating position from the start.
The problem with Jay’s nomination was that he was already serving on the Supreme Court as Chief Justice. After Washington nominated Jay, a number of Senators objected that it was unconstitutional for someone to hold two government jobs. Despite these objections, the Senate approved the appointment. John Jay sailed for London on May 12, 1794.
Negotiations
The trans-Atlantic trip was a relatively fast one, Jay arrived in London on June 15th. The British received him with the respect that was due to a diplomat. He met with Foreign Minister Lord Grenville a few days after his arrival. He also received a formal introduction to King George III a few weeks later.
Things seemed to get off to a good start. Both parties agreed to the end of aggressive measures in the Northwest Territory, and that both sides would maintain the status quo during negotiations. Negotiations continued through July and into August. Jay completed his first proposed treaty on August 6th, calling for the British evacuation of posts on American territory, compensation for ships seized by the British, and access for American ships to the British West Indies.
A few weeks later, Grenville countered with the British proposal. He suggested that boundaries between Canada and the US needed to be adjusted so that Britain had access to the Mississippi River. He was open to trade in the West Indies, but only for smaller ships, under 70 tons. These ships could not profitably make the trans-Atlantic voyage and therefore would limit trade between the US and the West Indies. It would essentially create a British monopoly on trade between the West Indies and Europe.
Jay objected to these British proposals. Giving up over 35,000 acres of US territory to give Britain access to the Mississippi River would be unacceptable. He also objected to the size limitation on US ships. The US were not British colonies and Britain should not be permitted to dictate how American merchant ships conducted trade in the West Indies.
One of Jay’s instructions was to push for the reimbursement of slaves taken during the Revolutionary War. This had been a provision in the 1783 peace treaty that the British simply ignored. Grenville argued that if slaves on their own traveled into British lines during the war, they were no longer considered the property of their masters and Britain should be free to allow them to leave the country. This was a difficult point for Jay to argue since he personally opposed slavery. Eventually he let the matter drop.
Another big issue was British arming and supplying Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory. Britain insisted on being permitted to trade with them, but agreed not to try to forge political ties or supply them in wars against the US. Jay called for a total demilitarization of the Great Lakes area, to which Grenville seemed amenable. Britain also agreed to limit what it considered contraband in order to allow American shipments of food and other raw materials to Europe.
Jay and Grenville debated back and forth for weeks. These were private talks, Even their secretaries did not participate and we don't have any formal records of their discussions.
The main reason Britain was willing to debate at all was the fear that the US might join the League of Armed Neutrality. If it did, this might draw other European powers into a war against Britain. Even though the US had no navy of its own, attacks on American shipping could result in other European navies coming to the assistance of the US.
By the end of September, Jay submitted a draft treaty, including free trade and other expansive rights for neutral shipping. It also prohibited British treaties with Indian tribes in US territory and affirmed that neither country would arm tribes or encourage war. It also called for a demilitarization of the Great Lakes region, the right of free trade worldwide, except for a limitation on specific contraband items going to Britain’s enemies. It barred the impressment of sailors and that Britain would reduce certain import tariffs.
The British, however, began to harden their negotiations and take a more aggressive stance. Apparently, Alexander Hamilton had told the British Ambassador to the US that America had no interest in joining the League of Armed Neutrality. The Administration wanted to stay out of European entanglements. The ambassador, of course, relayed this information to London.
This news reached Grenville on September 30, the same day Jay submitted his draft treaty. Grenville realized that the strongest card that the US had to play against Britain in the negotiations was a bluff. Therefore, Britain could pretty much dictate whatever terms it wanted and the US could do little about it.
Britain still saw some value in completing a treaty on its own terms, but it began to reject many of the tentative agreements that the parties had already reached. Grenville rejected the idea that Britain could not make agreements, treaties, or alliances with Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory. He called for the removal of provisions that Britain would try to restrain their Indians from conducting war against the US. He dropped the idea of disarmament around the Great Lakes or even giving a firm commitment to withdraw British posts from US territory.
Britain demanded the authority to search any ship on the open seas for anything that it considered to be contraband. It also wanted the definition of contraband to be just about anything headed to Europe other than food.
Final Treaty
Jay had to make continued concessions to get anywhere. Finally, by November, the two parties had worked out a final agreement. The British finally agreed to remove their military garrisons from US territory, but only by June 1, 1796, about a year and a half later. Both countries agreed to appoint a three member commission to resolve boundary disputes.
Anyone would be permitted to cross the US Canadian border for issues of trade. Britain and the US agreed that either of them could use the Mississippi River, although since Spain controlled most of the river, it was unclear what this would mean.
A commission would be set up in the US to adjudicate claims from British merchants who were still trying to collect debts from before the Revolution. Another commission would be set up in London to adjudicate seizures of US merchant ships. The US also agreed to compensate British merchant ships for seizures that ended up in US ports during the Citizen Genet controversy.
Trade with the British West Indies was limited to smaller ships of 70 tons or less. Addressing the Republicans threat to sequester or confiscate private British funds, the treaty prohibited this, even if the countries went to war. Britain would still be free to seize ships at sea, but if Britain captured food cargo, it would at least reimburse the owners for the value.
Overall, it really didn’t resolve any of the American complaints, but Jay thought that it would at least prevent an open war with Britain. He and Lord Grenville both signed the treaty on November 19, 1794.
Ratification
The next step was getting the treaty back to America for presidential approval, and Senate ratification. Even that proved difficult. Three copies of the treaty were sent across the ocean. French ships managed to stop all three of them. Two of the ships dumped the treaties overboard to prevent capture by the enemy. The third copy did make it, but took three and a half months during a brutal winter passage to reach America. During a French naval search of that ship, the courier opted to hide the treaty rather than toss it. He arrived in Philadelphia on March 7, 1795, four days after Congress had ended its session and gone home.
Americans got word of the treaty more than a month earlier. In late January, Benjamin Franklin Bache published news that a treaty had been signed in London, but no one knew the details. Rumors swirled. Republicans feared the worst. President Washington did not help quell these concerns when, after he received the treaty, he opted to keep its terms a secret.
Jay personally had a difficult voyage back to America. His six weeks at sea traveled through constant storms, including 32 consecutive days of rain. He finally reached New York at the end of May. The treaty terms were still a secret to almost everyone and Jay wasn’t revealing anything either.
One big surprise for Jay was that he had been elected Governor of New York during his absence. Recall that Jay had run against Governor Clinton three years earlier. He had won the popular vote then, but Clinton managed to win the election by having the ballots of three counties invalidated. In 1795, Clinton announced that he would not seek another term. Voters, many of whom were still outraged by that stolen election, swept Jay into office without him even knowing anything about it. Upon learning the news, Jay resigned his office as Chief Justice and was sworn in as governor.
Meanwhile all Americans, except for President Washington and a few close advisors, remained in the dark about the terms of the Jay treaty. Washington called the Senate back into a special session to debate the treaty. While the Senators were able to read the treaty, they adopted a gag order forbidding all Senators from revealing the treaty’s contents. Inevitably though, Senators began leaking some information fueling public concerns.
The Federalist majority managed to block all the Republican efforts to make changes to the treaty. A treaty would require a two-thirds vote. The Senate could not go along with Article XII, which limited the sizes of ships that could trade with the British West Indies and also prohibited the export of the products which were mainly produced in the West Indies, including sugar, coffee, cotton, and cocoa and molasses. With that change, the Senate gave its provisional consent by a vote of 20-10, just passing the necessary two-thirds approval, on June 24, 1795.
Public Reaction
Even after passage, the Senate maintained the gag order. By this time though, leaks and rumors were all through the public press. A few days after the final vote, one of the opponents, Senator Stevens Mason of Virginia, gave a copy of the treaty to Benjamin Franklin Bache, editor of the anti-administration newspaper The Aurora. On July 1, Bache published the full text.
As expected, Americans were outraged by the treaty’s terms. It achieved almost nothing that Americans wanted, and actually legitimized some of the actions the British were doing to Americans. Protests turned into mob riots across America. Jay was burned in effigy. A Philadelphia mob burned a copy of the treaty in right front of the British Ambassador’s residence, then used stones to shatter all of his windows. One Bostonian wrote on a wall “Damn John Jay! Damn everyone who won’t damn John Jay!” Another mob in Boston burned a British ship that they believed was acting as a privateer.
Alexander Hamilton tried to give a speech supporting the treaty in New York City, but was driven away by mobs throwing stones at him. Republicans organized town meetings calling for a rejection of the treaty. While Federalists attempted to run some rallies in support of the treaty, these were overwhelmed by the rallies against it.
Despite the outrage, President Washington signed the treaty on August 14, 1795. Washington was not happy with the treaty either but without a navy and without a sizable army, the treaty was the only way the US could avoid war with Britain. The British Parliament accepted the treaty without Article XII, and the Jay treaty became the law of the land.
Next Week: Thomas Paine brings us The Age of Reason.
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Charles, Joseph. “The Jay Treaty: The Origins of the American Party System.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 4, 1955, pp. 581–630. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1918627
DEMMER, AMANDA C. “Trick or Constitutional Treaty? The Jay Treaty and the Quarrel over the Diplomatic Separation of Powers.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 35, no. 4, 2015, pp. 579–98. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24768869
Estes, Todd. “Shaping the Politics of Public Opinion: Federalists and the Jay Treaty Debate.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 20, no. 3, 2000, pp. 393–422. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/3125063
Estes, Todd. “The Art of Presidential Leadership: George Washington and the Jay Treaty.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 109, no. 2, 2001, pp. 127–58. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4249911
Newcomb, Josiah T. “New Light on Jay’s Treaty.” The American Journal of International Law, vol. 28, no. 4, 1934, pp. 685–92. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2190755
We left off last week with hundreds of militia banding together to exact revenge on John Neville, the Federal Inspector of Revenue in western Pennsylvania. At first a company of militia had ridden to his house, resulting in Neville killing at least one and wounding four others. This caused hundreds to return the next day, July 17, 1794, and burn his home to the ground, despite the property being defended by a dozen federal soldiers. The defending soldiers were released, as were Federal Marshal David Lenox and Neville’s son Presley, who had been held prisoner during the fighting. When Lenox and Neville tried to return to Pittsburgh, they faced drunken militiamen trying to attack them. They got to the city, where they found General Neville. The general had left his home before the battle, knowing that if captured, he could be tortured or killed. He had wisely stayed in Pittsburgh at the home of a friend.
Pittsburgh Standoff
The militia had succeeded in taking some revenge. But many were even angrier because their commander, Major McFarland, had been killed in the attack on Neville's home. The rebels descended on Pittsburgh and threatened to burn the town unless Neville finally resigned his commission and Marshall Lenox turned over any outstanding warrants. The rebel militia camped outside Pittsburgh was estimated at over 1000 men. Negotiations went on for days as they attempted to satisfy the angry militiamen. A local lawyer named Hugh Henry Brackenridge tried to negotiate a settlement with the rebels. He attended a hearing before the rebel committee. The main point of contention was over whether the marshal would return the summonses that he had already served on locals, back to authorities in Philadelphia.
During this debate, the rebels brought in Robert Johnson, the same revenue agent who had been tarred and feathered a few years earlier. Johnson accepted the gravity of the situation and agreed to resigning his position as a revenue agent. That night, during a brutal thunderstorm, Marshal Lenox and General Neville escaped out of Pittsburgh and rode east, headed for Philadelphia.
Brackenridge remained in discussions with the rebels, who had set up a headquarters at a nearby church. His goal was to convince the rebels that this was not going to end well. The federal government would have to respond to this rebellion. Rather than back down, however, the rebellion only seemed to grow in strength and size.
It seemed that those who lived in Pittsburgh itself opposed the rebellion, while all of the communities surrounding them were in support. Several weeks after the battle at Neville's home, Bower Hill, rebels seized the federal mail and found letters from a number of Pittsburgh residents condemning the rebellion. In a reaction, the rebel leaders called for a militia assembly at Braddock’s field on August 1. An estimated 7000 armed militia turned out with the intention of burning Pittsburgh. They began marching toward the town, but were eventually dissuaded by moderate voices that told them that Pittsburgh had agreed to banish the letter writers who had condemned the rebellion.
Albert Gallatin
While things seemed to be spinning out of control, there were moderates who were attempting to tamp down the growing violence. One important voice was that of Albert Gallatin. He will become more important in the history of the United States, so perhaps now is a good time to introduce him.
Gallatin was born in Switzerland in 1761. He spoke French as his primary language. He came from a wealthy merchant family but his father died when he was only four years old, and his mother died when he was nine. A family friend stepped in to raise him. When he was twelve, he was sent to the Academy of Geneva, where he became a great fan of the enlightenment. When the American Revolution began, Gallatin wanted to be a part of it. He and a fellow student left school in 1780 at age 19. They travelled to France, where they met with Benjamin Franklin. He gave them letters of introduction before they sailed for Boston.
Boston was not terribly interesting for two young men who were excited about the American frontier. Gallatin moved to Machias in the Maine wilderness for a year, where he ran a trading post. He then returned to Boston where he worked briefly as a French tutor at Harvard College.
By this time the Revolution had ended. Becoming bored again with Boston, Gallatin got involved in the post-war land boom out west. He teamed up with a French land speculator who wanted to sell western lands to Europeans. In 1785, Gallatin moved to Virginia and became a naturalized citizen of the state. He also married a Richmond girl, who was the daughter of a boarding house owner where he was staying. Gallatin hoped to become rich with the western land boom. Instead, he made his fortune the old fashioned way, he inherited it. A year after moving to Virginia, he received a small fortune left to him by a relative in Europe. He used that money to buy 400 acres of land in Fayette County, Pennsylvania and built a large stone house, which he dubbed Friendship Hill.
He became active in Pennsylvania politics, favoring the more radical factions in the state. In 1788, Gallatin served as a delegate to the state convention that the anti-federalist faction called to recommend amendments to the proposed US Constitution. Over the years, Gallatin gained a reputation as a strong supporter of the anti-federalist, and later the Democratic-Republican factions in government.
In 1790, the people of Fayette County sent him to serve as their representative in the US House. He quickly fell in the faction controlled by James Madison and also became a leading opponent of many of Alexander Hamilton’s proposals, including the excise bill. Gallatin also became a leading voice at many of the gatherings in western Pennsylvania opposed to the tax. Gallatin’s views against the tax were in sync with those of the people he represented. At the Pittsburgh Convention in 1792, Gallatin served as secretary and signed the resolution calling for the refusal to have any dealings with anyone who took a position to collect the whiskey tax.
This put Gallatin in direct contention with President Washington. In response to the Pittsburgh Convention Hamilton got the president to issue a proclamation admonishing anyone who was organizing to obstruct the operation of the excise law.
The people of Pennsylvania, however, were quite happy with Gallatin’s positions. In 1793 the state legislature appointed him to the US Senate. That same year, he married Hannah Nicholson, the daughter of Commodore James Nicholson, who had been a hero of the Continental Navy. Gallatin’s first wife had died a few years earlier, shortly after they had moved to Pennsylvania.
Gallatin took his seat in the Senate in late 1793. Almost immediately, the Senate received a petition from several Federalists in Pennsylvania objecting to the seating based on the fact that Gallatin had not been a US citizen for nine years, as required by the Constitution. He had taken his oath of citizenship to Virginia eight years earlier. The issue was not cut and dry because supporters argued he had expressed his desire to become a citizen in 1783, ten years earlier, and that was the date that should count. The Senate sent the matter to committee to review the facts, then called for a vote. The Senators ruled that Gallatin’s election was void by a vote of 14-12. Gallatin had to leave the Senate and return home.
He arrived only a month before the battle of Bower Hill caused the region to explode. In mid-August of 1794, about a month after the militia had burned Neville’s home, Gallatin served as secretary for a conference at Parkinson’s Ferry, arguing with the radicals that there was not possibility of military success against the federal government and that they should be looking for a political solution. While Gallatin opposed the tax, he asserted that it was constitutional, and the people could not simply use violence to oppose laws that they did not like.
A couple of weeks later, Gallatin gave an hours-long speech to a hostile crowd, trying to explain why this rebellion was different from the American Revolution, and why they needed to support the rule of law.
Federal Response
Gallatin was pushing the idea of submission because he knew what was coming and hoped to avert it. As early as 1792, following the first attacks on revenue officers in the region, Alexander Hamilton had been pushing for “vigorous and decisive measures” or, he said “the spirit of disobedience will naturally extend and the authority of the government will be prostrate.” He called on President Washington to issue a stern warning and then send in federal troops if the people did not comply. President Washington issued his public proclamation in September of that year, but left out Hamilton’s proposed threats of military force, something that Attorney General Edmund Randolph recommended deleting.
Hamilton viewed this ongoing confrontation as a test of the new federal government. The government had to show it was willing to use force to enforce its laws. He saw this rebellion as an opportunity to demonstrate the federal government’s power and resolve. He characterized the protesters as committing treason, that they were a disease that threatened to destroy the Union. Hamilton had agreed to a few changes, such as a reduction in the amount of the tax and the change that allowed local courts to hear tax cases. But he adamantly opposed further appeasement, such as removing Neville as revenue agent. This would be interpreted as weakness and would only encourage more defiance of federal laws.
Normally, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson would be expected to balance Hamilton’s more extreme views. But by this time Jefferson was gone. He had resigned as Secretary of State at the end of 1793. He was sick of the constant political battles with Hamilton, and believed that the President was increasingly supporting much of Hamilton’s agenda.
Attorney General Edmund Randolph had become Secretary of State at the time. He expressed deep concerns over the use of military force, at least before any diplomatic or judicial options were exhausted. Even if it was hard, the government had to be based on the affection of the people, not military force. If there were crimes committed, they should be handled by the judiciary, with due process, not through the use of armed soldiers just going around and crushing entire communities.
The new attorney General William Bradford, and Secretary of War, Henry Knox, both generally sided with Hamilton’s view. Bradford viewed the insurrection as treason and a threat to the existence of the government itself. Knox stressed that the government needed to deploy overwhelming force to convince the people of the new government’s authority. Knox very much pushed the idea of overwhelming force, so that the matter did not drag out or give the rebels any hope of an eventual compromise to end the dispute. He wanted the Whiskey Rebellion to be in contrast to Shays Rebellion, where the government did not have the power to put down the opposition.
Raising an Army
President Washington seemed more reluctant than most of his cabinet to use military force. He had never been a fan of this sort of violent and destructive protest, even when he was on the other side. Two decades earlier, Washington had condemned the destruction of British tea in Boston.
In this case, Washington believed the excise law was a legitimate one, and that he had a duty to make sure it was enforced. He accepted that it was always a last resort, but his fear of appearing as a military tyrant gave him pause.
After learning about the destruction of Bower Hill in July, Washington met with Pennsylvania Governor Mifflin. The governor believed that the lawlessness could be handled by the judiciary and calling out an army was not necessary. Unsatisfied with Mifflin’s assurances, Washington met with James Wilson, at that time a Justice on the US Supreme Court and also a resident of Pennsylvania. Wilson advised the president that the rebellion was too powerful to handle with judicial proceedings alone.
That gave Washington the political cover to issue an order mobilizing militia. He authorized the mobilization of 13,000 militiamen from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. It would take time to assemble the army so he also gave the rebels until September 1 to disperse and submit to the law.
Peace Commission
The following week, Washington also dispatched a Peace Commission to meet with the rebels. The Commission was made up of Attorney General Bradford, Senator James Ross, a federalist who had replaced Gallatin in the Senate after the removal over citizenship, and Judge Jasper Yeates, who sat on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and was also an ardent federalist. None of the three men were very sympathetic to the rebel cause. Also joining the Commission on the trip were two men appointed by Governor Mifflin: Pennsylvania Chief Justice Thomas McKean, and Congressman William Irvine. These two men were more sympathetic to the cause of the rebels, but still agreed that there had to be submission.
The commission travelled west and met up with the leaders of the rebellion on April 28. This was the same meeting where Gallatin gave his speech calling for the people to submit to federal law. The commissioners demanded complete submission and that all the rebels stand down. After a contentious debate the committee of rebels voted 34 to 23 in favor of submission. The commissioners expressed concern that the vote was not unanimous and had been conducted by secret ballot. It seemed clear that none of the rebels were inclined to make themselves a target for federal retribution, but that the resistance and violence would only continue.
The commissioners then insisted that every male age 18 or older sign an oath of submission on September 11. Turnout was dismally low, in some cases because people believed they would face retribution from their neighbors if they signed the oath.
The commission reported back to President Washington that they did not believe the region would submit and that order could not be restored without military coercion. This seemed to be the expected result since the militia army was already gathering and preparing during this time. Bradford used his time as a commissioner to gather intelligence on the leadership, numbers, and locations of rebels to provide to the federal army.
The Army Marches
By September 25, the army was ready to march. Washington personally led the militia army. He appointed as military commander of the army the Governor of Virginia, and Washington’s old cavalry commander, Light Horse Harry Lee. The right wing of the army was made up of militia from Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and commanded by their governors. Pennsylvania Governor Mifflin had been a Continental General. Governor Richard Howell of New Jersey had only risen to the rank of captain during the war.
The left wing, made up of militia from Maryland and Virginia was under the command of Maryland Congressman Richard Smith, a former Continental Colonel, and General Daniel Morgan of Virginia.
Alexander Hamilton also travelled with the army. Secretary of War Henry Knox, missed the expedition, choosing instead to attend to personal business in Maine.
The Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia used Carlisle as a staging area. The Maryland militia camped at Williamsport, Maryland. The Virginia militia made camp at Cumberland Maryland. Washington reviewed the troops in early October, before leaving the army at Bedford, to return to Philadelphia. He turned over full military command to General Lee.
As the armies reached western Pennsylvania. Then nothing. All the rebels went home and simply said, what rebellion? Nothing to see here. No one wanted to take on the federal militia army.
This left the soldiers without a war to fight. The leaders believed that the violence would only reappear after they left. Instead they opted to make arrests. Coordinated squads of cavalry were deployed on the night of November 13th to arrest the alleged leaders of the rebellion. The army rounded up around 300 men, who were held in various places, many simply herded together into open pens. Complaints began almost immediately that the arrests were done without warrants, that the army had disregarded amnesty promises already given, that many of the arrests seemed arbitrary and included people who had actually supported the government’s efforts to restore order.
Because there was no army to fight, General Lee dismissed most of the militia by November 17, just four days after the mass arrests. Only 1500 volunteers under General Morgan remained to ensure that no problems flared up again over the winter.
The next problem was that armies don’t do a very good job doing law enforcement. Officers interrogated the prisoners, but were unable to do much with them. No one was willing to confess to anything or provide witness testimony against anyone else.
In the end, they released almost all of their prisoners. They took about 20 men back to Philadelphia for trial. These men were marched through the streets of Philadelphia with the sign "insurgent" hung around their necks. But actually convicting any of them for treason or sedition proved nearly impossible. In the end, only two men were ever convicted. Neither of them were considered leaders in the movement. They were described as simpletons or insane, probably not bright enough to refuse giving incriminating testimony against themselves. In the end President Washington pardoned both of the men.
The government faced criticism as there was some looting by the militia army, and destruction of property. Most of the complaints came from the Democratic Republicans. The militia army however, had its intended effect. Farmers still effectively evaded the excise tax by hiding their distilleries. Several thousand rebels moved further west into Ohio territory to avoid further interactions with the government. But the open violent attacks on government officials doing their jobs came to an end.
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