American Revolution Podcast: Revolutionary War Battles

Showing posts with label Revolutionary War Battles. Show all posts

Sunday, September 6, 2020

ARP165 Bemis Heights (2nd Saratoga)

A few weeks ago, we left General Horatio Gates at the head of an army comprised of Continentals and militia poised to block the advance of General Johnny Burgoyne and his army of British and German Bruswickers. The two armies had fought at what became known as the battle of Freeman’s Farm, without any real change to the two army’s positions.

Since then, both armies remained in position, neither ready to advance on the other. Gates sat behind his entrenchments at Bemis Heights, waiting for the British to get desperate enough to attack his strong defensive position.

British Desperation

With each day that passed, the Continental Army grew stronger, while the British grew weaker. By early October, Gates had over 10,000 and Continentals and militia under his direct command. Burgoyne’s army had dwindled to about 5000. He was cut off from food and supplies from the north, and could not venture out to forage in the area, not that there was much left to forage even if they could go out.

The British army had been on reduced rations, meaning the men were not getting enough to eat. By day, Continental riflemen picked off British pickets from a distance. At night, the patriots snuck up on the pickets and killed them with knives or tomahawks. Among the ranks, suicides and desertions grew. Conditions were that miserable and prospects that bleak.

Benedict Arnold wounded on Bemis Heights
(from British Battles)

For many officers and men, more than their own lives were at stake. Many of them had their families with them. These dependents were on the same starvation-level rations as the army and faced an unknown fate if they fell into the hands of the enemy. German commander Friedrich von Riedesel had his wife and daughters with him. He had attempted to send his family back, but his wife refused to abandon him.

For reasons beyond the safety of his family, General Riedesel had been pushing Burgoyne to pull back the army to Fort Edward. From there, they would be able to reestablish supply lines to Ticonderoga and would have a better line of retreat. Burgoyne dismissed such recommendations. He was still focused on getting to Albany. He had sent messages to General Henry Clinton in New York, encouraging him to send an army up the Hudson to meet up with Burgoyne in Albany. Retreating was out of the question. Even so, Burgoyne knew his position was becoming more desperate each day.

In addition to Burgoyne facing an army twice his size, New York militia general Jacob Bailey now led 2000 soldiers north of Fort Edward, making that route of retreat much less of a possibility.

As I mentioned last week. Burgoyne wrote a series of letters to General Clinton. Most had a rather optimistic tone, explained later as not wanting to put in writing how really desperate his situation had become. Burgoyne had learned only recently that General Howe had abandoned him by taking his entire army south to capture Philadelphia and with no intention of moving north again that year. Burgoyne learned of that long enough before that he could have retreated back to Ticonderoga and ended the season there. That was what many of his generals recommended.

Burgoyne, though, had gone to London the year before and gotten this command by telling the political leadership that the generals in America were too timid and not aggressive enough in pushing forward. He had promised to open up a corridor from Canada to New York City that year. Anything less would be seen as a failure. Perhaps withdrawal would have been a sensible act of caution, but that is exactly how he had criticized his superiors in order to get this command ahead of more senior generals. Burgoyne was a gambler. He knew that he had to take some real risks, not only to win the war, but also to justify his rise in the ranks past other leaders.

General Burgoyne
(from Wikimedia)

Although he didn’t use the term, Burgoyne was showing the same “victory or death” attitude that had served the Americans well in many prior battles. Turning back was not a serious consideration.

Although General Howe had abandoned him, Burgoyne still hoped that Clinton could salvage the campaign. Although Clinton complained that he did not have enough men even to defend his command around New York City, Burgoyne hitched all of his hopes on Clinton sending a force up the Hudson River to Albany. If he could just reach that town, his army would be saved. Clinton had sent a message which Burgoyne received on September 21. Clinton had sent the message ten days earlier, saying that ten days later he would begin a diversionary attack up the Hudson River with 2000 men to attack Fort Montgomery and that he hoped it might divert some of the American forces away from Burgoyne.

Clinton never indicated he would go all the way to Albany. Even if he did, Clinton’s 2000 man force combined with Burgoyne’s army of 5000 or 6000 effectives would still be outnumbered, by the enemy, probably by two to one. Even if Clinton delivered more than he promised in his note by taking Albany, that would not necessarily spell victory for the British. Burgoyne still placed all of his hopes on joining up with Clinton at Albany and ultimately reaching New York City. Even though that looked increasingly unrealistic to just about everyone else.

Burgoyne's Advance (from Wikimedia)

Some have argued that Burgoyne’s letters to Clinton at this point indicated that Burgoyne knew that failure was the probable end of his campaign and that he wanted someone else to take the blame. On September 27 Burgoyne sent a messenger to tell Clinton he needed assurance that Clinton could take Albany before he could push through. Otherwise, if Clinton failed, Burgoyne would be forced to retreat. The next day, Burgoyne learned about John Brown’s raid that had captured Skenesborough and also received an inaccurate report that the Americans had taken Fort George. This caused Burgoyne to dash off another desperate note to Clinton saying that he would not have given up his communications with Ticonderoga if he had not expected to meet up with British forces at Albany. Clinton sent reply messages to make clear he was not going to Albany. The Americans intercepted those messages, so they never reached Burgoyne anyway.

On October 4 and 5, 1777 Burgoyne held a council of war with General Riedesel, Philips, and Fraser. They agreed that they needed to do something soon. The army would launch an attack against the American defenses. Their hope was to punch a hole in the lines, and march through to Albany.

Burgoyne originally proposed that he would deploy virtually his entire army against the American Left, leaving only a few hundred men to guard the baggage near the river. The other generals thought this was insanity, since the Americans could then easily capture their baggage with a quick raid, leaving the army in the field with nothing. Generals Riedesel and Fraser still recommended the army retreat back to Fort Edward. Burgoyne, however, refused to consider that option.

Instead, the generals agreed on a plan to attack the American left flank. If they could roll up the Americans there, they could take the heights and threaten to push the rest of the Continental Army back against the Hudson River. The British could then push more soldiers into the battle as needed over the course of the day, while still protecting their baggage. It was a desperate gamble, but really the best option aside from retreat or surrender.

Arnold-Gates Fight

The American leadership though, seemed to be doing everything it could to undermine its own very strong position. Specifically, the fight between General Gates and General Arnold grew into an all-out squall. Gates had left Arnold pretty much on his own on the left flank during the battle of Freeman’s Farm a few weeks earlier. By failing to send sufficient reinforcements that day, Gates seemed to be trying to set up Arnold for failure. When the Americans under Arnold held their own under the British assault, it appeared that Arnold would be credited with a great victory. Arnold had to return to headquarters to beg Gates personally to send in more reinforcements. After that, Gates refused to let Arnold return to the battlefield and lead the final victory. By all appearances, Gates seemed more willing to lose the battle than to give Arnold credit for the victory.

When Gates reported the victory to Congress and to the Governor of New York, he did not even mention Arnold. Gates merely stated that a division of the army had stopped the British advance. He named several field officers but failed to mention Arnold’s leadership at all.

Gen. Horatio Gates
(from Nat. Port. Gal.)

Several days after the battle at Freeman’s farm. Colonel James Wilkinson removed Morgan’s riflemen from Arnold’s command and moved them to his own command, without giving Arnold any notice. It was hard for anyone to see any military value to this change. In fact, removing the riflemen from the flanks, where they had been so critical at Freeman’s Farm seemed the height of military stupidity. The lack of any notice was also a deliberate act of disrespect designed to provoke Arnold. Arnold had issued daily orders to Morgan’s men, only to find them countermanded by Wilkinson's orders. It made Arnold look like a fool who did not know what was happening in the chain of command.

Arnold took the orders as a direct insult against him and one putting the whole army at risk in an attempt to win some petty political game. He charged into Gates’ headquarters for a direct confrontation. The two generals got into a screaming match. Gates said he was not even sure Arnold was still a general since he had submitted his resignation to Congress weeks earlier, shortly before traveling to Saratoga. He informed Arnold that he was relieved of command and that General Lincoln would take his place. He further suggested that if Arnold did not like it, he should go back to Philadelphia and take up the issue with Congress.

Arnold stalked out, but then sent a written note asking Gates to explain the reasons for his treatment. Instead, Gates simply sent a note to Arnold giving him leave to return to Philadelphia, and saying he would no longer speak with Arnold either in person or in writing.

According to legend, although the document has never been found, every officer of the line in the army, except General Lincoln, signed a written request to Arnold not to abandon the army at this time. Even officers who knew how prickly Arnold could be did not want to lose their best combat commander on the eve of battle.

American Charge at Saratoga
(from History on the Net)

As I mentioned in an earlier episode, Gates’ disfavor of Arnold seemed to stem from Arnold’s decision to take two young officers, Richard Varick and Henry Livingston onto his staff. The two officers had been on General Schuyler’s staff before he lost his command. Gates saw Arnold’s decision to give staff positions to these two young allies of his arch-rival as a direct attack against him.

After hearing from all the officers who wanted Arnold to remain, Gates sent out a feeler via an aide to see if Arnold would be willing to dismiss the two men, as an olive branch to repair relations between them. Arnold absolutely refused to dismiss two officers. They had done nothing wrong and he would not dismiss them in order to assuage the commander’s feelings. Although Varick and Livingston soon left on their own, the two generals seemed unwilling to repair their relationship for the good of the war effort.

Arnold remained in camp, but Gates refused to include him in any staff meetings of top officers. Arnold continued to write letters to Gates, recommending various actions, but Gates simply ignored them. On October 1, Gates formally stripped Arnold of command, personally took over the left wing, and gave General Lincoln command of the right wing.

Despite having stronger numbers and a good position, the Continental Army’s leadership seemed hopelessly divided. Gates seemed determined to destroy Arnold, even if it meant losing the battle.

The Battle

On the morning of October 7, General Burgoyne personally led a division of over 2000 soldiers, along with General Fraser, against the American left flank. His goal was to see if they could find weakness in the American lines. The light infantry, grenadiers, and select German troops, backed by ten field cannon left camp shortly after 10:00 AM, advancing to Barber’s Wheatfield. From there, they could observe the American positions.

Bemis Heights troop positions (from Wikimedia)

Facing the British in the woods on the other side of the field were Morgan’s rifles along with Enoch Poor and Ebenezer Learned’s brigades, more than 2000 continentals, with perhaps another 1500 militia. For most of the morning, the two armies eyed each other and vied for position.

Around 2:00 PM, the British opened fire against Poor’s brigade. The distance was too far for the firing to be effective and the Americans held their ground. Finally, the British charged across the field with their bayonets, but were cut down by the Americans at close range. Major John Acland, who led the British charge was shot in both legs and taken prisoner. General Poor’s Continentals counter-charged and captured the British cannons on the other side of the field.

Morgan’s riflemen engaged with Fraser’s regulars, keeping the British pinned down with deadly accurate rifle fire. Burgoyne sent orders for the men to withdraw, but Morgan’s riflemen shot the messenger before he could get to Fraser. Not aware of the orders, Fraser remained on the field, taking heavy casualties.

Arnold Attacks

As the battle raged, General Gates was nowhere close to the battle. Although Gates had made himself the division commander there, he remained at his headquarters two miles away from his soldiers in the field. Arnold, confined to his tent, fumed as he heard the distant sound of gunfire. For several hours, the Americans, primarily General Enoch Poor’s brigade and Morgan’s riflemen, held the enemy at bay. Gates dispatched written orders based on reports received from the battlefield.

Finally, after he could take it no longer, Arnold mounted his horse and rode toward the sound of gunfire. He found Colonel Morgan, but simply rode past him toward the enemy. On the front lines, Arnold rallied the retreating men and reorganized them for another charge. Morgan’s riflemen soon caught up with Arnold and provided him with support as the British line reeled from the unexpected American charge.

Benedict Arnold at Saratoga

On the other side of the lines, General Simon Fraser attempted to rally the British lines, riding up and down, encouraging the men. Arnold saw Fraser’s effective leadership. He did not know it was Fraser, but turned to Morgan and told him that the officer needed to be taken out. Morgan assigned the job to one of his best sharpshooters. Minutes later, Fraser fell off his horse, fatally wounded with a shot to the stomach.

Men who saw Arnold in the field that day described him as a madman, perhaps even drunk. Although the charge of drunkenness seems to have been made by his detractors trying to disparage his role that day. Arnold rode back and forth, shouting to them and encouraging them, regularly exposing himself to enemy fire, as if he preferred to die in battle than return to his tent as ordered.

He rode his horse across the entire British line of battle, drawing numerous shots but never being hit. Finally Arnold rallied a regiment to charge the British redoubt, leading the charge himself. The defenders fired at him, finally taking down his horse,who collapsed. Arnold jumped free from the falling animal and stood up, only to have a wounded enemy soldier shoot him at near point blank range, hitting Arnold in the leg. When the soldiers with Arnold moved to bayonet his attacker, Arnold said “Don’t hurt him! He’s a fine fellow. He only did his duty.”

It was the last great charge of the day and allowed the Americans to hold the field. The Germans made one more futile attempt to retake the redoubt but were easily driven back. The British pulled back to a defensive position near the Hudson River, badly bloodied that day. As Arnold was carried from the field, Gate’s aide finally caught up with him, with the orders that he should return to camp immediately.

Aftermath

Between the two battles, Freeman’s farm and Bemis Heights, fought within a few weeks of each other and generally over the same area of land, the British had taken over 1000 casualties, over 400 killed and nearly 700 wounded. Several hundred more were taken prisoner. With his dwindling force running out of food and supplies, General Burgoyne’s pulled back to a defensive area along the Hudson River. Another attack was out of the question, and even the prospect of retreat seemed unlikely following the battle.

Burial of Simon Fraser
(from National Army Museum)

The death of General Simon Fraser was an especially difficult blow to the British leadership. Fraser died of his wounds early in the morning the day after the battle, while in the care of the Baroness von Riedesel. He was buried along with Burgoyne’s aide de camp, Francis Clerke, who also fell victim to Morgan’s rifles, while delivering a message to field commanders. The two officers’ graves went unmarked to prevent the enemy from finding them.

The Americans had lost far fewer casualties, less than 350 killed and wounded between both battles. More militia reinforcements were arriving each day, swelling the American ranks.

General Arnold was the most conspicuous injury. One of Gates’ aides approached Arnold as stretcher bearers carried him back from the battlefield. He asked “where are you hit?” Arnold responded “in the same leg” meaning the same one that had been shot at the Battle of Quebec a couple of years earlier. Arnold then added “I wish it had been my heart.” Arnold’s work that day in defiance of Gates’ orders had been critical to the victory.

Now, the British had no more real options to fight. Burgoyne’s last hope was that a relief force under General Clinton might reach them from New York City. His army hung on, refusing to surrender, with the hope of a relief column to save the army.

We’ll see how that goes next week when we cover the surrender at Saratoga.

- - -

Next Episode 166 Surrender at Saratoga

Previous Episode 164 Forts Clinton and Montgomery

Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast

Join the Facebook group, American Revolution Podcast: https://www.facebook.com/groups/132651894048271

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give. Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via Venmo, Zelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)

Click here to see my Patreon Page

An alternative to Patreon is SubscribeStar. For anyone who has problems with Patreon, you can get the same benefits by subscribing at SubscribeStar.

Click here to go to my SubscribeStar Page

Sunday, October 21, 2018

Episode 067: Washington Takes Command

A few weeks ago, I discussed the Continental Congress’ decision to create a Continental Army and appoint George Washington as its commander in chief. Before Washington could take charge, the Provincial Army fought the battle of Bunker Hill that I discussed for the last two weeks. With the battle over, I’m going to pick up the story of Washington taking command of the new Continental Army.

New Generals for a New Army

The Continental Congress had voted to create the Continental Army on June 14, 1775. It appointed George Washington as the new commander on June 15, two days before Bunker Hill. Word of the new commander did not reach Gen. Artemas Ward until June 25, a week after the battle. Washington took a couple of weeks to prepare, get his affairs in order, and make the trip to Boston, arriving on July 2, escorted by James Warren, the new President of the Provincial Congress, and Dr. Benjamin Church head of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety.

Washington Takes Command a Cambridge
(From New England Historical Society)

Washington first stopped to meet with General Ward, now the Continental Army’s second in command and the most senior major general in the new army. I’m not sure if Ward was offended or relieved to have a new commander. He did turn over command promptly and without public comment. If there was a chance the two might develop a good working relationship, Washington put an end to that over the next few weeks. Washington publicly criticized the lax command structure and leadership that he inherited, which Ward took personally.

With Washington were fellow Virginians the new Major General Charles Lee, third in command of the new army and newly appointed Brigadier General Horatio Gates. As I mentioned last week, both men were in contention for the top job and both had been officers in the regular army before settling in Virginia.

Connecticut General Israel Putnam, who had played a prominent role at Bunker Hill and most other events at the siege of Boston, also received an appointment as major general in the new Continental Army. The only major general not present was Philip Schuyler who was in Albany trying to resolve the military situation with Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold out around Fort Ticonderoga (see Episodes 59 and 60).

Two more Massachusetts generals in the Provincial Army were among the first eight brigadier generals appointed by Congress. Generals John Thomas and William Heath received their commissions. Generals Joseph Spencer from Connecticut, and Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island also both served in the Provincial Army and received commissions as brigadiers.

Artemas Ward loses command
(From Wikimedia)

In case you were wondering, the others in the first class of brigadier generals were Joseph Sullivan, a New Hampshire delegate to the Continental Congress, who would arrive a few days later, Richard Montgomery who was Schuyler’s second in command in New York, and David Wooster from Connecticut, the same man who had refused Captain Benedict Arnold access to the powerhouse in New Haven after the Battle of Lexington (see, Episode 59). These men rounded out the first class of brigadiers.

Also with Washington were his new aide, Maj. Thomas Mifflin and his secretary Lt. Col. Joseph Reed, both from Pennsylvania, and both of whom will play prominent future roles in our story. At the risk of making too many introductions at once, I want to mention one more man accompanying General Washington. Billy Lee was Washington’s slave. He served as his personal assistant, valet, butler, and messenger. Washington had purchased Lee in 1768. The two men apparently grew very close. Lee was one of the few men anywhere who could keep up with Washington on a horse. Both men were excellent and daring riders. Lee would serve Washington for all eight years of the war, remaining by his side through everything. It is unclear if Washington ever confided in Lee, because if he did, Lee never betrayed that confidence. It was clear that Washington was close with Lee and appreciated his service. When Washington died, Lee was the only slave he freed outright. He also granted Lee a pension for the remainder of his life.

George Washington

I’ve already given some background on some of these new generals, and will probably need to provide more background on more of them in future episodes, but today, I just want to focus on Washington himself. Hopefully, everybody knows who George Washington is, and there are literally over a thousand published biographies about the man, almost all of which are better than this brief summary.. But in the interest of being thorough, here is a brief background.

George Washington by Peale
1776 (from Wikimedia)

Washington was one of the earliest people I introduced in this story, way back in Episode 5. There, as a young man he blundered into the Ohio Valley and kicked off the Seven Years War between Britain and France, known in America as French and Indian War. In 1759, as the French and Indian War was nearing its end, Washington married Martha Custis, a wealthy widow with two children of her own.

George, then 26, left active military service and got elected to the House of Burgesses later that year. For the next 15 years, he spent his time as a gentleman farmer and minor legislator, while remaining a Virginia militia officer. Washington had begun wearing his militia uniform to the Second Continental Congress, where he was a delegate. Some have argued he was angling to be made the new commander of the Continental Army. As I mentioned in an earlier episode, from the public and private statements of Washington around this time, I think he hoped to be made a general, but did not anticipate being appointed Commander in Chief. When offered the command though, he stepped up and accepted it.

Washington was also an extremely formal, quiet, and reserved man. As a boy, he came from one of the lesser families in Virginia and was always focused on comporting himself more like the wealthier leaders in the colony. He focused obsessively on his dress, speech, manners, and behavior, and expected others to do the same. He rarely took anyone into his confidence or engaged in casual conversation. If anyone ever betrayed his confidence, even in a minor way, he would cut them off rather coldly and would not allow them to become close ever again.

Reorganizing the Army

When Washington arrived in Cambridge, the southern officer experienced a bit of a culture shock with his new army made up of New Englanders. Washington had expected to command an army of over 20,000. The force that met him, however, had less than 14,000 ready for duty, which referred only to the state of their health, not whether they were really trained to fight in battle.

While he did not comment publicly about his first thoughts on his new army, he did write a letter to a distant cousin at Mount Vernon:

The People of this Government have obtained a Character which they by no means deserved—their Officers generally speaking are the most indifferent kind of People I ever saw. ….. [T]they are by no means such Troops, in any respect, as you are led to believe of them from the Accts which are published, but I need not make myself Enemies among them, by this declaration, although it is consistent with truth. I daresay the Men would fight very well (if properly Officered) although they are an exceeding dirty & nasty people.

Gen. Charles Lee
(From Wikimedia)

He was shocked at the level of disorganization, that soldiers and officers did not respect the chain of command, and that blacks and whites were fighting alongside one another. He immediately began to try to change all these things.

One of the things though, that helped make Washington great, was his ability to accept advice and to change his views when convinced of a better idea. Washington initially ordered the dismissal of black troops. As a Virginian he was raised with the concern that armed blacks created a risk of slave insurrection. New Englanders though, had no such fears. Free whites outnumbered both slaves and free blacks combined by overwhelming numbers. Convinced by his New England officers that dismissing the black troops was a bad idea, he soon reversed himself and permitted the racially integrated units to continue. He soon grew to admire and appreciate the capabilities of these men.

His concerns about organization, deportment, and the chain of command though, required change. After personally inspecting the lines, and getting numerous reports on the state of his new army, One of Washington’s first actions was to hold several courts martial, to remove officers who had exhibited cowardice during the battle of Bunker Hill. He also took an inventory of his army, including men, arms, and supplies. He did away with the right of soldiers to elect their officers. All Continental officers would receive a commission from the Continental Congress.

Washington knew that an effective army needed discipline. He issued rules against profanity, drunkenness, and gambling. Officers and men had to attend daily religious services. Violations could be punished with floggings. He ordered officers to improve the neatness and appearance of their men and the camps, keep their men from wandering away from camp without orders, and crack down on the destruction of private property.

The new commander issued an order for sentries not to communicate with the enemy. Soldiers on the front lines at Boston Neck or Charleston Neck often stood within shouting distance of their counterparts on the other side. Such conversations were banned as was any correspondence with the enemy.

Billy Lee, Washington's servant
(from findagrave)

Supplies were also a primary concern. Washington tried to get Congress to buy more shirts for his army. He really wanted whole uniforms but realized this was impossible for now. Many men had been wearing the same unwashed shirts for months, reducing them to rags. Washing them was impossible as there were no women around to do the work. Apparently, it was inconceivable that a soldier might wash his own clothes. New shirts would go a long way toward improving morale. Congress, however, could not come up with the money even for that. Instead of uniforms, Washington ordered his generals and aides to wear ribbons over their shoulders much like a Miss America sash. Washington wore light blue, his general wore pink sashes and his aides green ones. Field officers would wear colored cockades, a smaller ribbon tied in a bow, in their hats.

Washington organized his army into three divisions, one for each of his major generals at Boston. He put General Ward in charge of the the army’s right at Roxbury, defending Boston Neck. General Lee took charge of the left, which included the defense of Charlestown Neck against the British on Bunker Hill. Putnam commanded the center at Cambridge, under Washington’s direct supervision.

Washington may have expected that the men in his new army would need training and discipline. What really shocked him was the lack of ammunition and supplies. Originally his aides told him the army had just over 300 barrels of powder, about enough to give each soldier a one full cartridge box, and not much more, not even counting the needs of any artillery. That count, however, was based on old paperwork. It had not counted all the powder that had been used over the past month, including the Battle of Bunker Hill. When his aides actually did a physical check on inventory, they found only 90 barrels for the entire army. When Washington heard the news, he apparently was struck speechless for some time. He realized he did not have enough to fight even one battle with the British. If the British attacked, his army could not fight back.

Siege of Boston (from Journal of the American Revolution)

Washington did not write any letters to Congress about this desperate shortage. He feared that if the enemy learned of this fact, they would march out of Boston and crush his army as they could not even return fire for very long. In fact, the British commander, Gage, did hear about the powder shortage. He still had his spy network including Benjamin Church, head of the Committee of Safety. Gage, however did not believe it, thinking it was an attempt to draw him out of Boston into battle. Washington made getting more powder a priority, but it would take months to get any significant increase in stock. He had to issue orders banning any firing practice or other unauthorized discharges in order to conserve what little powder they had. Also, to counter the lack of bayonets for most of his men, the army ordered the production and deployment of spears to defend against an attack. Even these were slow in coming.

Disease also became more of a problem over the summer. Dysentery and smallpox swept through both the British and Provincial camps, killing or disabling many. At one point nearly 20% of the Continental Army was unfit for service. Hundreds of them would die that summer, without ever seeing battle. In late July, Washington appointed Benjamin Church as the head of a newly formed “Hospital Department” a position that would be referenced as “Surgeon General”.

For the most part, the army seemed to accept its new commander and complied with his policies. It could all fall apart quickly though. Ward, his second in command soon took offense at Washington’s criticism of the condition of the army when he took control Ward knew that reflected poorly on his leadership. Lee, third in command, was still upset that Congress had not selected him as commander in chief. He seemed to be waiting for Washington to screw up, so that he could move into the top slot. Both men, however, bided their time and, for the moment, enforced Washington’s policies.

Skirmishes

Washington was eager to do battle with the British, but the condition of his army and the lack of ammunition made this impossible. Both armies remained well entrenched in defensive position, neither side willing to attempt to dislodge the other.

On the British side, Bunker Hill seems to have taken the fight out of the British commanders. In July, they received reinforcements that more than covered their losses from the battle. But General Thomas Gage in particular seemed unwilling to initiate any new fighting. Gen. Henry Clinton had pushed to follow through on their original plan to take Dorchester Heights. His plan would bypass Boston Neck and launch assault troops for a water landing. Clinton got the plan as far as putting soldiers on landing craft. Gage, however, got cold feet and sent a messenger ship to recall the invasion before they could land.

The Boston Lighthouse (from New England Historical Society)

There were occasional skirmishes. In the days following Washington’s arrival, there were apparently several minor attacks and counter attacks near Boston Neck. British troops attacked defenders at Roxbury, possibly in an attempt to capture some stray cattle between the lines. After that, Gen. Ward issued an order calling for any cattle straying beyond American lines to be shot. The Americans attacked and destroyed Brown’s Tavern, a small building on Boston Neck occupied by British regulars. The British would launch another raid a few weeks later, attacking Americans who were trying to reinforce and extend their defensive lines. The Americans would use the the distraction of this attack to launch a successful attack on the Lighthouse on Lighthouse Island, making night movements for the British Navy a little more difficult. That night, the British sent a construction crew with 30 marines as guards to repair the lighthouse, They were still working the following morning when the Patriots launched another attack on the island, capturing the construction crew and the marines, and once again burning down the repaired lighthouse.

The arrival of the new Continental rifle units from Virginia and Pennsylvania created new excitement. Riflemen liked to show off their skills by firing on sentries across the river in Boston. Somehow the regulars captured one of them. It’s not clear whether they captured him alive and then hanged him, or simply hanged his dead body after they killed him. Either way the hanging body appeared in Boston in view of the Continental lines on August 2. Enraged riflemen received permission to fire on regulars in Boston, which they did for the rest of the day, killing or wounding an unspecified number. British muskets could not return fire, but artillery could. One rifleman died from a well placed cannon ball.

These are only a few examples of the ongoing small-time skirmishing that kept both armies on alert.

Plowed Hill

A slightly larger skirmish occurred when on August 26, Washington ordered the occupation of Plowed Hill (aka Ploughed Hill), a small hill across the river to the north of Bunker Hill. Overnight, 1200 Continentals entrenched their position on the hill, giving them a good position across the river against the British on Bunker Hill.

Ploughed Hill, Cambridge 1775 (from bouseblog)

The next morning, the British opened fire on the Continental forces from Bunker Hill and several gunboats, but could do little against entrenched forces. They killed or injured a few soldiers who ran out of the bunkers to collect British cannon balls. Continental officers gave soldiers a reward for any balls they collected. A few soldiers tried to use their feet to stop balls slowly rolling across the field, only to discover that a relatively slow moving 20 pound ball can still do serious damage to your foot. The Americans had one cannon with them, which they used successfully to sink one small British gunboat.

The British prepared to assault Plowed Hill by boat, but decided against it. Continental riflemen were already picking off too many of them. They did not want another costly win like Bunker HIll for land that they could not really hold if they took it. In the end, they simply left the Americans in control of the hill. So, the summer of 1775 ended with the stalemate over Boston showing no sign of ending.

- - -

Next Episode 68: Congress' Olive Branch Petition

Previous Episode 66: British Take Bunker Hill

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give. Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.
Thanks,
Mike Troy

Click here to see my Patreon Page

You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber. This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges. Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project. Thanks again!

Visit http://www.amrevpodcast.com for a list of all episodes.

Visit https://pod.amrevpodcast.com for free downloads of all podcast episodes.

Further Reading:

Websites

LOC: Washington’s Commission as Commander in Chief: http://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/commission.html

William “Billy” Lee: http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/william-billy-lee

From George Washington to Lund Washington, August 20, 1775: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-01-02-0234

Benjamin Church becomes “Surgeon General”: http://drbenjaminchurchjr.blogspot.com/2015/10/dr-benjamin-church-jr-appointed-surgeon.html

Burgoyne, Lee, and Enoch Brown’s Tavern, July 7, 2007 Journal of the American Revolution: http://boston1775.blogspot.com/2007/07/burgoyne-lee-and-enoch-browns-tavern.html

VIDEO: J.L. Bell describes George Washington’s Headquarters in Cambridge C-SPAN, 2017: https://www.c-span.org/video/?436822-4

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

French, Allen The Siege of Boston, New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Frothingham, Richard History of the Siege of Boston, Boston: CC Little & J. Brown, 1851.

Heitman, Francis Historical register of officers of the Continental Army during the War of the Revolution, April, 1775, to December, 1783, Washington: Rare Book Publishing Co. 1893.

Leiter, Mary Biographical Sketches of the Generals of the Continental Army of the Revolution, Cambridge: University Press, 1889.

Linn, John, et. al (ed) Pennsylvania in the war of the revolution, battalions and line. 1775-1783, Harrisburg: Lane Hart,1880 (pp. 6-7 discuss Battle of Plowed Hill).

Lodge, Henry Cabot George Washington, Vol. 1, Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1898.

Martyn, Charles The life of Artemas Ward, the first commander-in-chief of the American Revolution, New York: Artemas Ward, 1921.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)

Beck, Derek The War Before Independence: 1775-1776, Naperville, Ill: Sourcebooks, 2016.

Beeman, Richard R. Our Lives, Our Fortunes and Our Sacred Honor: The Forging of American Independence, 1774-1776, New York: Basic Books, 2013.

Borneman, Walter American Spring: Lexington, Concord, and the Road to Revolution, New York: Little, Brown & Co. 2014.

Chernow, Ron Washington: A Life, New York: Penguin Press, 2010 (book recommendation of the week).

Fleming, Thomas Now We are Enemies: The Story of Bunker Hill, St. Martin’s Press, 1960.

Forman, Samuel Dr. Joseph Warren: The Boston Tea Party, Bunker Hill, and the Birth of American Liberty, Pelican Publishing, 2011.

Lockhart, Paul The Whites of Their Eyes, New York: Harper Collins, 2011.

Nelson, James L. With Fire and Sword: The Battle of Bunker Hill and the Beginning of the American Revolution, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011.

Philbrick, Nathaniel Bunker Hill: A City, A Siege, A Revolution, New York: Penguin Books, 2013.

Phillips, Kevin 1775: A Good Year for Revolution, New York: Penguin Books, 2012.

Sunday, October 14, 2018

Episode 066: British Take Bunker Hill

Last week, I discussed how the provincial army decided to occupy Bunker Hill, then actually occupied Breed’s Hill on the night of June 16-17, 1775. The next morning, the British under the command of Gen. William Howe crossed the harbor to land a force in Charlestown. They expected to push the inexperienced colonists off the hill and off the Charlestown peninsula. It took Howe all day to get his forces across the water and prepare for attack. He held back his forces until all of them, including his reserves, were across. Gen. Howe sensibly wanted to hit hard with all of his forces at once.

Provincial Defenses

The delay, however, gave Massachusetts Col. William Prescott, in command of the provincial forces on Breed’s Hill, more time to entrench and expand his defenses. He also had time to call for reinforcements, though those never came. Also frustrating was the fact that that Prescott really did not have command of all the forces. Prescott controlled the contingent on Breed's Hill where his Massachusetts militia had, build the main defenses. New Hampshire Colonel John Stark used his colonial militia to build a defense of the provincial’s left flank, but did not really coordinate his work with anyone else. Connecticut General Israel Putnam spent most of his day yelling at infantry and artillery on Bunker Hill, but not accomplishing much of anything else.

"Bunker Hill Flag" flown by the
provindials (from Wikimedia)

The three separate groups, however, did manage to create a rather formidable defense. Each leader seemed to see the weaknesses left by the others and tried to fill in the gaps. Prescott held a strong fortification in the center. Stark built a surprisingly impregnable defensive line on the left flank, defending the line all the way to the water line. Putnam got the forces on Bunker hill, primarily artillery, to prevent an easy path for the British around Prescott’s right flank.

British First Assault

By mid-afternoon, some time between 3:00 and 4:00 PM on June 17th Gen. Howe was finally ready to make his first advance on the provincial lines. Howe divided his force in half, leaving his second in command, Gen. Robert Pigot to begin a direct assault on Breed's Hill. Howe would lead the other half of his army against the right flank where General Stark and Captain Knowlton had thrown up breastworks.

While the British had disembarked, Putnam had sent militia into Charlestown village where they took up positions as snipers in the building. Pigot’s men lining up for the assault took casualties from the harassing fire in the village. Howe approved Admiral Graves’ request to destroy the town. Graves opened up on Charlestown with hot shot (iron balls heated to the point where they would set wooden buildings on fire when they came into contact) and carcasses (combustible materials fired from cannon, designed to set buildings on fire). Graves also deployed a team of sailors with torches to complete the destruction. The effort quickly burned the entire village of several hundred buildings to the ground. The provincial snipers either burned or retreated back up the hill. The fire also contributed to the oppressive heat for everyone in the area.

British Grenadiers on Bunker Hill by E. Moran (1909)
(from Britanica)

Howe, advanced at the front of his line toward the provincial’s left flank. Meanwhile Pigot advanced his troops directly against Breed’s Hill. Howe also sent several light infantry companies along the beach, trying to get around the provincial lines and attack from the rear.

Howe’s planned attack quickly fell apart. The 330 light infantry sent along the beach should have been able to push through the 50 militia defending the beach. General Howe had requested that Admiral Graves position a ship to fire on the beach, but by late afternoon Graves could not move anything there to be of use that day. Militia typically would panic and fire early before the enemy was in range. Regulars could then charge their position and destroy them with bayonet. Col. Stark, however, had carefully instructed his men not to fire until the British reached a marker on the beach that he had laid out. In doing so, the militia held their fire until the British were close enough to take a devastating volley. The British staggered back, attempting several more assaults, but given the thin strip of land, had to climb over their dead comrades, thus slowing their charges. They never were able to break the provincial line. Nearly a third of the British force lay dead or dying on the beach, with many more wounded. Stark’s American left flank held.

Meanwhile, Howe and Pigot had their own problems advancing the main force up the hill. The fields around Breed’s Hill had a number of low lying fences, which farmers used to mark property boundaries. The soldiers stumbled to cross these fences in the face of enemy fire. Like Stark’s men, Prescott got his soldiers to hold their fire until the regulars were well within range, then unleash devastating volleys. He also used sharpshooters to pick off enemy officers at an alarming rate. Meanwhile, Putnam had found the cannons abandoned by his artillery, grabbed a few infantrymen, and gave them a quick on the job training in artillery fire. Soon, provincial artillery was firing into the advancing British lines with pretty effective results.

Howe realized his right flank on the beach had failed to break the enemy lines. He now knew his main assault had to succeed. But the fire against the regulars as they attempted to get over the fences and reform their lines was too much. The regulars kept trying to fall back and reform lines before advancing again, but could not force their way into the redoubt. Soon hundreds of regulars lay dead and wounded all over the field, creating even more impediments for future assaults. Howe tried to order his field cannon closer to break the enemy lines, but the cannon got stuck in the muddy fields and could not get into position.

Pigot’s direct assault on Breed’s Hill took fewer casualties, but also failed. Once he saw Howe’s line begin to retreat, he also pulled back to prevent the wholesale slaughter of the British left.

Provincial Lines Hold

Once the infantry pulled back, the artillery renewed its largely ineffective barrage of the provincial defenses. Meanwhile, Prescott’s men were exhausted. Most had been awake for nearly 36 hours, having built their defenses the night before. They were beginning to run out of ammunition, having only what they carried in their cartridge boxes.

Prescott had maintained good firing discipline in the redoubt. The entrenchments had protected most of them from enemy fire. But desertion had reduced the redoubt to about 150 men. Most of them were out of ammunition. The officers found a few artillery shells and broke them open to use the powder in the muskets. Still, there were not enough musket balls. Defenders experimented with shooting small rocks or anything else they could fit down their barrels.

Colonial defenders at the rail fence
(from British Battles)

Prescott kept waiting for reinforcements. The few companies that crossed Charlestown Neck, seemed content to observe the battle from Bunker Hill. They did not even bother to start a second line of entrenchments on that larger hill, in the event that the British overran Breed’s Hill. Only a single company of Connecticut militia serving under Captain John Chester joined Prescott in the main redoubt. This supplemented the line with only about 20 more men.

The other person able to join Prescott was Major-General Joseph Warren, who had recently received his commission from the Provincial Congress while serving as that body’s President. Warren had spent the morning in Cambridge suffering from a terrible migraine headache. But he was determined to join the fight, despite the fact that everyone thought he was too valuable to risk on the battlefield. But Warren said he could not ask other men to risk their lives if he would not do the same. He wanted to be where the fighting was most dangerous. He acquired a musket and joined Prescott in the redoubt. Again, although he outranked Prescott, he left Prescott in command.

Despite the abysmal performance by provincial artillery, they did provide Prescott with a little support. Captain Samuel Trevett was the only artillery officer that day to make a pretty good account of himself. He disobeyed Col. Gridley’s orders to remain off the Charlestown Peninsula and fire at the navy from the relative safety of Cobble Hill. Instead, Trevett brought two field cannon across Bunker Hill, past the redoubt on Breed’s Hill, and set up in the defensive fletches just to the east of the redoubt. From there, his crews could bring effective fire against the regulars trying to storm the redoubt.

According to some accounts, General Putnam also convinced another artillery crew to move down from Bunker hill and set up in a defensive location just to the west of the redoubt. Although the inexperienced crews could not fire quickly, they did contribute to the fire against the regulars trying to take Breed’s Hill.

Second Assault

As soon has the regulars staggered back to the shore, Howe began almost immediately reforming his ranks for a second assault. The regulars began their second assault right away, in hopes that the enemy would not have time to reinforce or reposition.

Battle of Bunker Hill
(from Reddit, used with permission)

The officers reformed the lines and made their second charge up Breed’s Hill. Because ammunition was running low, Prescott ordered his provincials to wait until the British were within 30 yards of the redoubt. Later retellings give the famous line “don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes.” But given these accounts came much later, it is unclear if Prescott ever really spoke those words. Whatever words he did use though, Prescott got his men to hold their fire until the regulars were almost upon them. He then unleashed what became some of the most brutal and devastating fire of the day.

The regulars tried to hold their ground and storm forward. But the provincials kept up a three line volley fire, meaning a line fired about every ten seconds, while the other two reloaded. Some British companies took 90% casualties. By one account, some regulars began stacking up their own dead to use as a defense against the withering fire.

One American sharpshooter in a tree above the redoubt did his best to pick off officers with deadly accuracy. He had several men below him reloading and passing him a loaded rifle, allowing him to take shots with great rapidity. It is estimated that this one shooter alone took out about twenty officers before the enemy dispatched him.

After about thirty minutes of brutal fighting, the British staggered back in retreat for a second time. One of the few regulars still standing on Breed’s Hill was Gen. Howe, who somehow found himself amazingly alive as everyone around him had fallen. Stunned by the repulse, Howe remained standing. The then slowly picked his way back down the hill, stepping over the hundreds of bodies that littered his path.

Third Assault

General Howe had to accept that his first two attempted assaults were complete failures. The provincials had held their ground, contrary to all conventional wisdom. Further, his own regulars had been unable to keep lines or withhold fire until within range. He decided to make a few changes for the third assault. First, he finally got his artillery within range of the enemy lines. British grapeshot tore into many of the provincials outside and around the redoubt. Howe also organized his men into five columns rather than lines. Normally, marching columns into battle is a bad idea since a single cannonball could rip through most of the column. But the provincials did not really have any effective artillery. The few they did have were off to the sides. The columns left gaps between the soldiers so they could more easily get around impediments while advancing. He ordered his remaining exhausted and overheated regulars to remove their packs and any other encumbrances. Howe also ordered his soldiers not to load their guns. He did not want them stopping to fire and breaking stride. This would be a bayonet assault only.

Inside the provincial redoubt, Prescott had more men now, but these were the men who had been protecting his flanks They had moved inside to get away form the deadly British artillery fire. This time, Prescott ordered his men to withhold fire until the enemy was within 15 yards. The regulars got so close that many thought the provincials had finally retreated and had abandoned the redoubt.

Death of Maj. Pitcairn
(from British Battles)

Instead, the provincials gave the regulars another deadly volley. The British took heavy casualties but continued forward, storming the redoubt shouting “fight, conquer, or die!” The provincials had killed most of the British officers, so confusion reigned. Regulars got pinned down behind the final wall as both sides continued to fire. One of the field commanders at the lead of the regulars was Major John Pitcairn, the same marine who had commanded the regulars on Lexington Green a few months earlier. Pitcairn desperately charged his marines into the withering fire, taking a mortal wound to the chest.

Soon though, provincial fire slacked as they had no more ammunition. The regulars swarmed the redoubt, expecting the provincials to surrender or flee. Those provincials who had not deserted though, were the toughest of the lot. They continued fighting hand to hand, using their guns as clubs. Finally, Prescott and Warren called for a retreat. General Warren used his sword to fight hand to hand as the soldiers pulled out. Warren was determined to be the last man out of the redoubt. As the men retreated, Warren called for one last volley. At that moment a British officer’s aide pulled a pistol and fired, shattering Warren’s skull, killing him instantly. Just to be sure, a group of grenadiers bayoneted his body repeatedly. The regulars, angry at the high price they paid to take the hill, were in no mood to accept any surrenders, even if anyone even tried.

The provincials took most of their casualties for the day during the retreat. The British fired repeated volleys as the survivors ran across an open field, escaping Breed's Hill and moving up Bunker Hill. On Bunker Hill, Putnam attempted to rally a second line. But even he could not stem the panicked retreat over Bunker Hill and back across Charlestown Neck.

Having captured the defenses on Breed’s Hill. Howe decided not to pursue the retreating provincials. His army was in disarray and most of his officers dead or wounded. It was now near evening. Gen. Clinton had crossed into Charlestown without orders, bringing even more reinforcements. But they were too late to engage. The remaining provincial forces retreated across Charlestown Neck back toward Cambridge, leaving the peninsula completely in British control. The battle was over.

Bunker Hill Aftermath

Bunker Hill is considered a British victory because the regulars successfully took the hill and took control of the Charlestown peninsula. But it was a costly victory. The British suffered more than 1000 dead and wounded. British officers took a big hit, with over 80 killed or wounded. If you don’t count Clinton’s late arrivals, that is nearly a 50% officer casualty rate.

Generals Howe and Pigot, both of whom led chargers survived unscathed, though all of Howe’s 12 aides who marched alongside him were killed or wounded. While the British won the battle, they learned that the provincials would stand and fight. Like British leaders before them, the new generals now understood taming the American rebellion would be no easy task. In a letter following the battle, Gage wrote “The loss we have sustained, is greater than we can bear. Small Armys cant afford such losses, especially when the Advantage gained tends to little more than the gaining of a Post.”

The Americans took about 450 casualties that day. Only about 30 were taken prisoner, and 20 of those died in captivity, likely due to serious wounds before capture. Although over 3000 provincials claimed to participate in the battle in some way, there were never even 1000 men opposing the British assault at any point in the battle. So as a percentage, casualty rate for the Americans who actually fought on Breed’s Hill was pretty high as well.

Death of General Warren by J. Trumbull (1786)
(from Wikimedia)

Gen. Gage had planned to take Dorchester Heights following the capture of Bunker Hill. But the casualty rates from the battle changed his mind. His army would occupy and entrench Bunker Hill, but would not attempt to take any more land from the Provincial Army.

The most painful loss for the provincials was the death of Gen. Warren. James Warren would replace Joseph Warren as President of the Provincial Congress. James was no close relation to Joseph. He was married to Mercy Otis Warren, the sister of the famous James Otis. The man who had played such a large role over many years in the events leading to the fighting in Boston.

The British guards on Charlestown Neck, eventually put up artillery to prevent any attempted counter attack. The provincials fortified entrenchments between the Neck and Cambridge, to stem another British assault. They also fortified their defenses in Roxbury, still expecting a British attempt to take Dorchester Heights. Col. Gridley oversaw the new defenses, but received assistance from a new source, a Boston bookstore owner named Henry Knox. Knox had long been a Son of Liberty and active in pre-war Boston. Despite having no actual military experience, Knox had read all about military engineering and artillery. He was ready to put his learning to work.

On the British side, General Gage had decided against any further assaults for now. Both armies buried their dead and treated their wounded, a larger percentage of which would die over the next few weeks, given the state of military medicine.

Many British officers blamed their defeat on the poor performance of the regulars. That poor performance, many argued, reflected poor training and drill, which in turn reflected on the officers. Ultimately, Gage was to blame and would lose his command as a result of the losses at Bunker Hill. But that decision was still months away. Instead, the American commander would be the next one replaced, when the Americans get a new Commander in Chief, General George Washington.

- - -

Next Episode 67: Washington Takes Command

Previous Episode 65: Provincials Occupy Bunker Hill

Click here to donate

Click here to see my Patreon Page

Further Reading:

Websites:

Ketchum, Richard "The Decisive Day Is Come" American Heritage Mag. Aug 1962, Vol. 13, Iss. 5: https://www.americanheritage.com/content/%E2%80%9C-decisive-day-come%E2%80%9D

John Stark http://www.seacoastnh.com/framers/stark.html

Samuel Gerrish http://boston1775.blogspot.com/2016/06/samuel-gerrish-first-officer-of.html

Bunker Hill Courts Martial:
Capt. Callender: http://www.derekbeck.com/1775/info/callender-court-martial
Maj. Gridley: http://www.derekbeck.com/1775/info/maj-gridley-court-martial
Capt. Gridley: http://www.derekbeck.com/1775/info/capt-gridley-court-martial

Samuel Gerrish Court Martial: http://boston1775.blogspot.com/2016/06/samuel-gerrish-unworthy-officer.html

VIDEO: Nathaniel Philbrick discusses his book, Bunker Hill: A City, A Siege, A Revolution, C-Span, 2013: https://www.c-span.org/video/?312873-1

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Bolton, Charles (ed) Letters of Hugh, Earl Percy, from Boston and New York, 1774-1776, Boston: Charles E. Goodspeed, 1902.

Dana, Elizabeth Ellery (ed) Barker, John John Barker diary - The British in Boston, 1774-1776, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1924.

French, Allen The Siege of Boston, New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Frothingham, Richard History of the Siege of Boston, Boston: CC Little & J. Brown, 1851.

Frothingham, Richard Life and times of Joseph Warren, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1865.

Lincoln, William (ed) The journals of each Provincial congress of Massachusetts in 1774 and 1775, and of the Committee of safety, Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1838.

Swett, Samuel History of Bunker Hill Battle: With a Plan, Boston: Munroe and Francis, 1826.

VIDEO: Uhlar, Janet Dr. Joseph Warren: Early American War Hero (1 hr) Bedford TV, 2016.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)

Beck, Derek, Igniting the American Revolution 1773-1775, Naperville, Ill: Sourcebooks, 2015.

Borneman, Walter American Spring: Lexington, Concord, and the Road to Revolution, New York: Little, Brown & Co. 2014.

Fleming, Thomas Now We are Enemies: The Story of Bunker Hill, St. Martin’s Press, 1960.

Forman, Samuel Dr. Joseph Warren: The Boston Tea Party, Bunker Hill, and the Birth of American Liberty, Pelican Publishing, 2011.

Lockhart, Paul The Whites of Their Eyes, New York: Harper Collins, 2011.

Nelson, James L. With Fire and Sword: The Battle of Bunker Hill and the Beginning of the American Revolution, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011.

Philbrick, Nathaniel Bunker Hill: A City, A Siege, A Revolution, New York: Penguin Books, 2013.

Phillips, Kevin 1775: A Good Year for Revolution, New York: Penguin Books, 2012.