Sunday, October 18, 2026

ARP404 The Quasi-War Army


Last week we covered the XYZ affair.  France’s main complaint against the US was that it continued to trade with Britain while France and Britain were still at war.  President Adams sent a three member commission to France to resolve the matter diplomatically.  John Marshall, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Elbridge Gerry tried to discuss the matter, but Foreign Minister Talleyrand refused even to open formal discussions.  Instead, he used some backchannel efforts to get US concessions, including efforts by three intermediaries, identified as X, Y, and Z in the reports, to provide a bribe before any formal talks would begin.

The Commissioners arrived in Paris in October 1797, but Adams did not receive any substantive reports until March 1798.  Adams’ initial instinct was that America should go to war with France, but he thought better of it, and tried to bury the insults that France had hurled at the US diplomats.

The Democratic-Republicans in Congress thought Adams was hiding successful diplomacy and trying to force the US into a war.  They demanded the documents, which Adams released. Once the documents became public in April, 1798, most Americans demanded war.  Many Republicans, including Vice President Jefferson, were still trying to find a way to avoid war, but even they were afraid it was too late.

War Fever

The release of the reports kicked off war fever around the country.  Even the Democratic-Republicans were sympathetic to the view, or simply stayed silent.  College students began marching in favor of war.  Rallies around the country called for a war to defend the national honor.  One Federalist toast at the time became “Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute.”

Quasi-War Recruiting Poster
Taking advantage of war fever, the Federalists went on the offensive in Congress, pushing through bills that the Democratic Republicans had opposed for months or years.  On April 8, just days after Adams revealed the reports, Congress passed laws to approve arming American merchant ships and voting nearly $1 million for harbor fortifications and cannon foundries.  Remember that in 1797 total federal expenditures for the entire government were only around $6 million.

A couple of weeks later, Congress authorized the President to purchase twelve ships with up to 22 guns each.  A few days after that, it approved the formal establishment of a US Navy and a Marine corps. 

There are a whole bunch of measures which took place simultaneously over 1798 and 1799 as the country ramped up for war.  I’m going to cover separate issues in separate episodes.  Although the establishment of the Navy and the Marines is a really big deal, I want to focus this week on the US Army.

The army was a constant source of contention for Congress from the very beginning.  There essentially was no army when Congress first met under the Constitution.  The two main reasons were that there was no money to pay for an army, and that many Americans considered a standing army in times of peace to be a symbol of tyranny.  There was no reason for a free people to have professional soldiers.

Under President Washington, Congress had reluctantly authorized some increases in the army so that it consisted of about 4000 soldiers by the time Washington left office.  Almost all of these soldiers were stationed along the western frontier, either deterring or actively fighting Indian resistance to western settlements.

Following Adams’ speech during the special session of Congress in 1797, the Federalists proposed establishing a much larger provisional army to prepare for a war with France.  The Democratic Republicans voted it down.  Instead, Congress passed a resolution noting that the President could call up to 80,000 state militiamen if the need arose.  This eliminated any immediate cost and also reaffirmed the preference for the militia as the defenders of liberty rather than a standing army.

In May of 1798, a few weeks after the XYZ reports became public, with the public mood changed, Congress approved raising a Provisional Army of 10,000 men.  This was in addition to the 4000 man army in the west.  This Provisional Army would be focused on the potential threat from France.

Meet the New Boss…

It was up to President Adams to pick a commander who would lead this new provisional army.  The commander of the Legion of the United States, the army out in Ohio, had been General Anthony Wayne, up until December of 1796 when Wayne died rather suddenly and under suspicious circumstances.  Wayne’s second in command, General James Wilkinson, became the new commander.  Wilkinson was a paid Spanish agent, although that wasn’t proven - just a rumor.  There was also some suspicions that Wilkinson might have poisoned General Wayne.  In any event, no one seemed to think Wilkinson should play any role in this new Provisional Army.  He would remain in command of the Legion in the Ohio Territory.

Adams’ cabinet had already made their decision for a new commander in chief of the army: Alexander Hamilton.  As I mentioned in earlier episodes, even though Hamilton had retired from the government and was working as a private attorney in New York, the cabinet seemed to view him as their de facto leader.  

Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott had been Hamilton’s assistant before he left, and continued to view Hamilton as his superior.  Secretary of State Timothy Pickering and Secretary of War James McHenry also closely allied with Hamilton.  All three men regularly corresponded with Hamilton, keeping him informed of all matters related to the government.  This included sending him top secret information, such as the reports from the French Commissioners before they were given to Congress.  

These cabinet members often awaited Hamilton’s responses and repeated his thoughts as their own when advising President Adams.  All the cabinet members were holdovers from the Washington Administration and had no personal loyalty to Adams.

The irony is that Adams and Hamilton seemed to agree on a great many things politically. But Adams hated Hamilton.  There were many reasons, but the big one was that Adams thought that Hamilton had manipulated the 1796 elections in an attempt to keep Adams from winning the presidency.  Adams knew that his cabinet was close to Hamilton, but he probably did not understand at the time just how much Hamilton was controlling the government.

So when Adams’ cabinet recommended that he appoint Hamilton to command the new Provisional Army, Adams balked.  Adams noted that Hamilton wasn’t even a general in the American Revolution.  At a cabinet meeting he threw out names like Horatio Gates, Benjamin Lincoln, or Daniel Morgan, all top generals in the last war, who would be better candidates as a commander.  The cabinet shot down all of those ideas, and kept insisting on Hamilton.

The cabinet meeting ended without a decision, but later in the day, Adams decided on a leader who wasn’t Hamilton and who no one could criticize: George Washington.

Adams wrote to Washington, saying that he was considering appointing Washington as the military commander.  The former president, by this time 66 years old, and having thought he had finally retired for the last time must have thought: just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in!

Whatever Washington’s personal thoughts, and he did convey to others that he had no desire to come out of retirement again.  Washington’s response to President Adams, written on July 4, 1798 confirmed that if the president needed him, he would serve.

Adams did not wait for Washington to respond.  He nominated Washington and asked the Senate to confirm.  Adams then sent Secretary of War James McHenry to Mount Vernon to deliver Washington’s commission as lieutenant general.  Adams also asked McHenry to get Washington’s opinions on other key appointments, including inspector general, adjutant general and quartermaster general.  All three would hold the rank of major general, but they would have to decide a chain of command between the three.

Before McHenry left Philadelphia, Hamilton arrived in the city and met with him.  Hamilton gave several suggestions on how to approach several issues with Washington.  He also gave McHenry a sealed letter to give to the President.  Secretary of State Timothy Pickering also gave McHenry a letter for Washington.  Adams was kept in the dark about all of this.

Fight Over Officers

McHenry took two days to ride to Mount Vernon, arriving in the late afternoon.  Before Washington retired for the night, McHenry gave him the three letters.  When the two met the following morning, he found Washington having arisen before dawn and was already hard at work compiling a list of officers for the new army.

Over the next two and a half days, the men discussed how to organize the army.  Washington made clear that he did not plan to leave Mount Vernon unless France actually invaded.  Because of this, the inspector general would have practical command of the army as it prepared for an invasion.

The three men under consideration for the top jobs were Henry Knox, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Alexander Hamilton.  Knox should have been the favorite for the job.  He had been a capable officer throughout the war, serving as a major general.  He had fought with Washington in almost every major engagement and proved himself a highly valued officer.  He took over command of the Continental Army after Washington resigned his commission at the end of the war, and managed the army as the Secretary of War under both the Confederation period, as well as under President Washington.

By contrast, the other two contenders, Pinckney and Hamilton had not risen above the rank of colonel in the Continental Army during the war.  Pinckney’ main appeal was his political popularity in the South.  If France did attack, it would almost certainly start there.  Pinckney’s enthusiastic support for the army would help raise enlistments there and increase southern support.

McHenry, however, pushed hard for Hamilton to get the top job, as did Pickering via his letter to Washington.  Both men were devoted political supporters of Hamilton.  Even though they both knew Adams did not want Hamilton for a top job, they knew that if Washington recommended it, Adams would go along.  Hamilton’s letter to Washington did not recommend anyone since he knew he was in contention and did not want to seem overly ambitious.

McHenry reminded Washington that Knox had let him down during the Whiskey Rebellion.  Knox had to return home to handle some personal business while Washington was riding out to western Pennsylvania.  It was Hamilton who accompanied the president on that mission.  

McHenry also argued that Pickney would not mind serving under Hamilton and that his services would be just as valuable as the third or fourth ranked highest officer as they would as the second ranked.

After lengthy discussions, Washington and McHenry agreed to offer Hamilton the highest rank, Pinckney the next highest, and Knox the third.  Just in case Knox refused an appointment that would place him under the command of two former subordinates, Washington recommended Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee for the third major general in Knox’s place.

They also agreed on a number of other top appointments.  The only other possibly controversial nomination was William Smith as one of the brigadier generals.  Smith had served honorably throughout the war, spending its final years as Washington’s aide-de-camp.  What made him controversial was that, after that, he took an appointment as the secretary to the American legation in London, where John Adams was ambassador.  Smith then courted and married Adams’ daughter Nabby.  This made him the president’s son-in-law, which meant his appointment could invite charges of nepotism.

With the officer recommendations decided, McHenry returned to Philadelphia to brief the president, carrying with him Washington’s letter of acceptance. As expected, Adams expressed concerns over Hamilton’s rank.  McHenry and Pickering, however, strongly endorsed the idea.  They also stressed that this is what Washington wanted.  In the end the president went along with Washington’s proposal in full, including Hamilton and Smith.

Adams also suggested that Aaron Burr and Peter Muhlenberg, whose brother Frederick Muhlenberg had been Speaker of the House, be appointed as a way of including some Democratic Republicans among the military leadership.  The Federalists in his cabinet and in the Senate rejected these as well.  Washington personally said Burr would be a bad choice given his proclivities for political intrigue.  The notion of Burr serving under Hamilton also would have been fraught with problems.

The Senate confirmed most of the list.  Secretary of State Pickering lobbied hard to get Hamilton through, but did not fight for Smith.  Senators raised concerns about the president’s son-in-law’s qualifications and ultimately rejected him.  Smith would end up as a lieutenant colonel.

As many feared, Knox ultimately rejected his appointment.  He could not accept the insult of serving under two former subordinates after leading the army for so many years.  The discussion, however, that led to his final refusal, lasted for months.  After Adams returned home to Massachusetts, Knox visited him to discuss his concerns.  Adams admitted that he would have preferred Knox to be the senior officer but that he was acceding to Washington’s wishes on the matter.  

Adams also wrote to McHenry to say he was having second thoughts about Hamilton as the most senior major general. The Secretary of War panicked.  He reached out to Washington and Hamilton. Both McHenry and Pickering argued to Washington that Adams was considering these changes because of his personal animus toward Hamilton and that Washington should simply insist on his original decision to keep Hamilton at the top.

In the end, after both Hamilton and Washington threatened to resign if Knox was given seniority, Adams confirmed his approval of Hamilton at the top.  Knox refused his appointment under such insulting circumstances.  Light Horse Harry would end up serving as the third major general.

Reaching that conclusion took months.  The original proposals began in July, 1798, and were not resolved until October.

Recruitment

Organization of the army became a nightmare.  Secretary of War McHenry had to make most of the arrangements.  But he also had to run most major decisions by Washington, who remained home in Mount Vernon, and Hamilton, who remained home in New York, meaning that time-consuming correspondence slowed every major decision.

While all this was going on things were made even more difficult by outside events.  In Quincy, President Adams was distracted by his wife Abigail’s illness which lasted for months and was very severe.  Adams stayed by her sick bed almost constantly. The government in Philadelphia also had to flee the city again during the summer of 1798 when yellow fever returned to the city.

Meanwhile Congress continued to fight over the larger army.  While it had agreed on a provisional army of 10,000, The House passed another bill later in July that raised the size of the army to 50,000.  This would be far larger than the Continental Army ever was during the Revolutionary War.  There were also proposals, at Hamilton’s urging, for a national conscription to achieve the enlistment goals.

Divisions

These proposals, along with other measures, caused the Democratic-Republicans to recoil from any support.  First, there was no good evidence that France even intended to land a large invading army.  Britain still dominated the Atlantic Ocean, and there was no easy way for France to bring an army to America.  Also, all of the army leadership were Federalists, which was a huge concern for the other party.

Republicans viewed the army as part of  a Federalist plot to seize more power and crush opposition. They began referring to the proposed army as the presidential army and argued that this large standing army would be used primarily to quash political dissent

They also accused the Federalists of plans to engage in an offensive war, capturing Louisiana and the Floridas. There were even claims that the US would join Britain in taking control of all of South and Central America.

As it turned out, one of the opponents of the enlarged army was President Adams himself.  Adams believed that if there was fighting, it would take place at sea, meaning the US needed to focus on building a navy, not an army.  He told McHenry that there was “no more prospect of seeing a French army here, than there is in Heaven.”

Also the taxes and loans required for such an army would break the country. Treasury Secretary Wolcott agreed on this point - a rare departure from supporting Hamilton. President Adams also feared that Hamilton might use this army to trigger a civil war and take control of the United States and perhaps build an empire expanding into South America.

Adams’ fears were not unfounded. There is evidence that Hamilton was particularly interested in invading Louisiana and the Floridas, despite the fact that these were Spanish possessions and that the war was directed at France.  Hamilton reached out to the commander of the western army for support with such a plan - General James Wilkinson.  Recall that Wilkinson remained a paid secret agent for the Spanish.  He complied with Hamilton’s instructions but attempted to slow walk Hamilton’s orders and prevent any possibility of success.  In the end, Hamilton thought he could not take the offensive without Washington’s approval.  Washington refused to go along with any of this and the plans for any offensive actions collapsed.

Adams also slowed down efforts to build the new army. He rejected the idea of national conscription.  Pay was set at $5 per month, which was less than soldiers were paid during the Revolutionary war and about one-third of what a man could make as an unskilled laborer or in the Navy.

Hamilton’s insistence that officers be Federalists led to problems finding sufficient numbers of qualified officers, particularly in the south, where the Democratic-Republicans were more predominent.

When recruitment began in early 1799, no one seemed ready to enlist.  Although Congress had authorized an army of 10,000, Only 2000 men enlisted over the summer.  More would dribble in, but the army never reached half of its goal.

Logistics proved perhaps even worse than during the Revolution. Soldiers didn’t get paid.  They often didn’t get fed.  There were not even enough barracks, weapons, or basic equipment.  As a result, many recruits deserted.

Thanks to partisan games, political opposition, and some very real incompetence, the Provisional Army never really amounted to much of anything.  Adams continued to focus on peace negotiations with France, over Hamilton’s objections. In February, 1800 Congress ended recruiting, and the army was disbanded a few months later.

Next week, we will look at the efforts to build and use a Navy during the Quasi War. 

 - - -

Next Episode 405 The Quasi-War Navy (coming soon)

Previous Episode 403 The XYZ Affair

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Further Reading

Websites

Quasi War https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/quasi-war

Coleman, Aaron N. “‘A Second Bounaparty?’ A Reexamination of Alexander Hamilton during the Franco-American Crisis, 1796-1801.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 28, no. 2, 2008, pp. 183–214. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043587

Murphy, William J. “John Adams: The Politics of the Additional Army, 1798-1800.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 2, 1979, pp. 234–49. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/364841 

PERL-ROSENTHAL, NATHAN. “Private Letters and Public Diplomacy: The Adams Network and the Quasi-War, 1797–1798.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 31, no. 2, 2011, pp. 283–311. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41261613

“John Adams to George Washington, 22 June 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0270

“George Washington to John Adams, 4 July 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0290

“George Washington to James McHenry, 4 July 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0295

“George Washington to John Adams, 13 July 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0314

.“George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, [14 July 1798],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-22-02-0002-0002

“Henry Knox to George Washington, 29 July 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0374

“Henry Knox to George Washington, 26 August 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0438

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Adams, Charles F. The Life of John Adams, Vol. 2, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1871.

Bowers, Claude G. Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America, London: Constable and Co. 1925.

Brown, William L. An examination of the causes and conduct of the present war with France, London: T. Cabell, 1798. 

Godfrey, Carlos E. Organization of the Provisional Army of the United States in the Anticipated War with France, 1798-1800, [publisher unknown] 1914. 

Morse, Jr. John T. John Adams, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1884. 

Wood, John The History of the Administration of John Adams, Esq., Late President of the United States, New York: Barlas and Ward, 1802. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams, Univ. of Kansas Press, 1975. 

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. Making the Presidency John Adams and the Precedents That Forged the Republic, Oxford Univ. Press, 2024.

DeConde, Alexander The Quasi War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared war with France, 1797-1801, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Kurtz, Stephen G. The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800, Literary Licensing,  LLC, 2011.

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, Little Brown & Co. 1962 (borrow on archive.org).

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001.  

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (borrow on archive.org) 

Nester, William The Hamiltonian Vision, 1789-1800, Potomac Books, 2012 (Chapter 19 on XYZ available at JSTOR)

Palmer, Michael A. Stoddert's War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801. Naval Institute Press, 1987 (borrow on archive.org).

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

Shaw Peter The Character of John Adams, Univ. of NC Press, 1976. 

Smith, Jean E. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation, Henry Holt & Co. 1996. 

Staloff, Darren Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding, Hill and Wang, 2005. 

Stinchcombe, William The XYZ Affair, Praeger, 1980. 

Vaughn, Harold C. The XYZ Affair, 1797-1798, Franklin Watts, 1972.

Wood, Gordon S. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.

 * As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, October 11, 2026

403 The XYZ Affair

For the last few weeks, we’ve been covering the growing divide in the US over a possible war with France.  This week, that possibility grows exponentially following what has become known as the XYZ Affair.

Property protected à la françoise
When John Adams became president, the biggest issue of his presidency was the diplomatic dispute with France.  President Washington had recalled James Monroe as Minister to France because he seemed more interested in keeping a bond between revolutionary France and the Democratic Republicans in America rather than in representing Washington’s policies.

Washington sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to replace Monroe.  When Pinckney arrived in December 1796, French officials refused to accept his credentials.  A few months later, they threatened him with arrest if he remained in France.  France also had begun seizing US merchant vessels at sea.  All of this really just came to light in America as Washington was leaving office, meaning President Adams would have to resolve it.

Adams called an emergency session of Congress where he made clear that relations with France had fallen apart and that the US needed to build up its army and navy to deal with this threat. At the same time, he also formed a three member commission, to send to France to work out a diplomatic solution.  The commissioners were John Marshall of Virginia, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, the same man that French officials had rejected as the new American Minister.

The Directory

Before we get into the Commission’s actions, it might be helpful to understand what was going on in France at this time.  The French Revolution began in 1789, but took several years before it abolished the monarchy, executed the king, and fundamentally changed the government.  

By 1792, the convention ran the country.  It consisted of nearly 800 elected representatives, making governing virtually impossible, with no executive branch.  Eventually it evolved that the Committee of Public Safety within the convention ran things, but that led to the Reign of Terror.  Politicians were always trying to out-radical each other and vying for power in this rather unstructured environment. 

To provide more organization, the Convention adopted a constitution in 1793, but it never really went into effect.  The Convention suspended it, arguing that wartime emergencies made implementation impossible.  In 1795, France finally implemented a constitution.  This one maintained a popularly elected Council of 500.  It created a second legislative body called the Council of Ancients.  Voting for the Council of Ancients had stiff property requirements, and voters had to be at least 30 years old.  Those elected had to be at least 40 years old.  This body consisted of 250 elected officials.

French Directory
The new constitution also created an executive branch.  But rather than a single chief executive, leadership was created in a five member group called the Directory.  The Council of 500 proposed a list of Directory members, and the Council of Ancients then selected the five members from that list. All members of the directory had to be at least 40 years old, have government experience, and could serve only a single five year term.  Each year, one member of the Directory would be replaced.

The idea behind all this was to create more structure and separation of powers and to prevent governments from swinging wildly in any single election.  It was designed to restore stability following the chaos of the Reign of Terror that it replaced.

Despite this supposedly well-ordered system, the fact that France was still at war with most of Europe, and that the economy was in shambles, led to repeated shake-ups, attempted coups, assassinations, and crack downs on civil rights.  In short, French leaders had much more on their minds than their relations with the United States.

Talleyrand

One French leader who was giving some thought to the US was Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, the Directory’s new foreign minister.

Talleyrand came from a minor noble family in France.  Due to a clubbed foot, he could not pursue a career in the army.  Instead, he entered seminary. After being expelled for a sexual affair, he was nevertheless ordained thanks to family connections, in 1779.  A decade later, he received an appointment as a bishop.  

Talleyrand
When the revolution began the following year, he went to the National Convention as a representative of the clergy.  His pro-revolutionary attitude got him excommunicated around the same time that the Convention confiscated all church property, thus depriving him of an income.

Talleyrand turned to diplomacy, getting an appointment to serve as a negotiator in London, trying to keep Britain out of a war with France.  His 1792 meetings with Prime Minister William Pitt secured neutrality, but the execution of King Louis and the invasion of Belgium the following year made war with Britain inevitable.  Talleyrand had to leave Britain, but going back to France would probably result in his arrest and execution.  

Instead, he moved to America.  On his way to America, he reported having diner with British General Benedict Arnold in Falmouth.  In America, Talleyrand settled in Philadelphia, where he lived privately for about two years. He made contacts, getting involved in land deals and other financial schemes, helping Americans secure European investments..

He formed social contacts and financial arrangements with men like Alexander Hamilton, Robert Morris, and Henry Knox.  He even took an oath of allegiance to the US in 1794.  After the formation of the Directory in France, Talleyrand was no longer under fear of arrest in France.  He returned in the fall of 1796, just as relations between the US and France were collapsing.  In July, 1797, the Directory appointed him Foreign Minister. This was not necessarily a safe job.  Of the fourteen men who had held the position since the Revolution began, five had been executed, four were in exile, and at least two others had been imprisoned.

Talleyrand relied on his time living in America, and also consulted with others, including former ministers Fauchet and Adet who were both back in France by this time.  If Americans thought they were on the brink of war with France, no one in France seemed to agree.  They saw no benefit in going to war.  Doing so would only push the US further into the arms of Britain, which is exactly the opposite of what they wanted.  

The Directory seemed to have been betting on a friendly government in America winning the 1796 elections. When that did not happen, France simply wanted to do whatever it could to keep the US from deepening its relationship with Britain.

Talleyrand had no real power to make foreign policy, but he did advise the Directory on the subject.  In October 1797, he recommended that France drag out negotiations with the US.  This would prevent them from having to give into any US demands, while at the same time stringing them along so that they did not move closer to Britain.

To delay discussions, Talleyrand suggested they demand an explanation of President Adams’ speech to Congress since they understood that as a threat of war.  It would make clear to the Americans that the French were not negotiating under any such threats.

The Commissioners

Around the same time that Talleyrand was proposing delayed negotiations with the Americans, the delegation from America arrived in Paris.

Charles C, Pinckney
Pinckney had remained in Europe since the Directory’s refusal to accept his credentials a year earlier.  He moved to Amsterdam.  Marshall arrived in Europe on September 1.  They waited for several weeks for Gerry to arrive.  In the meantime, they got to know each other, and discussed their strategy.

After a couple of weeks, Marshall and Pinckney headed to Paris on their own.  They arrived on September 27.  Finally, a week later on October 4, Gerry arrived.

The Commission’s options were pretty limited.  They had instructions not to approve any grants or loans to France.  They could not agree to anything that would violate US obligations under the Jay Treaty with Britain, and could not accept any French restrictions on the rights of American commerce.  In short, they could use nice words but were not authorized to concede anything of substance.

Negotiation Attempts

The three Commissioners went to Talleyrand’s office, but he refused to see them.  The French minister started playing games with them.  First, he had Thomas Paine send them a letter suggesting the Americans accepted a role of an unarmed neutral.  Pinckney wrote back a non-committal reply, but that told Talleyrand that he could communicate via unofficial back channels without giving the commission any official recognition.

A few days after that, Jean Conrad Hottinguer stopped by Pinckney’s apartment in the evening.  Pinckney was having dinner with Marshall.  Hottinguer asked Marshall to leave so that he and Pinckney could have a private discussion.  Marshall agreed.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:John_Marshall_(NPG).jpg
John Marshall
Hottinguer told Pinckney that the Directory was upset over Adams’ May 15 message to Congress and that they demanded an explanation.  He also said the US government needed to reimburse its own citizens for any debts that France owed them, and also pay for the commerce that the French had seized or destroyed, as well as lend an unspecified sum of money to the government.  They would also need to pay a bribe just to start any negotiations.

When Pinckney told his fellow commissioners about these unofficial demands, they all agreed that it was a non-starter.  Pinckney and Marshall were ready to be done, but Gerry said they should press for more details.  In another meeting with Hottinguer,  on October 19, Hottinguer set the bribe amount at 1.2 million livres, about $250,000.  Only Gerry wanted to continue.

Talleyrand believed that he and successfully divided the commissioners and that Gerry was the weakest link in the group.  He sent Lucien Hauteval, an old business acquaintance of Gerry to say that Talleyrand was ready to meet informally.  Again, Pinckney and Marshall refused.  They demanded only a formal meeting.  Gerry went by himself, believing that a social call with Hauteval and Talleyrand, both of whom he already knew, would not commit the US to anything.

The meeting itself did not discuss anything of substance.  Talleyrand had used it as a way of confirming that Gerry seemed willing to negotiate without his fellow commissioners.

The following day, October 20, a businessman named Bellamy visited Marshall at his apartment.  He noted that France had just signed a peace treaty with Austria a few days prior.  That meant the war in Europe was largely over.  The only belligerent still facing France was Britain.  France could now focus more on that, as well as making more demands on the US.

Hottinguer returned a few days after that, claiming the Directory was becoming impatient, expecting their bribe.  He also noted that France had defeated the great powers of Europe and that America needed to step up.  France would no longer accept neutrality.  The US could be a friend or an enemy, nothing in between.  Pinckney replied that the US was not ready to roll over and demanded free commerce.  Hottinguer again brought up the subject of the bribe, at which point Pinckney lost  his temper and screamed “No, no, not a sixpence!”

Seeing that these unofficial discussions were breaking down, Gerry went to see Talleyrand and Hauteval again.  He made clear the commissioners had no authority to offer any grants or loans and could not pay any bribes.  Talleyrand suggested the commissioners front the money out of their personal funds and that there would be additional hostile measures within a week if there were no concessions.  Later, Hauteval suggested that one commissioner return to America to get authority for a loan while the others continued to negotiate.

While the commissioners rejected this, they said they might agree to a smaller cash payment if France suspended the seizure of American vessels.  Talleyrand thought he was close to breaking the commissioners.  He sent Bellamy back to talk about the unfortunate fate of those countries that had opposed France, and that France might use its Republican contacts in America to stir up public opinion against the commission.

On November 3, Bellamy told them that the Directory was going to send a complaint to Philadelphia that Pinckney and Marshall were too uncooperative, saying that if Aaron Burr and James Madison had been sent, this whole thing could have been resolved by now.

After about five weeks of negotiations, the commissioners had had enough.  Marshall and Pinckney were disgusted by the way they were being treated, without any official recognition and the continuing demands for bribes just to start official discussions.  Both of them were ready to return home, declaring the attempted diplomatic solution a failure.

Elbridge Gerry
Gerry, however, wanted to keep the lines of communication open.  He didn’t think it was in France’s interest to go to war with America, and believed that Talleyrand was bluffing just to get more concessions.  Gerry convinced his fellow commissioners to hang around while he continued these backchannel discussions on his own through December.

The commissioners gave up their hotel rooms ,instead moving to a less expensive guest house run by a Madame de Villette.  She was a charming hostess to the commissioners.  Unknown to them, she was also working as an agent for Talleyrand.

At the end of the year, Gerry received word that the Directory wanted Marshal and him to remain in France, but wanted Pinckney gone.  The Directory also issued a new edict saying that they would seize any ship that was carrying any goods of English origin.

Marshall tried to draft a written summary of the American position for the Directory, but Gerry, got him to delay delivery as Gerry continued discussions on his own.  

By February, Talleyrand was still pushing for a promise of a loan, trying to convince Gerry that he could do so, but also told him not to discuss the plan with his colleagues.  He also announced that a refusal would mean the expulsion of all the commissioners.  Gerry still refused to agree.

Talleyrand did not follow through on his threat.  Instead February turned into March, when Talleyrand agreed to meet with all three commissioners again.  It was a final push for a loan.  When that wasn’t forthcoming, Talleyrand suggested that Marshall and Pinckney leave the country before they were forcibly expelled.

The commissioners met amongst themselves for the final time on April 3, 1798.  Both Marshal and Pinckney were fed up with Gerry.  They thought his willingness to accept Talleyrand’s continued indignities were embarrassing to the country and were making him into a French puppet.  Gerry thought they were just jealous and were letting personal grudges get in the way of negotiations.  Marshall left for Bordeaux to catch a shop home.  

Pinckney, who had his family with him, got permission to travel to Lyon so that his sick daughter had time to recover before a trans-Atlantic voyage.  By the time she was healthy enough to travel, France had closed all of its ports to American shipping.  Pinckney remained in the country until August.  He spent some of that time trying to document the American sailors being held in French prisons.  Gerry ended up leaving France around the same time, after receiving orders from Secretary of State Pickering to do so.

Reception in America

Back in America, word of progress was sketchy.  Not only did Congress leave Philadelphia in July, but so did most of the other branches.  Yellow fever struck the city again.  Unlike the 1793 epidemic, which killed 10% of the population, this one only killed about 2%.  Adams prudently moved back to Massachusetts, returning only in November when the new session of Congress began.

Congress was still battling over policy.  Federalists wanted even larger armies and navies.  The Democratic Republicans opposed this, even after a French privateer entered Charleston Harbor and burned a British ship there in violation of American neutrality.

It wasn’t until March 4, 1798 that dispatches from Europe, sent in January, finally arrived.  They reported that Talleyrand would not negotiate until he received an explanation for Adams’ address to congress the year prior.  Everyone saw this as an insult, treating the president like an underling.  It further identified three men who had demanded bribes for Talleyrand and the Directors as well as a loan for France.  The report did not identify the men by name but referred to Hottinguer as X, Bellamy as Y, and Hauteval as Z.

Adams was upset that the commissioners did not leave immediately, but there was little that could be done about that now.  He called together the cabinet and discussed the possibility of war.  The Cabinet was mixed.  They corresponded with Hamilton who thought that war or a British alliance was inadvisable as it would divide the country.

Adams drafted a message outlining France’s attacks on America’s national honor and its refusal to stop attacking American shipping.  He called for a declaration of war.  After a few days, Adams thought better of it.  He shelved the message, as well as the dispatches, keeping all of them secret.

Instead, on March 19, he sent a mild and vague message, drafted by Secretary of Treasury Wolcott, simply reporting that the commissioners’ reports gave little hope of success.  He called on Congress to do more to protect American shipping, and lifted an order that prevented American vessels from arming themselves.

The Republicans in Congress, that is, the pro-French faction, as well as Vice President Jefferson, thought Adams was being vague and refusing to release the reports because France was really on the verge of a successful diplomatic solution and that Adams wanted to prevent that and go to war.  Demonstrations around the country condemned the president’s efforts to drive the US into a war with France.

Congress demanded the release of the original reports from the commissioners. Adams refused at first.  In April, the House passed a resolution demanding the release of the documents.  President Adams released them.  Congress was stunned when it learned the truth.  The Federalists in the Senate immediately voted to release the papers to the public. 

The reports shocked the nation.  Republicans were stunned by the abusive and insulting treatment of the  American commissioners.  As Americans became aware of the truth, the public calls went from attacking Adams for pushing the country toward war, to calling for war with France.

War with France seemed inevitable.

Next Week: The Quasi-War with France begins.

 - - -

Next Episode 404 The Quasi-War with France (coming soon)

Previous Episode 402 A Brawl in Congress

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Further Reading

Websites

The XYZ Affair https://www.thoughtco.com/the-xyz-affair-4175006

Adams Address to Congress, May 16, 1797: https://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/john-adams/the-xyz-affair-1797.php

The French Directory: https://www.worldhistory.org/French_Directory

BAUER, JEAN. “With Friends Like These: John Adams and the Comte de Vergennes on Franco-American Relations.” Diplomatic History, vol. 37, no. 4, 2013, pp. 664–92. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/44254324

Kramer, Eugene F. “Some New Light on the XYZ Affair: Elbridge Gerry’s Reasons for Opposing War with France.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 4, 1956, pp. 509–13. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/362143

Ray, Thomas M. “‘Not One Cent for Tribute’: The Public Addresses and American Popular Reaction to the XYZ Affair, 1798-1799.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 3, no. 4, 1983, pp. 389–412. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/3122881

Stinchcombe, William. “Talleyrand and the American Negotiations of 1797-1798.” The Journal of American History, vol. 62, no. 3, 1975, pp. 575–90. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2936215

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

America and France. The intire [sic] message of the president of the United States, to both houses of Congress: covering the full powers to, and dispatches from, the envoys extraordinary of the United States, to the French Republic, Boston: B. Russell, 1798. 

Adams, Charles F. The Life of John Adams, Vol. 2, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1871.

Bowers, Claude G. Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America, London: Constable and Co. 1925.

Morse, Jr. John T. John Adams, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1884. 

Wood, John The History of the Administration of John Adams, Esq., Late President of the United States, New York: Barlas and Ward, 1802. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams, Univ. of Kansas Press, 1975. 

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. Making the Presidency John Adams and the Precedents That Forged the Republic, Oxford Univ. Press, 2024.

DeConde, Alexander The Quasi War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared war with France, 1797-1801, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Kurtz, Stephen G. The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800, Literary Licensing,  LLC, 2011.

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, Little Brown & Co. 1962 (borrow on archive.org).

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001.  

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (borrow on archive.org) 

Nester, William The Hamiltonian Vision, 1789-1800, Potomac Books, 2012 (Chapter 19 on XYZ available at JSTOR)

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

Shaw Peter The Character of John Adams, Univ. of NC Press, 1976. 

Smith, Jean E. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation, Henry Holt & Co. 1996. 

Staloff, Darren Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding, Hill and Wang, 2005. 

Stinchcombe, William The XYZ Affair, Praeger, 1980. 

Vaughn, Harold C. The XYZ Affair, 1797-1798, Franklin Watts, 1972.

Wood, Gordon S. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.

 * As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.