We last left the main Continental Army under General Washington in Episode 324. The officers were on the verge of mutiny, as they came to believe that Congress would never give them all the benefits they had been promised for their sacrifices and that they would probably be sent home as paupers, many facing debtors' prison for the debts they incurred to further the cause of liberty. Only George Washington’s speech at Newburgh in March 1783, prevented a likely uprising of the army.
Congress itself was broke, and deeply in debt. It had no way to repay its debts since its delegates would not agree on any real taxing authority and the states refused to come up with a way to provide the funds needed to pay off the debts to the army, and to everyone else who had made contributions to the cause of independence.
Separation Pay
Superintendent of Finance, Robert Morris, had submitted his resignation, effective at the end of May, 1783. His abilities to create money from nothing had been pushed beyond all reasonable limits. He told Congress that finding any solution to its financial problems was simply beyond his abilities at this point, and that they should find someone else. Of course, there was no one else. Producing gold and silver from promises simply did not work. Morris was one of the most skilled financiers in North American, and perhaps the world. He could do nothing more.
Despite the lack of any money, the war was over and Congress had to send home the army. General Washington informed the delegates that a bare minimum of three months’ separation pay had to be provided, if only to give the soldiers traveling money to get home. In April, weeks before Morris’ departure, delegates came to him and told him he needed to come up with the necessary money before he left.
Morris, of course, was still struggling to come up with the one month’s pay that he had promised the army in January. Covering three months’ pay would require raising about $750,000 from nothing. Morris said he simply could not do this. He told the delegates that he could not in good conscience issue more promissory notes that he knew would never be repaid.
Congress formed a committee, headed by Virginia delegate Theodorick Bland, to pressure Morris into finding a way to pay off the army so the soldiers could go home. Also on the committee were two men we know pretty well; fellow Virginian James Madison, and New York delegate Alexander Hamilton.
The delegates pressured Morris to remain in office long enough to figure out a way to cover the three month’s pay for the army so they could go home. Morris finally relented and agreed to stay on the condition that Congress understand this was the very last thing he was going to do.
Morris knew the only way to create this money was to print more paper Morris Notes. He would have to sign each note, guaranteeing his personal promise for repayment of the notes.
Duration of the War
Next, delegates had to decide what to do with the army itself. Most of the soldiers had enlisted for the duration of the war. Since a peace treaty had arrived and the enemy announced cessation of hostilities, that meant to most people that the war was over. Soldiers had already made it clear they would not simply sit in camp, starving, without adequate clothing or shelter, just waiting until Congress decided they could leave.
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| Nassau Hall - Princeton |
Congress debated the matter in April. They agreed that the war was not over until both sides ratified the final treaty, which would not happen until some time in 1784. At the same time, they had to begin the process of at least reducing the army and sending some men home. Congress authorized Washington to issue mass furloughs. This would allow the men to return home, although not formally ending their service, and allowing that they could be recalled to service if the need arose. Furloughed units would march home with their guns and uniforms.
The biggest source of delay was that the promised three months of separation pay was not forthcoming. Morris had agreed to print the money, but could not find enough paper in Philadelphia to print the notes.
Going Home
Despite the lack of separation pay, Washington announced the furloughs in his general orders of June 1. The men were to prepare to go home, while paymasters would remain in camp to help settle accounts. Officers would march their men home in units. This was done primarily to keep order and prevent thousands of starving and impoverished men, armed with guns, from descending on the population while trying to find their way home.
The Maryland line was the first to leave camp on June 5. Major Thomas Lansdale tried to find a route home that would avoid small towns and villages, to prevent looting by his soldiers. The New York and New Jersey lines left the following day. These men had the shortest travel home. After that, New Hampshire left. Massachusetts, which had the largest contingent in the army, left on June 8th. By June 13, Washington’s army of 10,000 men had been reduced to about 2700.
Many officers were particularly upset. General Horatio Gates had already left, leaving General William Heath as the senior officer after Washington. He submitted a complaint on behalf of the officers that they were being sent home without any of their promised back pay or benefits. General Washington understood their concern. He responded that he would make the furloughs voluntary. Any officers who wanted to remain in camp as they waited for Congress to make good on its promises were free to do so. Similarly, enlisted men who wanted to remain could agree to trade places with a soldier who had not yet been furloughed.
On June 12, the Maryland line arrived in Philadelphia on its way back to Maryland. There, the soldiers finally received some good news. Morris had managed to print at least some of the separation pay they had been promised. The soldiers received their three months’ pay. It was simply paper, meaning that when they spent it, they might get only 40 or 50 cents on the dollar, but at least it was something.
The problems started when the men of the Maryland line bunked overnight in Philadelphia and had a chance to speak with other Continental soldiers stationed in Philadelphia. The soldiers learned that the Maryland line had been offered furloughs and were provided with the pay they had been promised in January, as well as separation pay from Congress and additional pay from the Maryland legislature.
The soldiers stationed in and around Philadelphia, who were not part of General Washington’s immediate command in New York. They had not been offered furloughs. They had not received not a penny of separation pay, nor even the pay they had been promised in January. This differential treatment among Continental soldiers was particularly galling.
Trouble in Philadelphia
A group of noncommissioned officers sent a protest letter to Congress, demanding to know why some soldiers were getting pay and furloughs, while their units were not. Congress did not know how to respond, and did not.
A few days later, somewhere between 80 to 100 soldiers who had been stationed in Lancaster, about 80 miles from Philadelphia, began marching to the city to “obtain justice.” Concerned about the army marching on the capital, Congress asked the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania to turn out the militia to stop the mutinous Continentals before they arrived in the city. The Council refused. Council President John Dickinson informed Congress that the militia was not inclined to defend Congress against the army, and might just be inclined to join them.
The Council’s secretary at the time was Major John Armstrong. He had been General Horatio Gates’ aide de camp a few months earlier and was the author of the angry letter at Newburgh that forced Washington to put down a near mutiny among the officers. Now a civilian, Armstrong remained sympathetic with the soldiers, who were simply demanding that Congress keep its promises to them.
On June 20, the mutineers entered Philadelphia and surrounded the State House, what we today call Independence Hall. Congress remained inside with no one to defend them. Over the next few days more soldiers joined the protest. The crowds around the State House grew to nearly 400. Most of the soldiers were there with their muskets.
The mutineers did not engage in any violence. This was simply a protest. They wanted Congress to act and were there to demand it. Delegates were free to come and go, although they were subject to soldiers yelling at them and harassing them. President Elias Boudinot was followed home by a group of armed soldiers who acted in a threatening and intimidating way, but did not physically assault him or hinder his walk.
While there had been no violence yet, members of Congress had no idea how long it would remain that way. Congress attempted to negotiate with the mutineers, but delegates were unwilling to accede to their demands, especially since it would probably only encourage more mutinies. Alexander Hamilton, a former officer himself, tried to get the men to stand down. Hamilton’s efforts at negotiating with the mutineers later led to rumors that he had instigated the mutiny in order to put more pressure on Congress. There has never been any evidence to substantiate the idea that Hamilton encourage the protests in any way.
President Boudinot sent word to Washington that they were facing a mutiny of the Pennsylvania line and had no one to protect them. Washington reacted quickly, sending Major General Robert Howe, with 1500 men from his camp in New York, more than half of his remaining army.
It took days for word to reach Washington and for the relief army to reach Philadelphia. By the time the soldiers arrived, Congress was gone. Pennsylvania’s President John Dickinson had advised Congress to adjourn from the city. That’s exactly what they did. The delegates had voted to adjourn and resume their session in Princeton., New Jersey, leaving the mutineers behind.
With Congress gone, and word that Washington was sending an army to suppress the mutiny, the mutineers dispersed. Two of the officers, fearing the consequences of their mutiny, simply fled. They boarded a ship bound for Ireland and left the country. Following the departure of those to leaders, most of the mutineers surrendered and ended their protests. Most of the mutineers were simply granted furloughs and sent home. Several of the leaders who had remained would be arrested and prosecuted. Eventually those who were tried and convicted would be pardoned.
Princeton Congress
Congress was in no hurry to return to Philadelphia. It was not just the mutiny, but the fact that the Pennsylvania government did not seem to want to lift a finger to protect them during the crisis. Some delegates believed that top officials in Pennsylvania may have even encouraged the mutiny in order to encourage Congress to act on several matters.
When President Boudinot ended the session in Philadelphia on June 24, he told delegates that Congress would resume business in Princeton on the 26th. Most delegates could not move that fast, so it took until June 30 until they had a quorum to do any business.
Princeton, of course, was much smaller than Philadelphia, leaving many delegates struggling to find room and board. It was mostly a college town. The College of New Jersey, later called Princeton University, was very much in operation at the time, with students attending class alongside delegates meeting in Congress. Congressional secretary Charles Thomson complained about the odor from the student dorms that he had to pass each day on his way to congress.
Congress met in Nassau Hall, the school’s main building. President Boudinot was from New Jersey and was a trustee at the college. His colleague and former delegate to the Continental Congress, John Witherspoon, was president of the college. The school made available whatever space Congress needed.
Congress passed a resolution formally moving its meeting place to Nassau Hall and made it the new seat of government.
Pierce Notes
For General Washington, the mutiny was just another sign that he was losing control. Washington had been working on a circular to the states, arguing that they needed to maintain a strong union and a standing army now that the war was over. Having the Continental Army threaten Congress and chase it out of Philadelphia was not helping him to make his case for retaining a standing army. The conventional wisdom of the time was that standing armies in peacetime were tyrannical, and threatened the operation of a civilian government. The Philadelphia mutiny played directly into that fear.
Washington had to backpedal and downplay that concern. He noted that this was not the army going after Congress. It was a few bad apples. The continental army actually stopped the mutiny in the end. Washington characterized the mutineers as raw recruits with little military experience, and that it was a relatively small number of men.
In July, the Continental officers received some welcome news. Congress had completed its approval of a lump sum payment to officers in lieu of a pension, their back pay, and reimbursement for rations and uniforms that they were promised, but had never received.
Paymaster John Pierce was tasked with making the final payoff, which totaled about $11 million. Of course, there was no actual money to make these payments. Instead Pierce offered settlement certificates to each officer. This was essentially a paper IOU from Congress. Unlike the Morris Notes, which were backed personally by Robert Morris, these so-called Pierce Notes were simply backed by the promises of the Continental Congress to make good on them someday.
The nominal values of these certificates were pretty substantial. Lieutenants received around $1500. Generals received nearly $10,000. Even so, without any credible backing, the Pierce Notes were mostly sold off at a very deep discount. For many years afterward, the notes were used as a medium of exchange, always traded at a deep discount to face value, based on the recipient’s belief that Congress might someday make good on them.
More Waiting
Even after receiving their pay, much of the remaining army had to stay in camp, awaiting the final departure of the British Army from New York. General Washington, however, thought that the immediate crisis was under sufficient control that he could take a short departure from camp.
In August, Washington visited upstate New York, going to Albany, Saratoga, and Ticonderoga. He finally had an opportunity to visit some of the battlefields that had contributed to the success of the war. Always the businessman, Washington also saw that valuable land in the Mohawk Valley, which had been the target of Loyalist and Indian attacks for most of the war, was selling for much less than it would be worth in peacetime. He and Governor George Clinton formed a land partnership to purchase over 6000 acres along the Mohawk River.
When Washington returned to Newburgh, he found requests from Congress in Princeton that he move down to be with them. I suspect Congress remained concerned about future mutinies and wanted Washington close by.
Washington was not inclined to rush down to New Jersey. His wife Martha, who was with him in camp, had come down with a fever. Washington was also concerned about leaving the bulk of this remaining army without his presence for an extended time. The army had to remain near New York. Although no one expected the British to go on an offensive, there were still loyalists in New York who might cause trouble if there was not an army present to discourage them. Washington wanted to remain with his army.
Even so, with continued pressure, and after Marth was feeling well enough to travel, Washington left Newburgh and moved his headquarters to Princeton by the end of August. The General received spacious accommodations, taking possession of a large 320 acre plantation just south of town, named Rocky Hill.
With a much smaller army to command and being separated from the large contingent that still remained around New York City, Washington stepped away from the day to day burdens of command. He spent much of his time dining and talking with Members of Congress. He attended many functions in his honor and even went to a commencement ceremony at the college. He sat for a portrait and a bust of himself. Congress voted to pay for a statue of Washington that would someday sit in front of the legislature.
Witnesses who had seen Washington in command of the army in earlier times and had the opportunity to interact with him in Princeton noticed a great change. With the pressures of command mostly gone, Washington was able to relax. Observers noted that he smiled much more often and even showed some elements of wit and humor, a countenance rarely on display during the war.
Like all the other officers and men who had served in the field for so many years, Washington was simply ready to go home. He corresponded with his staff at Mount Vernon, hoping to put the house in shape for his return. He hoped Congress would come up with some of the funds it owed him for his expenses over the war. He had provided his country with a valuable service that was coming to an end. Washington simply wanted to go home.
Next week: The British face one final battle of the war in Cuddalore, India.
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Next Episode 328 Cuddalore (Available September 22, 2024)
Previous Episode 326 Fort Carlos
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Further Reading
Websites
Bowling, Kenneth R. “New Light on the Philadelphia Mutiny of 1783: Federal-State Confrontation at the Close of the War for Independence.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 101, no. 4, 1977, pp. 419–50. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20091201
Gallagher, Mary A. Y. “Reinterpreting the ‘Very Trifling Mutiny’ at Philadelphia in June 1783.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 119, no. 1/2, 1995, pp. 3–35. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20092924
Personal Ties Bring Congress to Princeton: https://www.princeton.edu/news/2015/07/02/july-4-milestone-americas-and-princetons-history
Nassau Hall, Princeton, N.J. June 30, 1783 - Nov. 4, 1783: https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/buildings/section8
The Continental Congress at Nassau Hall https://paw.princeton.edu/article/continental-congress-nassau-hall
“To George Washington from Henry Carbery, 25 July 1789,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0172
Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789, Vol 24, Jan. 1 - Aug. 9, 1783, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1904.
Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*
Fowler, William H. Jr. American Crisis: George Washington and the Dangerous Two Years after Yorktown, 1781-1783, Walker & Co. 2011.
Head, David A Crisis of Peace: George Washington, the Newburgh Conspiracy, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Pegasus Books, 2019.
Nagy, John A. Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies of the American Revolution, Westholme Publishing, 2007.
* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.
