Sunday, October 11, 2026

403 The XYZ Affair

For the last few weeks, we’ve been covering the growing divide in the US over a possible war with France.  This week, that possibility grows exponentially following what has become known as the XYZ Affair.

Property protected à la françoise
When John Adams became president, the biggest issue of his presidency was the diplomatic dispute with France.  President Washington had recalled James Monroe as Minister to France because he seemed more interested in keeping a bond between revolutionary France and the Democratic Republicans in America rather than in representing Washington’s policies.

Washington sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to replace Monroe.  When Pinckney arrived in December 1796, French officials refused to accept his credentials.  A few months later, they threatened him with arrest if he remained in France.  France also had begun seizing US merchant vessels at sea.  All of this really just came to light in America as Washington was leaving office, meaning President Adams would have to resolve it.

Adams called an emergency session of Congress where he made clear that relations with France had fallen apart and that the US needed to build up its army and navy to deal with this threat. At the same time, he also formed a three member commission, to send to France to work out a diplomatic solution.  The commissioners were John Marshall of Virginia, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, the same man that French officials had rejected as the new American Minister.

The Directory

Before we get into the Commission’s actions, it might be helpful to understand what was going on in France at this time.  The French Revolution began in 1789, but took several years before it abolished the monarchy, executed the king, and fundamentally changed the government.  

By 1792, the convention ran the country.  It consisted of nearly 800 elected representatives, making governing virtually impossible, with no executive branch.  Eventually it evolved that the Committee of Public Safety within the convention ran things, but that led to the Reign of Terror.  Politicians were always trying to out-radical each other and vying for power in this rather unstructured environment. 

To provide more organization, the Convention adopted a constitution in 1793, but it never really went into effect.  The Convention suspended it, arguing that wartime emergencies made implementation impossible.  In 1795, France finally implemented a constitution.  This one maintained a popularly elected Council of 500.  It created a second legislative body called the Council of Ancients.  Voting for the Council of Ancients had stiff property requirements, and voters had to be at least 30 years old.  Those elected had to be at least 40 years old.  This body consisted of 250 elected officials.

French Directory
The new constitution also created an executive branch.  But rather than a single chief executive, leadership was created in a five member group called the Directory.  The Council of 500 proposed a list of Directory members, and the Council of Ancients then selected the five members from that list. All members of the directory had to be at least 40 years old, have government experience, and could serve only a single five year term.  Each year, one member of the Directory would be replaced.

The idea behind all this was to create more structure and separation of powers and to prevent governments from swinging wildly in any single election.  It was designed to restore stability following the chaos of the Reign of Terror that it replaced.

Despite this supposedly well-ordered system, the fact that France was still at war with most of Europe, and that the economy was in shambles, led to repeated shake-ups, attempted coups, assassinations, and crack downs on civil rights.  In short, French leaders had much more on their minds than their relations with the United States.

Talleyrand

One French leader who was giving some thought to the US was Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, the Directory’s new foreign minister.

Talleyrand came from a minor noble family in France.  Due to a clubbed foot, he could not pursue a career in the army.  Instead, he entered seminary. After being expelled for a sexual affair, he was nevertheless ordained thanks to family connections, in 1779.  A decade later, he received an appointment as a bishop.  

Talleyrand
When the revolution began the following year, he went to the National Convention as a representative of the clergy.  His pro-revolutionary attitude got him excommunicated around the same time that the Convention confiscated all church property, thus depriving him of an income.

Talleyrand turned to diplomacy, getting an appointment to serve as a negotiator in London, trying to keep Britain out of a war with France.  His 1792 meetings with Prime Minister William Pitt secured neutrality, but the execution of King Louis and the invasion of Belgium the following year made war with Britain inevitable.  Talleyrand had to leave Britain, but going back to France would probably result in his arrest and execution.  

Instead, he moved to America.  On his way to America, he reported having diner with British General Benedict Arnold in Falmouth.  In America, Talleyrand settled in Philadelphia, where he lived privately for about two years. He made contacts, getting involved in land deals and other financial schemes, helping Americans secure European investments..

He formed social contacts and financial arrangements with men like Alexander Hamilton, Robert Morris, and Henry Knox.  He even took an oath of allegiance to the US in 1794.  After the formation of the Directory in France, Talleyrand was no longer under fear of arrest in France.  He returned in the fall of 1796, just as relations between the US and France were collapsing.  In July, 1797, the Directory appointed him Foreign Minister. This was not necessarily a safe job.  Of the fourteen men who had held the position since the Revolution began, five had been executed, four were in exile, and at least two others had been imprisoned.

Talleyrand relied on his time living in America, and also consulted with others, including former ministers Fauchet and Adet who were both back in France by this time.  If Americans thought they were on the brink of war with France, no one in France seemed to agree.  They saw no benefit in going to war.  Doing so would only push the US further into the arms of Britain, which is exactly the opposite of what they wanted.  

The Directory seemed to have been betting on a friendly government in America winning the 1796 elections. When that did not happen, France simply wanted to do whatever it could to keep the US from deepening its relationship with Britain.

Talleyrand had no real power to make foreign policy, but he did advise the Directory on the subject.  In October 1797, he recommended that France drag out negotiations with the US.  This would prevent them from having to give into any US demands, while at the same time stringing them along so that they did not move closer to Britain.

To delay discussions, Talleyrand suggested they demand an explanation of President Adams’ speech to Congress since they understood that as a threat of war.  It would make clear to the Americans that the French were not negotiating under any such threats.

The Commissioners

Around the same time that Talleyrand was proposing delayed negotiations with the Americans, the delegation from America arrived in Paris.

Charles C, Pinckney
Pinckney had remained in Europe since the Directory’s refusal to accept his credentials a year earlier.  He moved to Amsterdam.  Marshall arrived in Europe on September 1.  They waited for several weeks for Gerry to arrive.  In the meantime, they got to know each other, and discussed their strategy.

After a couple of weeks, Marshall and Pinckney headed to Paris on their own.  They arrived on September 27.  Finally, a week later on October 4, Gerry arrived.

The Commission’s options were pretty limited.  They had instructions not to approve any grants or loans to France.  They could not agree to anything that would violate US obligations under the Jay Treaty with Britain, and could not accept any French restrictions on the rights of American commerce.  In short, they could use nice words but were not authorized to concede anything of substance.

Negotiation Attempts

The three Commissioners went to Talleyrand’s office, but he refused to see them.  The French minister started playing games with them.  First, he had Thomas Paine send them a letter suggesting the Americans accepted a role of an unarmed neutral.  Pinckney wrote back a non-committal reply, but that told Talleyrand that he could communicate via unofficial back channels without giving the commission any official recognition.

A few days after that, Jean Conrad Hottinguer stopped by Pinckney’s apartment in the evening.  Pinckney was having dinner with Marshall.  Hottinguer asked Marshall to leave so that he and Pinckney could have a private discussion.  Marshall agreed.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:John_Marshall_(NPG).jpg
John Marshall
Hottinguer told Pinckney that the Directory was upset over Adams’ May 15 message to Congress and that they demanded an explanation.  He also said the US government needed to reimburse its own citizens for any debts that France owed them, and also pay for the commerce that the French had seized or destroyed, as well as lend an unspecified sum of money to the government.  They would also need to pay a bribe just to start any negotiations.

When Pinckney told his fellow commissioners about these unofficial demands, they all agreed that it was a non-starter.  Pinckney and Marshall were ready to be done, but Gerry said they should press for more details.  In another meeting with Hottinguer,  on October 19, Hottinguer set the bribe amount at 1.2 million livres, about $250,000.  Only Gerry wanted to continue.

Talleyrand believed that he and successfully divided the commissioners and that Gerry was the weakest link in the group.  He sent Lucien Hauteval, an old business acquaintance of Gerry to say that Talleyrand was ready to meet informally.  Again, Pinckney and Marshall refused.  They demanded only a formal meeting.  Gerry went by himself, believing that a social call with Hauteval and Talleyrand, both of whom he already knew, would not commit the US to anything.

The meeting itself did not discuss anything of substance.  Talleyrand had used it as a way of confirming that Gerry seemed willing to negotiate without his fellow commissioners.

The following day, October 20, a businessman named Bellamy visited Marshall at his apartment.  He noted that France had just signed a peace treaty with Austria a few days prior.  That meant the war in Europe was largely over.  The only belligerent still facing France was Britain.  France could now focus more on that, as well as making more demands on the US.

Hottinguer returned a few days after that, claiming the Directory was becoming impatient, expecting their bribe.  He also noted that France had defeated the great powers of Europe and that America needed to step up.  France would no longer accept neutrality.  The US could be a friend or an enemy, nothing in between.  Pinckney replied that the US was not ready to roll over and demanded free commerce.  Hottinguer again brought up the subject of the bribe, at which point Pinckney lost  his temper and screamed “No, no, not a sixpence!”

Seeing that these unofficial discussions were breaking down, Gerry went to see Talleyrand and Hauteval again.  He made clear the commissioners had no authority to offer any grants or loans and could not pay any bribes.  Talleyrand suggested the commissioners front the money out of their personal funds and that there would be additional hostile measures within a week if there were no concessions.  Later, Hauteval suggested that one commissioner return to America to get authority for a loan while the others continued to negotiate.

While the commissioners rejected this, they said they might agree to a smaller cash payment if France suspended the seizure of American vessels.  Talleyrand thought he was close to breaking the commissioners.  He sent Bellamy back to talk about the unfortunate fate of those countries that had opposed France, and that France might use its Republican contacts in America to stir up public opinion against the commission.

On November 3, Bellamy told them that the Directory was going to send a complaint to Philadelphia that Pinckney and Marshall were too uncooperative, saying that if Aaron Burr and James Madison had been sent, this whole thing could have been resolved by now.

After about five weeks of negotiations, the commissioners had had enough.  Marshall and Pinckney were disgusted by the way they were being treated, without any official recognition and the continuing demands for bribes just to start official discussions.  Both of them were ready to return home, declaring the attempted diplomatic solution a failure.

Elbridge Gerry
Gerry, however, wanted to keep the lines of communication open.  He didn’t think it was in France’s interest to go to war with America, and believed that Talleyrand was bluffing just to get more concessions.  Gerry convinced his fellow commissioners to hang around while he continued these backchannel discussions on his own through December.

The commissioners gave up their hotel rooms ,instead moving to a less expensive guest house run by a Madame de Villette.  She was a charming hostess to the commissioners.  Unknown to them, she was also working as an agent for Talleyrand.

At the end of the year, Gerry received word that the Directory wanted Marshal and him to remain in France, but wanted Pinckney gone.  The Directory also issued a new edict saying that they would seize any ship that was carrying any goods of English origin.

Marshall tried to draft a written summary of the American position for the Directory, but Gerry, got him to delay delivery as Gerry continued discussions on his own.  

By February, Talleyrand was still pushing for a promise of a loan, trying to convince Gerry that he could do so, but also told him not to discuss the plan with his colleagues.  He also announced that a refusal would mean the expulsion of all the commissioners.  Gerry still refused to agree.

Talleyrand did not follow through on his threat.  Instead February turned into March, when Talleyrand agreed to meet with all three commissioners again.  It was a final push for a loan.  When that wasn’t forthcoming, Talleyrand suggested that Marshall and Pinckney leave the country before they were forcibly expelled.

The commissioners met amongst themselves for the final time on April 3, 1798.  Both Marshal and Pinckney were fed up with Gerry.  They thought his willingness to accept Talleyrand’s continued indignities were embarrassing to the country and were making him into a French puppet.  Gerry thought they were just jealous and were letting personal grudges get in the way of negotiations.  Marshall left for Bordeaux to catch a shop home.  

Pinckney, who had his family with him, got permission to travel to Lyon so that his sick daughter had time to recover before a trans-Atlantic voyage.  By the time she was healthy enough to travel, France had closed all of its ports to American shipping.  Pinckney remained in the country until August.  He spent some of that time trying to document the American sailors being held in French prisons.  Gerry ended up leaving France around the same time, after receiving orders from Secretary of State Pickering to do so.

Reception in America

Back in America, word of progress was sketchy.  Not only did Congress leave Philadelphia in July, but so did most of the other branches.  Yellow fever struck the city again.  Unlike the 1793 epidemic, which killed 10% of the population, this one only killed about 2%.  Adams prudently moved back to Massachusetts, returning only in November when the new session of Congress began.

Congress was still battling over policy.  Federalists wanted even larger armies and navies.  The Democratic Republicans opposed this, even after a French privateer entered Charleston Harbor and burned a British ship there in violation of American neutrality.

It wasn’t until March 4, 1798 that dispatches from Europe, sent in January, finally arrived.  They reported that Talleyrand would not negotiate until he received an explanation for Adams’ address to congress the year prior.  Everyone saw this as an insult, treating the president like an underling.  It further identified three men who had demanded bribes for Talleyrand and the Directors as well as a loan for France.  The report did not identify the men by name but referred to Hottinguer as X, Bellamy as Y, and Hauteval as Z.

Adams was upset that the commissioners did not leave immediately, but there was little that could be done about that now.  He called together the cabinet and discussed the possibility of war.  The Cabinet was mixed.  They corresponded with Hamilton who thought that war or a British alliance was inadvisable as it would divide the country.

Adams drafted a message outlining France’s attacks on America’s national honor and its refusal to stop attacking American shipping.  He called for a declaration of war.  After a few days, Adams thought better of it.  He shelved the message, as well as the dispatches, keeping all of them secret.

Instead, on March 19, he sent a mild and vague message, drafted by Secretary of Treasury Wolcott, simply reporting that the commissioners’ reports gave little hope of success.  He called on Congress to do more to protect American shipping, and lifted an order that prevented American vessels from arming themselves.

The Republicans in Congress, that is, the pro-French faction, as well as Vice President Jefferson, thought Adams was being vague and refusing to release the reports because France was really on the verge of a successful diplomatic solution and that Adams wanted to prevent that and go to war.  Demonstrations around the country condemned the president’s efforts to drive the US into a war with France.

Congress demanded the release of the original reports from the commissioners. Adams refused at first.  In April, the House passed a resolution demanding the release of the documents.  President Adams released them.  Congress was stunned when it learned the truth.  The Federalists in the Senate immediately voted to release the papers to the public. 

The reports shocked the nation.  Republicans were stunned by the abusive and insulting treatment of the  American commissioners.  As Americans became aware of the truth, the public calls went from attacking Adams for pushing the country toward war, to calling for war with France.

War with France seemed inevitable.

Next Week: The Quasi-War with France begins.

 - - -

Next Episode 404 The Quasi-War with France (coming soon)

Previous Episode 402 A Brawl in Congress

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Further Reading

Websites

The XYZ Affair https://www.thoughtco.com/the-xyz-affair-4175006

Adams Address to Congress, May 16, 1797: https://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/john-adams/the-xyz-affair-1797.php

The French Directory: https://www.worldhistory.org/French_Directory

BAUER, JEAN. “With Friends Like These: John Adams and the Comte de Vergennes on Franco-American Relations.” Diplomatic History, vol. 37, no. 4, 2013, pp. 664–92. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44254324

Kramer, Eugene F. “Some New Light on the XYZ Affair: Elbridge Gerry’s Reasons for Opposing War with France.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 4, 1956, pp. 509–13. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/362143

Ray, Thomas M. “‘Not One Cent for Tribute’: The Public Addresses and American Popular Reaction to the XYZ Affair, 1798-1799.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 3, no. 4, 1983, pp. 389–412. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/3122881

Stinchcombe, William. “Talleyrand and the American Negotiations of 1797-1798.” The Journal of American History, vol. 62, no. 3, 1975, pp. 575–90. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2936215

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

America and France. The intire [sic] message of the president of the United States, to both houses of Congress: covering the full powers to, and dispatches from, the envoys extraordinary of the United States, to the French Republic, Boston: B. Russell, 1798. 

Adams, Charles F. The Life of John Adams, Vol. 2, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1871.

Bowers, Claude G. Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America, London: Constable and Co. 1925.

Morse, Jr. John T. John Adams, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1884. 

Wood, John The History of the Administration of John Adams, Esq., Late President of the United States, New York: Barlas and Ward, 1802. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams, Univ. of Kansas Press, 1975. 

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. Making the Presidency John Adams and the Precedents That Forged the Republic, Oxford Univ. Press, 2024.

DeConde, Alexander The Quasi War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared war with France, 1797-1801, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Kurtz, Stephen G. The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800, Literary Licensing,  LLC, 2011.

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, Little Brown & Co. 1962 (borrow on archive.org).

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001.  

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (borrow on archive.org) 

Nester, William The Hamiltonian Vision, 1789-1800, Potomac Books, 2012 (Chapter 19 on XYZ available at JSTOR)

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

Shaw Peter The Character of John Adams, Univ. of NC Press, 1976. 

Smith, Jean E. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation, Henry Holt & Co. 1996. 

Staloff, Darren Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding, Hill and Wang, 2005. 

Stinchcombe, William The XYZ Affair, Praeger, 1980. 

Vaughn, Harold C. The XYZ Affair, 1797-1798, Franklin Watts, 1972.

Wood, Gordon S. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.

 * As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, October 4, 2026

ARP402 Brawl in Congress


Partisan tensions had been growing in Congress for several years, primarily over the issue of whether the US should maintain neutrality and a good trading relationship with Britain, or whether it should deepen its ties with Revolutionary France and join the effort to rid Europe of monarchy.

On January 30, 1798, these tensions turned physical when Congressman Roger Griswold of Connecticut used his cane to beat Vermont Congressman Matthew Lyon on the House floor. This week, we will look at how things got that bad.

Responding to France

Back in Episode 398, we left off with newly inaugurated President John Adams calling a special session of Congress in May, 1797 to resolve the diplomatic crisis with France. After President Washington had recalled James Monroe and sent Federalist Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to serve as the new French Ambassador, France rejected his credentials, threatened Pinckney with arrest, and began attacking US shipping. This was clearly an act of war. But the US was in no position to go to war. 

Congressmen Lyon and Griswold
Britain had been doing the same thing to US shipping a few years earlier, resulting in the Jay Treaty. The Democratic Republicans saw that treaty as a sellout, making the US subservient to British interests like it was back in the colonial era again. France had helped America win independence. The US was turning its back on France as the people of France struggled to remain free from monarchy.

The Federalists just liked Britain more than France. They certainly wanted to remain independent, but America had always had a good trading relationship with Britain. Working as equals to maintain that relationship was not returning to colonial status. France had killed the king who had supported America, and was involved in brutal internal wars, and attacks on the rest of Europe. This did not involve American interests and the US should simply stay out of it.

President Adams gave his address to Congress in May 1797, very clearly outlining the French insults and aggression against the US, and called on Congress to decide how to respond. Adams clearly sided with the Federalist position, calling for a larger army and navy to protect American interests.

For the next two weeks. Congress debated how to respond to the President’s address which called France’s actions “derogatory to the honor and aggressions so dangerous to the Constitution, union, and even independence of the nation” and that the response should be a massive buildup of the military to confront these threats.

Federalists wanted the congressional response to thank the President and tell him that Congress would respond as he wanted. Democratic Republicans objected to the presidential suggestions to build up the military and wanted to say so in the congressional response. 

The House formed a committee of five members to hash out a unified response for this divided body. The committee consisted of three federalists, Roger Griswold of Connecticut, John Rutledge, Jr. the son of the former Governor of South Carolina, and Jonathan Freeman of New Hampshire. The two Democratic Republicans on the committee were Abraham Venable, of Virginia and John Kittera of Pennsylvania.

The Federalist majority on the committee simply pushed through a response that thanked the president, but did not push back on anything the president had said. Even other federalists in the House thought it was too complaisant.

Congressman John Nicholas, a Democratic Republican from Virginia, proposed an amendment to the committee report. He said that the country was moving toward a terrible war with France that would only bring difficulties. He wanted a response that used temperate and conciliatory language that would hopefully heal the breach with France, rather than using provocative rhetoric that would only worsen the existing situation. The government’s words would likely reach France before any envoy that the US sent. Angry language would only push the situation further toward war. There was no question that the US was weaker than France. Why would they want to provoke a war with a more powerful country? Instead of endorsing the president’s rhetoric, the congressional response should attempt to dampen its potential harm.

The Nicholas Amendment led to hours of debate on the House floor as to what sort of message Congress should send, and what would be the consequences of that message. While these debates went on for days, Federalists essentially argued that France was already engaged in hostile actions against America and regardless of what Congress did, might soon bring their war on Europe to America as well. The US needed to prepare. The president’s proposals to increase the army and navy were sensible preparations, even if war did not come.

The Democratic Republicans argued that, even if the US built up its military, it was in no condition to fight a full scale war with France. Pursuing a diplomatic goal that would sooth over whatever differences existed, and prevent war entirely, should be Congress’ primary goal.

Lengthy debate and multiple amendments, Congress finally came up with a response. That was a mish mash of conflicting ideas. We want peace with France, but we still have to maintain our national honor. We want more peace negotiations, but will also prepare for the possibility of war. The response ended by saying they would have to consider the details of any policy response to the situation - in other words, committing to nothing.

Preparing for War

Congress agreed to make preparations for war. It allocated funds to fortify US ports and harbors. It also approved completing three frigates for the Navy, the USS United States, the Constitution, and the Constellation. Construction of these ships were started years earlier, with slow progress due to lack of funds. Congress was now providing the necessary funds. It also approved the purchase of three additional frigates and six sloops of war.

Congress authorized the president to use this naval force to accompany convoys of merchant vessels. It also approved regulations to arm merchant vessels.

Congress also authorized some minor expansions of the standing army, including one additional regiment. In addition, the president could raise a provisional army if needed. Congress empowered the president to borrow money if needed for the defense and security of the country, and declared that it would raise taxes to cover any loans that the president borrowed. Finally, Congress restricted the exports of any arms and ammunition to make sure the US had a sufficient supply on hand.  These compromise measures neither satisfied the Federalist desire for a stronger defense, nor the Democratic Republican desire to focus solely on diplomacy.

Peace Commission to France

President Adams, still focused on the diplomatic crisis with France, did not even wait for Congress’ response to his message in May before he acted. On May 31, Adams nominated a commission of three officials to go to France on a diplomatic mission. 

Originally, Adams had considered sending one Federalist and two Democratic Republicans. The reasoning was that French officials had a better relationship with the Democratic Republicans and that might help negotiations. He had originally considered Elbridge Gerry and James Madison for the commission. But after learning that Madison’s appointment would cause all the Federalists to object, he gave up on that idea.

Instead, Adams proposed they send Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, the designated French Ambassador who Washington had selected and who the French Directory had rejected, along with John Marshall and Francis Dana. Marshall was a moderate Federalist who had recently served as Virginia’s attorney general. Dana was also a moderate Federalist, who was at the time Chief Justice of Massachusetts. Dana had also been Adams’ secretary for many years while Adams was serving as a diplomat in Europe.

Congress approved the commission, but Dana declined to serve. In his place, Adams appointed Elbridge Gerry. Many Federalists in Congress balked at this nomination. Gerry wasn’t a Federalist. Like Adams, he didn’t really claim allegiance with either party. He had served in Congress for four years, but that was before the partisan break really defined itself. Gerry had refused to sign the Constitution at the Convention and had fought against it. He also articulated a strong sympathy for the French Revolution and for Thomas Jefferson, although he voted for Adams as an elector in 1796. In short, he seemed like a loose cannon. But Adams trusted him, and since there was already a Federalist majority on the Commission, Congress went along.

The Senate confirmed the nominees, although Gerry received quite a few dissenting votes.

Enforcing the Treaty with Spain

In mid-June, about a month after Adams called Congress into session, the president reported a new wrinkle. Remember that treaty with Spain that we signed that gave the US more land along its southern border? Well, Spain seemed to be rethinking that. Spain had suspended the efforts to draw the new border and announced that it was not withdrawing its troops from the forts in that territory.

Spanish officials delayed their treaty obligations by requesting a decision on whether to leave their forts standing, or to demolish them, and also to get an assurance from the US that it could keep the local natives pacified. Clearly Spain was having second thoughts about how much of a threat the US was, and whether it had given away too much in the treaty.

The Administration managed to complete the transition by taking a hard line with the Spanish Ambassador that the Treaty would be executed as signed and that Spanish forces would withdraw or else. At the same time, Adams told Spanish officials they were free to leave the forts intact or destroy them as they wished, but the garrisons needed to leave. He also pushed official assurances that local Spanish settlers who had land claims to property would be protected.

Adams also asked Congress in June to enact legislation to create a territorial government for the region. He also sent US soldiers into the region after the date permitted by the treaty. Spanish soldiers would have to decide whether to fire on the US Army, or withdraw according to the treaty. They chose to withdraw.

Blount Conspiracy

This is also the same time that Congress became aware of the Blount Conspiracy. I’ve mentioned this in earlier episodes. William Blount had been the territorial governor of Tennessee, and became one of the first US Senators once Tennessee became a state in 1796.

Blount also had his personal fortune invested in western lands. In late 1796, he heard rumors that Spain planned to cede the Louisiana Territory, and the Floridas to France. Given the hostility between France and the US, this would make settlement of those western lands far less attractive, thus destroying their value.

Blount did not trust the Federal Government to handle this situation, so he turned to the British. Blount knew Captain John Chisholm, who owned a tavern in Tennessee, right down the street from Blount’s home. Chisholm’s background is a little sketchy. He was born and raised in Scotland, moving to America in 1777. By some accounts he had been a British regular for a time and was also a loyalist during the war. But he mostly stayed out of the war, living on the frontier and marrying a Cherokee woman.

In late 1796, Captain Chisholm escorted several Cherokee to Philadelphia, with the intent of obtaining US citizenship. While there, he met with John Lister, the British Ambassador to the United States. The men proposed to use British military resources to capture the Floridas from Spain. At the same time, frontier armies consisting of both settlers and Native Americans, would seize Spanish settlements along the Mississippi River, including the capture of New Orleans.

Ambassador Listor was not sure what to make of the proposal, but he took it seriously enough to provide Chisholm with funds to go to London and make the pitch directly to the ministry.

On April 21, 1797, Senator Blount wrote to James Carey, a US Indian Agent with the Cherokee, hoping that Carey would help get the Cherokee on-board with the plot. The letter outlined the entire conspiracy and Blount’s role in it. Blount told Carey to burn the letter after reading it. 

Carey did not burn the letter. Instead, he turned over the letter to federal officials who forwarded it to President Adams in June. Adams immediately turned over the documents to the Senate.

For Blount, the revelation of this conspiracy could not have happened at a worse time. Spain was threatening to break a treaty with the US, and France was threatening war, because both countries feared that the US was getting into bed with Britain and would become a threat to Spanish and French interests. Now came a revelation that a US Senator was involved in discussions to encourage Britain to help seize Spanish colonies in America. 

The Senate confronted Blount with the evidence against him on the House floor. Blount did not know how to respond and attempted to flee. After being brought back to the Senate by force, he took the 5th and remained silent. Senator James Ross of Pennsylvania with the evidence of the conspiracy in hand, recommended Blount’s immediate expulsion from the Senate Blount then lawyered up and demanded a hearing.

He managed to delay a vote for a couple of days, but on July 8, the Senate voted against a motion to postpone and then voted 26 to 1 to expel Blount from the Senate.

The matter also created a rift with Britain. Secretary of State Pickering met with Minister Liston to inquire into British involvement. Liston obviously downplayed Britain’s role, and could truthfully say by that time that Britain had already rejected the proposal and had documentation attesting to that fact.

Blount, however, remained the primary target of national wrath. A prosecutor in Pennsylvania brought criminal charges against Blount for “disturbing the peace of the United States”. There was also debate over whether to prosecute him for violating the Neutrality Act. Several other conspirators were arrested, although Chisholm escaped arrest by fleeing to Britain. Some sources indicate that the British Ambassador helped with his escape.

The House of Representatives impeached Blount, with legal opinions from the Attorney General and the US Attorney agreeing that impeachment was appropriate.

The Blount Conspiracy would occupy the attention of government officials for the next year and a half. Blount returned to Tennessee where he remained popular and was elected to the State House. Federal efforts to arrest Blount and return him to Philadelphia failed when no one in Tennessee would assist with the effort.

The Senate debated trying Blount in absentia, but kept deferring a final decision. The matter simply lingered for the rest of 1797, and all of 1798. Finally, in January of 1799, the Senate dropped the matter on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that Senators and Congressmen were not subject to impeachment. Expulsion by their respective bodies was the appropriate action, and Blount had already been expelled.

While there was bipartisan condemnation of Blount’s conspiracy, the whole matter raised the temperature in the capital and around the country over having a foreign policy that respected national dignity while avoiding war.

Griswold v. Lyon

It was in the context of all this heightened partisanship and anger that a fight broke out in Congress. Not a war of words, an actual fight.

Congress’s special session lasted from May 15 to July 10, 1797. It picked up again with its regular session on November 13th. On January 30, 1798, the House voted on the impeachment of Sen. Blount so tensions were running high. 

While everyone was standing around waiting for the votes to be tallied, Freshman Congressman Matthew Lyon, a Democratic Republican commented that the Connecticut Federalists here all hypocrites who voted against the views of 90% of their constituents, and that if he opened a press in Connecticut, he could start a revolution there and get all of the Federalists thrown out of office.

Lyon and Roger Griswold, a Federalist Representative from Connecticut, had been arguing for weeks over various issues related to the ongoing dispute with France. Griswold overheard Lyon’s comments, which witnesses later said were made in a loud voice for everyone to hear. Griswold then asked whether Lyon would be wearing his wooden sword when he marched into Connecticut.

This was a reference to a recent article that had reported that Lyon had been court martialed for cowardice during the Revolutionary war, and as a punishment General Hortio Gates ordered him to wear a wooden sword. Lyon either ignored the remark, or, as he later claimed, did not hear it. So Griswold walked over, grabbed his arm and repeated the remark. 

In response, Lyon spit in Griswold’s face. Griswold simply wiped away the spit and walked away, knowing that Lyon would be condemned for his actions. The Committee of Privileges called Lyon’s actions “a violent attack and gross indecency.” Lyon sent an apology to the Speaker, claiming that because the House was in a break the rules of decorum should not apply.

The incident became a matter of debate in the House, as well as across the nation as newspapers reported on it. Federalists wanted “Spitting Lyon” as they now called him, expelled from the House for his behavior. The Federalist press also resurrected stories about Lyon’s cowardice during the war. 

The Democratic Republicans did not defend the behavior, but they also opposed expelling Lyon from the House over the matter. Debate on the matter continued for two weeks. In the end, the vote for expulsion was 52 in favor to 44 against. This meant that Lyon remained since the vote failed the necessary two-thirds majority.

Upset at the outcome, Griswold plotted his revenge. He purchased a hickory walking stick, then a few days later walked onto the House floor on February 15. Lyon then described what happened next: 

As soon as I saw him [Lyon] in his seat I took my cane and walked across the floor in front of the speakers chair, which is more than forty feet in extent.—He saw me before I struck him, and was endeavoring to draw a sword cane when I gave him the first blow—I call’d him a scoundrel & struck him with my cane, and pursued him with more than twenty blows on his head and back until he got possession of a pair of tongues [tongs], when I threw him down and after giving him several blows with my fist, I was taken off by his friends—

The Federalists in the House considered the attack justified.  A new committee report condemning the behavior but refusing to consider expulsion of either man was upheld by a vote of 73 to 21.

Nothing more really came of the incident since a few weeks later, new information from France called attention to more serious matters.  We’ll cover that next week, when we face what became known as the XYZ Affair.

 - - -

Next Episode 403 The XYZ Affair (coming soon)

Previous Episode 401 War Comes to Puerto Rico

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Further Reading

Websites

President Adams Message to Congress, May 16, 1797: https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/may-16-1797-special-session-message-congress-xyz-affair

The Impeachment of Senator William Blount—the First in American History https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/02/the-impeachment-of-senator-william-blount-the-first-in-american-history

Documents on the Blount Conspiracy, 1795‑1797 https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Journals/AHR/10/3/Documents_on_the_Blount_Conspiracy*.html

Fracas in Congress: The Battle of Honor between Matthew Lyon and Roger Griswold  https://essaysinhistoryjournal.com/article/1339/galley/2535/download

Roger Griswold Starts a Brawl in Congress https://connecticuthistory.org/roger-griswold-starts-a-brawl-in-congress-today-in-history

Free eBooks

(from archive.org unless noted)

Adams, Charles F. The Life of John Adams, Vol. 2, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1871.

Bowers, Claude G. Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America, London: Constable and Co. 1925.

Campbell, Tom W. Two Fighters and Two Fines: Sketches of the lives of Matthew Lyon and Andrew Jackson, Little Rock: Pioneer Publishing Co. 1941 (borrow only). 

Mastereson, William H. William Blount, New York: Greenwood Press, 1954. 

McLaughlin, J. Fairfax Matthew Lyon, the Hampden of Congress, New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co. 1900. 

Morse, Jr. John T. John Adams, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1884. 

Turner, Frederick J. “Documents on the Blount Conspiracy, 1795-1797” The American Historical Review, 1905. 

White, Pliny H. The Life & Services of Matthew Lyon. Burlington: Times Job Office, 1858. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Austin, Aleine Mathew Lyon “New Man” of the Democratic Revolution, 1749-1822.  Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1981.

Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams, Univ. of Kansas Press, 1975. 

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. Making the Presidency John Adams and the Precedents That Forged the Republic, Oxford Univ. Press, 2024.

Cunningham, Noble E.  The Jeffersonian Republicans: The Formation of Party Organization, 1789-1801, Univ. of NC Press, 1957 (borrow on archive.org).

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Kurtz, Stephen G. The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800, Literary Licensing,  LLC, 2011.

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, Little Brown & Co. 1962 (borrow on archive.org).

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001.  

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (borrow on archive.org) 

Nester, William The Hamiltonian Vision, 1789-1800, Potomac Books, 2012. 

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

Sharp, James R. American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis, Yale Univ. Press, 1993.

Shaw Peter The Character of John Adams, Univ. of NC Press, 1976. 

Smith, Page John Adams, Vol. 2, Doubleday, 1962 (borrow on archive.org). 

Wood, Gordon S. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.

Morgan, John C. Resist Tyranny: The Story of Matthew Lyon, Early American Patriot. Wipf and Stock, 2017 (borrow on archive.org). 

 * As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, September 27, 2026

AR-SP54 Kingdom of Devils, with Katherine Grandjean


Michael J. Troy (MJT): Hello and thanks for joining this special edition of the American Revolution. We're here with our monthly roundtable and as is our norm, we have brought in a special guest, Katherine Grandjean, who is author of Kingdom of Devils: A Tale of Murder in the Shadow of the American Revolution. And I will admit that we're going a little outside the American Revolution. This book is set in the 1790s, but heck, our American Revolution podcast is in the 1790s now. So that's just fine. KG, welcome and thank you for joining the roundtable.

Katherine Grandjean (KG): Thank you so much. It's great to be here.

MJT: So Katherine and I caught up with each other at an American Revolution event in Philadelphia. She told me a little bit about the subject of her book and I was absolutely fascinated and I thought I've really got to learn more about this. She was kind enough to send me a copy of her book and I read it. It's really interesting. KG, why don't you just start by telling us a little bit about what the main premise of your book is in the setting?

KG: Yeah, happy to do that. So Kingdom of Devils is really two things. It's an investigation of a series of murders that happened mostly in Kentucky and Tennessee in the 1790s. But it is also a history of life in the wake of the American Revolution, especially in the West, especially in what became the trans-Appalachian West. Really at its heart, it tells the story of this string of murders. The main characters of the book are two brothers, Wiley and Micajah Harpe, who in 1798 and 1799 went on this sort of wild killing spree, cutting across East Tennessee and Kentucky and some of Cherokee country and eventually the story even spills over into the Mississippi River Valley. And they killed about two dozen people probably. That's about what I think the final tally is, although some estimates go even higher than that, and the sort of incredible thing about this story is that no one has ever really explained why they did it.

So at the most basic level, the book is sort of my investigation of that mystery. My attempt to turn over rocks and visit county courthouses and discover bits and pieces of evidence that are the clues they left behind that explain in some sense what these murders were all about. But I did realize at some point while working on this book that in order to make this story really legible to readers and to make the Harpes themselves understandable, I was going to have to paint a pretty wholesome picture of life in the early republic, especially in the Western territories.

And so, while the book follows the Harpe story very closely, it does also paint a very vivid portrait of the world around these characters and essentially the early republic in its sort of shaky and uncertain infancy in the years after the American Revolution. Imagine a time—probably not hard for this audience, right?—but imagine a time when nobody was really sure what the United States was going to be or what it would look like, and people were still kind of licking their wounds coming out of the Revolutionary War, and only two presidents had ever occupied the nation's highest office. For most of the book, we're in John Adams's presidency, and there's a lot of context that sort of makes the time period more digestible and sort of understandable to my readers. So, that's kind of the basic idea of the book. It's really a story that kind of moves you through my investigation of what this string of murders is all about.

MJT: For people who are up to date on the podcast, we're actually going through this era right now where Tennessee has just become a state. We've talked a lot about the roughness of the western frontier at this time and this really captures a lot of that. I had actually heard about the Harpe Brothers, just very little about them, but it's kind of a regional tale of "Big Harpe" and "Little Harpe", and they were kind of portrayed as these early scary monsters on the frontier. A lot of tall tales, and it's interesting to find that there is some truth behind all of it and there really is a history behind it. I don't know, are you familiar with the Doan Gang in Pennsylvania?

KG: Yeah, for sure. Not as deeply as I now know the Harpes, but yes, there are some parallels.

MJT: They reminded me a lot of that. My family is from the Quakertown area in Pennsylvania where the Doan Gang hung out. So, I was more familiar with that story growing up because it's part of the local lore there. And they of course were a Tory group of brothers who ended up turning to crime, although they mostly ended their spree during the Revolutionary War, whereas this one takes place later.

This is an interesting story in that we are trying to understand how these people came to be what they became and why maybe the society they grew up in helped push them in that direction. Both of these brothers were born before the American Revolution and were children during the war. So for anybody who's familiar with the war in the Carolinas during the American Revolution, we know that this was really a brutal time, a period of civil war where neighbor was fighting neighbor. There were often brutal actions being taken if you weren't on the right side compared to the other person who was confronting you. There was also a lot of brutality in the western parts of the area because they were battling with the Cherokee, and of course that was a particularly brutal form of fighting as well. So brutality and violence was kind of baked into their childhoods from the very beginning, and I guess their father was a Tory who abandoned them early. What do we know about the father?

KG: No, in fact, a lot of this is sort of hazy. I mean, first of all, I'm glad you were familiar with this story coming into my book because I think most people aren't. Though this story was once quite famous. The Harpes in their own time and in the generations that followed were really the stuff of tall tales and fireside oral history. This story lived and breathed in the American imagination, particularly in southern folklore, for many years. William Faulkner conjures them in some of his novels, and Herman Melville mentions them in The Confidence-Man. In the opening scene, he calls them thugs. So there was a time when they were much more famous, actually. But what that means is there is a lot of questionable embellishment in the folklore that once surrounded these two men, and they seem to have been larger-than-life characters in some ways.

Micajah is this sort of hulking, very intimidating, probably taller than most, really robust figure, and Wiley's a little smaller and slighter, but seems to have been the brains of the duo, the prime mover, and the main character in my book in many ways. But in any case, what do we know about their background? The question that really sucked me into this when I found this story—and I didn't know it either until I happened to stumble upon it accidentally—was why? Why did they do this?

Traditionally, there have been a couple of explanations batted around. Traditionally, people just said things like, "Well, they were bloodthirsty and they were evil and they were monsters," but that never really felt satisfying to me. That felt like it was foreclosing on the real possibilities of digging into what this episode might be able to tell us about the early United States.

One of the other things that has been suggested about them was what you just said: that perhaps they came from a loyalist family. Their father may have been a loyalist, and they as young men or even as young boys may have actually fought in the war themselves, although they would have been pretty young at that point. As you mentioned, they came from North Carolina. There is some suggestion in folk tradition that they lived through some of the brutalities of the war in the Carolinas. The partisan warfare in the southern backcountry, the absolute horror and trauma and ugliness of the civil war that was the Revolutionary War in the Carolinas and Georgia—for most Americans, that's still an unfamiliar story.

Most of the audiences I talk to, especially in places like Massachusetts and Connecticut, think of Lexington and Concord, Washington crossing the Delaware, or Bunker Hill; they're not as familiar with what the war looked like in the southern states. And so that's partly what initially got me interested in writing this book, because I hadn't been looking for this story. I did not set out to write this book, but I was teaching a course about early American violence and assigned an old roundup article from the 1960s that Richard Maxwell Brown wrote on violent episodes in American history. I just wanted to give my students a way of thinking about what they might want to do in their own research projects.

The Harpes happened to be mentioned in this piece in about two sentences, and I was just blown away that I had never heard about it. I could not believe that after years and years of writing, thinking, and researching early American history, I'd never encountered these figures or this story. But when I found it, I was primed in a certain way for a tale that would open up possibilities of thinking about life in the wake of the Revolutionary War. I had sensed for a long time that the years coming out of the Revolution were not as bright and tidy as public collective imagination sometimes likes to think.

For instance, if you think about the war itself in the South—people being pulled out of their houses, patriot and loyalist gangs, neighbors and vendettas, and men being lynched—I suspected that people took some of those bad feelings and scars into their later lives. It was not always an easy thing to move on from. There's been a lot of recent scholarship that has emphasized reconciliation in the wake of the war and forgiveness of former loyalists, which I think is very good. People like Rebecca Brannon have written at length about this, but I have argued that you have to separate what state legislators were doing in offering forgiveness to former Tories from what ordinary people were thinking in their own lives and how they felt about former loyalists coming out of the Revolution.

So all of that is to say that this suggestion that maybe the Harpes came from a loyalist family was one of the things that really attracted me to the story. Having said that, I was never able to 100% confirm that, but it is one of the things people said about them, and it's a plausible scenario. Many former loyalists came out of the Carolinas and drifted into what became Tennessee and Cherokee country to try to start over.

MJT: That may be the preamble of their early lives, right? And the violence that we saw between Tories and patriots during the war wasn't the only violence, even if that carried over. You had the violence around the attempt to form the State of Franklin, and there were a whole lot of other things going on—including the continuing fighting with the Indians who didn't want to give up their land. It's a brutal time, and living on the frontier was a brutal life where you had to be prepared to kill or be killed. That certainly has an impact on your psyche.

The other thing I want to get into is the issue of land. People kind of think that the Revolution ended, everybody settled down, became a yeoman farmer, and life was happy and peaceful. We've been going through on the podcast all the land speculators fighting over conflicting claims—the Blounts, the Seviers, senators and governors trying to get rich off land speculation. But the way you get rich off land speculation is selling that land to farmers, and when different people are selling the same land to different farmers with fraudsters involved, it becomes a huge mess. That seems like how Wiley Harpe got his start; he had settled and become a farmer on the frontier. Is that right?

KG: That's right. That's in fact the first thing I can see him doing in the historical record—buying land outside of Knoxville in Knox County, Tennessee, in its very early days. Property and land ownership is a big theme in this book. The wider backdrop is a time of Western land speculation, panics, and the Robert Morris house of cards coming crashing down.

The book opens in a hopeful place for the Harpes. We meet Wiley buying land in 1797 and recently married to a very pretty, respectable young woman named Sally who came from a fairly affluent family—somewhat of a coup for him. There's nothing up to this point to suggest the Harpes are going to be anything different than the thousands of anonymous young men pushing into the western hills. But as I built the world around Wiley and his brother, it became clear that it was actually quite difficult to get established in the Western territories.

Beyond the 17-year war Tennessee settlers fought with the Cherokees, huge land companies and wealthy speculators engrossed land quickly. In North Carolina's land offices, which sold off much of what became Tennessee, there were rampant amounts of fraud, forgeries, and military bounty warrants rife with corruption. By the late 1790s, you end up with dozens of confusing, overlapping land claims, lawsuits galore, people falling into debt, and sitting atop a rotten pile of fraudulent original deeds.

This chronic insecurity of property was an engine of volatility and violence in East Tennessee. It's a critical piece of the puzzle for the Harpe story specifically. There was a moment when Wiley fell into debt and signed a promissory note to a creditor—a wrinkle in the puzzle nobody else writing about the Harpes had ever mentioned. When I found it in the Knox County Archives, I instantly grasped that this was a critical piece of the story.

MJT: Wiley loses his farm as a result of a lawsuit?

KG: He was sued. If you filed a lawsuit to collect a debt in this period, debtors could dodge the sheriff across many cycles of county court and kick it to the next season. This debt hung over things for quite a while, but eventually, the sheriff came and seized his property. This was happening to them in the years just before the murders began.

MJT: And then I guess they turned to horse thieving for a while?

KG: Yes. They've been portrayed as thieves and brigands for many years. This attempt to steal a horse speaks to their struggles to stay afloat. Horse theft was a capital crime punishable by branding, ear-cropping, or hanging because horses were used as currency. In East Tennessee, right on the border of the Cherokee Nation, it was fairly easy to steal horses, drive them across the border, launder them, and resell them to someone in Georgia or South Carolina. Turning to horse theft was a profound decision.

MJT: After they lost the farm, did they have any legitimate source of income or job?

KG: Wiley bought his land and lived a fairly peaceful, unremarkable life for about a year. It's only in this final cascade of misfortunes that things unravel. When he has no recourse left, they take their wives, their horses, and flee into Kentucky. That's where things get underway on this killing spree in 1798 and 1799.

MJT: And this is where things really turn dark. It doesn't seem like they went on a killing spree to support themselves financially; it seems to be much more of an emotional anger, "get back at the world" motivation. What do we know about their actual decision to turn to a life of murder?

KG: This is my argument in the book. No, they don't seem to have turned to murder primarily for financial gain or plunder. Even when they robbed people, that was not what they were primarily after.

Some cryptic testimony has survived about how they viewed their project of violence: that they had declared war on fellow Americans, or really on all society, in retaliation for some "fancied injury". They were doing this not for pure love of bloodshed or material gain, but to make a statement—a protest in the face of a world they felt had wronged them.

In the 1790s, this was a novel thing. They were inaugurating a pattern of American violence that felt exotic and incomprehensible at the time, but by the light of the 21st century, looks recognizable as men staging spectacular episodes of violence out of grievance and anger.

MJT: It seems like you're saying in the book that they had a "type" of victim—establishment figures, war veterans, people succeeding in an unfair society where they had failed. But they didn't go after specific people who personally wronged them; it was more a general type. Is that fair?

KG: It's sort of both. Like modern rampage killers, it's a mix of people they knew and didn't know. Most of the people they killed were men and some boys. Many of the men targeted were Continental Army veterans, justices of the peace, and men of substantial property who had done well in the post-revolutionary years. Yet there were many other victims who were spontaneously chosen when met alone on the road. It was both random and selective.

MJT: Police forces as we know them didn't exist until the mid-1800s. How did law enforcement work on the frontier in the 1790s?

KG: Not very well. The state did not yet have a monopoly on enforcing the law. Locals were expected to raise a hue and cry, gather a posse, or call out a militia company. The dividing line between public and private law enforcement was hazy. In April 1799, the Kentucky governor issued a proclamation offering $300 for either brother or $600 for both, essentially admitting usual methods had failed.

Furthermore, law enforcement was local—a county sheriff's jurisdiction ended at the county line. There was no system or precedent for cooperation across county or state lines. The Harpes skipped county lines and covered hundreds of miles across Kentucky and Tennessee, which is why they got away with it for so long.

MJT: They actually got captured very early in their spree and were in jail for a time.

KG: A deputy sheriff in Danville, Kentucky, managed to track them down after one of their first murders—Thomas Langford at a Wilderness Road tavern. They were put in jail for the winter of 1799 with their wives, who were along for the ride.

MJT: Two men and three wives?

KG: Micajah had one legal wife and an unofficial second wife named Betsy. All of them spent the winter in jail. In March 1799, the jailer opened the jail to find Wiley and Micajah had escaped, leaving their wives—some of whom had delivered babies or were pregnant—behind.

The women were tried and acquitted. Under the doctrine of coverture, a married woman's legal identity was subsumed by her husband. Jurist William Blackstone noted that under "matrimonial subjection," if no independent will was involved, a woman might not be criminally culpable for acts like burglary or highway robbery committed under her husband's direction. Furthermore, 18th-century juries could not imagine young married mothers voluntarily participating in such heinous actions.

MJT: Once the husbands were out of the picture, all three women remarried or lived peaceful, respectable lives. So the jury got it right that these were decent women drawn in by their husbands.

KG: They were present and possibly complicit in ways I'm not always comfortable with, but once the brothers were gone, they lived quiet lives and put it all behind them. Under modern law, they certainly would have gone to prison as accomplices.

MJT: How did the brothers end up?

KG: In 1799, after a horrific cluster of murders in present-day Henderson County, Kentucky, a quasi-legal posse led by a victim's husband, Moses Steagall, hunted them down. Micajah "Big Harpe" was killed in an extralegal execution. In his dying moments, Micajah made statements about their agreement to kill as many people as possible.

Wiley escaped and disappeared for several years. He resurfaced under an alias in the lower Mississippi River Valley around the time of the Louisiana Purchase. The end of my book unmasks him as having joined the gang of famous river pirate Samuel Mason, preying on flatboat commerce heading down to New Orleans.

MJT: Why didn't more people turn to this level of criminality given the lawlessness on the frontier?

KG: There is a myth that people in the West reveled in lawlessness, but most wanted courts, sheriffs, and predictability. In researching hundreds of post-revolutionary murder cases, I found a common thread: the Revolution raised ordinary men's expectations of social mobility and respectability. When men faced failure, debt, and downward mobility, that frustration sometimes turned into extreme violence. The Harpes were an extreme case, but their underlying economic and social frustrations were rampant in the Early Republic.


Questions & Answers (Q&A) Session

MJT: I want to open it up for questions now. Does anybody have any questions for our guest?

Chris: Hello MJT, Chris from St. Paul, Minnesota. Hi KG. In your research, did you track down the families of the victims and the Harpes to hear about family lore?

KG: I have been in touch with some of the descendants of the victims, who have helped keep the story alive. They tend to have the most vivid memories, though some accounts are mixed with folklore. Harpe descendants are much harder to find because official paper trails went cold after the first generation.

Chris: Did they work in concert with any other outlaws or groups?

KG: The initial 1798–1799 murder spree was strictly the work of the two brothers. However, later in the Mississippi River Valley, Wiley joined the criminal gang of river pirate Samuel Mason, preying on flatboats shipping goods down the Mississippi River.

Participant: Were all of the murders committed using firearms?

KG: Mostly not. They were opportunists who used axes, knives, and blunt instruments for intimate, person-to-person violence. They frequently weighted victims' bodies with stones and submerged them in creeks to delay detection.

MJT: How did you get involved in history, and what led you to write this book?

KG: I grew up in New England and always wanted to be a writer. I initially trained as a historian of 17th-century New England colonial and Native relations. While teaching a university course on early American violence, I came across a two-sentence mention of the Harpe brothers in a 1960s article. Surprised that I had never encountered them before, I spent eight years visiting county courthouses to reconstruct their story and write Kingdom of Devils.

MJT: Kingdom of Devils is available wherever fine books are sold, and I'll put links in the show notes. KG, I really enjoyed speaking with you tonight.

KG: Thank you so much, Mike, and thank you all for your questions!

* * *

Buy the book: ⁠Kingdom of Devils⁠.

Professor Grandjean's website: ⁠https://www.wellesley.edu/people/katherine-grandjean⁠

To see upcoming roundtable events, or listen to past recordings, go to ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://amrevrt.org/virtual-round-table-events⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠

To participate live in future Zoom events, be sure to join as a member on ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Patreon⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠, or sign up for my ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠mailing list⁠⁠⁠⁠.

Click here to see my Patreon Page
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