American Revolution Podcast: Revolution War Planning

Showing posts with label Revolution War Planning. Show all posts

Sunday, January 19, 2020

Episode 132: Britain Adjusts its War Plans

General William Howe had hoped to end his 1776 campaign with the subjugation of New Jersey in December. With that, he expected the remainder of the Continental Army would dissolve and he could focus on granting pardons to everyone who swore loyalty to the King. Of course, General Washington had other ideas, fighting the battles of Trenton and Princeton and keeping up the Forage War across New Jersey for most of the winter. This kept the Continental Army and the counter-offensive alive for at least another year.

Howe left the skirmishing in New Jersey to his subordinates. Howe himself, spent the winter in New York enjoying one party after another and his mistress, Betsy Loring. His professional focus remained on the inevitable campaign that would begin again in the spring of 1777.

More Shock and Awe

Even before Washington counter-attacked at Trenton, indeed even before Howe had completed pushing the army out of White Plains New York, Howe had begun writing Secretary of State Lord George Germain and others in London calling for more reinforcements. Remember, Howe had begun the New York campaign a combined Army and Navy force of about 42,000 men, not even counting the 8000 or so stationed in and around Quebec.

General William Howe
(from Wikimedia)

With about 10,000 sailors and marines, only about 32,000 of the British and German forces in New York were army. Over the course of the campaign, he had lost nearly nine thousand soldiers as prisoners or through desertions or death. Most deaths coming from disease. Howe would need more reinforcements for the 1777 campaign.

Remember, when preparing for the 1776 campaign, officials had decided to deploy an overwhelming force in order to crush this rebellion. In 1775 the entire British army worldwide consisted of only about 50,000 soldiers. Sending 40,000 to New York and Quebec had been quite a burden. They did so in the hope that they could end this war quickly, rather than having an expensive drawn out effort lasting many years.

Howe’s letters to Lord Germain in the fall of 1776 informed him that there was no way the campaign would end that year and that they needed to send many more reinforcements in order to crush patriot moral and force a surrender. This had to frustrate Germain. Howe also said he found that he could raise almost no Tory regiments from among the locals, meaning they would need more from recruits Britain or mercenaries from Europe.

By late November, about the time General Lord Cornwallis was chasing the rapidly disintegrating Continental Army across New Jersey, Howe provided more specifics on his planned campaign for 1777. He would deploy one army of about 10,000 men from Providence, Rhode Island, marching through New England toward Boston. He would launch another army of 10,000 men up the Hudson river toward Albany, presumably linking up with forces from Quebec and cutting off New England from the colonies to the south. Another army of 8000 would occupy New Jersey and create a threat against Philadelphia, thus preventing Washington from moving troops to deploy against the other two armies. Finally, he would maintain a force of around 5000 in and around New York City to defend his base of operations there. Once Howe has subdued New York and New England early in the season, he would then capture Philadelphia and begin moving south to subdue the southern colonies.

To accomplish all of this he would need another 15,000 soldiers. Again, his hope seemed to be that overwhelming force would get the patriots to surrender without even having to fight a major bloody battle.

Howe wrote about all of these plans even before Washington had launched his attacks against Trenton and Princeton, capturing about 1400 prisoners and putting almost all of New Jersey back in contention.

Following the revitalization of the patriots after those victories, Howe conceded that he would have to fight a decisive battle to defeat the rebels, something he had not really tried to do in 1776.

No Reinforcements

Sir George Germain, Lord
Sackville (from Wikimedia)

Howe had hoped for more reinforcements to shock and awe the patriots into surrender. It seems, though, that the only people shocked were officials back in London who saw no good justification for spending more money to raise and deploy another 15,000 reinforcements. Germain told Howe that he was not getting anywhere near that number of soldiers. First Germain thought 15,000 was excessive because 7800 soldiers should give Howe the 35,000 total he said he required. A few years later, at a Parliamentary inquiry over the events of 1777, Howe testified that Germain’s numbers only made sense if Howe counted his soldiers who were disabled on sick leave and those who had been captured as available for duty.

Even beyond that dispute, Germain further determined that the ministry simply was not willing to pay for an army of 35,000 to put in Howe’s command. He ended up sending about 2300 reinforcements for Howe’s 1777 campaign. Howe needed to find a way to win this war with the already massive force under his command, a force that far outnumbered anything the Continentals had put in the field.

Focus on New York

Like every commander at time, Howe had subordinates who did not think he was up to the job, that they could do a much better job, and were not afraid to say that to anyone back in London who would listen.

General John Burgoyne had left Canada in December 1776 after the northern army had taken Crown Point following the battle of Valcour Island, and then retreated back to Canada without attacking Fort Ticonderoga. Commanding General Guy Carlton’s caution in not taking Ticonderoga that winter had upset many officers, including Burgoyne. So Burgoyne’s personal mission in London focused more on bad mouthing Carleton rather than Howe, but he of course made clear that he had better ideas than all the commanders in North America.

In February 1777, Burgoyne drafted a memorandum: Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada where he described in detail how he would lead an army of 8000 regulars, 2000 Canadian militia, and 1000 Indians (or “savages” as he called them) down from Canada, capturing Fort Ticonderoga. A diversionary force would leave from Montreal and move down Lake Ontario toward the Mohawk River. The main force would move from Quebec, down Lake George to capture Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Ultimately, the force would continue on to Albany, where the northern army would either link up with Howe’s forces moving up from New York City, or at least establish communications with New York City via the Hudson River.

General John Burgoyne
(from Wikimedia)

This was not an original idea. It was very similar to what Carleton had proposed and failed to do the year before. It was also what military planners had suggested from the very beginning, as a strategy to cut off troublesome New England from the rest of the continent.

Burgoyne, with his detailed plan, successfully lobbied to lead the campaign himself. Lord Germain, Lord North, and King George all agreed that Burgoyne was best for the job. The King even weighed in with very specific Remarks on the conduct of the War from Canada about Burgoyne’s plan. The main concern was that London did not want to send more expensive reinforcements to Canada, and also that they wanted a sufficient force in Canada to protect it from another invasion. As a result, they shaved Burgoyne’s request to send a force of 11,000 down to about 7200 regulars and Hessians, with around 3800 remaining in Canada.

With Burgoyne’s acceptance of the reduced numbers, he left London near the end of March so that he could be back in Quebec by early May. He needed to get moving if he would have time to organize his troops, obtain the necessary supplies, and begin his campaign by some time in June.

This left leaders with two uncomfortable problems. First, giving Burgoyne command of the northern army invading New York would be a slight against General Carlton, who was senior to Burgoyne and the current commander of the northern army in Canada. Some historians indicate this was an issue of personal animosity between Germain and Carleton. If there was any ill will between the two men, there certainly was also good objective reasoning not to put Carleton in charge. Carleton’s inability to secure Ticonderoga, despite marching right up to its walls the year before did not exactly enhance his reputation as an aggressive fighter to officials in London.

General Sir Guy Carleton
(from Wikimedia)

The administration was clearly frustrated with the slow pace of events in America, and laid the blame on Howe and Carleton. Giving an independent command to an aggressive fighting general like Burgoyne might be just the thing to bring the rebellion to a faster conclusion.

No one, however, wanted to disgrace or attack Carleton. Instead, they used the argument that whoever led the expedition would have to link up with Howe’s army and come under Howe’s command. They wanted Carleton to retain his independent command of Canada. After all, he also was the Governor of Canada. So, Carlton had to remain in Canada while Burgoyne led the bulk of the northern army into New York.

Regardless, Carlton would take this action as a slight against his leadership abilities. Sure enough, when Carlton received word of Burgoyne’s assignment, he immediately sent word that he wished to be recalled to London. But there would be no time for him to fight or challenge the orders once received. He had to go along with it. The Ministry kept Carlton in Canada. He would remain there, discontented, until the summer of 1778.

The second ego bruised was that of General Henry Clinton, who had been seeking an independent command of his own and expressed continued frustration at serving under Howe. Before Burgoyne arrived in London, Lord Germain and others had already been considering a similar plan to Burgoyne’s, with the intention of giving command of the force to General Clinton. As second in seniority to Howe, and given the fact that he had been frustrated with Howe’s refusal to take his strategic advice the year before, Clinton would be the obvious leader. Howe had actually assumed Clinton would get the northern command and had requested that London send Burgoyne back to America to become Howe’s second in command.

General Sir Henry Clinton
(from Wikimedia)

But with the decision to give the command to Burgoyne, the administration had to find a way to appease Clinton. To make things even more uncomfortable, Clinton was already on his way to London. As I mentioned back in Episode 119, Clinton had secured Rhode Island for Howe, after being left out of the entire New Jersey campaign. Frustrated, he boarded a ship for London in January and arrived in March, just after the administration had handed the New York expedition to Burgoyne. Even before hearing of this latest slight to his honor, Clinton had planned to resign his commission. He felt everyone held him responsible for the failure to take Charleston, South Carolina back in the spring of 1776, and that he was getting dumped into unimportant posts where he could do little to restore his reputation.

The ministry did not want Clinton to resign, but they also did not seem to want to give him any important command either. Instead, they opted to stroke his ego. The King honored him with a Knight of the Bath for his services, promoted him to Lieutenant General, and let him address Parliament. After giving him all that, Germain told him he had to go back to New York and babysit New York City while Burgoyne invaded New York and Howe took his army to on its spring campaign.

Howe Plans to Take Philadelphia

So with the northern army’s invasion of New York approved and ready to go, planners could consider Howe’s other suggestions, an invasion of New England and the capture of Philadelphia. Howe’s grand program that he had proposed in the fall looked even more sketchy after Washington attacked Trenton and Princeton and took back most of New Jersey. London still was not willing to send the reinforcements that Howe wanted. As a result, he dropped his plans for New England. The British outpost in Rhode Island would remain with a limited force to provide a check on New England, but the planned offensive came to nothing.

Burgoyne's proposal for 1777 (solid) and
Howe's attack path for Philadelphia (dots)
(from US History)

Instead, Howe focused on capturing Philadelphia. In his correspondence with Germain and others over the winter, Howe did not say explicitly how he planned to assault Philadelphia. Everyone assumed he would march his army across New Jersey, cross the Delaware River at some point and assault the city. His plan to put his entire army on ships, sail down to Maryland and assault Philadelphia from the south seems to have come later.

And this is really where things break down. Germain and others in London assumed that Howe would provide support for Burgoyne’s invasion in New York. An attack across New Jersey would occupy the attention of the Continental Army, thus relieving pressure on Burgoyne. Germain also seemed to think that at some point, Howe would march northward to link up with Burgoyne’s army, either in Albany or somewhere in upstate New York.

Germain thought Howe would take Philadelphia early in the season. Everyone in London believed that Pennsylvania harbored a great many loyalists who would rise up, as they did in New Jersey, once the King’s troops entered the colony. Howe would take Philadelphia easily, set up a reserve force of mostly locals to hold the city, then move the bulk of his combat troops north to assist Burgoyne by late summer or early fall.

Confusion Reigns

Overall, the war planning over the winter of 1776-77 left none of the generals completely happy. As I mentioned, General Carlton was mortified that Burgoyne got command of the army invading New York. He wanted to return to London.

General Clinton also more senior to Burgoyne was similarly upset and tried to resign. His resignation refused, he returned to New York and commanded the tiny contingent holding New York City while others engaged with the enemy. Although he commanded a force of around 7000, almost all of them were German mercenaries or local loyalist militia. He had almost no regulars under his command.

I mentioned in an earlier episode that General Lord Percy had returned home in early 1777 to resign as well. The King accepted his resignation and he left the army permanently.

General Lord Cornwallis
(from Nat. Portrait Gallery)

General Lord Cornwallis was ticked off that he was getting the blame for Washington’s successes in NJ that winter and that he could not return to London to advocate for himself.

General Howe was frustrated by London’s refusal to give him the reinforcements he needed to carry out his plans for three armies. He could not strike at New England, nor did he have enough men to send a separate army up the Hudson River to coordinate with Burgoyne. He had to settle for capturing Philadelphia only.

Even General Burgoyne, who got the plumb command over two more senior generals and got his plan of attack approved, only received less than two-thirds of the number of soldiers he had sought for the mission.

Having all the leading generals upset and angry at each other was bad enough. What was worse was that no one seemed to have a sure understanding of the overall strategy for the year ahead. Burgoyne thought that Howe or Clinton would assist with his offensive by pushing up from New York City toward his advance, or at least attacking New England to draw away some of the enemy. Clinton did not receive any such orders. When later urged to push up the Hudson to relieve Burgoyne, he refused to do so because it would leave New York City vulnerable to attack.

Similarly, Howe made his only goal for the year capturing Philadelphia. There was some discussion that he might assist Burgoyne in the fall after pacifying Philadelphia. But He never received explicit orders to do so. Many historians put the blame on Lord Germain for this. They point to a story just before Easter 1777, when Germain was eager to get out of London and return to his country home. His secretary reported that he never sent explicit orders to Howe to assist Burgoyne. Not wanting to wait in London, Germain had his staff work on the orders and send them to his home for his signature later. But all Howe ever got was a copy of Burgoyne’s orders that indicated that Howe might be of some assistance at some point. Howe never even started his move on Philadelphia until the end of July, and did not even enter Philadelphia until the end of September.

Howe, therefore never made any effort to send a force up the Hudson to relieve Burgoyne in the late summer when it might have helped. But the truth is he knew what Burgoyne was doing and even if Germain gave him some discretion in how to act, it seems he should have been prepared to support Burgoyne. Later, during a Parliamentary inquiry into the matter, Howe justified himself as follows:

Had I adopted the plan to go up the Hudson River, it would have been alleged that I had wasted the campaign with a considerable army under my command, merely to ensure the progress of the northern army, which could have taken care of itself, provided I had made a diversion in its favour by drawing off to the southward the main army under General Washington. Would not my enemies have gone further, and insinuated that, alarmed at the rapid success which the honourable General [Burgoyne] had a right to expect when Ticonderoga fell, I had enviously grasped a share of the merit which would otherwise have been all his own? and let me add, would not Ministers have told you, as they truly might, that I had acted without any orders or instructions from them?

In other words, Howe would have been criticized for sitting around New York all summer waiting to assist the northern army rather than doing something proactive like capturing Philadelphia. Howe blamed Burgoyne for getting the reinforcements that Howe wanted for his own plans. Howe reasoned that if Burgoyne got the soldiers, he should be capable of defeating the Americans without more help from another army.

None of the other generals would ever admit to such a thing, but all were probably waiting for Burgoyne to fail. Burgoyne had criticized everyone else for being too cautious and for lobbying for his own command over the backs of more senior generals. He was an upstart who was junior to all these other generals. Further, he had no family in Parliament to support him politically if he did fail. If Burgoyne’s aggressive offensive failed, it would show why those cautious tactics he criticized were the right strategy. As it was, everyone started the fighting season of 1777 with a different idea of how things would work. We will see in a future episode the results of that confusion.

Next week: British test American resolve on the Hudson by raiding the town of Peekskill.

- - -

Next Episode 133 Peekskill Raid

Previous Episode 131 Congress - Baltimore Edition

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give. Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.
Thanks,
Mike Troy

Click here to see my Patreon Page

Sunday, June 16, 2019

Episode 101: British Land at Staten Island

The Americans were feeling pretty good about themselves in the spring and summer of 1776. They had chased the British Army out of Boston in March, and then declared independence in July. For the patriots, there was no more bickering over taxing authority in London. The United States were now separate from the British Empire.

Britain, though, had no intent of letting this relationship go that easily. After all, you don’t build a world empire by giving away an entire continent just because some rebels kill a few hundred of your soldiers. King George and Lord North had spent the winter assembling the largest military force the Empire had ever sent overseas.

Adm Richard Howe (fromWikimedia)

You would think that they would be ready to kick off their military reconquest of North America by April or May when the spring military season normally began. But for a few reasons, they ended up delaying the whole program. Part of the problem was leadership. Admiral Richard Howe had been positioning himself in Parliament to lead the expedition, but he wanted diplomatic power, not just military command. The debate inside the ministry took months before they decided that although Howe would head a Peace Commission, he would have no authority to make any political concessions. He could only grant pardons. Howe did not like the restrictions on his authority, and considered walking away. But in the end, this was the mission of a lifetime. Howe was going to save North America for the Empire. He could not walk away from that.

Another reason for delay was the assembly of the army and a fleet to carry them. Carrying tens of thousands of troops across the Atlantic was no easy task in 1776. It would require hundreds of transport ships which the government needed to build, buy, or lease. Producing or acquiring all the arms and equipment took time as well. Britain wanted all of this to arrive at once. They wanted shock and awe, not some slow military build up over time.

Finally, even after London had its army and navy ready to go, along with all the equipment, it faced a series of storms in the Atlantic that spring, that delayed passage of most of the fleet for several months. As a result, the British would not be ready to do much of anything before mid summer.

By June, General William Howe in Halifax was itching to go. It had been three months since he evacuated Boston and he was ready to redeem himself. On June 29, 1776 most of General Howe’s fleet reached the waters just off Sandy Hook, NJ, just south of New York City. He had more than 100 ships carrying around 10,000 soldiers. This looked pretty intimidating to the continentals and militia preparing to defend the city. But it was only the first phase. General Howe would await the arrival of his brother Admiral Howe, with a larger fleet, as well as General Henry Clinton and his army returning from the Carolinas. Over the next month, the patriots in New York would simply watch the enemy fleet grow and grow and grow.

Staten Island

Howe was not yet ready to engage the enemy, but he also did not plan to leave his men stuck in ships for weeks while the awaited the remainder of the invasion force. He landed his force on Staten Island, where his men could camp and forage for fresh food.

At the time, Staten Island was lightly populated, with less than 3000 people, and ruled by a handful of prominent families. It tended to be loyalist. While the patriots had been trying to round up loyalists in much of the region, as well as build defenses to oppose a British landing, they had pretty much left Staten Island alone. Most of the islands had been under the guns of the small British fleet that had been in New York’s harbor for the previous couple of years.

On July 2, General Howe began to disembark his troops on Staten Island, facing no military resistance, only a miserable rain storm. The army set up camp and waited. Almost all of the 500 adult males on the island signed oaths of loyalty to the King. The locals happily sold food to the hungry army.

After a few weeks, one officer commented that the good food and comforts of the island had a noticeably good effect on the soldiers. They seemed more energetic and in high morale. According to the officer, one measure of this improvement was the increased number of rapes reported by locals against soldiers. He noted that because the locals failed to bear these attacks with resignation, he got to hear quite a few interesting court martials. Yes, comments like this would probably get any officer kicked out of the army today, but the army of the 1770’s still had a long way to go in sensitivity towards women’s issues.

In any event, the army was regaining its strength and vigor, and the rapes did not seem to create too much ill will among the locals, at least not any that would induce them to change sides. Staten Island became a comfortable base of operations for the British.

Admiral Howe Arrives

About the same time General Howe was approaching New York, his brother Admiral Howe arrived in Halifax. Having found that the General had already departed, Admiral Howe immediately set sail down the coast toward New York.

While en route, Admiral Howe attempted to work out a proclamation to encourage the patriots to surrender, accept a pardon and return to British authority. Although he had no political concessions to offer, Howe relied on the threat of his military force to convince the rebels to give up their cause. If one is faced with the destruction and confiscation of all property, the rape of one’s family, and possibly being hanged, accepting that Parliament can levy a three cent tax on a pound of tea does not seem that outrageous an alternative.

1776 Map of NY Harbor

As I’ve mentioned before, some officers thought they should terrorize the populace until they submitted. Howe thought otherwise. He believed that the mere sight of the military force would be intimidating enough. The leaders had to show mercy and magnanimity so that the rebels would accept that surrender would not be so bad after all.

Howe had prepared not only a public proclamation, but wrote letters to the colonial governors (the Royal Governors, not these provincial leaders pretending to be governors), as well as to his friend Benjamin Franklin. You may recall that Howe and Franklin had spent months trying to work out a peace deal in 1774 and 1775 before Franklin finally left England to returned to Pennsylvania. Howe hoped his old friend would assist in bringing the conflict to a peaceful conclusion.

Admiral Howe’s fleet encountered several patriot ships along the way. His fleet captured a Nantucket whaler. Howe released the ship and gave the captain a bottle of brandy to show his good intentions. A day later, he encountered a ship smuggling goods in violation of the Prohibitory Act. Again, Howe released the ship and allowed it to keep its cargo. Howe attempted to give these captains copies of his proclamations to spread among the colonies. However, no one wanted to take them. They feared they might be prosecuted for collaborating with the enemy.

Unfavorable winds and poor weather slowed Admiral Howe’s approach to New York. It also didn’t help that his navigator mistook Nantucket Island for Long Island, taking the fleet off course. Finally on July 12, the first of Admiral Howe’s fleet would arrive at Staten Island. Ships would continue to dribble in over the next few weeks. But even with over 21,000 soldiers now, the Howe brothers continued to wait. They were still expecting nearly 3000 more soldiers from General Clinton’s mission in the Carolinas as well as about 8000 Hessian mercenaries still on their way from Europe. So the Howe Brothers sat and waited.

This also began a pretty familiar theme for the Howe offensives. Neither Admiral Howe nor General Howe seemed in any hurry to defeat the rebels. They moved slowly and methodically, to win their battles. They never moved quickly or rashly to take advantage of surprise or confusion. Remember, General Howe commanded the British attack at Bunker Hill. He was not inclined to charge his men into an entrenched enemy and face another slaughter. He preferred to move on the enemy using care to protect his advancing forces. Moving slowly against the enemy on their own terms meant that the British could be assured of victory. It also usually meant that while they could win a battle, they could not capture the enemy.

Many have argued that the Howes did not want to win. They generally favored the American cause and did not want to crush the colonists. I don’t think they deliberately set out to lose the war, but they also did not seem intent on crushing the enemy either. They seemed to think that, at some point, the rebellion would fall apart on its own after a series of battlefield losses. They did not want a massacre that would create decades of resentment in the colonies. Rather, if they could simply show the colonists that defeat was inevitable, and the terms of surrender were not so bad, that most of them would voluntarily return to the fold. In hindsight, it was a poor strategy. But at the time, it seemed reasonable to many.

Elizabeth Loring

Some have attributed another reason to General Howe’s slow pace to another reason. While in Boston, Howe had met Elizabeth Loring. Elizabeth or “Betsey” had married Joshua Loring, Jr., the son of a British naval officer. By most accounts, Joshua Jr. was a dirt bag. He had held a number of minor positions in the Massachusetts Government and had left Boston with the other Tories in the evacuation to Halifax. Before the war, he had served as Sheriff in Massachusetts, during which time he got a reputation for ripping off suspected criminals and enriching himself. During the British occupation of Boston and in Halifax, he made money supplying liquor to the British Army. As a military contractor he had great incentive to ingratiate himself with General Howe.

Elizabeth Loring (from Geni)

Now, there are no verifiable records of the gossip of the day, but apparently Mrs. Loring had a bit of a reputation as a slut even before she met Howe in Boston. Some contend she had been a mistress of Dr. Joseph Warren, who died leading the patriots on Bunker Hill. Mercy Otis Warren also wrote a play in 1772 that subtly made fun of her reputation for sleeping around.

Whatever her background, it seems that she began an affair with General Howe that became pretty open and notorious. Her husband Joshua seemed to tolerate the affair, eventually being compensated with an appointment as Commissary of Prisoners. The job had decent pay, but Loring enriched himself even more by embezzling money allocated for the feeding and care of American prisoners of war. Loring grew rich while hundreds of prisoners literally starved to death. General Howe, in turn, seemed willing to overlook these crimes against humanity as long as Loring let him enjoy sexual favors with his wife.

Partly, as the result of all this was that General Howe was in no hurry to see the war come to an end, when he would have to return home to his older wife. Instead, he enjoyed long nights of attending shows, drinking, gambling, and sex.

Up the Hudson River

While the Howe brothers seemed in no real hurry to do much of anything, some of their junior officers were chomping at the bit. On July 12, only a few hours before Admiral Howe arrived, the 44 gun Phoenix, the 20 gun Rose and three smaller British ships, caught a favorable wind and sailed up the Hudson River, past Fort Washington and Fort Independence. The Continentals had built these two forts with the specific intent of preventing the British from sailing up the river.

The patriot batteries fired on the ships, but inflicted only minimal damage to the rigging. One sailor had to have a leg amputated. The patriots did more damage to themselves. The inexperienced artillery crews managed to blow up at least one gun. They tried to load a powder charge without first swabbing the barrel. As a result, the powder ignited from a spark still in the barrel from the previous shot, killing six members of the crew and seriously wounding several others.

Phoenix and Rose up the Hudson, 1776
(from Wikimedia)

According to some accounts, the crew had been getting drunk and hanging out at the whore houses at Holy Ground before they spotted the British ships, so in addition to their inexperience, their drunkenness may have contributed to the fatal accident. The artillery crew was also commanded by an inexperienced 19 year old who had been a college student only a few months earlier. Fortunately for Captain Alexander Hamilton, the Continental Army offered lots of second chances after poor performances like this. His leadership would improve over time. The British returned fire, mostly hitting buildings in New York, killing and wounding several civilians.

For Washington, this was not only a huge embarrassment. It proved that his defenses were worthless against the British Navy. They could sail up behind his forces and cut off his line of retreat whenever they wanted. He also had no idea what those ships planned to do. Some rumors suggested they might be arming Tory regiments to launch an attack on Washington’s rear. Others suggested they might be on a mission to destroy some American ships under construction further up river. They might also be trying to open up lines of communication with General John Burgoyne’s forces who could be moving south over Lake Champlain to complete the British plan of sealing off New England from the rest of the colonies.

If fact, they had no real plans at all other than to test the American defenses. The ship remained upriver for a few weeks, The patriots maintained men along shore to oppose any attempts at landing. After facing a failed patriot raid against the ships and a failed attempt at sending fire ships at them, the ships sailed back down the Hudson, leading to another minor firefight with the Continental artillery, before rejoining the main fleet off Sandy Hook. They did succeed though, in proving to everyone that the American defenses were useless against the British naval domination of the rivers around New York.

Peace Negotiations

The day after Admiral Howe arrived in Staten Island, he began distributing his proclamations as a Peace Commissioner, promising pardons for all who would swear allegiance to the King and making vague and exaggerated claims that he could negotiate a peace and bring the violence to an end. Howe was disappointed to hear the Americans had just declared independence, but still pushed forward with his plans to settle the dispute without further bloodshed.

General Washington used the opportunity to send General Howe a letter, objecting to the treatment of American prisoners, primarily those held in Canada. These men were now prisoners of war of the independent United States, not criminals.

Admiral Howe then decided to send a letter under a flag of truce to “George Washington, Esq.” Washington’s personal aid, Colonel Joseph Reed refused to accept the letter because it was not addressed to General Washington. The British refused to recognize Washington’s commission and could not put his title on the message without tacitly accepting that he was a legitimate commander of a legitimate army.

Joseph Reed (from Geni)

A week later, on July 20, Howe sent his Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel James Patterson, under a flag of truce to meet with Washington to discuss prisoners. The Americans blindfolded him and took him to meet with Washington.

There, Patterson attempted, once again, to hand deliver Howe’s letter, now addressed to George Washington, Esq, & etc. & etc. This time, Washington himself refused to accept the letter without the proper title. Patterson insisted the Admiral met no disrespect, and that the et ceteras were there to imply all appropriate titles. Washington said that yes, they could mean anything and everything, but he would not even consider a negotiation until they recognized his proper title, which would implicitly mean recognizing American independence as well.

Washington went on to tell Patterson that he understood the Admiral’s only real power was to grant pardons. No one wanted his pardons because they had not done anything wrong. Also, if the British wanted to negotiate any sort of political solution, they needed to do that with the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, not a military general. The meeting lasted several hours, and was apparently reasonably cordial. But neither side seemed to be willing to do anything that would even begin any sort of peace talks. By late afternoon, Patterson put on his blindfolded and was led back to the British ship waiting to carry him back to the fleet.

Howe did get his messages to Congress as well. But they also seemed to fall on deaf ears. Having committed to independence and with Howe having no real authority to offer any political reforms, Congress seemed in no mood to talk. Benjamin Franklin received a private letter from Howe, which he had published in the newspapers along with his reply. In his reply, Franklin noted that the relations had grown so poisoned between the British and Americans that neither could ever trust the other again as fellow subjects. The only way the British could hope to govern America was to break the spirit of the people with the “severest tyranny”. Clearly Franklin’s message was aimed more at Americans who were considering the negotiation option more than it was to Admiral Howe. But it did make clear that the time for talk was over. Only force of arms would decide anything going forward.

More Forces Arrive

With talks going nowhere, the Howes awaited the arrival of their remaining troops. On July 31 and August 1, the fleet arrived from South Carolina with Admiral Peter Parker, General Clinton, and General Lord Cornwallis and 3000 regulars, following their defeat at Fort Sullivan in South Carolina. On August 14 the fleet carrying 8000 Hessians arrived. The soldiers disembarked at Staten Island following a long and difficult crossing.

By this time, the Howes had about 32,000 soldiers, 10,000 sailors and more than 400 ships already to attack New York and begin the reconquest of America. With peaceful negotiations at an impasse, the Howes decided it was time to use their army.

Next Week: before we get to the invasion of Long Island, I want to move south again. The British had failed to establish a base along the Carolina coast, but they had stirred up the Cherokee in the west to fight the patriots. We will take a look at patriot attempts to crush the Cherokee uprising.

- - -

Next Episode 102: Cherokee War in the South

Previous Episode 100 The Declaration of Independence

Click here to donate

Click here to see my Patreon Page

You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber. This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges. Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project. Thanks again!

Further Reading

Websites

British Forces Land at Staten Island, the New York Campaign Begins: http://www.revwartalk.com/Battles-1776/07-02-1776-battles-british-forces-land-at-staten-island-new-york-the-new-york-campaign-begins.html

Joshua Loring, Jr - American Revolution’s Public Enemy Number One:
http://tidewaterhistorian.blogspot.com/2010/09/american-revolutions-public-enemy.html

Washington Plays Hardball With the Howes, by John L. Smith, Jr. (JAR) (2015)
https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/11/washington-plays-hardball-with-the-howes

The Enigma Of General Howe, by Thomas Fleming, American Heritage, Vol. 15, Issue 2 (Feb. 1964): http://www.americanheritage.com/content/enigma-general-howe

Journal of HMS Phoenix, July-Aug 1776: http://revwar75.com/battles/primarydocs/phoenix.htm

Journal of HMS Rose, July-Aug 1776: http://revwar75.com/battles/primarydocs/rose.htm

Washington, George Memorandum of an Interview with Lieutenant Colonel James Paterson, July 20, 1776, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-05-02-0295

Letter from Lord Howe to Benjamin Franklin, June 20, 1776:
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-22-02-0282

Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Lord Howe, July 20, 1776: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-22-02-0307

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Bouton, Nathaniel (ed) State Papers: Documents and Records Related to the State of New Hampshire, Vol. 8, NH Legislature, 1874.

Carrington, Henry Battles of the American Revolution, 1775-1781, A.S. Barnes & Co. 1876.

Flick, Alexander C. Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution, New York, The Columbia University Press, 1901.

Force, Peter American Archives, Fifth Series, Vol 1, M. St. Claire Clarks, 1837.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 5, Vol 2, M. St. Claire Clarks, 1837.

Johnston, Henry The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn, Long Island Historical Society, 1878.

Mather, Frederic The Refugees of 1776 from Long Island to Connecticut, 1913.

Tomlinson, Abraham; Dawson, Henry B. New York city during the American revolution : Being a collection of original papers (now first published) from the manuscripts in the possession of the Mercantile library association, of New York city by New York (N.Y.). Mercantile Library Association;
Privately printed for the Association, 1861.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Bliven, Bruce Under the Guns: New York, 1775-1776, New York: Harper & Rowe, 1972.

Daughan, George C. Revolution on the Hudson: New York City and the Hudson River Valley in the American War of Independence, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2016.

Ellis, Joseph Revolutionary Summer: The Birth of American Independence, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975.

Gallagher, John J. Battle Of Brooklyn, 1776, Da Capo Press, 1995.

Golway, Terry Washington's General: Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution, Henry Hold & Co. 2004.

McCullough, David 1776, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Schecter, Barnet The Battle for New York, New York: Walker Publishing, 2002.

Wheeler, Richard Voices of 1776: The Story of the American Revolution in the Words of Those Who Were There, 1997.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, April 21, 2019

Episode 093: The Dave Mathews Band Breaks Up

As General Washington prepared for an expected British invasion of New York City in the summer of 1776, the overwhelming force of British regulars was not his only worry. New York was filled with Tories. It may have been the most pro-British of the 13 colonies.

Even before the Continental Army moved to New York, local patriots had forced the royal government out of the colony. Operating under Isaac Sears, who was an active leader in the Sons of Liberty, patriots had forced Royal Governor William Tryon to flee the city in 1775. He could only rule over the colony from a British Navy ship in the harbor. The New York Tories could not speak publicly about their views, but there were too many of them to lock up or banish from the colony. So unlike Boston, where the relatively small numbers of Tories had been bottled up in the city along with the regulars, the Continental Army in New York found itself surrounded and intermingling with thousands of people who remained loyal to the King. Most Tories had left the city itself, but Staten Island and Long Island had plenty.

Holy Ground Riots

Much of the Continental Army settled into the city. For the Continental soldiers, who were mostly small town New Englanders, New York City was a culture shock. The city had a pretty large red light district, known as the Holy Ground. The name derived from the fact that Trinity Church owned most of the real estate in the neighborhood.

Of course, it’s not like Boston didn’t have prostitutes, it did. But in puritan Boston, the prostitutes maintained a low profile. In New York, soldiers and officers were shocked by the brazenness and the prostitutes actively plying their trade. One young lieutenant commented on their “impudence and immodesty” After getting to know them a little better, he was even more shocked by their apparent brutality.

Holy Ground Brothel (from Revolutionary War Journal)

Even so, soldiers actively availed themselves of their services. By some accounts there were as many as 500 women working in the Holy Ground area. The district was nothing new. It had been serving locals at least since the 1760s. But the influx of thousands of young soldiers away from home caused business to boom. In the evenings soldiers would head to the district to get drunk and get laid. Within weeks of arrival, syphilis began spreading throughout the ranks. In the days before antibiotics, syphilis would often mean a slow and painful death.

It is not entirely clear whether the New York prostitutes were particularly pro-Tory, or whether the motive was money, or some sadistic pleasure. But in April 1776, two Continental soldiers turned up dead, one of them brutally castrated, in one of the Holy Ground brothels.

The soldiers rioted for days, destroying brothels and openly fighting in the streets with some of the locals. The men tore down the brothel where the army had found the two dead soldiers, and damaged several others. A few days later locals found the dead body of a prostitute dumped into an outhouse, presumably killed during the riots.

Washington ordered a curfew, punished drunkenness with public floggings, and did what he could to keep the army and the prostitutes separate. He did not attempt to ban soldiers from visiting Holy Ground entirely. Detachments sent to keep order there had trouble identifying soldiers since almost none of them wore uniforms.

The active rioting only lasted a few days before the fighting stopped. Business dipped a little for a short time, but soon returned to normal. Soldiers continued to risk their lives for visits to the Holy Ground.

Tory Efforts to Organize

If the muted presence of Tories in the city was bad, it was even worse in some of the outlying areas like Long Island or Staten Island. In many of the outskirts, Tories still spoke openly in favor of supporting the King and of forming militia units to support the regulars once they arrived.

There were still a few companies of regulars in New York. These units, however, remained aboard ships in New York Harbor. They did not attempt to establish permanent bases anywhere, not even on some of the islands that remained Tory strongholds. There simply were not enough of them to protect against a patriot raid to capture or kill them.

Generals Lee and Washington both attempted to cut off interactions with the ships in the harbor. Until Lee’s arrival, goods and information flowed freely between the fleet and the city. The Continental Army made commerce a little more difficult. But the fleet was able to get the food and supplies it needed from the surrounding islands. There were plenty of Tories, as well as other merchants happy to sell for hard money. The fleet also spread the word that the regulars were on their way, and that loyal colonists should prepare for their arrival as best they could.

Days after his arrival from Boston in April, Washington had written the local Committee of Safety to do what it could to disrupt communications between Governor Tryon aboard ship and the many Tory elements in the region. Two months later in June, Washington reported that little had changed and that the Royal Governor was still stirring up trouble.

Israel Putnam (from Wikimedia)

Concerned about Tory activity, Washington instructed General Israel Putnam, his second in command in New York, to arrest some of the key Tories in and around New York City. He wanted it done quietly so as to avoid stirring up loyalist sentiments. Putnam should arrest notorious leaders espousing opposition to the patriot cause, and send them to a prison set up in Connecticut for this purpose.

The patriots had rounded up quite a few Tories, but numerous others escaped their grasp. Richard Hewitt was a prominent Tory living out on Long Island near Suffolk. Fans of the AMC series, Turn, which is loosely based on events on Long Island during the Revolution, may know Hewitt as a British officer. In fact, Hewitt was a native born New Yorker.

Putnam authorized the arrest of Hewitt, and deployed a group on horseback to go out to Hempstead in Suffolk County to arrest him. Hewitt, however, rounded up a group of loyalists, who armed themselves and occupied his house. When the patriots arrived, the two parties exchanged fire, in what is sometimes called the Battle of Hempstead Swamp. It was hardly a battle though, involving a few dozen men at most, with no known casualties. The patriot attackers realized they could not take the house and returned home empty handed. Once the regulars arrived a few months later, Hewitt would raise a regiment of loyalist militia and would command them as a Lt. Col.

Another prominent Tory, Oliver De Lancey, lived on Manhattan, just north of town, in the area that is today part of Central Park. De Lancey came from one of the wealthiest and politically powerful families in New York. He had sat on the Governor’s Council for decades. For many years, De Lancey tended to support colonial protests against taxes and other Parliament restrictions. But when it came time to take up arms in support of the cause, De Lancey thought that was going too far, and spoke out against rebellion. Now labelled as a prominent loyalist, he faced arrest. In June, De Lancey fled his farm and escaped to the British fleet in the harbor.

When the regulars took the city, De Lancey would be one of the top loyalist militia officers, rising to the rank of major general. What all this showed was that even before the British fleet arrived for the invasion, Washington could not control the region because of too much loyalist sympathy. New York simply was not New England.

The Plot Against Washington

Patriots redoubled their efforts to arrest Tories after the discovery of a conspiracy to target George Washington. The instigator of this conspiracy was probably Gov. Tryon. But since Tryon was bottled up in New York Harbor, he had to rely on men still in the city.

One of those men was New York City Mayor David Mathews, whom Tryon had appointed in February 1776. After the Continental Army occupied New York City, they left Mathews alone. Mathews, in turn, probably tried to keep a very low profile.

Mathews was not just sitting around though. There is good evidence, he was working with a band of men who planned either to assassinate Washington and some of the other top Continental officers, or possibly capture them and turn them over to the British.

As far as I know, David Mathews did not go by “Dave” nor was he really the leader of this band. The group is probably better known as the Hickey Conspiracy or the Tryon Plot. For some reason, I like calling it the Dave Mathews Band. That really isn’t historically accurate though.

Gov. William Tryon
(from Wikimedia)

In any event, the conspiracy involved bribing several members of Washington’s Life Guard. This was an elite group of soldiers that the Continental Army had established back in March 1776 in Boston to provide protection for General Washington. They acted as his personal bodyguard. The plan was to have these men, who had Washington’s trust, to turn on him and kill or capture him as soon at the British regulars began their attack on New York.

The conspiracy fell apart in June. One of Washington’s guards Sgt. Thomas Hickey ended up in prison for passing counterfeit notes. The Irish born Hickey had been a British regular who had deserted and then joined the Continental Army in Cambridge. Despite his past position with the enemy, he was selected to join Washington’s Life Guards.

While in prison Hickey bragged to a fellow prisoner, Isaac Ketchum that he was part of a conspiracy to kill Washington and then defect back to the British army. Ketchum turned prison snitch and revealed the information in exchange for his own release from prison.

Hickey faced a court martial. He admitted to taking bribes, but claimed he never intended to go through with it. He just wanted to take the money from gullible Tories. The court martial did not buy his story. It sentenced him to death. On June 28, Hickey when to the gallows, the first Continental soldier executed by a court martial. Most of the army and the city turned out to see the execution. It was supposed to be one of the most widely viewed executions up until that time in America.

According to some other accounts, Ketchum exposed only that Hickey was conspiring to desert to the enemy, not kill Washington. Hickey was convicted of conspiracy and sedition, but the trial never heard testimony about any assassination plot. Whether Hickey was part of the assassination plot or not though, there did appear to be one. A man named Samuel Fraunces testified before Congress after the war, that he had exposed the plot and was falsely accused of being part of the conspiracy and imprisoned for a time.

Whoever exposed the plot, an assassination plot did seem to exist. With the plot exposed, patriots arrested Mathews and 12 others suspected of being involved. They shipped them off to Connecticut. Mathews was placed under house arrest in the custody of his brother in law, who was a Major in the Connecticut militia. Several years later he escaped and returned to New York, by then under British control. Mathews resumed his role as Mayor of New York City as well as the leader of Tory militia. He remained in those roles until the British evacuation in 1783.

The patriots never prosecuted anyone else, even though Hickey allegedly claimed that over 700 men were part of the plot. There simply was no evidence to convict anyone. The Patriot leadership did not want the public to find out that Continental soldiers were plotting to kill their commander. Also, for civilians, there was still the problem that there were no treason laws on the books, except those laws for committing treason against the King.

Continental Defenses

As it turned out, the British were in no hurry to take New York. The first of the invasion fleet did not begin to arrive until July. Most of them would not arrive until August.

That gave the Continental Army almost all summer to improve and expand its defenses. While they did use the time to build up fortifications, in many ways, time was not on their side. Patriot forces grew to over 20,000, but most of them were militia from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The Continental Army itself had grown again, but was under 10,000. Militia were often untrained and sometimes uncooperative in following orders. The Continental army was not much better. Remember, most of Washington’s army left service at the end of their enlistments in December 1775. Washington had to replace most of them with new recruits. This meant that even the Continental soldiers often had about six months experience, and almost none in combat.

In May, Washington had to deploy General Sullivan, along with 3000 soldiers to Canada. I’ll get into the details for that deployment in a couple of weeks, but this only weakened Washington’s forces in New York. Disease also continued to wreak havoc with the army. It was not unusual for one-third of the army to be too sick for active duty at any time.

Rather than focus on training and drilling, the army spent much of its time digging ditches and building forts and other entrenchments. While defenses were important, the army needed more time training the soldiers to fight in battle. That simply did not happen.

In Boston, Washington had regular intelligence about the enemy thanks to patriots who remained in Boston during the occupation. He had no such intelligence network in New York, meaning he largely did not know what the loyalists were doing, nor could he control their communications with the British fleet. He would eventually build a spy network, but he did not have one at this time.

Washington also would have benefited greatly from cavalry, which could have scouted Long Island and completed longer distance raids. Connecticut volunteers had arrived in New York with horses. However, since Congress had not authorized payment for the care and feeding of horses, the soldiers had to send them back to Connecticut. Washington would not get a cavalry.

Nathaniel Greene

One of the most critical defenses for the patriots was the Gowanus Heights on Long Island. Washington delegated authority for those defenses to General Nathaniel Greene. Now I’ve mentioned Greene in several earlier episodes, but I have not really introduced him. Greene was one of the original group of brigadier generals which Congress commissioned in June 1775. He would be the only general besides Washington to serve as a general for the entire war.

Nathanael Greene
(from Wikimedia)

Greene was only 33 years old when he joined the Continental Army. He came from a Quaker family in Rhode Island. His family’s pacifist roots did not exactly predict a military career, but Greene was obsessed with the military from a young age. He eventually left the Quaker community as a result. Greene also developed a friendship with Henry Knox, well before the war began. Greene was always looking to buy books on military strategy. Knox’s bookstore in Boston was the only one in the region that carried a wide variety of such books.

Greene’s family made its money in commercial shipping. When London began increasing tariffs and cracking down on smuggling, his business suffered. Greene owned one of the ships seized by Lt. Dudingston of the Gaspee. Greene sued Dudingston personally. There is some evidence that when the patriots raided and burned the Gaspee, that a local sheriff attempted to serve papers on Dudingston, before they shot him that is (See, Episode 36)

Greene helped form a militia unit in Rhode Island and hoped to be voted its commander. The soldiers voted for someone else because Greene had a limp from a childhood accident that made him unable to march smartly. Despite the disappointment, Greene remained in the regiment as a private.

As a private, Greene still had important personal and professional connections in the government. As a result, after Lexington, the Assembly chose Greene to become a militia General and lead its regiments to Cambridge. So, overnight promotion from private to general, not bad!

General Greene stood out in Cambridge for enforcing strict order among the Rhode Islanders, requiring camps be built in straight lines, men remain properly uniformed, and maintained regular drills. This made the Rhode Islanders stand out among the chaotic camps around Cambridge, and brought Greene to Washington’s attention. Greene, however, got his commission in the Continental Army primarily because Congress was making an effort to include as many colonies as possible in the leadership, and Greene was the highest ranking officer from Rhode Island.

Greene impressed Washington in Cambridge. Now Washington was putting more responsibility in the hands of this young general who had never even seen a real battle. Greene had been back in Rhode Island during the Battle of Bunker Hill. During the Battle of Dorchester Heights, Greene deployed along with Gen. Sullivan north of Boston, prepared to invade the city should the British attack Dorchester from south Boston. Since that never happened, Greene sat miles away from the action.

Greene put great effort into the defenses on Long Island, though as we’ll see when we get to the battle, his inexperience left some serious gaps that the enemy exploited. Green was sick and not in command by the time the British invaded. He joined much of his army in the hospital with what modern historians guess was typhoid.

By the end of the war, Greene would turn out to be one of the best generals in the Continental Army, and in my opinion, one of the most underrated. But during the fighting in New York, his inexperience would show badly.

Greene’s inexperience, however, was the general rule, not the exception in the Continental Army. This young army of recent civilians prepared to receive the largest British invasion force ever sent overseas.

Since General Howe is going to take until August before he begins his fight in New York, I’ll turn to some other area for the next few weeks.

- - -

Next Episode 94: War At Sea, Battle of Turtle Gut Inlet

Previous Episode 92: State Constitution, Part 2

Click here to donate

Click here to see my Patreon Page

You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber. This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges. Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project. Thanks again!

Further Reading

Resources to learn more about today’s topic.

Websites

Schenawold, Harry Holy Ground, 2015: http://www.revolutionarywarjournal.com/holy-ground

O'Reilly, Edward “Profligate, abandoned, and dissipated”: NYC’s Last Colonial Mayor, 2015: http://blog.nyhistory.org/profligate-abandoned-and-dissipated-new-york-citys-last-colonial-mayor

Shattuck, Gary "Plotting the ‘Sacricide’ of George Washington" Journal of the American Revolution, 2014: https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/07/plotting-the-sacricide-of-george-washington

Washington’s Life Guards: http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/life-guards

"Irishman Thomas Hickey executed for plotting against Washington" Irish Echo,
https://www.irishecho.com/2011/02/226-years-ago-irishman-thomas-hickey-executed-for-plotting-against-washington-2

Moran, Donald N. The Scoundrel Who Saved the Continental Army,
http://www.revolutionarywararchives.org/scoundrel.html

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Flick, Alexander C. Loyalism in New York During the American Revolution, New York, The Columbia University Press, 1901.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 4, Vol 5, M. St. Clair & Peter Force, 1837.

Mather, Frederic The Refugees of 1776 from Long Island to Connecticut, (1913).

Johnston, Henry The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn, (1878).

Tomlinson, Abraham; Dawson, Henry B. New York city during the American revolution : Being a collection of original papers (now first published) from the manuscripts in the possession of the Mercantile library association, of New York city by New York (N.Y.). Mercantile Library Association;
Privately printed for the Association, 1861.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)

Bliven, Bruce Under the Guns: New York, 1775-1776, New York: Harper & Rowe, 1972.

Daughan, George C. Revolution on the Hudson: New York City and the Hudson River Valley in the American War of Independence, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2016.

Ellis, Joseph Revolutionary Summer: The Birth of American Independence, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975.

Golway, Terry Washington's General: Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution, Henry Hold & Co. 2004.

McCullough, David 1776, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Meltzer, Brad & Mensch, Josh The First Conspiracy: The Secret Plot to Kill George Washington, Flatiron Books, 2018 (book recommendation of the week).

Schecter, Barnet The Battle for New York, New York: Walker Publishing, 2002.