Sunday, February 22, 2026

ARP378 Kentucky Statehood

Last week we covered some of the key federal legislation from 1792.  That year also saw the admission of a 15th state to the Union.  Congress admitted Kentucky on June 1, 1792.


Kentucky’s road to statehood was a long and bumpy one - requiring a total of ten conventions in Kentucky and multiple cessions and agreements from Virginia.  In the colonial era, Virginia claimed the territory as part of Virginia, but never really did anything with it.  

There were a few explorations of the area.  Daniel Boone was one of the earliest in 1769. The first settlements in Kentucky did not begin until 1775.  The mountainous terrain made it impossible to bring wagons into the area.  The Shawnee, Cherokee, Chickasaw and other tribes claimed this mountainous region.  When settlers did arrive, they referred to the land in reference to the Kentucky river that ran through it.  

The origin of the word “Kentucky” is unclear.  It comes from Native American languages, but historians disagree even over which language it originated. Some argue it is from the Iroquois, others say it is Algonquin.  They also disagree on its meaning. Some say it means “land of meadows” others “land of tomorrow” still others, “land of our fathers”.  So the short answer is that no one knows for certain where the name came from or what it means, but everyone started calling it Kentucky.

Virginia County

In 1776, when Virginia first established Kentucky County, the white population was less than 200 people.  By that time, land companies were already set up and trying to sell land to settlers, based on the Cherokee cession of land in the 1775 Treaty of Sycamore Shoals.

George Rogers Clark helped defend the territory during the war, but he was mostly focused on the small area along the Mississippi River. The inland territory was mostly on its own and still dominated by Indians.

Almost from the beginning though, everyone seemed to think that Kentucky would eventually separate from Virginia.  When Virginia formally ceded its lands north of the Ohio River to make up the Northwest Territory, it retained control of Kentucky County.

During the war, with no governments paying much attention, the settler population in Kentucky exploded. After Clark’s successes in 1778 reduced the threats of Indian attacks, western settlers poured into the region.  By 1780, Virginia broke up the region into three counties, Jefferson, Fayette, and Lincoln.

When the war ended, Virginia made good on its land grants to veterans by providing land in Kentucky.  By 1784, the population was estimated at around 30,000.  By 1788, the population was estimated at 62,000.

Almost immediately, the people of Kentucky found their interests diverging from those in Virginia. The settlers had managed to find and develop good farm land in Kentucky. But getting crops to market to the east, over the Allegheny Mountains, was not practical.  The easiest way to move crops to market was down the Mississippi River.

Mississippi River Dispute

The Treaty of Paris in 1783 recognized the Mississippi as the boundary between the US and Spain.  Of course Spain was not a party to that treaty, and was not bound by anything in it.  The river flowed south into what is today Louisiana, where Spain controlled both sides of the river as part of West Florida.

In June 1784, Spain closed the river to US commercial traffic.  Spanish officials were concerned about the rapid growth of the settler population, and were concerned it was only a matter of time before settlers would cross the Mississippi and begin threatening Spanish territory.  By closing the river to commercial traffic, Spain hoped to discourage the westward expansion of settlers.

Spain’s refusal to allow traffic set off a dispute that would last for more than a decade.  The action had an impact.  Kentuckians were unable to sell much of what they produced.  They began allowing the use of tobacco in the place of currency since no one could sell much of anything.  After a new Spanish minister, Don Diego de Gardoqui, arrived in the US, negotiations began, but the Spanish crown refused to allow Gardoqui to negotiate the US use of the Mississippi.  That was off the table.

For most Americans, the Mississippi was far off on the frontier and mattered little to them.  To the people living on the frontier who required access to markets, this was a critical life or death issue.

Independence Movement

In November of 1784, Benjamin Logan, a veteran who had settled in Kentucky and was representing the area in the Virginia legislature, called a meeting of militia leaders.  Although the primary purpose of the meeting was to discuss defenses against a possible attack by Cherokee and Chickamauga warriors, the issue of Kentucky statehood also came up at the meeting. 

The next month, a larger convention met in Danville to identify key grievances, including surveying fees being diverted to eastern interests and unfairly extracting money from the cash-strapped region.  They also demanded better roads for getting their crops to market and better support for frontier defense against Indian raids.

Delegates agreed to hold two more conventions in 1785, one in May and another in August, where they focused on the idea of separating Kentucky from Virginia and forming an independent state.

There were essentially four different factions in Kentucky who looked at the relationship with Virginia differently.  Some were perfectly happy to be part of Virginia.  It ensured they would have support when they needed it against Indian attacks.  As the population grew in Kentucky, so would its representation in the Virginia legislature which would have to accommodate Kentucky's concerns.  

A second faction seemed fine with separation, but only if they received Virginia consent and could separate on mutually agreed terms.  Many of these people tended to be large landowners with titles from Virginia.  They feared that a new state might not recognize their Virginia land claims.

A third faction was ok with declaring independence, whether Virginia wanted it or not.  They were their own people and could decide their own destiny.  Not all settlers in Kentucky even came from Virginia.  Many were from Pennsylvania or North Carolina.  This faction saw Kentucky taking the same path as Vermont: asserting its own independence and eventually achieving its own statehood in the Union.

Finally, there was a fourth faction that wanted true independence, and had little interest in remaining part of the Union.  Virginia dominated the US government.  Congress seemed uninterested in fighting for the rights of Kentuckians to get their trade goods to market.  If Kentucky became an independent nation, it might form an alliance with Britain who could use military force to open the Mississippi River for them, or perhaps an alliance with Spain would give them the access they needed.

Virginia Legislature

The Virginia Assembly was not opposed to allowing Kentucky to secede.  Virginia had already ceded its claims to the Northwest territory.  It realized that Kentucky was geographically isolated from the rest of Virginia and would have different interests.  Separation would mean the Assembly would not have to deal with continuing calls for support against Indian incursions or a host of other complaints from the lack of infrastructure and state support.

There was some dissension.  Leaders, including James Monroe, expressed concerns about Virginia's loss of power and prestige as it continued to shrink.  There was also the fear that as western states proliferated, they would eventually outnumber the eastern states and be able to dictate national policy.  As separate states, they might even break away from the Union entirely

Virginians wanted the separation to happen on reasonable terms.  They wanted Kentucky to take a share of the state debt, to recognize the land titles already granted by Virginia, and to pay for the costs of expeditions against the Indians. Virginia also wanted a few more years of land grants to keep its promises to veterans.  It also demanded that Kentucky join the Union.

In 1786, Virginia passed an enabling act granting permission for Kentucky’s separation.  This act was contingent on the Continental Congress admitting Kentucky into the Union by June 1, 1787.

After Virginia passed the 1786 Enabling Act, Kentuckians held a fourth convention in September of 1786.  Many of the more radical factions were unhappy with all the conditions that Virginia had placed on separation.  One of the more radical leaders that grew in prominence was James Wilkinson.  I’ve mentioned before that he had been an aide to Horatio Gates, been involved in the Conway Cabal and had been a leader of the Kentucky Militia who supported US forces during the 1790 and 1791 campaigns against the Indians in Ohio.

Wilkinson and the radicals simply wanted to declare independence and not ask permission.  They were in no mood to agree to all the conditions Virginia wanted to place on their independence.  The convention ended up not taking any action because it never reached a quorum.  When it finally did meet with a quorum in January of 1787, Virginia’s deadline for action had already expired.

Second Enabling Act

At that point, Virginia passed a second enabling act, not changing any conditions but setting a new deadline for independence by January 1789 and Congressional approval of statehood by July 4, 1788.

A fifth convention met and accepted Virginia’s terms on September 17, 1787.  Wilkinson did not attend this convention.  He had left for New Orleans in August, with the hope of making a deal with the Spanish to support Kentucky’s separation from both Virginia and the United States.

The situation got even more tense when Kentuckians learned that John Jay had been negotiating a treaty with the new Spanish Minister Gardoqui.  In those negotiations, Jay was willing to surrender on the issue of the Mississippi River rights in order to gain more fishing rights in the Atlantic Ocean.  This only reaffirmed the belief of many Kentuckians that Congress did not care about the interests of those on the frontier.

Kentuckians convinced the Virginia legislature to add a Kentuckian to the state delegation to the Confederation Congress in New York.  Virginia complied, nominating John Brown, who had been Kentucky’s representative in the Virginia State Senate for several years.

While Kentucky’s acceptance of Virginia’s terms seemed to be an indication that the process would finally move forward, you may also recall that on that same date, September 17, a convention in Philadelphia finalized the proposed new US Constitution.  When it came time for the Confederation Congress to act on Kentucky’s application for statehood, delegates had trouble even reaching a quorum.  When they finally got one, a congressional committee put together a resolution to approve the agreement and admit Kentucky into the Union at the end of the year. That happened on July 3, 1788, the day before the deadline in the Virginia Enabling Act. 

The full Congress, however, refused to act on the committee's recommendation.  By that time nine states had ratified the new Constitution.  Delegates believed it would be improper to take action at that time.  They left the application to be handled by the new US Congress once it took over.

Spanish Option

Kentuckians saw this as a huge setback.  The new Congress would not be in place for several more years, and probably wouldn’t make Kentucky statehood a priority, even when the Representatives got down to business.  The radical secessionist movement gained popularity in the territory.  Wilkinson had already approached Spanish officials about joining the Spanish Empire.

Gardoqui suggested to Kentucky’s representative in New York that Spain would grant access to the Mississippi River if Kentucky did not join the United States.  Spain very much liked the idea of having a buffer country in between the US and Spain.  Wilkinson did not make his plan public in Kentucky.  He was well aware that efforts to join Spain were probably not popular with the majority of Kentuckians, and that he could be tried for sedition if the plan blew up before it could be finalized.  Publicly Wilkinson spoke about negotiating commercial agreements with Spain that would allow use of the Mississippi River, something everyone in Kentucky wanted.

Despite his circumspection, rumors began to circulate that Wilkinson had made a secret deal with Spain and had become a paid Spanish agent.  These rumors were true, but not proven.

Kentucky had set a date for a sixth convention in July of 1788, with hopes of ratifying Congress’ decision to admit Kentucky as a state.  When news arrived that Congress had not approved admission, several radicals, including Wilkinson, called for unilateral secession and the defense of their position with force of arms.

The moderates, however, prevented movement in this direction.  Instead, the convention called for a seventh convention to take place in November and that delegates be given broad power at that convention to take whatever steps were necessary to gain admission to the Union and to secure navigation of the Mississippi.  These delegates would also draft a state constitution and begin organizing a government.  This strategy continued to move the process forward without taking a violent break from Virginia and the US.  The convention also extended the right to vote to all free male inhabitants of Kentucky, eliminating Virginia’s property requirements.

When the seventh convention met in November, no real progress had been made.  Virginia had ratified the Constitution, of the objections of most people in Kentucky.  There was no further action by Congress, which was still awaiting the election of a new U.S. Congress under the Constitution.  Virginia also had not established a new enabling act after the last one had expired.  Delegates all wanted separation from Virginia, but there was now a split as to whether they would join the Union. Calls for both violent separation and for joining the union were both voted down. In the end, the convention ended without doing much of anything, other than calling for a new enabling act from Virginia and planning for an eight convention in the summer of 1789.

A month after the seventh convention ended, Virginia passed a third enabling act, with new deadlines.  The act also enraged Kentuckians by trying to dump more of Virginia's state debt onto Kentucky, and also Virginia retaining control of land grants in Kentucky until Kentucky joined the Union.

Many of the moderates did not bother to show up at the Eighth Convention in 1789.  They were unwilling to move forward under the terms of the new enabling act.  Also, the US Congress had just begun to meet and was not ready to consider Kentucky's application for statehood.

Delegates elected James Wilkinson as chairman of the Committee of the Whole, controlling debate.  Despite this radical leadership, the delegates still were not willing to go along with violent separation.  They realized that the state was not powerful enough.  They also needed support against Indian incursions.  Wilkinson still did not feel he had enough support to move the convention to consider a Spanish alliance.  Instead, they petitioned Virginia to put back to the terms of the Second Enabling Act, and petitioned Congress to work towards navigation rights on the Mississippi.

Prominent Virginia leaders by this time, including men like George Washington and James Madison had heard reports of a movement toward Kentucky breaking away and forming an alliance with Spain.  With more attention paid to that possible conspiracy, most people publicly denied any support.  The  movement seemed to wane.  As the movement waned, so did Wilkinson’s popularity.  Wilkinson faded from politics and began focusing on his private business and his work as a militia leader, leading several campaigns into the Ohio Territory.

Moderates Prevail

Things seem to improve at the end of the year.  In December, 1789.  Virginia restored the terms regarding debt that Kentucky considered more reasonable in its fourth enabling act. When the ninth convention met in Danville in July of 1790, the debt issue had become much less contentious since the federal government had agreed to assume all of the war debt.  Statehood finally seemed within reach. The Convention set June 1, 1792 as the planned date for statehood.

In December of 1790, President Washington called on Congress to admit Kentucky in his second state of the union address.  Congress complied.  On February 4, 1791, Congress approved an act admitting Kentucky to the Union. This was two weeks before Congress passed a similar act admitting Vermont. While Vermont moved quickly, gaining statehood only a few weeks later, Kentucky still had more of a process in front of it.  Vermont was already operating as an independent state for years, with a governor and a constitution.  Kentucky had neither of those.

It was more than a year before delegates met again in April, 1792 to draft a state constitution.  Delegates managed to complete the document in just 18 days.  The new constitution granted the vote to all free white males over the age of 21, with no property requirements.  Much of the rest was pretty similar, a house and senate along with a governor.  They made the governor particularly powerful, with extensive veto and appointment powers.  The constitution also explicitly protected slavery.

The convention approved the constitution. There was no need to send it to a statewide vote, although it did call for a statewide vote in 1797 to decide whether a new convention should make changes.

With the state constitution complete, Kentucky held its first elections a few weeks later, choosing Isaac Shelby as its first governor.  Shelby had been a military leader during the war and had been one of the moderates who had opposed Wilkinson’s more radical proposals at most of the conventions.

On June 1, 1792 according to Virginia’s enabling act and Congress’s vote on statehood, Kentucky officially became a state.  Three days later, on June 4, the state legislature met for the first time and got down to business.

It had taken more than a decade, ten state conventions and four enabling acts to complete the process of statehood.  The work was finally complete.

Next Week: we cover the presidential election of 1792.

 - -

Next Episode 379 Election of 1792 (coming soon)

Previous Episode 377 Washington's First Veto

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Further Reading

Websites

“The Admission of Kentucky and Vermont to the Union [Editorial Note],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-0103-0001

Hawthorne, Elizabeth L. “KENTUCKY IS BORN.” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, vol. 49, no. 167, 1951, pp. 133–38. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23374051

Leadingham, Christopher L. “To Open ‘the Doors of Commerce’: The Mississippi River Question and the Shifting Politics of the Kentucky Statehood Movement.” The Register of the Kentucky Historical Society, vol. 114, no. 3/4, 2016, pp. 341–69. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44980554

Leadingham, Christopher L. Forging a Bluegrass Commonwealth: The Kentucky Statehood Movement and the Politics of the Trans-Appalachian West, 1783–1792 [Master’s thesis] Marshall University, 2017. https://mds.marshall.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2113&context=etd

How and Why the Kentucky Counties Formed https://kygs.org/brief-history-of-kentucky-genealogists

“Act Concerning Statehood for the Kentucky District, 22 December 1785,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0236

“Bill Providing for Kentucky Statehood, [15 December] 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-09-02-0107.

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Collins, Lewis Historical Sketches of Kentucky, Vol. 1. Collins & Co. 1874. 

Jacobs, James R. Tarnished warrior, Major-General James Wilkinson, New York: The Macmillan Co. 1938. 

Kerr, Charles History of Kentucky, Vol. 1, Chicago: American Historical Society, 1922. 

Kinkhead, Elizabeth S. A History of Kentucky, New York: American Book Company, 1896. 

Marshall, Humphrey The History of KentuckyVol. 1 & Vol. 2Frankfort, Geo S. Robinson, 1824. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Chinn, George M. Kentucky Settlement and Statehood, 1750-1800, Kentucky Historical Society, 1975. 

Harrison, Lowell H. Kentucky's Road to Statehood, Univ. Press of KY, 1992. 

Harrison, Lowell H. & James Klotter A New History of Kentucky, Univ. Press of KY, 1997 (borrow on archive.org). 

Linklater, Andro An Artist in Treason: The Extraordinary Double Life of General James Wilkinson, Walker Publishing Co. 2009.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, February 15, 2026

ARP377 Washington’s First Veto

Last week we covered the US Army’s first major military loss when the Indians in the Northwest territory soundly defeated the army under General Arthur St. Clair.  Today we will cover Congress’ response to that loss, and other legislation from 1792.

Military Appropriations

The defeat reinforced President Washington’s view that the nation needed a larger standing army.  Many members of Congress still believed that a standing army in peacetime violated a fundamental tenet of the Revolution.  A professional military that was large enough to compel the citizenry to comply, not out of voluntary acceptance, but fear of military reprisal was the tyranny that they had just shed under British rule.

First US Penny 1792

Washington and others calling for a larger army understood that concern, but also recognized that there were very real military threats, from both Indian tribes and foreign nations, that required substantial numbers of professionally trained soldiers to defend the new country.  

The other big issue was cost.  The country would be digging its way out of debt for decades because of the cost of the Continental Army during the war.  The cost of a large peacetime army could cause that national debt to increase, no decrease.

Up until the time of the Battle of the Wabash in 1791, the US Army had never exceeded 1000 soldiers.  In 1790 Congress had authorized raising a force of 1273, mostly to deal with Indians in the Ohio territory.  Low pay and poor conditions had prevented reaching those enlistment goals.  By the time General St. Clair went off to fight the total number of American regulars was only about 800 officers and men.

Following the loss on the Wabash, Congress was finally willing to approve a much larger army.  Fortunately, they had some of the top talent in the administration to advise them.  President Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox had both played key roles in organizing the Continental Army.  Congress also sought the advice of former Inspector General Friedrich von Steuben, who was by this time living on a large estate in upstate New York, granted to him for his services during the war.

After taking their advice, Congress adopted a plan to create the Legion of the United States.  This would total over 5000 officers and men. The legion would be divided into four independent sub-legions that would normally operate independently.  Each sub-legion would have a troop of dragoons, a company of artillery, two regiments of infantry and one regiment of riflemen.  The total cost of maintaining this army would be about $1 million per year.

President Washington also appointed a new commander of the army Major General "Mad" Anthony Wayne had been one of Washington’s top generals during the war.  He was known for tough discipline and aggressive action.

Although he was a Pennsylvania native, Wayne had moved from Georgia after the war.  He had received a large land grant in appreciation for his work during the southern campaign.  In 1791, the Georgia voters sent Wayne to Philadelphia as their representative in Congress.  Washington had approached Wayne for a leadership role in the army as early as 1789, but Wayne was not interested.

However, by 1792, Wayne was struggling with his finances, and was facing accusations of election fraud for his election to the House of Representatives.  By this time, Wayne put all of that behind him by accepting Washington’s appointment as commander of the US Army.  

Wayne was in no hurry to rush into another battle.  He set up a training ground on the banks of the Ohio River, just north of Pittsburgh.  He spent months training and recruiting new recruits, who had enlisted for three years.  He did not want to go into battle until his army was ready.

Militia Act

If the establishment of a large standing army had been controversial, Congress also tackled even more contentious issues in the Militia Act.  Congress had been debating an act to regulate state militias since Congress had first met in 1789.  The members kept tabling the matter because no one could agree on the Federal Government’s role in state militias.

State and local militias were considered the backbone of America’s fighting force.  Given the relatively small size of the professional army, the country needed to have a well armed and well trained militia to step up in times of war or national emergency.

Many state officials, however, were skeptical of the idea that the federal government should control the militia.  Many were still fearful that the federal government might become tyrannical, and it would be up to the state militias to challenge that tyranny.

During the Constitutional Convention, delegates had debated these issues.  Foremost in their minds, however, was Shays Rebellion in Massachusetts, and the inability of both the state and the Confederation Congress to control that rebellion.  In response, delegates gave congress the authority 

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; [and] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

The new militia act was designed to fill in the details for that Congressional authorization.  Congress’ Militia Act, passed on May 2, 1792, explicitly gave the president the power to call out the state militia doing any invasion or the imminent danger of invasion by any foreign nation or Indian tribe.  It also gave the president authority to call out the militia if an insurgency grew so large that it could not be handled by regular judicial proceedings.  Any militia member’s refusal to follow the orders of the president could result in a court martial and a fine of up to a year’s pay.

A week later, on May 8, Congress passed a second militia act.  It required all able-bodied white men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to be enrolled in a militia.  All militia members were required to buy their own musket or rifle, ammunition, and equipment to keep on hand at all times.  The law exempted certain professions from militia duty, including most federal officials, sailors, ferry operators.  It also allowed states to create their own exemptions.

The state exemptions were particularly contentious.  Congress debated whether to grant exemptions for religious reasons.  Some states with many Quakers or other peace-oriented religions, strongly supported this exemption.  Madison strongly advocated for a conscientious objector provision, but could not get it passed.  Other members believed such a provision would create a loophole that would allow anyone who just wished to avoid service to claim an exemption.  There were also arguments from manufacturers that militia duty would disrupt the productivity of apprentices. In the end, by allowing each state to adopt whatever exemptions it wanted, they sidestepped these contentious arguments and left it to state leaders to resolve on a state by state basis..  

There was also some debate about whether a president might abuse the power to call up the militia to put down a rebellion.  While no one expected President Washington to abuse the power, the same might not be said for future presidents. The result was a requirement that a federal judge had to affirm the need to call out the militia.

Congress also ended up limiting the power of the militia for three years.  That would force them to reconsider whether this power was being used properly after some time had passed.

The law also defined carefully how a chain of command would work, with the President as commander in chief.  It also limited militia service to a maximum of three months in a year.

Because the most controversial matters regarding conscientious objections were avoided in the final bill, both militia acts passed Congress pretty convincingly.  President Washington signed them into law.

Tariff Act

I covered the Militia Act first because it led directly from our last episode’s events regarding the war with the Indians in the Ohio territory.  But Congress was actively engaged in a number of other important laws at the same time.  It passed the tariff Act in March, about two months before the Militia Act.

Congress had already begun authorizing tariffs in 1789. It was one of the first things that Congress did since it needed to start collecting money. The 1792 Act took tariffs in a new direction and brought more controversy. 

The basis for the new tariffs came from Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures, released in late 1791.  Hamilton proposed increasing tariffs for the purpose of making it more expensive for consumers to import manufactured goods from abroad.  This would allow local manufacturers, primarily based in New England and the mid-Atlantic states to become more competitive.

Back during the colonial era, the colonies were not permitted to engage in manufacturing.  Britain wanted the colonies to focus on producing raw materials for British manufacturers.  The independent US saw manufacturing grow at a phenomenal rate.  Hamilton saw manufacturing as the key to making the United States into an independent world power, with less dependence on Europe.

To this end, Hamilton’s report recommended higher tariffs on imported goods.  It also recommended reducing tariffs on certain raw materials, and even subsidies for certain industries.  Many import duties were increased by about two percent.  Certain items, including cotton, hemp, and iron, had massive duties in order to encourage domestic production

This plan also had its opponents.  Merchants and shipowners, who thought they had fought a revolution to prevent officials from sticking them with tariffs to benefit certain groups over others, greatly opposed this plan.  Opponents noted that the Constitution only allowed tariffs for raising revenue, not for the influencing of manufacturing.  The distinction between regulatory and revenue tariffs had also been a hot button issue during the Revolutionary War.

Southern colonies balked at the idea of having to pay more for their imported goods in an effort to benefit moneyed interests in the north. Jefferson viewed America as an agricultural utopia, and that encouraging greater manufacturing and industry would destroy that.  Southern leaders like Madison favored free trade.  They did not want Hamilton using the government to benefit his rich supporters in northern cities.  Rather, southern farmers should be permitted to buy from whatever source they wished.  They saw Hamilton’s efforts as a form of corruption, using the government to enrich friends and the expense of everyone else.

Despite this strong opposition, the tariff act passed much along the lines that Hamilton had recommended.  President Washington signed it into law.

Coinage Act 

Congress also passed the Coinage Act in April. The Constitution required that the federal government established a mint for coining money.  Washington had badgered Congress for several years to get this done.  Finally, in 1792, Congress put it in place.  The Coinage Act established the US Mint in Philadelphia.  It authorized the creation of copper pennies and half-pennies, silver half-dimes, dimes, quarters, half-dollars and dollars, and gold pieces worth $2.50, $5, and $10.

The law went into great detail about the design and metal quality of the coins that I won’t get into here.  I will say that Madison and Jefferson objected to Hamilton’s formula because Jefferson wanted the silver dollar to be exactly one ounce.  While this was not a major public issue, the fact that Jefferson’s view beat Hamilton’s was one that greatly annoyed Hamilton.  On thing that particularly galled Hamilton, Madison, who tended to serve as Washington's ghost writer on major speeches, attempted to put his own preferred wording of the metal content issue the President’s state of the Union address on this matter to be partisan intrigue.  Hamilton later pointed this out and the President changed the wording to appear neutral on the matter.

The more public issue was the design.  Hamilton wanted George Washington to appear on the coins, much like European coins included the images of the current monarch.  Hamilton and other Federalists believed this would instill patriotism. The Republicans objected.  They did not want the President to appear as a king and instead proposed more abstract symbols of liberty to appear on all the coins.

Washington stayed far away from this debate.  Once again though, the Republicans prevailed.  The Coinage Act specified the use of abstract imagery rather than that of any actual person.

Finally, Hamilton suffered a third blow in the passage of this act.  It would seem logical that the mint would fall under the authority of the Treasury Department.  Hamilton, however, had a great deal of responsibilities on his plate at this time.  Jefferson had already held himself out as an expert on coinage, based on his tours of France’s mint.  Washington ended up giving the responsibility for regulating and managing the mint to the Secretary of State.

Because the mint was a very specific facility, it became the first building built from scratch for the federal government.  President Washington appointed Pennsylvania Treasurer David Rittenhouse to be the first director of the mint.  Supposedly, Rittenhouse hand pressed the first half-dimes a few months later.  He got his silver for these coins directly from President Washington, who donated his silverware for the experiment.  It would not be until 1793 that the first mass produced coins, pennies would be distributed to the public.

More Assumption of Debt

During the 1792 term, Hamilton also pushed for greater federal assumption of state debts from the war.  The first assumption bill, which had been part of the whole compromise to move the capital to Washington, DC, had left out many debts particularly in Massachusetts and South Carolina.  

Some opponents argued that many states were abusing the assumption to get hundreds of thousands of more dollars than they actually deserved.  To them, this was waste, fraud, and abuse.  Later the government would appoint a commission to look into the matter.  The commission found that many states, in fact, got more money than they should have. 

Hamilton was not particularly concerned about the details.  His focus was to have the nation’s entire financial system focused on the federal government, rather than the states, so that investors could get paid.

Related to all of this, Hamilton also pushed for a sinking fund to be adopted.  This was a common financial strategy used in Britain.  It ensured that certain tax revenues were dedicated to the reduction of debt and could not be used for other purposes.

Part of the act passed by Congress that year was the establishment of more sources of revenue to pay down the debt.  An important one was a tax on whiskey.

Hamilton’s main focus was on investor confidence.  He did not want US debt to be sold at a discount in the market.  During several financial crises in 1791 and 1792, Hamilton had the Bank of the United States and the Bank of New York buy up securities to ensure they remained near par value.  His goal was investor confidence so that foreign investors would invest in lower interest loans.  

Opponents, however, saw it as a strategy to enrich Hamilton’s favored investor class, giving them healthy returns with no real risk.  Once again, Hamilton got congress to pass the laws, but opponents like Madison continued to grow angrier.  They saw the abuse and speculation among eastern investors that ended up harming many working people.

Apportionment Act

One of the biggest debates that year was over apportionment.  Following the 1790 Census, Congress had to reapportion seats in the House of Representatives.  Members of Congress had to determine how many representatives each state would get. 

The Constitution required no more than one representative for every 30,000 people, except that every state would have at least one representative.  You’d think this would be a simple math problem.  But there was more than one way to do the math and certain states got advantages depending on what model was used. 

Congress, using a formula that Hamilton had recommended, took the total population of the US (counting slaves as three-fifths of a person) and divided it by 30,000.  This gave them a House of 120 representatives.  Of course, some states had a fraction of a representative, so the states with the largest fraction got an extra representative.

As it turned out, most of those fractional bonus representatives went to northern states that were more heavily federalist.  As a result, the southern states, which also tended to be dominated by Democratic-Republicans, objected to this formula.

Since the Federalists were in the majority, Congress passed the law using their formula and sent it to President Washington.  The President found himself in a bind.  He did not like controversial partisan decisions.  Signing the bill would anger many southerners, particularly Virginians.  Vetoing the bill might make him look provincial and supporting the position of his home state.

Washington asked for comments from his cabinet.  Not surprisingly, Hamilton and Knox, both northerners, said he should sign the bill.  Congress acted reasonably in this matter and the President should defer to Congress.  Jefferson and Randolph, who were both from Virginia, both argued for a veto.  They argued that the formula for apportionment should simply apply the ratio of 30,000 to 1 to each state population and give the state that number of representatives.  There should be no bonus representative for any fraction that was higher based on the total national population.

In the end, Washington decided to veto the bill.  He stuck to a more basic constitutional arguments.  The Constitution said there should be no more than one representative for every 30,000 people.  Under the Federalists’ formula, some states had more than that.  One state had a representative for every 28,000 people, for example.

Washington vetoed the bill on April 5, 1792.  He sent it back with two objections.  The President noted that the Constitution required that representatives be apportioned based on the population of each state, not the national population.  It also required no more than one representative for every 30,000 voters and that this bill violated that in some states.

After Congress failed to override the veto, it ended up using the other formula, and changing the distribution to one representative for every 33,000 people.  In other words, the formula that the Democratic-Republicans like Jefferson and Madison wanted prevailed.  This reduced the size of Congress from 120 members to 105 members, still much larger than the first congress, but not as large as some had hoped.

In the end, no state got more votes since Congress was 15 members smaller.  The changed formula only affected two states. Delaware lost one representative and Virginia gained one using the Jefferson formula rather than the Hamilton formula.

Next week, the American flag gets a 15th star and a 15th stripe as Kentucky joins the Union.

 - -

Next Episode 378 Kentucky Statehood

Previous Episode 376 Battle of the Wabash

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

 Follow the podcast on X (formerly Twitter) @AmRevPodcast

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American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account. You may also donate via Venmo (@Michael-Troy-20).


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Further Reading

Websites

Militia Act of 1792 https://www.mountvernon.org/education/primary-source-collections/primary-source-collections/article/militia-act-of-1792

The First Congressional Investigation: St. Clair's Military Disaster of 1791: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA517709.pdf

Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures Dec. 5, 1791: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007

Coinage Act of April 2, 1792 https://www.usmint.gov/learn/history/historical-documents/coinage-act-of-april-2-1792

The 1790 Census and the First Veto: https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2022/04/04/the-1790-census-and-the-first-veto

Balinski, M. L., and H. P. Young. “The Jefferson Method of Apportionment.” SIAM Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 1978, pp. 278–84. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2029901.

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Brant, Irving James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1950 (borrow only). 

Maas, John Defending a New Nation, 1783-1811, Center of Military History, 2013. 

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Rights of Man, Little Brown and Co. 1951.  (borrow only)

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton: Portrait in Paradox, Harper & Brothers, 1959. 

Preston, John H. A Gentleman Rebel: Mad Anthony Wayne, Garden City Publishing Co., 1930. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chernow, Ron Washington, A Life, Penguin Press, 2010. 

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. The Cabinet: George Washington and the Creation of an American Institution, Belknap Press, 2020. 

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Ellis, Joseph J. His Excellency. George Washington, Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. 

Ellis, Joseph J. Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation, Knopf, 2000.

Ferling, John Jefferson and Hamilton: The Rivalry That Forged a Nation Hardcover, Bloomsbury Press, 2013. 

Heidler, David S. & Jeanne T. Washington's Circle: The Creation of the President, Random House, 2015. 

Hunger, Harlow Giles Mr. President: George Washington and the Making of the Nation's Highest Office, De Capo Press, 2013. 

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012.

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (Borrow on archive.org

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, February 1, 2026

AR-SP46 Carl Borick The Revolution in South Carolina

Carl Borick, Director of the University of Charleston Museum in South Carolina joined us for a discussion of South Carolina's role in the Revolutionary War.

We covered the British attack on Fort Sullivan in 1776, Charleston's stand of in 1779, the British Siege of Charleston in 1780, and the events following the Siege.  

The Charleston Museum has a special exhibit called Ringleaders of Rebellion: Charleston in Revolt, 1775-1783.  You can get more details here: https://www.charlestonmuseum.org/exhibits/upcoming/68/ringleaders-of-rebellion

Mr. Borick also has thee books about the War: 


To see upcoming roundtable events, or listen to past recordings, go to AmRevRT.org

To participate live in future Zoom events, be sure to join as a member on Patreon, or sign up for my mailing list,


Click here to see my Patreon Page
You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option making monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.


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Sunday, January 25, 2026

ARP376 Battle of Wabash

In late 1791, the US Army faced its first real challenge in battle.  The stakes were whether the Ohio  Territory would become part of the United States, or remain Indian territory.

Ohio in 1790

The Ohio territory was seen as the future of the United States.  Congress was counting on land sales there to help finance the federal government, and to begin paying off war debts.  The Northwest Ordinance had divided up the land and outlined how it would be auctioned and sold to settlers moving into the territory.  Virginia had already begun settling veterans on land north of the Ohio River.  The Ohio Company had established Marietta in 1788 and began selling land and settling the territory.

Arthur St. Clair had been appointed as Governor of the Northwest Territory.  To the extent the US had any army at all, almost all of it was located in Marietta with the purpose of making sure settlement proceeded as planned and for purposes of Indian pacification.  As I mentioned back in Episode 359, Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar remained in command of the US Army.

Battle of Wabash

Back in Episode 336, we covered how the US had entered into a series of treaties in 1785 giving it the legal possession of most of the Ohio Territory.  Many of the Indians who lived there, however, did not recognize the validity of those treaties, and were determined to keep the Americans from settling on their side of the Ohio River.

One of the leaders of this resistance was the Miami war chief MihÅ¡ihkinaahkwa, also known as Little Turtle.  We first discussed Little Turtle back in Episode 271, when he intercepted a force of French soldiers that were trying to advance through his territory toward Detroit in 1780.

His warriors massacred the soldiers, prisoners were tortured, mutilated, and burned alive, with a a few released so they could tell the story.  The purpose of this treat was a warning to stay out of Miami territory.  Little Turtle received some British support in his efforts to keep the Americans out of his territory.

With the arrival of US settlements at the end of the War, Little Turtle joined the Northwestern Confederacy, an alliance with other tribes including the Shawnee and Delaware, as well as the Iroquois under Joseph Brant.

Native warriors regularly conducted raids on settlements, killing settlers, burning their farms, and often kidnapping their children.  They did not restrict their raids to the Ohio territory.  Many raids crossed into Virginia and Pennsylvania.

Harmar Expedition

Harmar, by this time a general by brevet, and his officers regularly met with tribal leaders in hopes of establishing diplomatic understandings or trade agreements.  The army did not report engaging in any attacks on Indians.  In fact, Harmar had orders from the Secretary of War not to engage in any offensive operations.  The US wanted to avoid provoking a war.

Josiah Harmar
Frontier communities were largely responsible for their own protection.  They formed militias which were not afraid to engage with native tribes when they thought it was necessary.  But the growing presence of more and more settlers on what the Indians still regarded as their lands led to increased Indian attacks.  Territorial governor Arthur St. Clair reported that the Indians had killed, wounded or captured over 1500 men women and children since the end of the Revolutionary War.  St. Clair warned that if the government failed to act, the settlers would take increasingly aggressive actions on their own.  The Indians were also getting supplies and support from the British outpost still occupying Detroit.

US Officials determined that some of the most aggressive raids were coming from the Miami and neighboring tribes along the Wabash River, which mostly runs through what is today the State of Indiana.

Officials in Philadelphia, including President Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox, concluded that the army needed to engage in a sudden stroke with a large force to “chastize” the hostile tribes for their continued attacks.  This expedition would be similar to the Sullivan Expedition in New York during the Revolutionary War.  The army would march in force, burning crops and villages. Their ultimate target would be the confluence of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph Rivers, called Kekionga, near modern day Fort Wayne, and where a concentration of Native warriors were gathering.

The US Army, however, did not have nearly enough soldiers for such a mission.  Although Congress had recently authorized recruitment of nearly 1300 officers and men, the current US Army was probably closer to 500.  Many of these were spread out across outposts that could not simply be abandoned.  General Harmar was able to assemble about 320 officers and men for his expeditionary force.  He augmented this force by calling out the militia in Kentucky and western Pennsylvania.

Harmar Campaign
This raised over 1100 men, bringing the total to nearly 1500.  Harmar complained about the condition of the militia.  Many of those who turned out were hired substitutes.  Many were boys or old men.  The majority had not come with guns.  

The main army assembled primarily at Fort Washington, modern day Cincinnati, and marched into Indian territory in September.  A second smaller group of several hundred marched east from Vincennes.

Much of this area was wilderness, requiring the army to cut its own roads.  Progress was slow, often only a few miles per day.  Cold weather, disease, and insufficient rations soon began to take its toll.  Many militiamen, including at times entire units, tried to desert.

The force that marched east from Vincennes, never made it to their goal.  The group consisted of only about 50 regulars and over 250 militia.  Given the hardships of the march and a lack of food, the militia mutinied and abandoned the mission.  They ended up burning one small village and returning to Vincennes.

This second force from Vincennes, however, had been providing a distraction for the Indians, making it difficult for them to concentrate on Harmar’s main force.  As Harmar’s army advanced through the wilderness, they encountered little resistance.  Natives were well aware of the approaching army and fled their homes.  As a result, Harmar divided his forces so they could cover more ground, burning more villages and crops.

Battle of Kekionga

By October 17, the army reached Kekionga.  Harmar deployed Colonel John Hardin with about 300 men, mostly Kentucky militia, to take out a village several miles away, the home of Little Turtle.  Instead, they walked into an ambush set by Little Turtle.  The surprised militia panicked and ran away.  Many threw down their arms and fled without firing a shot.

Little Turtle
The result was a slaughter, about 100 men were killed, about one-third of the total force.  The US army commander with the force, Captain Armstrong reported hiding in a swamp that night, listening to the Indians celebrating their victory over the corpses of their vanquished.

Back at the main camp, Warriors began harassing the soldiers.  The Indians, who probably numbered over 1000, and could probably have taken the force, did not attack directly.

The army burned the village and destroyed an estimated 300 homes and 20,000 bushels of corn.  Unable to get the Indians into a decisive battle, the army began to withdraw.

A couple of days later, Colonel Hardin took another 400 men and returned to the village, hoping to catch the Indians by surprise and exact some revenge for the ambush he suffered earlier.  Little Turtle set up another ambush and attacked. This force of mostly regulars suffered about 80 killed.  The battle was a fierce one with a number of Indians killed as well, although exact numbers are unknown.  The brigade withdrew and the Indians did not pursue.

On November 3, Harmar’s army returned to Fort Washington, having lost a total of 183 men.  Harmar reported that the mission was a success.  They had burned a number of towns and set up a string of outposts in Indian territory.  As for the casualties, Harmar blamed the militia, referring to their "ignorance, imbecility, insubordination and want of equipment"

Despite the rosy picture Harmar tried to paint, the consensus was that the mission was a failure. A court of inquiry cleared Harmar of any wrongdoing, and blamed the militia for the shortcomings of the campaign.  Despite being cleared, public opinion, including civilian leadership, were highly critical.  Many feared that the inconclusive attack would serve as a provocation and result in more attacks on settlements. 

This fear proved correct.  Native raids on towns in Ohio picked up over the winter and into the spring of 1791. Many Americans believed that the army had abandoned the region.  This resulted in more squatters moving into the territory as well.  Government officials needed to act decisively or the plans for the Northwest Territory would fail.

A New Army

Washington removed Harmar from command, reactivated the territorial Governor, Arthur St. Clair as a major general, and put him in command of the Army.  St. Clair, of course, had been a  major general during most of the Revolutionary War.  While returning to active service, St. Clair retained his position as territorial governor.  Washington also appointed an experienced second in command. Richard Butler had served as a colonel during the war, operating as a regimental commander in the Saratoga Campaign, later he transferred to Valley Forge, fighting at Monmouth and Yorktown. Washington personally recognized his abilities and gave him a brevet to brigadier general before the Revolution had ended.

Arthur St. Clair
After the war, Butler became a large land owner in Western Pennsylvania, and also served as a state judge in Pittsburgh, as well as a member of the state’s General Assembly.  Butler returned to full service as a full brigadier.

Knox requested that Congress authorize an expansion of the army to 3000.  The final law passed by Congress in March 1791 authorized a second regiment of 912 men, 2000 short term enlistments, and to call out the militia for six months.  

Another, former Continental General, Charles Scott, also took command of a militia army from Kentucky.  Scott’s first experience fighting Indians had been in the Braddock Campaign of 1755.  After the war, Scott had moved into the Kentucky territory to take his share of veteran’s land.  Two of his adult sons were killed by Indians, one of them in Harmar’s expedition.

The goal of this overwhelming force was to impress on the Indians and others, the power of the US Army and the futility of resistance. The goal, once again, was to burn Indian villages, and focus on the target at the center of the Wabash territory, controlled primarily by the Miami Indians who had defeated Harmar. 

There was some opposition.  Thomas Jefferson feared that the action would create a permanent need for a larger standing army and would increase the national debt. In an effort to resolve the issue, Washington agreed to send an emissary, the Chief Cornplanter of the Iroquois, along with Colonel Thomas Procter who had been a Continental officer who fought in the Sullivan expedition against the Iroquois.  The goal was to convince the western tribes to accept peace or else, as Knox put it, they would “send forth such number of warriors as would drive you entirely of the country” resulting in “absolute destruction to you, your women, and your children.”

In the end, Cornplanter refused to go, and Procter needed help getting across Lake Erie, which British officials refused to allow.  There were a few other half-hearted attempts to make diplomatic overtures, but none of these had any impact.  The consensus was that they needed to display overwhelming force before the Indians would come to heel.

The initial plan had been to organize the military campaign in the spring, and for the expedition to embark in July.  St. Clair had returned to Philadelphia for consultations and left for the west a few weeks after Congress passed the law authorizing the larger army in March, 1791.  St. Clair, however, was sick with gout and found it hard to travel.  He did not reach Fort Washington until mid-May.  When he got there, he found only about 150 regulars present and fit for duty.  

St. Clair’s first action was to deploy 500 of the mounted Kentucky militia to attack and distract the Indians from his primary target.  The commander of this secondary force was former Continental Colonel James Wilkinson.  You may recall Wilkinson from the Revolution, when he was an aide to General Horatio Gates.  Wilkinson had to resign in 1778 for his role in the Conway Cabal.  He later served nearly two years as the Continental Army’s Clothier General, but resigned from that position as well, generally considered a failure.

After the War, Wilkinson moved to the Kentucky territory, where he was a leader in the effort to separate Kentucky from Virginia.  He strongly opposed the ratification of the Constitution and was much more interested in an independent State of Kentucky.  What most people did not know at the time was that after Virginia ratified the Constitution, Wilkinson traveled to meet with the Spanish Governor in New Orleans.  His aim was to make a deal that would make Kentucky part of the Spanish Empire, and for this service he would receive a grant of 60,000 acres.  While Spain was not fully ready to put such an ambitious plan into effect, they did begin providing funds to Wilkinson for him to act as a Spanish agent.

For now though, Wilkinson’s interest aligned with the United States.  He wanted to stop the Indian raids on Kentucky.  Wilkinson and the Kentucky militia rode out in May toward the Wabash Valley.  At first he marched north toward Kekionga, but that was a feint.  He then rode his army west attacking villages further south along the Wabash River.

His attack on one village surprised the residence.  His soldiers managed to kill six men, two women, and one child.  He also captured 38 prisoners among those captured was Little Turtles daughter and grandchild.  He continued his rampage on a series of towns through August, burning homes and destroying crops.  After deciding his work was done, Wilkinson and his militia returned to their homes in Kentucky.

St. Clair's Camp Nov 4, 1791
Wilkinson’s raids were supposed to be a distraction while St. Clair’s main force made its attack. But the main army waited at Fort Washington.  It was not until September that General Butler arrived with the additional regulars.  The army set out in September, again moving slow as they cut their way through the wilderness.  To speed up the process Butler abandoned St. Clair’s orders to cut two parallel lines for the army, and instead focused on just one.  When St. Clair rejoined the army a few days later, he reprimanded Butler for violating orders. The result was a rift between the first and second in command of the army. The two men refused to speak to one another for the remainder of the campaign.

By October 12, the army reached Fort Jefferson, one of the outposts established by the Harmar Expedition.  This was less than half the distance of their 150 mile march to Kekionga.  By that time, frost was killing the forage and a lack of supplies was causing food shortages for the army.  St. Clair’s gout got so bad he could no longer ride a horse.  He continued in a litter carried between two horses.  After 60 of the Kentucky militia still with the main force deserted, St. Clair had to send about 300 soldiers to go after them.  St. Clair feared the deserters might capture the food supply wagons that they so desperately needed.

St. Clair had left Fort Washington with over 2400 men.  By the end of October, he had only less than 2000. After deploying a regiment to go after the deserters, he had at most 1700 men in the main body, although some estimates say this was as few as 1400.  There were also several hundred camp followers, women and children who were related to the soldiers.

The Battle

On November 3, the army reached the Wabash River and established a camp.  They had seen no organized enemy and did not bother to set up any real defenses.  

There was, however, a large force of Indians in the region.  The Wilkinson Expedition a few months earlier had motivated the tribes to form an army of their own.  Led by Little Turtle and the Shawnee Chief Blue Jacket, the Indian army consisted of between 1100 and 1400 warriors.

At around dawn the following morning, the Indians attacked the camp.  The surprise attack was devastating.  Most of the militia fled immediately.  Reports say that many of them simply dropped their guns and ran without firing a shot.

Richard Butler
Those who remained, including most of the regulars, were surrounded.  The Indian warriors overran the American artillery and killed the soldiers manning those guns.  The infantry fought mostly in hand to hand combat with bayonets.  St. Clair led a bayonet charge and had two horses shot out from under him during the battle. Although he had several bullet holes in his uniform, he managed to survive unscathed.  General Butler was shot twice.  He retired to his tent, where he died.

Some of the female camp followers took up arms and fought with the army.  Some of these women were killed in battle as well.  

The battle raged for about four hours.  Eventually, St. Clair ordered a breakout charge, leaving behind the wounded and their supplies.  Those who survived the charge and escaped returned to Fort Jefferson.  Any wounded left behind were killed and scalped.  The Indians did not pursue the retreating column for very long.  The Indians realized they were missing out on the spoils left in camp and returned to claim their share.

Aftermath

Although records differ, there were probably somewhere between 600 and 800 soldiers killed, and another 300 wounded.  As I said, those wounded who did not escape were killed.  So the wounded who did escape were able to run or ride a horse. US Army casualties were about two-thirds those involved in the battle.  Total losses cut the entire size of the US Army in half.

The Indians captured six cannons, 1200 muskets and ammunition, hundreds of horses, and wagons full of other supplies.  Indian casualties seem to have been rather light.  Little Turtle reported 21 killed and 40 wounded.

The American battlefield deaths were worse than any American battle during the Revolutionary war.  Many of the wounded were brought back to Fort Jefferson where they received inadequate medical care.  Most of them died there.

The entire campaign was an utter defeat.

Next week: we will look at the government’s response to this defeat, including some legislation that is still part of the government today.

- - -

Next Episode 377 Washington's First Veto

Previous Episode 375 Ratifying the Bill of Rights 

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

 Follow the podcast on X (formerly Twitter) @AmRevPodcast

 Join the Facebook group, American Revolution Podcast 

 Join American Revolution Podcast on Quora 
 
Discuss the AmRev Podcast on Reddit

American Revolution Podcast Merch!

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American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account. You may also donate via Venmo (@Michael-Troy-20).


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You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option making monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to ad-free episodes, podcast extras, and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

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Further Reading

Websites

Battle of Kekionga: https://archfw.org/heritage-trail/kekionga/the-battle-of-kekionga

A Narrative of Harmar’s Defeat: October 22nd, 1790 https://fortwaynehistory.com/2021/12/a-narrative-of-harmars-defeat-october-22nd-1790

Warner, Michael S. “General Josiah Harmar’s Campaign Reconsidered: How the Americans Lost the Battle of Kekionga.” Indiana Magazine of History, vol. 83, no. 1, 1987, pp. 43–64. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27791042.

St. Clair's Campaign of 1791: A Defeat in the Wilderness That Helped Forge Today's U.S. Army: https://www.army.mil/article/65594/st_clairs_campaign_of_1791_a_defeat_in_the_wilderness_that_helped_forge_todays_u_s_army

Eid, Leroy V. “American Indian Military Leadership: St. Clair’s 1791 Defeat.” The Journal of Military History, vol. 57, no. 1, 1993, pp. 71–88. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2944223

Nelson, Paul David. “General Charles Scott, the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers, and the Northwest Indian Wars, 1784-1794.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 6, no. 3, 1986, pp. 219–51. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/3122915.

Lt. Col. Josiah Harmar: https://pasocietyofthecincinnati.org/gallery_post/lt-col-josiah-harmar

General Richard Butler: https://www.butlerhistory.com/richardbutler

The Battle of the Wabash: The Forgotten Disaster of the Indian Wars https://armyhistory.org/the-battle-of-the-wabash-the-forgotten-disaster-of-the-indian-wars

Fort statue honors Indian war survivor: https://dailystandard.com/archive/2009-04-17/stories/8528/fort-statue-honors-indian-war-survivor

Congress’ First Investigation, St. Clair’s defeat: https://sitemap.carllevincenter.org/congress-first-investigation-general-st-clairs-defeat

The First Congressional Investigation: St. Clair's Military Disaster of 1791: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA517709.pdf

VIDEO: St. Clair’s Defeat: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDoLu_97IoE

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

General Harmar’s Campaign, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1954. 

Little Turtle, Chief of the Miami, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1954. 

Scott’s Wabash Expedition, 1791, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1953 (borrow only). 

St. Clair’s Defeat, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1954. 

Jarrold, Rachel Marian Arthur St. Clair: Governor of the Northwest Territory 1787-1802, Univ. of Illinois [Master’s thesis], 1909. 

Matthaidess III, Maj. Edwin D. “Our Loss Was Heavy”: Brigadier General Josiah Harmar’s Kekionga Campaign of 1790. Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015 (from Defence Technical Information Center).  

Potterf, Rex M. Little Turtle : 1752-1812, Allen County-Fort Wayne Historical Society, 1960. 

Smith, William Henry The St. Clair PapersVol. 1 & Vol. 2, Cincinnati: Clarke, 1882. 

Young, Calvin M. Little Turtle (Me-she-kin-no-quah): The Great Chief of the Miami Indian Nation, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1917 (1956 reprint). 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Calloway, Colin G. The Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First American Army, Oxford Univ. Press, 2014. 

Carter, Harvey L. The Life and Times of Little Turtle: First Sagamore of the Wabash, Univ. of Ill. Press, 1986. 

Gaff, Alan D. Field of Corpses: Arthur St. Clair and the Death of an American Army, Knox Press, 2025. 

Locke, Steven P. War Along the Wabash: The Ohio Indian Confederacy's Destruction of the US Army, 1792, Casemate, 2023. 

Schoenfield, Rick M. The Soldiers Fell Like Autumn Leaves: The Battle of the Wabash, Westholme Publishing, 2024. 

Winkler, John F. Wabash 1791: St Clair’s Defeat, Osprey Publishing, 2011.  

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.