American Revolution Podcast

Sunday, September 13, 2026

ARP400 The Maria Reynolds Affair

In 1797 a sex scandal rocked the capital. A sleazy affair connected with allegations of bribes and government corruption drew condemnation and destroyed the reputation of Alexander Hamilton. This week we look at the Maria Reynolds Affair.

The Meeting

The actual affair began back in the summer of 1791.

Alexander Hamilton

A beautiful 23 year old woman named Maria Reynolds knocked on Hamilton’s door at his home on 3rd Street in Philadelphia. Maria told the Treasury Secretary a story of woe. Her abusive husband had abandoned her for another woman. She was alone and needed help. Maria was originally from New York and that, as a fellow New Yorker, she hoped that Hamilton would help her. Hamilton’s wife was home at the time. Instead of discussing the matter further then and there, he agreed to meet her the following night at her boarding room.

The next night, Hamilton brought her $30. He later said that it was clear that Maria wanted a more intimate relationship, and the affair began that night. Hamilton’s wife, unaware of all this, took the children on vacation to Albany to visit her father. Hamilton brought Maria into their home, where the affair continued.

This went on for what was later described as “a short time” - maybe a few weeks, maybe months. At some point Reynolds told Hamilton that she was reconciling with her husband, something Hamilton later told others that he encouraged. Hamilton probably figured, it was fun summer, now it’s over, my family will be returning soon, and life will go on like nothing happened.

As you might have guessed, something happened.

The Money

Hamilton may have continued to see the young woman from time to time after she returned to her husband. At one point, Maria told Hamilton that her husband, James Reynolds, speculated in government securities and that he was getting insider information from the Treasury Department to make money.

Hamilton met with Mr. Reynolds, who identified Assistant Treasury Secretary William Duer as the person who was leaking insider information. We discussed Duer back in Episode 379. Insider trading was not illegal at the time. But Duer was involved in financial schemes of his own. He was engaged in a conspiracy to corner the securities market with borrowed funds. In early 1792, the conspirators were unable to repay their debts. They went to debtors’ prison and caused the Financial Panic of 1792.

Before all of that blew up, Hamilton received two letters dated December 15, 1791. One was from Maria Reynolds saying that her husband had discovered letters revealing their affair. The second letter was from James Reynolds saying that he had discovered the affair, that his wife had confessed everything to him, and attacking Hamilton for taking advantage of his wife. Two days later, James sent a second letter demanding to meet with Hamilton. Two days after that he sent a third letter, referencing a meeting between the two men, and making an interesting offer. Reynolds said he could not reconcile with his wife after what had happened. He asked Hamilton to give him $1000 so that he could leave town with his daughter, and that he would leave Maria behind for Hamilton to do whatever he wanted with her.

Hamilton paid Reynolds $600 a few days later, and another $400 a couple of weeks after that. $1000 was a considerable sum. Hamilton received an annual salary of only $3500. But with this payment Hamilton hoped to put the whole thing behind him. That didn’t work.

Reynolds did not leave town as promised. In fact, probably with the money from Hamilton, he purchased a large house on Vine Street. Over the next six months, Mr. Reynolds would ask for more money from Hamilton in smaller amounts. He essentially pimped out Maria, encouraging Hamilton to visit her and to lend him small amounts of money that everyone knew would never be repaid. Reynolds even encouraged Hamilton to visit Maria. In one letter to Hamilton he wrote “I find when ever you have been with her, She is Cheerful and kind, but when you have not in some time she is Quite the Reverse and wishes to be alone by her self."

Mrs. Reynolds also sent letters to Hamilton begging him to visit her. Hamilton continued the affair through most of 1792. Hamilton also passed along hundreds of dollars in loans to Mr. Reynolds during this time.

Reynolds Background

To this day, it is not entirely clear whether the Reynolds’ planned this from the beginning, or whether they simply took advantage of the situation. Hamilton came to believe that James and Maria Reynolds conspired together to ensnare Hamilton in a blackmail plot from the beginning. It is also possible that Maria really did come to Hamilton at first, seeking help, and with a willingness to trade sex for favors, and that James discovered the affair and only then decided to use it for blackmail and profit.

Our knowledge of the Reynolds’ background is limited. Maria was born Maria Lewis in New York City. Her father, Richard Lewis was an illiterate laborer. Her mother was Susanna Van Der Burgh. It was her second marriage. Susanna had at least six children with her first husband, Elias Dubois, and another six with Richard Lewis. Maria was the second to last, born in 1768. She has been described by various people who knew her as very attractive, and also very emotional, prone to wild mood swings.

In 1783, at age 15, she married James Reynolds, who had served in the Revolutionary War with his father, David Reynolds, most of that time in the commissary department. Reynolds was originally from Orange County, New York. Most of what we know of his post war years was that Reynolds made multiple efforts to receive compensation for losses during the war, and looking for a government job. The couple had one child, a daughter, Susan, born in 1785.

In 1790, a New York merchant, William Vredenburgh, hired James to buy up pay claims from soldiers in Virginia and North Carolina as part of a speculation scheme that they could get them at a discount and get the government to pay them in full. You may recall that at this time, Congress was considering legislation that would not allow speculators to collect on these claims, that the money should go to the original claimants. Hamilton was fighting for the speculators.

It is likely that James and Maria Reynolds moved to Philadelphia in early 1791, just after the Congress moved from New York to Philadelphia. They followed Congress in order to continue efforts to collect on the veterans’ claims that were the subject of their speculation efforts.

Investigation

In the fall of 1792, Reynolds was arrested for illegally purchasing soldier pensions and back-pay claims, as well as forging documents. This was part of his ongoing efforts to profit from speculation in the claims of veterans. Again, this was not illegal. The crime was that he got at least one person to testify that a veteran had died and that they were representing his estate, when in fact that soldier was still alive. That was fraud. That was illegal.

Oliver Wolcott, Comptroller of the Treasury at the time, swore out criminal warrants against Reynold and his partner Jacob Clingman. Clingman was released on bail the same day he was arrested. Reynolds lingered in jail. Maria appealed to Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Mifflin for her husband’s release. The Governor forwarded the matter to the Pennsylvania Attorney General with instructions that the Secretary of Treasury should have a say in whether Reynolds should remain in custody.

Reynolds remained in jail. Hamilton left the investigation with Wolcott. At some point Wolcott agreed to drop the prosecution if the suspects would reveal who at the Treasury Department provided them access to the lists of veterans that they were using to make their fraudulent claims. Reynolds claimed the source was William Duer. Wolcott did not believe that, since Duer had resigned nearly three years earlier . Wolcott later pointed the finger at an unnamed clerk. Historians believe that clerk was Simeon Reynolds who was terminated on December 17, 1792, shortly after this scandal broke, and is believed to be related to James Reynolds.

When Clingman got out on bail, he turned to his old boss, Congressman Frederick Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania, who had been Speaker of the House. Clingman had multiple conversations with Muhlenberg over the next few weeks hinting that Hamilton was involved in the speculation conspiracy and that he had advanced large sums of money to Reynolds

Although Muhlenberg was a Federalist, he was concerned about the charges his former clerk was leveling at the Treasury Secretary. Muhlenberg shared his concerns with two Congressmen from the other side of the aisle, James Monroe, and Abraham Venable, both from Virginia. The three of them walked down to the jail to get Reynolds’ side of the story.

Reynolds told them that he was willing to expose Hamilton’s wrongdoing if they could get him out of jail. They arranged for his release and agreed to call on him at home that evening. When they arrived at his home, Reynolds was gone. He skipped town.

Mrs. Reynolds, however, was at home and spoke to them. She showed them several letters from Hamilton to her husband that indicated that Hamilton and Reynolds were involved financially. She said there were other letters but that he had just burned them. She also told them that Hamilton had advised Mr. Reynolds to “leave these parts, not to be seen here again, and in which case he would give something clever.”

The three congressmen kept the letters that they found in Mrs. Reynolds’ possession and drafted a letter to President Washington, regarding their findings. Before they sent the letter, they thought it best to confront Hamilton directly and get his side of the story.

The men made an appointment to meet with Hamilton at his home on Saturday evening, December 15, 1792. Hamilton was well aware of the subject of their investigation. He had invited Wolcott to his home as well. Hamilton confessed to Wolcott earlier in the day, so that he was aware of the situation.

When Muhlenberg, Monroe, and Venable arrived at Hamilton’s home, they confronted him with their evidence. Monroe showed him the letters they had obtained from Maria Reynolds and recounted what she had told them.

Hamilton then responded by giving a full account of his relationship with the Reynolds’, the sexual affair and what he regarded as blackmail to keep them from revealing the affair with Maria. He denied that he had any business relationship with Reynolds nor that he had any role in speculation or revealing insider information to any speculators, including Reynolds. He indicated that he was a victim of blackmail which explained the payments to Reynolds.

The three congressmen agreed that Hamilton had been forthright about the situation and believed that he was not involved in any illegal conspiracy to speculate on government securities. The fact that this turned out to be an investigation into a private sexual affair made them uncomfortable and evinced a regret that they had dug into this dirt in the first place.

The following day, the three congressmen collected their documents and drafted and signed a report about their interview with Hamilton. In it, they said “We left him under an impression our suspicions were removed.” Hamilton drafted his own memorandum of the meeting. He also asked for copies of the letters and other documents that they had shown him at that meeting. Monroe had the House Clerk, John Beckley, make copies of all the documents for Hamilton. Beckley also made copies for his own files.

Clingman, who was still under indictment, and who hoped that a Hamilton scandal might help him to get out of it, learned from Wolcott that Hamilton had revealed that the payments to Reynolds were blackmail payments to cover up the sex scandal with Mrs. Reynolds, not payments as part of a scheme to speculate on government paper. Clingman then went to see Maria, who learned from him that Hamilton was telling folks about their affair and the blackmail. After a crying fit, Maria denied Hamilton’s story completely. She denied the sexual affair and the blackmail. She said Hamilton was making up all of it to hide his role in the conspiracy to profit from the illegal speculation. Clingman met with Monroe a couple of weeks after their meeting with Hamilton and told Monroe what he had learned from Mariah. Monroe took notes from their conversation, and added it to the investigation documents.

The informal congressional investigation had satisfied themselves that Hamilton was not participating in any conspiracy to profit personally from government funds. They accepted the story that he was engaged in a sexual affair and had become a victim of blackmail. As a result, they filed away their documents and considered the matter at an end.

James Reynolds disappeared from history at this point. He may have moved back to New York. In May of 1793, Maria filed for divorce in New York. Her divorce attorney was Aaron Burr. After divorcing Reynolds, she married Reynolds' business partner, Jacob Clingman.

The entire scandal was buried and remained hidden from public view.

Public Scandal

Five years passed, Hamilton resigned in 1795 and went back to private practice in New York. There might have been a few whispered rumors of the affair, but most people seemed to forget about the whole thing - everyone except John Beckley, the House Clerk.

Beckley had retained copies of all the documents and reports created by the informal congressional investigation. Beckley was a highly partisan supporter of the Democratic Republicans. He was the clerk who wrote the anonymous article calling for George Washington’s impeachment based on Washington overdrawing his account while President.

Beckley spent much of 1793 conducting his own investigation, including interviews with Clingman and former Treasury clerk Andrew Fraunces. Beckley was convinced that Hamilton was part of a conspiracy with William Duer to profit from insider deals related to speculation into treasury notes and other financial instruments. He was also convinced that Reynolds was secretly acting as Hamilton’s agent and he was determined to prove this.

Even Beckley’s investigation did not reveal anything new, so the matter sat for years. Then, in 1797, the Federalists took control of Congress and terminated Beckley because of his many partisan activities. At this point, Beckley just seemed to want revenge. The dirt he still had on Hamilton as the leading Federalist in the country seemed to be just what he needed.

To release his secrets, Beckley turned to James Callender. Originally from Scotland, Callender got his start publishing pamphlets that attacked powerful leaders and exposed corruption. He angered enough powerful men that he fled to America in 1793 under threat of prosecution for sedition. In Philadelphia, Callender began almost immediately working for Democratic Republican papers, eventually finding a position as a Congressional reporter. In that role he and Beckley got to know one another. Callender began writing for the anti-administration the Aurora, and developed a reputation as a radical commentator in Philadelphia.

Beckley gave Callender copies of all the documents that he had related to the Reynolds affair. These included all of the documents created during the investigations by Muhlenberg, Monroe, and Venable. It also included the letters written between Hamilton and Reynolds. In May 1797, in a book entitled The History of the United States for 1796 Callender republished the transcripts of all the documents, as well as his own thoughts on the affair, for the entire public to read.

He announced the motivation for publication as a defense of James Monroe. At the time, Monroe was the target of Federalist attacks for unsubstantiated charges of corruption. He had recently returned from France after being recalled by President Washington and had written a book attacking the former president. Callender said that his release of the Hamilton documents showed that Monroe had legitimate ammunition to attack Hamilton in 1792 and refused to do so. Unsaid was the message to the Federalists that if you attack our leaders, we can drop a rhetorical nuclear bomb on your leaders.

Callender made clear that he believed Hamilton and James Reynolds were involved in corrupt speculation together and that the sexual affair with Maria Reynolds was the cover story that Hamilton was using to cover up his corruption.

In response, Hamilton published his own booklet a few months later entitled Observations on Certain Documents, generally known as the Reynolds Pamphlet. In this 95 page booklet, Hamilton admitted to the sexual affair with Maria Reynolds, but denied the allegation of corruption and collusion with James Reynolds. As he had told the investigators years earlier, Hamilton wrote that the money paid to Reynolds was blackmail to keep the sexual affair private.

Hamilton’s defense only seemed to increase the attacks on him. Democratic-Republicans accused him of trying to "creep under Mrs. R’s petticoats" to hide his actual corruption. Federalists attacked his judgement for admitting to the affair publicly, and just bringing more publicity to the matter

Hamilton also accused Monroe of leaking the documents to Callender. He met with Monroe in New York on July 11, 1797 and demanded that Monroe issue a statement repudiating Callender’s charges. Monroe refused. He denied that he had leaked the documents and called Hamilton a scoundrel. The two men were ready to come to blows when their friend separated them. The two considered a duel but were talked out of it by several others, including Aaron Burr.

Months later, the two men were still considering a duel. In December, Monroe wrote to Hamilton, essentially saying that if Hamilton wanted a duel, he was ready. Hamilton wrote a response a few weeks later agreeing to a duel, but apparently thought better of it and never mailed that letter.

Over time the scandal faded. The one lasting impact was that anyone who thought Hamilton had pretensions toward becoming president some day, that seemed would never happen. Nothing more happened about the affair, other than the permanent stain on Hamilton's reputation.

Next week: We look in on the ongoing war between Britain and France involving colonies in the West Indies.

- - -

Next Episode 401 War in the West Indies (coming soon)

Previous Episode 399 Financial Crisis of 1797

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Sunday, September 6, 2026

ARP399 Financial Crisis of 1797

We’ve talked a great deal about money and finance in earlier episodes. Two common themes have emerged. The first is that Americans were always short on cash. There was never enough specie, that is gold or silver money. Americans were always looking for ways to run an economy without it. Second, everyone seemed to see the real wealth potential of America in the western lands that would be settled in the future. The financial crisis that we will cover this week involves both of those.

Financial Situation in America

In 1796, the government was focused on paying down debt from the Revolutionary War. In that year, total government debt was over $83 million. Government revenue was only a little over $8 million, meaning that debt was about ten times revenue.

Robert Morris

Debt dwarfed everything else in the government. Of the $8 million collected in 1796, about $3.2 million went to interest on the debt. Another $2.5 million covered all the other expenses for the federal government, and the final $2.5 went toward paying down the debt. This was actually a good year for the government. For several years prior, military costs due to fighting the Indians in Ohio and building a navy to deal with threats in North Africa had increased military costs and resulted in more debt.

Following the adoption of the Constitution, Congress had implemented a financial plan, created by Alexander Hamilton, which had raised taxes to pay down the debt. Many of these taxes were dedicated by law to repayment of debt. Even so, the national debt in 1791 was $75.4 million. By 1796, it had risen to $83.7 million

The burden of taxes did not directly impact many people, unless they were importers. The bulk of taxes were tariffs on imports. Another big chunk came from excise taxes, like the tax on whiskey, which certainly led to some complaints.

While the government was struggling with debt, life for most Americans was pretty good. In an earlier episode, I talked about the financial crisis of 1791-92, which was basically caused by speculators buying up old paper money at a discount to take advantage of the Federal government’s decision to pay the full value of that paper. When it turned out that repayment was going to take longer than many speculators had hoped, the financial bubble burst. I also mentioned that William Duer’s speculation and his bankruptcy in 1792 caused a big part of that financial crisis.

But since then, the economy had been doing pretty well. The Europe between France and most of the rest of Europe created a demand for US food and other goods. By remaining neutral, the US tried to sell to everyone in Europe. Many European investors, unnerved by the war in Europe, tried to park their money in US assets in order to protect them. US exports more than doubled between 1790 and 1794. Profits from overseas merchants quadrupled. Wages for laborers in port cities more than doubled. Many Americans began buying more luxuries such as imported fabrics, china, and carpets, despite import tariffs. The invention of the cotton gin in 1793 created a particular boom in the south.

Investment in western lands also grew during this time, raising land prices. The Jay Treaty assured that Britain would stop interfering in lands in the Ohio Territory, thus increasing land values in those western lands. The importance of the Jay treaty in western land prices came into sharp focus in the spring of 1796 when the House of Representatives tried to block funding for the Jay treaty. The prices on agricultural goods collapsed as merchants were afraid to take their ships to European markets for fear that the British navy would attack them if the US breached the Jay Treaty. Credit began to tighten and things looked bleak. This is part of what convinced the House to go ahead and fund the treaty.

The other side of the problem was that once the US implemented the Jay Treaty, the French Directory took its own actions. In July of 1796, France declared that it would treat neutral vessels (in other words US merchant ships) in the same manner that the British did, that is capturing and confiscating them. While France was not as great a naval threat as Britain, French privateers captured or sank more than 300 US merchant ships over the next year. This led to a doubling of insurance rates, a huge increase in the cost of imported goods, and a decline in US exports. The war in Europe, which had been a boon to US merchants for several years, was now turning into a larger problem for US merchants.

Causes of the Panic

The one persistent problem was a lack of hard cash, gold and silver was still scarce in many parts of the country. Using paper money was still considered speculative. Many parts of the country still relied on barter to obtain goods and services. This shortage was made even worse by the government’s efforts to pay down the war debts. Such payments often involved shifting specie back to Britain and Europe.

Thanks to the Jay Treaty and the increasing hostilities with France, the US economy became more reliant on the British economy. That caused problems when the British economy tanked in late 1796.

To understand the panic, we need to understand how banking worked at this time. For starters, most people never used a bank. It was for rich people only. Prior to 1795, the Bank of England never even issued a bank note below £10 sterling. A typical laborer at this time lived on about two and half pounds per month. So it was only the very wealthy, what we might today call the one-percenters, who ever used a bank or bank notes.

The Bank of England was privately owned and operated. It had been established in the late 1600s because the government found it was a convenient way to borrow money during wartime, when people were unwilling to make loans directly to the government.

The Bank of England circulated its own bank notes with the understanding that anyone holding a note could exchange it at the bank for gold or silver at any time. There was always far more paper money in circulation than there was gold or silver to cover all of it. The system was based on the fact that people trusted that the paper money could be spent just as easily as gold or silver and that not everyone would try to cash in their paper all at once.

Over several years in the 1790’s the Bank saw its specie reserves depleted as the government took more and more loans to support its allies and its own military in the war with France. Britain had also taken in more gold early in the decade when wealthy Frenchmen wanted to get their money out of France during the reign of terror, when it was a crime to hoard gold or silver. But after that passed, these French depositors wanted their money back.

As the bank’s gold and silver dwindled, it began pulling its bank notes from circulation. This caused economic recession, but should have at least maintained the stability of the banknotes. The problem was that the dwindling specie reserves were not the result of distrust in the bank, it was the government demands of war expenses and the demand of foreign investors for the return of their hard money.

Over time, as inflation of paper money value increased, more and more depositors demanded specie from the bank. By late 1796, the Bank’s specie deposits had fallen to about £2 million, less than a third of what it held two years earlier. By early 1797, reserves fell below £1 million.

Problems came to a head after a French fleet was spotted off the coast of Ireland in December. The French were responding to a plea from Wolfe Tone, a leader of the Society of United Irishmen, that sought to challenge British authority in Ireland. A fleet of more than 43 ships and nearly 14,000 French soldiers tried to land and form the basis of a larger Irish rebellion. Unfortunately for the invaders, a hurricane dispersed the fleet and damaged many of the ships. While the ships were on the Irish coast, they never landed.

Despite the failure, the mere presence of a French invasion fleet off the coast of Ireland unnerved many British investors. In times of crisis, wealthy investors wanted to hold onto gold and silver. The Bank of England was already under stress from government withdrawals to fund the war with France. Investors continued to demand withdrawals of gold and silver, as was their right.

The government still needed money from the bank to prosecute the war with France, So In February, 1797, at the Bank’s request, Parliament passed the Bank Restriction Act. This allowed the Bank of England simply to refuse to accept its own banknotes in exchange for gold or silver.

This had only happened one time before. In 1696, only a couple of years after the Bank of England was established, it had suspended specie payments in a similar war-related cash crunch. That created such a financial disaster that it avoided doing so ever since. Apparently, a century later, officials had forgotten just how horrible that experience was and were willing to do it again.

With the inability to exchange their notes, public faith in the Bank of England paper declined and the money devalued. This got worse after the bank simply printed more paper to finance the government’s demands for more loans for the war.

Reaction in US

The crash of the British financial system had a real impact on US markets. Most of the American economy was financed through credit markets in London and Amsterdam. After France invaded the Netherlands, access to credit in Amsterdam became much more difficult. The suspension of specie payments from the Bank of England turned off that credit spigot in Britain. British merchants began demanding more cash from Americans who did not have it. Exports of US goods to Britain crashed as British subjects could not afford to pay for them. On top of all that, US trade in the West Indies also collapsed thanks to the French privateers operating there.

As a result, the boom times of the early 1790s turned to a bust. Imports and exports sank. Port cities saw a collapse of new revenues, and wages for those involved in merchant trades fell again.

Land speculation, which had been a solid area of growth most of the time, also began to collapse. Much of the land’s value was based on hopes that it could be sold to European investors or settlers. With money from those sources gone for the time being, many US land speculators find themselves holding land purchased with borrowed money, and with no one to buy the land, so they could not repay those debts.

Morris in Debtors Prison

One of the most notable casualties in the US was Robert Morris. We all remember him as the Financier of the Revolution, and someone who almost singlehandedly maintained the financial system in America during the war by releasing paper money based on his own personal credit, which was better than the government’s.

After the war, during the confederation period, Morris stayed involved in helping to keep afloat the country’s finances, in part because he was one of the largest creditors for the government. Once the country ratified the Constitution, Morris turned to focusing on his business affairs. He served a term as a US Senator under the Constitution, but was mostly focused on rebuilding his business.

Morris was known for taking chances to make money, such as establishing trade with China after the war. A large portion of his wealth came from serving as a financial agent for wealthy European interests who wanted to invest in currency and land speculation in America. He also established two canal companies, believing that they would not only be profitable but would also increase the value of his western lands.

In 1791, Morris hired William Temple Franklin, Benjamin Franklin’s grandson, to serve as an agent for him in Britain. He partnered with Sir William Johnstone Pulteney to help Europeans invest in western lands, at first in upstate New York. He also bought heavily in western Pennsylvania and land in the new District of Columbia, where the new federal capital was being built.

Within a few years he had become the wealthiest man in America. Most of Morris’ money came from land speculation. His land purchases were always highly leveraged, with lots of debt behind them. But Morris’ credit was good and land prices almost always went up.

In the mid-1790s, the war in Europe caused foreign investment to decline. Land sales began to falter. Morris, always the gambler, saw land prices falling, so he doubled down, borrowed more money and bought even more land. At one point, even Washington suggested he might be taking on too much risk. Morris responded: “My dear general, I can never do things in the small. I must be either a man or a mouse.” During this same time, Morris began a multi-year project to build a large house that took up an entire city block in downtown Philadelphia. He hired Pierre L’Enfant to be the architect.

Others were not as brave as Morris. Amsterdam banks, where Morris had borrowed heavily, were unwilling to continue loans for what looked like increasingly risky land deals. When Morris tried to collect on war debts that the government owed him, Congress turned the tables by going over the books and proclaiming that Morris owed the government nearly $100,000. Morris was continually buying and selling trying to stay ahead of creditors, who he offered shares in his land companies rather than cash. Morris continued to produce his own paper money, but increasingly skeptical creditors would only accept them at pennies on the dollar. Morris’ failure to cover his obligations threatened to stop the building development in DC.

By the summer of 1797, with the financial crisis in London, fully hitting American merchants, Morris found himself in serious trouble. Creditors began showing up at his house daily, demanding past due payments and threatening consequences. Morris actually left the city to stay in his country home to avoid the sheriff. He refused having contact with people for fear of being served with court papers. Much of his land holdings were sold for non-payment of property taxes.

At the end of 1797, Morris and several houseguests had to threaten a constable and his deputies with guns to prevent them from breaking into his house to arrest him. By February, 1798, Morris knew that there was no way he could survive financially. He returned to Philadelphia where he was arrested and put into debtors prison. His remaining assets were seized and sold for his creditors to receive pennies on the dollar.

Senate Expels William Blount

The other prominent casualty of the financial crisis was William Blount. I mentioned a few weeks ago that Blount had been the territorial governor of the southwest territory, and became one of the first US Senators from the new state of Tennessee. I’d also mentioned that Blount was involved in a great many land deals, including the Yazoo land scandal in Georgia.

Over the 1780s and 1790s, Blount and his brothers had acquired over 2.5 million acres of western lands. Like Morris, most of their land was purchased on credit. When the war in Europe caused land prices to crash in 1795, Blount was in danger of heading to debtors prison himself.

Much of Blount’s land was dependent on the Mississippi River remaining open to trade. While the US had a treaty with Spain guaranteeing use of the river, when France started to defeat Spain in the war in Europe, many feared that France might take back Louisiana and shut down American access to the river. This would make Blount’s land holding virtually worthless.

To prevent a French takeover, Blount began conspiring with others to help the British capture Louisiana and the Floridas. With their help, the thankful British would allow them continued access to the Mississippi. In 1797, Blount sent a partner to Britain to sell the idea. In the meantime though, a Knoxville merchant James Carey, provided evidence of the conspiracy to army officials. Secretary of War Timothy Pickering, who hated Blount, took up the issue with President Adams. Adams forwarded the letter to the Senate with a note that he believed that Blount’s actions were criminal.

When Senator Blount walked onto the Senate floor that day, Vice President Jefferson had the Senate clerk read the letter revealing the conspiracy and asked Blount if he had anything to say about it. Blount asked for a day to respond. Instead of returning, Blount hopped on a ship headed to North Carolina. Federal deputies seized the ship and returned him to Congress. The Senate expelled him and the House of Representatives impeached him. Blount posted bail, then fled to Tennessee. One of his partners, however, testified before Congress and confessed to the whole conspiracy to give Britain control of the lands to the south and west of the United States.

In the end, Blount’s lawyers convinced the Senate to dismiss the articles of impeachment, arguing that members of Congress were not subject to impeachment. The Senate had already expelled him, which was the appropriate action. The Senate agreed and dismissed the articles for lack of jurisdiction.

The whole incident caused a ruckus for months among members of Congress and the administration. There was even a full scale brawl in Congress in February, 1798 over the matter.

Despite the universal condemnation in Philadelphia, Tennesseans seemed happy with Blount’s efforts to keep open the Mississippi River, by any means necessary. They elected him to the State Legislature, where he quickly became its leader. Blount was never able to resolve his land speculation debts before he died in an epidemic in 1800.

Next Week: a sex scandal involving Alexander Hamilton goes public.

- - -

Next Episode 400 Maria Reynolds Affair (coming soon)

Previous Episode 398 John Adams Inauguration

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Sunday, August 30, 2026

ARSP53 Eric Metaxas - Revolution

This text provides a summary of our Round Table discussion for August, 2026, with Michael Troy, host of the American Revolution Podcast. Our special guest is Eric Metaxas, author and the host of The Eric Metaxas Show. The conversation centers around Metaxas’s book, Revolution: The Birth of the Greatest Nation in the History of the World. Troy and Metaxas explore the deep ideological, legal, and spiritual origins of the American Revolution, emphasizing that the physical conflict of the war was preceded by a profound transformation in the minds of the American colonists. The discussion spans key pre-war protests, the foundational roles of both celebrated and forgotten figures, and the unique theological and intellectual currents that made self-government possible. Finally, the transcript concludes with an interactive question-and-answer session with podcast participants, which has been meticulously summarized at the end of this document.

Metaxas's Motivation and the "Generalist" Perspective

At the outset of the discussion, Michael Troy asks Metaxas about his motivation for adding another volume to the already vast library of literature surrounding the American Revolution. Metaxas frames his work by identifying himself not as an academic, but as a "generalist". He explains that academic works, while spectacular and highly useful for research, are often too narrowly focused or dense for the everyday reader. Metaxas argues that his book has "no angle" other than the core thesis that every single American needs to know the story of the American Revolution.

With the 250th anniversary of the Revolution approaching, Metaxas felt it was the perfect time to compile the entire narrative from 1761 to 1783 into a single, highly captivating, and accessible volume. His primary goal was to write a "greatest hits" book that would spark a deep, lifelong curiosity in readers, prompting them to explore academic trilogies, subscribe to historical podcasts, and "catch the bug" of revolutionary history. Metaxas expresses immense gratification that his approach has resonated with the public, noting that the book had already spent eight weeks on the New York Times bestseller list by the time of the recording.

The Spark of Rebellion: James Otis and the Writs of Assistance

A significant focal point in the early part of Metaxas's book is James Otis Jr., a figure Metaxas notes is largely underappreciated by modern Americans. In discussing Otis's importance, Metaxas points to John Adams as his narrative "Virgil" or guide through the early revolutionary landscape. John Adams was present in a Boston courtroom in 1761 when James Otis delivered his famous argument against the British Writs of Assistance. Adams vividly remembered this moment as the true opening scene of the American Revolution, famously writing that "then and there the child independence was born".

Troy and Metaxas discuss the fascinating, complex, and sometimes personal motivations that drove Otis. Troy compares Otis to "John the Baptist," a voice crying out in the wilderness to prepare the way for the next phase of history. Prior to his radicalization, Otis worked within the colonial legal system, collecting customs duties. However, after his father was rejected for a prominent job by the royal governor, Otis experienced a sharp, angry turn against the administration, transforming into a fierce advocate for colonial rights.

Troy characterizes the British failure to keep Otis on their side as a classic imperial blunder, noting that the primary goal of a colonial empire is to keep powerful, influential locals satisfied rather than crossing them. Once crossed, Otis catalyzed a political spiral that no one could have foreseen. Despite his massive early influence, Otis eventually lost his nerve and withdrew from the spotlight, fearing that the British government would target him as the legal "ringleader" of sedition and rebellion. Metaxas expresses a deep desire to have written even more about Otis, lamenting the "torture" of having to slim his original draft down from a theoretical 1,200 pages to a more manageable 600 pages.

John Adams: The Anti-Politician and Record Keeper

The conversation repeatedly returns to John Adams as a central, deeply admirable figure who was the literal "opposite of what you think of as a politician". Troy and Adams's biographers note that Adams was not a "gladhander" or a "backs slapper". He did not get along easily with people, and if he believed someone was a jerk, he would tell them so directly to their face. To illustrate this unvarnished personality, Troy shares an anecdote from a biography of Button Gwinnett. When Gwinnett first arrived in Philadelphia to join the Continental Congress, Adams immediately bypassed pleasantries, walked straight up to him, and demanded to know whether he was voting for or against independence.

Despite his abrasive public persona, Adams's extensive private records—including his letters to his wife Abigail, his diaries, and detailed meeting notes—remain an invaluable historical treasure. Metaxas highlights how hilarious and revealing Adams's raw, private observations of his fellow delegates were. For example, in his diary, Adams described Delaware delegate Caesar Rodney as the "oddest looking man" he had ever seen, with a "head no bigger than a large apple". Adams also privately mocked Pennsylvania's John Dickinson, the author of Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, by sarcastically referring to him in private correspondence simply as "the farmer". It was this human, humorous, and deeply honest perspective that Metaxas made sure to preserve in his book.

The "Revolution in the Minds" and Pre-War Protests

Metaxas dedicates his first dozen chapters entirely to the events leading up to the outbreak of armed conflict in 1775. He strongly aligns with John Adams's famous assertion that there was a profound "revolution before the revolution"—a fundamental shift in the minds and hearts of the people before any blood was spilled at Lexington and Concord.

When asked to identify the single pre-war protest that set everything in motion, Metaxas points to The Stamp Act of 1765. He explains that the Stamp Act revealed the deeply principled nature of the colonial leadership, who refused to pay a tax not because of the physical monetary burden, but because they believed Parliament had no constitutional right to levy it. The resistance was intense and visceral; colonists engaged in dramatic protests, which included tearing down the houses of royal officials brick-by-brick.

Troy points out why the Stamp Act provoked such a unique reaction compared to the earlier Sugar Act. The Sugar Act was an import tariff, which was viewed as an external trade regulation and fell under a legal framework the colonists had largely tolerated. The Stamp Act, conversely, was a highly visible, direct internal tax that affected daily life. Coming at a time when James Otis’s ideas had already prepared the intellectual landscape, the Stamp Act fell on "very dry kindle" and ignited a massive, unified colonial response.

When the British government backed down and repealed the Stamp Act in 1766, the colonists celebrated as if they had won a major war, completely unaware of the decade of conflict ahead. Metaxas shares a favorite story about Paul Revere, who designed a massive, ornate celebratory wooden obelisk on the Boston Common. Covered in wax-treated canvas and illuminated internally by 280 candles, this gigantic monument unfortunately caught fire and burned to the ground during the celebrations.

The swift repeal of the Stamp Act, driven largely by British merchants suffering from colonial boycotts, taught the colonists a critical lesson: if they united, they could successfully defy Parliament. Conversely, Parliament's subsequent Declaratory Act—asserting their absolute right to tax the colonies in all cases whatsoever—served as a permanent warning to the colonists to remain continuously vigilant.

British Missteps and the Rise of Military Governance

The British administration consistently miscalculated by trying to suppress colonial coordination rather than addressing their core grievances. A prime example discussed is the Massachusetts Circular Letter of 1768, drafted by James Otis Jr. and John Adams to coordinate a unified colonial response to the Townshend Acts. When Parliament discovered the letter, they issued a heavy-handed ultimatum: the Massachusetts Assembly must rescind the letter immediately or face dissolution. In a historic act of defiance, the assembly voted 92 to 17 to refuse the order. The "Glorious 92" were instantly celebrated as heroes, and Paul Revere crafted a famous silver bowl to commemorate the vote.

By 1774, British policy shifted from passive administration to direct military coercion. Following the Boston Tea Party, General Thomas Gage was sent to Massachusetts as both the military commander and the royal governor, operating under the philosophy: "If we behave like lions, they will behave like lambs".

Gage immediately attempted to assert absolute control by moving the colonial capital out of Boston and banning local town meetings. When colonists defied his ban and held a town meeting, Gage arrested the leaders. However, his attempt to project strength backfired spectacularly when thousands of armed local militia men spontaneously marched on the jail and freed the prisoners. Gage was entirely unprepared for this level of rapid, organized, and armed civilian defiance, which demonstrated that the ideological shift in New England was already complete.

Geographic Focus and Forgotten Heroes

Troy observes that Metaxas’s book heavily emphasizes New England and the early years of the conflict, which aligns with traditional American historical memory. Metaxas agrees, explaining that while major physical battles took place in the Southern theater later in the war, New England was the true "epicenter" where the ideological divide began and the "war of ideas" was fought.

This focus also allows Metaxas to highlight the colorful, highly dramatic personal stories of individual patriots. He expresses dismay that major cultural projects, such as Ken Burns’s PBS documentary on the Revolution, relegate legendary heroes like Nathan Hale—who was executed by the British at just 21 years old—to mere seconds of coverage. Metaxas also champions the eccentric Connecticut General Israel Putnam, describing him as a wonderfully colorful and "crazy" character who once ordered his militia men to literally march chest-deep into the water to attack a British warship with muskets.

The Spiritual and Theological Roots of Liberty

A central theme of Metaxas’s work is the deep, often-overlooked religious underpinnings of the American experiment. He rejects the secular notion that the Revolution was an inevitable, purely political evolution, arguing instead that self-government was a radical, wild idea rooted in Christian theology and the Protestant Reformation.

Metaxas argues that the Great Awakening, primarily driven by the dramatic open-air preaching of George Whitefield, laid the indispensable spiritual "kindling" for the Revolution. Whitefield’s message was revolutionary: he preached that every individual could have a direct, personal relationship with God, bypassing ecclesiastical and royal hierarchies. This theological egalitarianism naturally led to the political conclusion that all human beings are equal under God, and that the King of England is not a divine sovereign.

To illustrate Whitefield's status as a saint of the revolutionary cause, Metaxas recounts an extraordinary event from 1775. Before embarking on their arduous campaign through the Maine wilderness to Canada, Benedict Arnold and his officers stopped in Newburyport, Massachusetts. They visited the church where Whitefield had preached his final sermon and was buried in a crypt beneath the altar. The officers asked the sexton to open Whitefield's coffin. Finding that his body had decayed but his clerical gown’s cuffs and collar remained intact, the officers cut the fabric into small strips to carry with them as holy relics to protect them on their military expedition.

Furthermore, Metaxas explains that the Puritans viewed their journey to America through the lens of the Sinai Covenant. They explicitly cast themselves as the biblical Israelites escaping the "Pharaoh" (King George III) to enter the wilderness and establish a society governed directly under God's sovereignty.

Even the most secular and deistically-inclined founders, such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, fully embraced this cultural imagery. When tasked with designing the national seal for the new United States, Franklin proposed an image of Moses parting the Red Sea with Pharaoh's army drowning, while Jefferson proposed an image of the Israelites being guided through the wilderness by the pillar of cloud and fire.

This biblical worldview framed their understanding of human nature and governance. Because the founders held a Christian view of humanity as inherently fallen, they recognized that a society without a king required deep internal moral restraint. Both George Washington (in his Farewell Address) and John Adams argued that religion and morality were the indispensable cornerstones of a self-governing republic. Without internal spiritual discipline, a society would inevitably degenerate into chaos, requiring a tyrannical enforcer—like a king—to restore order.

Summary of the Question and Answer Session

At the conclusion of the main discussion, Michael Troy opens the floor to the audience for questions. Below is a detailed summary of each question asked by the participants and the answers provided by Metaxas and Troy:

1. Mike Davis’s Question: The Scope of the Stamp Act

Question: Did the Stamp Act only apply to papers sold in the American colonies, or did it apply within Great Britain and Scotland as well?
Answer: Metaxas defers to Troy's specialized knowledge on this specific legal history. Troy responds that while various Stamp Acts were implemented at different times across different regions of the British Empire, the specific, highly controversial Stamp Act of 1765 was designed to apply strictly to the North American colonies. Troy explains the mechanics of the act: the tax stamp was pre-printed directly onto paper in England, forcing the colonists to import all their legal and publishing paper from Britain. This severely damaged colonial paper mills, which were legally barred from manufacturing their own paper for these purposes.
Metaxas adds that John Adams and other colonial leaders viewed the act as a deliberate, calculated attempt to suppress free speech. They recognized that the high cost of imported, pre-stamped paper would bankrupt colonial newspapers, thereby crippling the free exchange of revolutionary ideas. Troy confirms this interpretation, noting that the act explicitly targeted newspapers while conspicuously exempting books, proving it was designed to quiet immediate political dissent.

2. Bob Wong’s Question: Thomas Paine and George Whitefield

Question: Is there any historical evidence that Thomas Paine was directly influenced by George Whitefield’s ideas when he wrote his highly influential pamphlet, Common Sense?
Answer: Metaxas acknowledges that while he cannot confirm a direct, documented link between the two men, the ideological connection is highly plausible. He notes that he dedicates an entire chapter in his book to Common Sense, calling it an unprecedentedly powerful document that single-handedly transformed colonial public opinion in just 47 pages. Metaxas points out that Paine's central argument against monarchy relies heavily on the Old Testament narrative that having a human king is fundamentally sinful and contrary to God’s design. He argues that even though Paine famously drifted away from Christian faith later in his life, at the time of writing Common Sense, he was thoroughly immersed in and utilizing the theological concepts popularized by Whitefield and the Great Awakening.
Troy adds the important biographical context that Paine only arrived in America a couple of years before the war began, meaning his intellectual foundation had been primarily shaped by the political and philosophical climate in England.

3. Audience Question (via Troy): The Origins of James Otis’s Ideas and the Whig Movement

Question: What was the origin of James Otis’s radical ideas, and did he and Paine draw from a shared British source?
Answer: Troy and Metaxas explain that both Otis and Paine were heavily influenced by the English Whig (or "wig") movement, which was deeply hostile to royal overreach. Metaxas expresses his personal delight in writing about John Wilkes, a famously witty and eccentric British Whig politician who vocally supported the American colonists. They discuss how British Whig giants like William Pitt and Edmund Burke openly defended the colonists in Parliament, arguing that the Americans were not launching a wild, novel rebellion, but were instead defending the traditional, historic "rights of Englishmen" established during the English Civil War. Troy frames the entire American crisis as a geographic extension of the ongoing British political battle between the Whigs (who favored Enlightenment reforms and parliamentary supremacy) and the Tories (who championed absolute obedience to the King). In America, there was no substantial Tory presence, allowing the radical Whig ideology to become dominant.

4. Audience Question (via Chat): The Iroquois Confederacy and Democracy

Question: Did the participatory democracy of the Iroquois Confederacy influence the founders’ design of the American government?
Answer: Metaxas strongly and unequivocally rejects this theory, calling it "naive" and "wildly overstated". While acknowledging that popular documentaries (such as Ken Burns's series) promote this idea, Metaxas compares it to claiming that the organizational structure of the "five families of the mafia" served as a beautiful template for American democracy.
Troy agrees with Metaxas's skepticism, explaining that while the founders admired the abstract philosophical concept of man living in a "state of nature" without a king, they also agreed with Thomas Hobbes's assessment that a true state of nature is a state of constant, brutal warfare. The ongoing, violent inter-tribal conflicts among Native Americans served as a cautionary tale of what happens without a stable, structured sovereign government, rather than a model the colonists wished to replicate. Metaxas concludes by pointing out that while his Greek ancestors invented democracy, it was historically confined to tiny city-states; scaling participatory democracy to an entire continent required a brand-new, highly complex legal structure that the founders had to design themselves.

5. Mark’s Question: The Reformation and the Revolution

Question: What is the relationship between the Protestant Reformation (such as Martin Luther’s stand on human equality and the Peasants' Revolt of 1524–1525) and the American Revolution?
Answer: Metaxas enthusiastically agrees with Mark's premise, stating that the American Revolution is the direct, long-term fruit of the Protestant Reformation. He explains that the core Reformation doctrine—that every individual must read the Bible, think clearly, and answer directly to God rather than blindly obeying an ecclesiastical hierarchy—directly translated into political independence.
To prove this, Metaxas highlights that when the Puritans arrived in Massachusetts in 1630, they immediately established Harvard College (1636) and mandated that every single town set up a grammar school. This massive push for universal literacy was not a secular Enlightenment initiative, but a deeply religious Reformation requirement. While Martin Luther himself did not fully grasp the concept of religious liberty and reacted poorly to the Peasants' Revolt, Metaxas argues that it took approximately 150 years for these radical seeds of individual conscience to fully mature and blossom into the American experiment.

6. Ed’s Question/Comment: Oliver Cromwell’s Influence on Religious Liberty

Question/Comment: Oliver Cromwell’s declaration of religious liberty in England in 1650 (which allowed Jews back into England for the first time in 300 years) had a massive, often unappreciated impact on the Puritan culture that ultimately led to the American Revolution.
Answer: Troy notes that while Cromwell succeeded in temporarily breaking the power of the Anglican Church, he is historically remembered as a negative example of a military dictator. This historical memory created a deep, permanent fear among the founders that George Washington would inevitably become an American Cromwell.
Ed and Metaxas actively defend Cromwell's legacy, pointing out that he was a highly "reluctant dictator" who spent a decade fighting for parliamentary democracy, attempted to abolish the House of Lords, and became furious when Parliament tried to offer him the crown. Despite his negative modern reputation, his radical Puritan governance heavily shaped the independent political ethos of New England.

7. Jay’s Question/Comment: The Long-Simmering Roots of Independence and the 1763 Proclamation Line

Question/Comment: The roots of American radicalism go back a full century before the Revolution, starting with the Puritans who fled Connecticut to found highly independent colonies in New Haven, Newark, and Elizabeth Town. This created a culture of "if I don't like it, I'll just go somewhere else". This dynamic worked perfectly until the British issued the Proclamation of 1763, which legally blocked colonists from expanding past the Appalachian Mountains. This boundary stripped colonists of their economic opportunities, boxed them in, and made them realize they were viewed by London as marginalized, second-class citizens.
Answer: Troy and Metaxas fully agree with Jay's analysis, noting that the revolutionary mindset was indeed over a century in the making. Troy points back even further to Roger Williams, who championed absolute freedom of religion in Rhode Island as early as the 1630s. Troy explains that while people in Europe had spent the Middle Ages and the Enlightenment fighting for freedom, their rebellions were routinely crushed by highly entrenched, powerful aristocracies. America was unique because the vast geographic space and the absence of an established aristocracy allowed these radical ideas of individual liberty and self-government to grow completely unchecked for generations, making the ultimate explosion of 1775 inevitable once Britain tried to reassert its authority.

* * *

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Sunday, September 13, 2026

ARP400 The Maria Reynolds Affair

The Meeting

The Money

Reynolds Background

Investigation

Public Scandal

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Further Reading

Websites

Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams, Univ. of Kansas Press, 1975.

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004.

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. Making the Presidency John Adams and the Precedents That Forged the Republic, Oxford Univ. Press, 2024.

Drury, Michael With the Hammer of Truth: James Thomson Callender, Univ. of Va. Press, 1990 (available on archive.org).

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org).

Ferling, John Jefferson and Hamilton: The Rivalry That Forged a Nation, Bloomsbury Press, 2013.

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, Little Brown & Co. 1962 (borrow on archive.org).McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001.

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (borrow on archive.org)

Nester, William The Hamiltonian Vision, 1789-1800, Potomac Books, 2012.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, September 6, 2026

ARP399 Financial Crisis of 1797

Financial Situation in America

Causes of the Panic

Reaction in US

Morris in Debtors Prison

Senate Expels William Blount

Signup for the AmRev Podcast Mail List

Further Reading

Websites

Free eBooks(from archive.org unless noted)

Books Worth Buying(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams, Univ. of Kansas Press, 1975. Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004.

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001. Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (borrow on archive.org)

Nester, William The Hamiltonian Vision, 1789-1800, Potomac Books, 2012.

Shaw Peter The Character of John Adams, Univ. of NC Press, 1976. Smith, Page John Adams, Vol. 2, Doubleday, 1962 (borrow on archive.org). Wood, Gordon S. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, August 30, 2026

ARSP53 Eric Metaxas - Revolution

Metaxas's Motivation and the "Generalist" Perspective

The Spark of Rebellion: James Otis and the Writs of Assistance

John Adams: The Anti-Politician and Record Keeper

The "Revolution in the Minds" and Pre-War Protests

British Missteps and the Rise of Military Governance

Geographic Focus and Forgotten Heroes

The Spiritual and Theological Roots of Liberty

Summary of the Question and Answer Session

1. Mike Davis’s Question: The Scope of the Stamp Act

2. Bob Wong’s Question: Thomas Paine and George Whitefield

3. Audience Question (via Troy): The Origins of James Otis’s Ideas and the Whig Movement

4. Audience Question (via Chat): The Iroquois Confederacy and Democracy

5. Mark’s Question: The Reformation and the Revolution

6. Ed’s Question/Comment: Oliver Cromwell’s Influence on Religious Liberty

7. Jay’s Question/Comment: The Long-Simmering Roots of Independence and the 1763 Proclamation Line

Signup for the AmRev Podcast Mail List

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, Little Brown & Co. 1962 (borrow on archive.org).
McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001.

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams, Univ. of Kansas Press, 1975.
Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004.

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001.
Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Shaw Peter The Character of John Adams, Univ. of NC Press, 1976.
Smith, Page John Adams, Vol. 2, Doubleday, 1962 (borrow on archive.org).
Wood, Gordon S. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.