ARP161 Freeman’s Farm (1st Saratoga)

Last week, we ended a series of episodes as General Howe made his long slow sailing voyage from New York to Maryland, then marched his army up to capture Philadelphia. 

Burgoyne Trudges South

While all that was happening, General Burgoyne was marching his northern army from Canada down through upstate New York, with the hope of taking Albany, and eventually linking up with British forces in New York City.  We last left General Burgoyne in Episode 155 as his army suffered a loss at Bennington, in an attempt to capture food and supplies.

Despite that loss, Burgoyne’s main army had reached the Hudson River and planned to march downstream to Albany.  His hope to recruit an army of Tories in upstate New York had proven to be a joke.  Almost all of his loyalist soldiers were men who had already fled New York to Canada and had joined at the outset of the expedition.  Promises of locals in New York who would flock to the King’s banner, had proven empty.

Freeman's Farm (from British Battles)

Burgoyne found his supply lines from Canada too long and attenuated to do much good.  He was frustrated that no British relief force seemed to be on its way from New York City.  After receiving word that General St. Leger’s force had given up on capturing Fort Stanwix and was returning to Canada, Burgoyne lost his only other prospect of reinforcements.  Burgoyne’s situation was becoming more threatened each day.  His army was shrinking, while his opponents were growing.  His men were isolated and largely cut off from additional food and supplies.  At the outset of this campaign, Burgoyne had hoped for more soldiers, better support from Canada, and most importantly a British army marching northward from New York City.

In letters back to London, Burgoyne discussed the option of pulling back to Fort Edward, reestablishing supply lines with Canada and awaiting more reinforcements.  But getting bogged down and refusing to advance was exactly what he had accused his predecessors of doing in order to get this command.  Burgoyne believed his orders were to push forward and take Albany.  He planned to do just that.

Burgoyne ordered the bulk of his small reserves, still at Fort Ticonderoga, to march south and join up with his main army.  He would not rely on maintaining lines back to Canada, but would live off the land. He determined that his army would cross the Hudson River and march down the west bank to Albany.  Crossing the Hudson so far upstream would prevent any problems trying to cross closer to Albany where they might have to do it in the face of the enemy.  But crossing where they did also made it nearly impossible to retreat back to Ticonderoga if they ran into problems.  Burgoyne was committing himself to complete victory or defeat, no option for backing down.

Schuyler Relieved

The Americans, having succeeded in killing or capturing over 1000 of the enemy at Bennington, continued to harass them whenever possible.  They drove off cattle and burned fields of grain and orchards.  They tore up bridges and felled hundreds of trees across roads, all to slow the British advance and deny them the supplies needed to maintain the army.

British March (from Wikimedia)

If time was on the side of the Contientals, it was not on the side of their commander.  Before word of the victory at Bennington or Fort Stanwix reached Congress, the delegates in Philadelphia concluded that the loss of Fort Ticonderoga in July was simply unacceptable.  Congress voted for the removal of General Philip Schuyler from command.  New England delegates especially had never really liked or trusted the New York general.  The loss of Ticonderoga under his command, was the final straw.  New Englanders had captured this fort a few years earlier, only to see it turned over to a New York commander.  That commander’s loss of the fort was unacceptable.  Congress ordered both General Schuyler and General St. Clair to report to Philadelphia for an inquiry into their activities.  The order came, despite the fact that both generals were actively engaged in the ongoing campaign to halt General Burgoyne’s army.

At first, Congress wrote to General Washington and asked him to pick a successor to the northern army.  Congress’ obvious choice was General Horatio Gates, who Washington, by this time, had great reason to distrust.  Washington knew that recommending Gates would be putting someone in charge who he really did not respect.  Picking someone else who did not have the experience in New York and at a time when Washington needed those generals to stop General Howe from capturing Philadelphia, would also be a problem.  Washington would have preferred to keep Schuyler in command.  He could not say that without appearing to thumb his nose at Congress.  So, Washington punted.  He simply informed Congress that if they were going to replace General Schuyler, that they should name the replacement.

Congress then selected General Gates to assume command.  Gates found out about the orders almost immediately.  At the time when almost all the officers in the Continental Army were in the field, either opposing Burgoyne’s advance on Albany or Howe’s advance on Philadelphia, Gates was in Philadelphia complaining about their leadership and lobbying for a new job.  After learning of his commission and knowing that the situation was desperate, Gates took a leisurely two weeks to travel up to New York and take command on August 19, 1777. 

 Gen. Horatio Gates
(from Wikimedia)

General Schuyler, who had received his orders to stand down and return to Philadelphia, felt obliged to remain in command until his successor arrived.  Schuyler then spent the next few days trying to brief Gates on the status of both his and the enemy forces and the strategies in place, but Gates seemed entirely uninterested in anything Schuyler had to say.  Instead, Gates held a large council of war for all Continental offices, as well as Albany militia commanders, but did not invite Schuyler.  Taking the hint, Schuyler finally packed up and left for Philadelphia.

Gates also received reinforcements of about 8000 men.  These included new recruits from New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.  Washington sent some of his own forces, including his highly valued riflemen commanded by Colonel Daniel Morgan.  General Benedict Arnold was marching his 1200 Continentals back from their victory at Fort Stanwix.  By early September, Gates commanded an army of over 10,000 soldiers, finally outnumbering Burgoyne's army.

Gates determined that he should pick out the best defensive ground in the region between Burgoyne and Albany and await the British there.  At first, he gathered his army at a place called Stillwater.  Then, after consulting with the locals, moved his army about three miles further north to Bemis Heights.  There, he relied on Polish Colonel Tadeusz Kościuszko to build the defenses.

Tadeusz Kościuszko

Kościuszko is an interesting figure himself.  He had grown up as a member of minor nobility in Poland.  During the 1760’s he worked as a military instructor for the Corps of Cadets in Poland. When the country descended into civil war, his family sided with the rebels against the King.   Rather than pick a side, Kościuszko fled the country.  He settled in Paris.  As a foreigner, he could not attend the military academy there.  Instead, he enrolled in Paris’ Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture.  At the same time, he audited lectures at the Military Academy and made use of the military libraries in Paris.  If you think about it, this was absurd.  It was a security risk for a foreigner to receive grades and a degree from the military academy, but officials had no problems with him sitting in on the classes and learning everything the instructor had to say.  But, that’s government bureaucracy I guess.

Tadeusz Kościuszko
(from Wikimedia)

After the partition of Poland in 1772, Kościuszko returned home to find his family broke from the war. He attempted to elope with the daughter of the local governor, but the Governor’s soldiers caught the young couple and beat him severely.  He returned to Paris, alone and out of money.

Kościuszko’s education in the French enlightenment, and his experience with petty aristocrats, left him with a fairly hostile view toward tyrannical leaders and a fan of liberation movements.  When Kościuszko heard about the war in America, he volunteered and traveled to Philadelphia. 

At first, he worked as a civilian consultant for some of the defenses along the Delaware River, then received a commission as colonel of engineers and a transfer to Fort Ticonderoga. There, he had worked with General Gates for a time before Gates left for Philadelphia.  Kościuszko had been a part of the retreat from Ticonderoga and remained with the northern army.  On Gates’ return as commander of the northern army, he relied on Kościuszko to oversee the construction of defensive works to oppose Burgoyne.

Benedict Arnold

Also joining Gates at Bemis Heights was General Benedict Arnold, fresh from his victory at Fort Stanwix.  Arnold’s role in capturing Fort Ticonderoga back in 1775 and his success in preventing the British from capturing the fort in 1776 with his improvised navy, among other accomplishments, gave Arnold a fair amount of command credibility.  He was now a major general, but still frustrated that he was more junior to Major General Lincoln who had been commissioned before him.

Arnold and Gates had gotten along well in earlier years when both men were in upstate New York together.  Gates knew of Arnold’s record and his abilities and gave him command of the left wing of the army.

Richard Varick
(from Wikimedia)

However, when General Schuyler left for Philadelphia, Arnold took two of Schuyler’s staff officers onto his own command, Richard Varick and Henry Brockholst Livingston.  Gates’ aide, Colonel James Wilkinson, who you may recall from Episode 118 was mixed up the conspiracy between General Gates and Lee to bring down General Washington, was by this time an old hand at internal petty politics within the army.  Wilkinson pointed out to Gates that Arnold’s decision to take two of Schuyler’s aides onto his staff meant that Arnold might not be particularly loyal to Gates.  He showed Gates letters from both men where they badmouthed Gates’ actions in the past.

Gates hinted to Arnold that he wanted the two men removed from Arnold’s staff.  Arnold, however, refused to take the hint and kept the officers where they were.  A few days later, in what Arnold took to be a petty reprisal, Wilkinson issued orders to move several regiments from Arnold’s command on the left wing to Glover’s command on the right wing.  Arnold lost his temper and wrote an angry letter to Gates. In response, Gates said it was just an oversight that would be countermanded, but it never was. 

The disagreement over staffing grew into a full-blown dispute between the two generals that would never heal.  Gates saw Arnold as part of Team Schuyler and potentially disloyal to him. Arnold saw Gates as a petty officer putting internal politics above the war effort. I don’t think either man was wrong in their assessment of the other.  The relationship between Gates and Arnold would never again be a good one.

Bemis Heights Defenses

On the morning of September 19th, American pickets noted the advance of the British Army toward Bemis Heights.  General Gates was happy to sit behind his defenses and to let the British try to force him out. 

Troop Deployments (from Wikimedia)

General Arnold disagreed.  Arnold feared that the British would send a force against the American right wing to distract the army.  Then, it would send a flanking force through the woods to move on the left flank. Once in the fields, the British could bring up their cannons and roll the American left, pushing everyone to retreat toward the Hudson river.  Sentries detecting movement in the woods confirmed that this was likely what would happen.  Gates seemed to think, bring it on. The British can try to charge up hills against a dug in enemy.  They will take an obscene number of casualties if they do.  He did not seem concerned that British artillery might devastate those defenses or that similar flanking maneuvers on Long Island or most recently at Brandywine had led to embarrassing losses for the Continentals.  His brilliant leadership would lead to a different result.

Arnold, supported by Colonel Morgan, had a different idea.  They wanted to advance the left wing of the army and hit the British in the woods before they could form up in the fields near the heights.  A fight in the forest was not a strength for either British regulars or Hessians.  Most of the Indian scouts had abandoned the British after the loss at Bennington, putting the British at a real disadvantage in that type of warfare.

After considerable badgering and argument, Gates split the difference.  He retained the Continental right wing, under the command of General Benjamin Lincoln, and supported by Generals Glover, Nixon and Patterson.  These armies would hold Bemis Heights against a potential attack.  General Arnold supported by Generals Poor and Learned, and Colonel Morgan could advance into the woods on the American left and engage the enemy there.  If they failed, they could retreat back to the heights and participate in the final defense.

Battle of Freeman’s Farm

The British attack came pretty much as the Americans expected.  General Burgoyne deployed his Germans under the command of General Riedesel down the trail along the Hudson River to attack the American right.  This group also took the bulk of the army’s artillery.  In the center, General Burgoyne rode with division commander General James Hamilton and four regiments supported by artillery.  Against the American left, Burgoyne deployed General Simon Fraser and his regulars, along with a couple of German regiments and the small remainder of Indians and loyalists that remained with the army.

American Assault Freeman's Farm
(from British Battles)

The Germans on the American right found it tough going as the column marched down the river road.  The Americans had burned several bridges across streams and felled numerous trees across the road.  The soldiers struggled to remove the impediments to make it into position by 2:00 PM.  Similarly General Fraser on the American left had to march nearly two miles further west to move around a deep ravine.

On the American left, General Arnold advanced with his division, with Colonel Morgan’s riflemen in the front.  The advancing British ran into Morgan’s riflemen at a small cabin on Freeman’s farm.  Freeman had been a local farmer who had long since fled to Canada due to his Tory sentiments.

There, Morgan’s riflemen startled the British advance skirmishers and forced them to retreat. Morgan’s men charged after the retreating skirmishers, only to run into the entire British center.  The Americans fell under cannon fire and quickly retreated back into the woods.  Both sides took devastating losses.  Morgan’s riflemen picked off the officers from the skirmishing companies before taking heavy casualties themselves from the British cannons.  Many of the British skirmishers took friendly fire as they retreated back to the main British lines. General Arnold rode through the front lines, encouraging his men to advance.  The fighting lasted about 45 minutes until both sides pulled back to assess the damages.

The lull lasted about two hours until shortly before 4:00 PM, both sides reengaged with the fiercest fighting of the day.  The American riflemen picked off artillery officers and crews, allowing the Continentals to capture several cannon.  Hamilton sent in British regular reinforcements to retake the cannons and turn them against the Continentals once again.  General Burgoyne also appeared near the front to encourage the men.  He got within range of Morgan’s riflemen, but they mistakenly picked off a captain that Burgoyne was conferring with.  The captain had a fancier saddle that caused the sniper to mistake him for the general.

Freeman's Farm (from British Battles)

Despite the fierce fighting, General Gates held back the American right at the Heights, not wanting to commit all of his forces to the fighting in case another attack came on the right.  Similarly, Burgoyne held back most of Fraser’s force on the American left in case the Americans tried a flanking attack from that side.  As a result, the Continental forces under Arnold and the British under Hamilton bore the bulk of the intense fighting.

At one point, the Americans almost forced the British center to buckle, but Major General Phillips personally rode in with four cannons to hold the Americans at bay while the British line could regroup.

By late afternoon Burgoyne ordered General Riedesel to secure the baggage and lead his soldiers against the right of Arnold’s advancing Continentals.  This was a risky move since it left the British baggage, and a portion of its artillery, relatively unguarded.  General Gates could have swooped down and captured all of it.  Gates, however, remained secure in his entrenchments, unwilling to venture out.

Benedict Arnold
(from Wikimedia)

Riedesel advanced with several hundred soldiers and two cannons to find the Continentals close to overrunning Hamilton’s center.  Riedesel ordered a charge and pushed back the startled Continentals.  This attack near the end of the day secured British possession of the field.  Only sunset and darkness finally put an end to the intense fighting, as the Americans drew back to their lines.

General Arnold was, in fact, fighting two battles at once.  One with the British, the other with General Gates.  Over the course of the battle, Gates had refused to comply with Arnold’s increasingly desperate calls for reinforcements.  At one point, Gates even sent orders for Arnold to send back a regiment to protect Gates’ headquarters.

In frustration, Arnold finally rode back to headquarters himself to make his demands in person.  Gates finally relented and sent off a brigade under the command of General Ebenezer Learned.  Gates, however, refused to allow Arnold to return to the battle and kept him in camp.  Learned’s reinforcements got lost in the woods and missed most of the battle.

At one point, after receiving concerning reports about the course of the battle, Arnold had enough and galloped off on his horse determined to enter the action.  Gates ordered his aide, Wilkinson, to chase after Arnold and bring him back.  Arnold reluctantly obeyed the direct order to return.  Thus Arnold missed the end of the battle.

Aftermath

At the end of the day, the British held the field, so Burgoyne declared victory in his letters to London.  However, the British had taken nearly 600 casualties that they could ill-afford.  The Americans had lost about half that number.  Although the British held the field of battle around Freeman’s farm, they had not even reached the main American lines still several miles away at Bemis Heights. Even most British officers conceded that the Americans had fought well and held their own against the regulars.

That night, the wolves came down from the hills to feed on the dead and dying as each side considered their next moves.  Many of Burgoyne’s officers wanted to advance again the next morning in hopes of catching the Americans still in disarray.  Burgoyne, however, decided against it.  The men were too exhausted.  He did consider another offensive on the 21st.  However, before dawn, he received a letter from General Henry Clinton in New York City.  Clinton's letter said that he would attempt an attack on some American forts in the lower Hudson valley in order to distract the Americans.  Burgoyne took this as hope that perhaps he might get some support from New York City after all.  He knew London had planned to send reinforcements to New York City and that their arrival might encourage Clinton to go on the offensive.

Burgoyne opted to halt his offensive and await more information on a possible relief column. For the next couple of weeks, both sides nursed their wounds, buried their dead, and planned their next steps.

Next week, during this pause, the Americans strike at Burgoyne’s rear, including a raid on Fort Ticonderoga.

- - -

Next Episode 162 Raid on Fort Ticonderoga 

Previous  Episode 160 Paoli Massacre & Fall of Philadelphia

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Further Reading

Websites

Horatio Gates: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/horatio-gates

Tadeusz Kościuszko: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/tadeusz-kosciuszko

Battle of Freeman’s Farm: https://www.britishbattles.com/war-of-the-revolution-1775-to-1783/battle-of-freemans-farm

The Battle of Saratoga (First)/ Freeman’s Farm: https://revolutionarywar.us/year-1777/first-battle-saratoga

Halsey, Francis Whiting. “GENERAL SCHUYLER'S PART IN THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN.” Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, vol. 12, 1913, pp. 109–118. www.jstor.org/stable/42890006

Brandow, John. H. “GUIDE TO THE SARATOGA BATTLEFIELD.” Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, vol. 12, 1913, pp. 315–320. www.jstor.org/stable/42890016

Strach, Stephen G. “A MEMOIR OF THE EXPLOITS OF CAPTAIN ALEXANDER FRASER AND HIS COMPANY OF BRITISH MARKSMEN 1776-1777 (Continued).” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 63, no. 255, 1985, pp. 164–179, www.jstor.org/stable/44229658

Hargreaves, Reginald “Burgoyne and America's Destiny” American Heritage Magazine, Volume 7, Issue 4, June 1956: https://www.americanheritage.com/burgoyne-and-americas-destiny

Lynch, Wayne “Debating Arnold’s Role at Freeman’s Farm” Journal of the American Revolution, September 12, 2013: https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/09/debating-arnolds-role-freemans-farm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Anbury, Thomas Travel through Various Parts of North America, Vol. 1, William Lane, 1789.

Baster, James (ed) The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1887.

Bird, Harrison March To Saratoga General Burgoyne And The American Campaign 1777,
Oxford Univ. Press, 1963

Brandow, John H. The story of old Saratoga; the Burgoyne campaign, to which is added New York's share in the revolution, Brandow Printing, 1919.

Clay, Steven E. Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 June to 8 November 1777, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2018 (US Army Website):.

Eelking, Max von, (translated by Stone, William L.) Memoirs of Major General Riedesel, Vol. 1, J. Munsell, 1868.

Hadden, James Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1884.

Hudleston, Francis J. Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne : misadventures of an English general in the Revolution, Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1927.

Luzader, John Decision on the Hudson, National Park Service, 1975.

Moore, Howard P. A Life of General John Stark of New Hampshire, New York self-published, 1949.

Riedesel, Friederike Charlotte Luise, Freifrau von Letters and journals relating to the war of the American Revolution, and the capture of the German troops at Saratoga, Joel Munsell, 1867.

Stone, William Leete, The Campaign of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne  and the expedition of Lieut. Col. Barry St. Leger, Albany, NY: Joel Munsell, 1877.

Walworth, Ellen H. Battles of Saratoga, 1777; the Saratoga Monument Association, 1856-1891, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1891.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Furneaux, Rupert The Battle of Saratoga, Stein and Day 1971.

Gabriel, Michael P. The Battle of Bennington: Soldiers & Civilians, History Press, 2012.

Ketchum, Richard M. Saratoga, Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War, Henry Holt & Co, 1997.

Logusz, Michael O. With Musket and Tomahawk, The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777, Casemate Publishing, 2010

Luzader, John F. Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, Casemate Publishers, 2008

Mintz, Max M. The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates, Yale Univ. Press, 1990.

Philbrick, Nathaniel Valiant Ambition: George Washington, Benedict Arnold, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Viking, 2016.

Snow, Dean 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga, Oxford Univ. Press, 2016.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

ARP160 The Paoli Massacre

Last week, we followed the Continental Army as it crossed the Schuylkill river, and sat on what was then the eastern border of Philadelphia, awaiting the British Army’s final push to take the city.  General Howe had defeated Washington at Brandywine.  After the rained out battle of the clouds, he faced virtually no military opposition as his army advanced toward Philadelphia.

British Delay Advance

General Howe, though, seemed in no particular hurry to enter the city.  After the Battle of Brandywine, the bulk of his army remained in camp for five days.  After learning that the Continentals were advancing toward him, Howe finally marched out his army to do battle, only to see the Continentals withdraw under a heavy thunderstorm.

Battle of Paoli (from Wikimedia)

The British advanced northward, but made no attempt to cross the Schuylkill River and enter the city.  On September 18th, Colonel Alexander Hamilton warned Congress that the British could be in Philadelphia, that very night.  Hamilton’s letter and those of other officers set off a panic within the city.  The President of Congress, John Hancock, reportedly passed along the alarm to the rest of Congress, then loaded everything he could into a collection of wagons and carriages, leaving the city at 3:00 AM the next morning.  Most other delegates did the same.

Two days later, the expected arrival of the British army in Philadelphia was still -- just an expectation.  The British Army camped patiently along the west bank of the Schuylkill River. On September 21, John Adams, who had fled to Trenton, NJ, wrote in his diary “It was a false alarm which occasioned our Flight from Philadelphia. Not a Soldier of Howes has crossed the Schuylkill.”  Adams went on to speculate that General Howe would wait for his brother Admiral Howe to bring the fleet up the Delaware River before entering the city.

Instead, the British were moving further upstream along the Schuylkill, in an apparent attempt to flank the Continentals as they had done on the Brandywine.  Washington also moved his army further upstream to contest any crossing and prevent just such a flanking maneuver.

Continental Deployments

To further vex the British, Washington deployed divisions of soldiers on the west bank and behind enemy lines.  One division was a force of about 1500 soldiers under the command of General Anthony Wayne.  General William Maxwell commanded a second force working in cooperation with Pennsylvania Militia General James Potter.  The goal of these units was to keep a low profile in the enemy’s rear, then harass and attack the enemy when the opportunity presented itself.

Gen. William Smallwood
(from Wikimedia)

Washington also ordered General William Smallwood to bring up his Maryland regiments and attack the rear as well.  Smallwood had been in Baltimore when the British landed in Northern Maryland.  In the following weeks, he had mustered more Maryland soldiers and marched them north toward the rear of Howe’s army.

Washington anticipated that these actions would be similar to the hit and run raids of the forage war that they had conducted in New Jersey the previous winter and spring.  Those actions had left the British frustrated and distracted.  Each of these divisions had a large contingent of 1500-2000 soldiers, as well as a few cannons.  Smallwood’s division had marched to Sadsbury Township, which was probably still a day’s march from the main British force.  Maxwell and Potter deployed out near Valley Forge, north of the main British force and ready to pounce on the British left flank if it tried to cross the Schuylkill.  Wayne deployed near Paoli Tavern, just a few miles south of the main British army and was prepared to attack the British right flank.

Skirmishing

On September 19th British outposts at Valley Forge came under attack from General Maxwell’s soldiers.  Howe sent General Cornwallis with two grenadier battalions and a light infantry battalion to engage the enemy and reinforce the outpost at Valley Forge.  By the time Cornwallis arrived, there were no enemy soldiers to engage, although he reported that he could see elements of Washington’s Army across the Schuylkill river in the hills dotting the eastern bank.  Those were Maxwell’s and Potter’s divisions who were tasked with harassing the enemy but avoiding large direct engagements.  As during the forage war, they would attack the outposts, but then fade away when larger armies marched out to engage them.

Anthony Wayne (Wikimedia)

To the south, General Wayne saw Cornwallis’ troops on the march toward Valley Forge and thought that the British might have been alerted to his presence.  He moved his soldiers a few miles away into some hills that provided more protection.

The British detected the American movements and received intelligence from local Tories that these men were under the command of General Wayne.  General Wayne was born and raised in Chester County and was well known to the locals.  The British deployed a brigade of light infantry, along with Ferguson’s riflemen to launch a surprise raid.  However, Wayne’s pickets alerted the main force to the British approach.  The Continentals retreated before the British could engage them.  The British did not pursue them into the hills.

The following day, the British intercepted a letter from Washington to Wayne, confirming that Wayne was in command of a force in their rear.  Wayne was staying a few miles from the British camp, close enough to keep tabs on them, but able to slip away again if the British attacked in force.  Wayne’s hope was that General Smallwood’s Marylanders would link up with his force and that the combined force of about 3500 could attack the British rear when they tried to cross the river and advance on Philadelphia.

General Charles Grey

The British army opted to dispatch Wayne’s small and isolated force before it could become a bigger problem for them.  Howe tasked Major General Charles Grey to lead the attack.

Gen. Charles Gray
(from Ocean's Bridge)

General Grey deserves a brief introduction here.  Grey was born in 1729 to the 1st Baronet of Harwick.  Because Charles was the fourth son, he was not in line to inherit lands or title so dad thought he should have a career in the military.  At age fourteen, his family purchased an ensign’s commission for him.  Young Charles traveled to Scotland in time to be a part of the British massacre of the Scots at Culloden as one of his earliest military experiences.

During the Seven Years War, Grey served as an aide to the Duke of Brunswick.  He was wounded at the Battle of Minden and again in another battle a few months later.  He continued in active service though, participating in several more European battles as well as the invasion of Cuba.  By the end of the war he had risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

The end of the war saw the end of active service for Colonel Grey, who had to go on half pay.  Fortunately, family money and connections kept him living the life of a proper English gentleman.  In 1772, he received a promotion to full colonel and served as aide-de-camp to King George III.  When the King sent General Howe to capture New York in 1776, Grey went along and within a year had risen to major general, most recently serving as a brigade commander at the Battle of Brandywine.

For the present mission, General Grey had to dispatch the American forces in the British rear.  Otherwise, General Howe could not cross the Schuylkill without fear of attack from both sides.

Paoli Massacre

In order to surprise the Americans, who seemed to run away whenever they saw the British advancing on their position, Grey ordered his forces camped at Tredyffrin to march out for a night time raid.  After dark on September 20th, 1200 men from the Second Light Infantry Brigade, along with two regiments of regulars and Ferguson’s rifles marched out of camp in search of the enemy.  Grey, however, was not interested in rifle fire, or musket fire. He ordered all of his soldiers to keep their guns unloaded and remove the flints to prevent firing.  He wanted complete silence and use of the bayonet against the enemy.

Paoli Map (from British Battles)

Grey’s brigade moved out into the night, knowing that Wayne’s force was in the area but not knowing their exact position.  As they got closer, Grey’s officers were able to compel a local to give up Wayne’s location nearby.

Some time shortly after midnight, the British ran into Continental camp pickets and dispatched them with bayonets.  The pickets, however, alerted the camp which began to form into lines.  Before they could get organized, the British light infantry charged the camps and bayoneted everyone they could find.  Some Americans mounted a brief defense.  Officers attempted to form their men into lines, but the British light infantry was on top of them before most could react.  Without sufficient time to organize a defense, the surviving Americans fled into the woods.  The British set the camp on fire, again bayoneting any soldier who tried to escape from a burning tent.

The same darkness that gave the British cover in their advance also gave the Americans cover in their retreat.  General Wayne was able to escape and bring with him the artillery and some of his wagons.  Several others, however, fell into enemy hands.

British Attack at Paoli (from British Battles)

American reports from the attack said that British soldiers mercilessly bayoneted the wounded and those trying to surrender.  In truth though, the British did capture about 70 or 80 prisoners, about half of whom were seriously wounded.  Estimates of Americans killed range from around 53 to 120, although that higher estimate almost certainly includes wounded who died after the fact. The British reported only five killed and seven wounded among the attackers.

During the attack on Wayne’s division, General Smallwood’s 2000 Marylanders were camped only about a mile away.  They heard the battle as it erupted.  Had they marched to the aid of Wayne’s brigade, they would have outnumbered the British considerably.  However, these were mostly inexperienced newly-recruited soldiers.  Instead of organizing a counter-attack, most of them fled into the woods themselves, never engaging with the enemy.  Half of Smallwood’s force deserted that night and returned home to Maryland.

Aftermath

The British considered the raid a great victory.  General Grey got the nickname Charles “no flints” Grey for his command to remove the flints from their guns before the battle.  He would continue on in the war with his reputation enhanced, and we will hear more about his later exploits in future episodes.

Wayne Carried from field
(from British Battles)

Most of the surviving Continentals were able to cross the river and join up with the rest of Washington’s main force.  General Wayne took much of the blame for the loss.  Several accusers, including some of his own officers, accused Wayne of failing to deploy sufficient camp guards to warn of the attack.  There was no time to hear these accusations for the next few weeks.

In October, the army assembled a court martial to question whether Wayne was guilty of neglect of duty.  Wayne’s defense laid out that he was well aware of the possibility of an attack based on a civilian tip.  He had increased the pickets and taken other precautions.  Wayne, in turn, accused one of his subordinates and accusers, Colonel Richard Humpton, of failing to react quickly enough to the attack and mount a proper defense.  In the end the court martial acquitted Wayne and did not seek to pin blame for the success of the attack on anyone.

British Enter Philadelphia

Having dispatched the enemy in their rear, the British prepared to advance once again. Howe moved various divisions further up the Schuylkill river toward Reading.  From that movement, he could either attack the depot at Reading, or cross the river further upstream and then descend on Washington’s flank, just as he had done at Brandywine.  Washington was determined not to let that happen.  He kept his own army moving upstream to confront the British wherever they attempted to cross

As Washington moved his army upstream to block Howe’s next movement, Howe simply turned his army around, went back downstream, and crossed the river at the fords Washington had just abandoned.  Only a few local militia defended the fords.  They turned and ran at the first sight of the British advance.  With the Continentals out of position, there was nothing to prevent the British from entering Philadelphia.

Philadelphia, 1777 Schuylkill on left, Delaware on right
(from Journal of Am Rev)

Howe crossed his army on the night of September 22 and the morning of September 23.  He marched his army to a camp in Norristown, a little less than twenty miles northwest of Philadelphia.  He was now between the Continental Army and the city.

Howe spent the next day in camp, neither attacking Washington’s Continentals nor marching into the city.  His army plundered and burned the homes of known rebels.  Many locals fled with whatever they could carry, but others greeted the army as liberators.  A great number of area loyalists had remained silent for years for fear of incurring the wrath of patriots. These families saw the British as saviors, returning law and order to the region.

The next day, the British marched to Germantown, which today is part of the city of Philadelphia, but at that time was a few miles outside the city limits.  As you might guess from the name, most of the population of this area were German speaking colonists.  Even so, the German speaking Hessian soldiers found the local population rather hostile to them.  Most of the inhabitants were members of a pacific sect that had emigrated from the Palatine region of what is today Germany.  They had hoped to escape the continual warfare of many of their neighbors, including Hesse.  Many saw this as a return of the military oppression that they had tried to leave behind in Europe.  Because they were pacifists, most of them did not take up arms, but they did greet the invaders with a cold hostility.

General Howe paused to see if the Continentals would attempt some sort of desperate counterattack to defend the city.  When that did not happen, Howe left the bulk of his army in Germantown, about 10,000 soldiers, and deployed General Cornwallis to march into Philadelphia with about 3500 men.  On the morning of September 26, Philadelphians saw the redcoats march through their streets, taking control of the city.

British Enter Philadelphia (from Pintrest)

Cornwallis led a triumphant march down Second street, then turning west to march through town, past Independence Hall where the rebels had declared independence just a year earlier.  By his side was General William Erskine, along with several leading loyalists from the city, Joseph Galloway and two of the Allen brothers (from the family for whom Allentown is named).  Governor John Penn probably would have liked to have joined them, but he was being held prisoner by the patriots in New Jersey.

The conquering army received a rather muted response.  The majority of Philadelphia's residents had fled the city.  A few weeks earlier the town had a population of 40,000.  As Cornwallis entered the city, an estimated 10,000 -15,0000 remained.  Congress had ended its session and moved to Lancaster eight days earlier.  Patriots had taken the State House bell, what we today call the Liberty Bell, out of the city to be hidden in Allentown.  Thousands of patriot refugees, many the families of men fighting, had fled the city with only what they could carry.

Those who remained did not know what to expect.  Even loyalists had their concerns. Those with finer homes might find them confiscated for use as officer’s residences.  Many remembered a year earlier when the British occupied New York and half the city was burned in order to deny it to the enemy.  Despite capturing Philadelphia, the British still had not opened up the Delaware River.  The British were without access to food and supplies.  There was the possibility that the patriots might besiege the city and attempt to starve out the occupants.  No one was quite sure what the next step would be.

The British believed that the capture of Philadelphia was the decisive victory they had long sought.  Traditionally, the capture of an enemy capital marked its surrender and ended the war.  It had been just over a month since the British had landed at Head of Elk, Maryland.  The British Army had overcome every obstacle in its path with relative ease.  General Howe had taken his time, avoiding any sorts of ambushes or traps that could surprise his army.  His faith in the professionalism of his officers and soldiers against an ill-trained rebel army seemed well-founded.

For the patriots, of course, the loss of Philadelphia was a setback, but not a fatal one.  As Thomas Paine had written a couple of weeks earlier, they were fighting for a cause, not for a couple of acres of ground.  Although Philadelphia had been the seat of Congress, it was not the home of some single leader who could offer surrender.  Congress could simply move to another town and continue its business, as it had a year earlier when it moved to Baltimore.

When Benjamin Franklin received the news in Paris a few weeks later that Philadelphia had fallen, he rhetorically asked: “Has Howe captured Philadelphia, or has Philadelphia captured Howe?”  One could easily dismiss this as Franklin’s attempt to spin some very bad news.  But his point was that Howe’s capture of the city had not ended anything.  Howe would be stuck in this inland area forced to defend it against attack and unable to move his armies elsewhere.

This had immediate consequences.  Remember, London had hoped that Howe would capture Philadelphia early in the summer, recruit local Tories to garrison the city, and move the bulk of his army north to assist with General Burgoyne’s march through the Hudson Valley.  By the time Howe finally took Philadelphia, it was practically October.  He was still not in any position to redeploy soldiers northward to New York. Shortly after taking Philadelphia, he received word that General Burgoyne had suffered a setback in New York and that his army could be in real trouble.

- - -

Next Episode 161 Battle of Freeman's Farm 

Previous  Episode 159 Battle of the Clouds

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Further Reading

Websites

John Adams Diary: “1777 Septr. 21. Sunday.,”  https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/01-02-02-0007-0003-0006

Charles “no-flint” Grey: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/charles-no-flint-grey

The 1st Earl Grey https://www.britannica.com/biography/Charles-Grey-1st-Earl-Grey

Paoli Massacre: https://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/paoli.htm

Fyers, Evan W. H. “GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S OPERATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1777. The Battle on the Brandywine Creek—11 September—and the Action at Germantown—4 October.” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 8, no. 34, 1929, pp. 228–241. www.jstor.org/stable/44232285

Futhey, J. Smith “The Massacre of Paoli.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 1, no. 3, 1877, pp. 285–319. www.jstor.org/stable/20084293

Pleasants, Henry. “The Battle of Paoli.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 72, no. 1, 1948, pp. 44–53.  www.jstor.org/stable/20087956

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Lisle, Clifton Diamond Rock A Tale of the Paoli Massacre, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920 (this is a fictional novel based on the events of the Paoli Massacre) (Google Books).

Pennypacker, Samuel W. Anthony Wayne, J.B. Lippincott company, 1908.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965 (borrow only)

Futhey, J. Smith “The Massacre of Paoli” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 1, no. 3, 1877, pp. 285–319,

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Brownlow, Donald G. A Documentary History of the Paoli Massacre, Kessinger Publishing, 2010.

McGuire, Thomas J. Battle of Paoli, Stackpole Books, 2000 (book recommendation of the week).

McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign Vol. 1, Stackpole Books, 2006.

Nelson, Paul D. Anthony Wayne: Soldier of the Early Republic, Indiana Univ. Press, 1985

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Pioneer Press, 1980 (orig. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

ARP159 Battle of the Clouds

Last week I covered the Battle of Brandywine, which was the major battle both sides had hoped would be decisive.  General Washington had hoped to halt the British advance on Philadelphia.  General Howe hoped to wipe away the American rebels and take their capital.  Howe won the battle and forced the Continentals to retreat, but he did not capture the enemy army.  Washington and the bulk of his soldiers escaped to fight another day.

Brandywine Aftermath

Following the battle, General Howe made no real effort to follow up and crush his opponent.  Instead, the British and Hessian soldiers remained in camp near Brandywine Battlefield for five days.  Remember, the British had only landed in Maryland a little over two weeks earlier.  Most of the soldiers were sick or out of shape after being kept aboard ship for six weeks. Most of their horses had died, and the remainder were in terrible condition.  After fighting a major battle, Howe did not want to push his men too hard.

Gen. William Howe
(from Wikimedia)

Although Howe had tried to put a stop to looting in hopes of winning over the local populace, he was fighting a losing battle.  At least two British soldiers were executed in the days after the battle for looting and marauding.  The British army did spend its time looking for American soldiers in hiding and for stashed supplies.  They also commandeered necessary food, horses, and anything else the army needed from the local population.

Howe deployed General James Grant with a couple of regiments, to look for American stragglers during the Continental retreat.  Grant's men scoured the area, finding little. Without horses, the soldiers on the march could cover little ground.  The feeble horses they had to pull their cannons could barely make it up some of the hills.

The British also had a large number of their own wounded, as well as several hundred wounded American prisoners.  Howe sent a message under a flag of truce inviting him to send doctors to care for the wounded prisoners held by the British.  Several Philadelphia surgeons, including Dr. Benjamin Rush (as signer of the Declaration of Independence) entered British lines under a flag of truce to care for the wounded prisoners.  While there, Rush met with a number of British officers, and spoke with an old friend, Joseph Galloway, who had also been a delegate to the Continental Congress at one time.  Rejecting independence, Galloway had thrown in his lot with the British and was assisting General Howe.  The two men, now enemies, spoke cordially and respectfully to each other.

Continental Retreat

The Continental Army had retreated from Brandywine in relatively good order.  The men were exhausted, but did not panic.  Most of the army marched into the village of Chester for the night.  The next morning, Washington moved his soldiers up to the Schuylkill River where they crossed a pontoon bridge and entered Philadelphia.  Fearing an imminent attack on the city, Washington removed his wounded to Trenton and to other towns north of Philadelphia.  The wounded General Lafayette went to Bethlehem.

George Washington
(from Wikimedia)

The Schuylkill River was the last major barrier separating the British from Philadelphia.  It took the army two days to move across the narrow bridge to the east bank of the Schuylkill.  If the Continentals removed that bridge, there would be no way for the British to cross in the face of the enemy.

Of course, Washington knew that Howe could also move north further upstream and cross where it was easier further up river.  Then Howe could march down and turn Washington’s flank just as he had done on the banks of the Brandywine.  Washington could easily find himself pinned in Philadelphia and forced to surrender his army along with the city.

Washington’s other concern about this position was that his position left Reading exposed.  Reading was a village to the west where the Continental Army had stored a great quantity of food and supplies.  The British would undoubtedly receive intelligence about this supply depot.  Howe could send an army to capture the supplies that his own army needed and deny them to the Continental Army.

So, on September 14, while the British continued to camp near Brandywine for days after the battle, and after Washington had given his army one day’s rest, he provided his soldiers with more ammunition and crossed back over the Schuylkill River.  He crossed further upstream across one of the fords, near what is today called Conshohocken.  Washington put the Continental army in a position where they could contest any British movement to the north, either toward Reading, or to move upstream where the regulars might ford the Schuylkill and take Philadelphia.

British Take Wilmington

With the Continentals on the march, the British remained in camp.  The British spent much of September 12 burying the dead from both sides and tending to the wounded.  They sent out foraging parties to collect food for the army.  On September 13, Howe sent a detachment to capture Wilmington, Delaware.  The local militia there put up no fight, and fled, abandoning their cannons without a shot fired.  The British captured Delaware’s President John McKinly, who had remained in town to oversee the town’s so-called defense.  After taking the town, Howe moved his wounded and his American prisoners to Wilmington as well.

As planned, at least a few ships from Admiral Howe’s navy also reached Wilmington about this time and helped to remove the wounded.  The Continentals still had forts and other defenses that prevented the navy from sailing further upstream to Philadelphia.  But the lower part of the Delaware was relatively open to the British.

Philadelphia Threatened

Although the British Army took its time and Washington prepared to put up another defense once it started to march again, most people feared that Philadelphia would fall within days.  On September 12, Thomas Paine penned his Crisis #4 where he began by noting the loss at Brandywine:

The event of yesterday was one of those kind of alarms which is just sufficient to rouse us to duty, without being of consequence enough to depress our fortitude. It is not a field of a few acres of ground, but a cause, that we are defending, and whether we defeat the enemy in one battle, or by degrees, the consequences will be the same.

Paine went on to point out that with Howe’s limited number of soldiers, being reduced with every battle, he must eventually fail, no matter how many field victories he had.

Thomas Paine
(from Wikimedia)

The Continental Congress began in inquiry into the loss at Brandywine.  It ordered General Washington to open a court of inquiry against General Preudhomme du Boore for his actions at Brandywine.  As you may recall from last week, the Continental general from France had been in command of the left wing on Birmingham Heights.  The soldiers were out of position and ran when attacked.  The fall of the left flank led to the general retreat of all the divisions on Birmingham Hill and could have proven much more disastrous, but for the rear guard action led by General Nathanael Greene.

When informed that he would face a court of inquiry, General de Borre instead submitted his resignation on September 13, blaming his failure on ill-trained and incompetent soldiers.  Congress accepted his resignation the next day.  That would be the end of de Borre’s career in the Continental Army, but not his end in the Revolution.  De Borre returned to France and to his commission as a colonel in the French Army.  A few years later, he would return to America with the French Army after France entered the war.  But that is getting ahead of our story.  For now, de Borre was going home.

Congress also requested General Sullivan, who was supposed to be commanding the division on Birmingham Hill, also be recalled from duty until there could be a court of inquiry.  On this request, Washington demurred.  He needed Sullivan to remain commander of the Maryland troops.  He told Congress that he could not afford to suspend Sullivan or conduct an inquiry at that time because he anticipated another battle within days.  Sullivan would retain his command.  He would face a court martial later that year, not only for Brandywine but also for his actions on Staten Island a month earlier and for other things.  The court martial would acquit Sullivan of all charges and cleared him to return to duty.

Casimir Pulaski

Congress was not just looking for leaders to blame.  They also had praise for many of the commanders at Brandywine.  The Marquis de Lafayette’s battlefield wound only improved the young general’s reputation.  The other foreign hero from Brandywine was Casimir Pulaski.  On September 15, Congress granted Pulaski a commission as a brigadier general in the Continental Army.

Gen. Casimir Pulaski
(from Wikimedia)

I mentioned Pulaski last week when he organized a cavalry charge to halt the British advance and give the rest of the army time to retreat.  Congress had been debating whether to give him a commission since he had arrived in America in late July.  His leadership and daring at Brandywine was enough to convince the delegates that he was the man for the job.

Pulaski had been born in Warsaw in 1745.  At the time, Warsaw was capital of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  It had a king who was elected by the nobles.  Coming from a noble family, Pulaski was a member of the national elite.  He served as a cavalry officer and grew in reputation.  The King, Stanislaw II Augustus, allied himself with the Russians and sought to turn the country into a Russian protectorate.  Stanislaw cut off alliances with France and Austria, leading to war.  The war went bad for Poland.  Russia, Prussia, and Austria partitioned the country in 1772.

During the war that led to the partition, Pulaski was part of a conspiracy to kidnap the King.  This led to charges of attempted regicide and made him a wanted man throughout Europe.  Pulaski had to flee his homeland, first to Prussia, then to the Ottoman Empire, and then again to France.  He attempted to join other armies, but the criminal charges against him meant that no other king would offer him a commission.

Facing debtors prison, Pulaski heard that American agents in Paris were looking for officers to go fight in America.  He met with Benjamin Franklin and impressed him with his military experience and zeal for liberty.  French officials strongly encouraged Franklin to give Pulaski a commission, and even offered to pay his travel costs to America.  France was eager to get him to leave the country before his presence created an international incident.

Pulaski took Franklin’s recommendation and boarded a ship for America in June 1777.  He arrived in Boston in late July, studying English during his voyage.  After presenting his credentials to Congress in August, he rode off to join the Continental Army without waiting for Congress to act.  He served as an unofficial gentleman volunteer to George Washington in the weeks leading up to Brandywine.

Along with his commission as general, Pulaski served as the Continental Army’s first Cavalry commander with the title “Commander of the Horse.”

Baron de Kalb

Also, on September 15, the same day Congress granted a commission to Pulaski, it also granted a commission as major general to Baron Johannes de Kalb.  Remember that de Kalb had traveled with Lafayette and several other would-be generals to America months earlier, but got caught up in the political dispute over having too many French generals.

Gen. Johann de Kalb
(from Wikimedia)

Congress had offered Lafayette a commission as major general after Lafayette agreed to serve without pay.  Congress left de Kalb and others cooling their heels in Philadelphia while they decided what to do.  In the weeks leading up to Brandywine, Congress had voted not to accept de Kalb’s offer of service.  Delegates then took a few weeks to debate how much to pay for his travel expenses and costs of returning home to France.

In the meantime, de Kalb did a little sightseeing, visiting the Continental medical facilities in Bethlehem.  Lafayette’s performance at Brandywine raised the reputation of French officers generally, and is credited in part with Congress’ change of heart.  It was probably also Lafayette’s strong support for de Kalb, who had been his superior and mentor in the French Army, that contributed to the change.

Congress voted to make de Kalb a major general. When de Kalb received the news of his appointment the following day, he sent a letter rejecting the offer.  Two days later, he had a change of heart and requested several conditions before he would accept his appointment.  One was the request that Congress back date his commission to the date of Lafayette’s.  That way de Kalb would not suffer the indignity of ranking below his former subordinate.  He also wanted the option to return to France if he determined his superiors disapproved of his service in the Continental Army.  He wanted his aide to be commissioned as a Lieutenant Colonel, that he receive a pension, and that his wife receive a pension if he was killed in service.

As a result of these negotiations, de Kalb did not join the army immediately, but remained in Bethlehem, where he remained with the wounded General Lafayette.  He would not accept his commission and join the army until well after the British occupied Philadelphia.

Battle of the Clouds

As Congress debated about officers, General Washington prepared for round two in the British Army’s advance toward Philadelphia.  As I said, the Continentals had retreated across the Schuylkill River.  When the British remained in camp near Brandywine, the Continentals moved back toward the British and prepared to contest any advance.

Troop Movements 

On September 15, General Howe learned that the Continentals had advanced toward his camp and were about ten miles north of his army.  Washington seemed to be daring him to fight another direct battle on open fields, something the British thought they would win every time.  Further, Washington’s forces had fallen to around 10,000 after Brandywine, so Howe had a numerical advantage.

In the early pre-dawn hours of September 16, General Howe assembled his army and began a march to meet the Americans near White Horse Tavern a few miles to the north.  Around 9:00 AM, Washington received word from Pulaski’s cavalry that the British were on the march.  Rather than take up an immediate defensive position, Washington marched his army three miles toward the advancing British.

Around 1:00 PM, General Cornwallis reported that his British regulars had encountered Pulaski’s cavalry and a few hundred militia, who fled as the first shots were fired.  Next, General Knyphausen’s Hessian jaegers ran into Continentals under General Anthony Wayne and William Maxwell.  An American charge unnerved the jaegers, and almost led to the capture of Hessian Colonel von Donop.  British grenadiers provided support to the jaegers and stopped the American advance.

The British formed a line of battle as General Matthews joined Knyphausen in a preparation to attack the Americans.  The Continentals were forced onto muddy ground which made maneuverability of their cannons difficult and was not an advantageous defensive position.  Washington ordered a withdrawal to higher ground, but it looked as though the British would be able to charge the American position before the Ameircans could withdraw.

Then, just as things were looking bleak, the sky darkened and a driving thunderstorm unleashed across the region.  One Hessian officer said that the rain  "came down so hard that in a few moments we were drenched and sank in mud up to our calves."  The wet powder prevented either side from being able to fire their guns.  The thick mud and driving rain made it impossible even to order a bayonet charge.

With the loss of their powder, and given the relatively weak defensive position, General Washington gave the order to withdraw as the worst nor’easter many had ever seen flooded everything.  The Continentals slogged north through the mud and rain, marching about five miles before reaching camp around 10:00 PM.  There, the soldiers spent a miserable wet night in the field before marching back to the Schuylkill River the next day.

The British march north, attempting to get around the American right flank and push the Continentals back against the flooded Schuylkill River.  The two camps eyed each other the next day, but neither seemed ready to re-engage.  By the following day, Friday September 19, the Schuylkill water levels had fallen enough that the Continentals could move across the fords and take up positions on the other side of the river.

Thus, thanks to the weather, what could have become a decisive major battle at White Horse Tavern was called on account of rain.  Both sides suffered about 100 casualties in the early fighting, but no full battle could play out.  The event became known as the Battle of the Clouds.

The British advanced as the Americans tried to remove supplies stored at Valley Forge and other areas around the region.  With their powder destroyed by the rain, it was not clear if the Americans even could put up a defense at the Schuylkill river. Washington directed Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton as one of many officers instructed to remove or destroy supplies that might fall to the enemy.  Hamilton was in the process of doing so when his small unit fell under enemy fire.  The team fled back to a flat bottom boat on the Schuylkill river, exchanging fire with the enemy as they polled back across to the American side.  The British Army was poised to cross the Schuylkill.  Hamilton wrote to President of Congress John Hancock that day: “If Congress have not yet left Philadelphia, they ought to do it immediately without fail, for the enemy have the means of throwing a party this night into the city.”

With most of the Continental Army along the east bank of the Schuylkill, Washington left one contingent of soldiers under General Anthony Wayne in the field  on the west bank to harass the enemy and delay their advance.  Wayne’s army camped at a small village called Paoli.

- - -

Next Episode 160 The Paoli Massacre

Previous Episode 159 The Battle of Brandywine

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via Venmo, Zelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)

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You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

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Further Reading

Websites

Virtual Marching Tour, Battle of the Clouds: https://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/clouds_1.htm

Paine, Thomas Crisis #4: http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/Paine/Crisis/Crisis-4.html

Casimir Pulaski https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/casimir-pulaski

Johann de Kalb: https://thehistoryjunkie.com/johann-de-kalb-facts

Letter From Alexander Hamilton to John Hancock, [18 September 1777]: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0282

Itinerary of George Washington:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1keqVPXxJl4zpAAQNfvdEqA7iAKXaKQ77e7a9IYx7G0c

Fyers, Evan W. H. “GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S OPERATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1777. The Battle on the Brandywine Creek—11 September—and the Action at Germantown—4 October.” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 8, no. 34, 1929, pp. 228–241. www.jstor.org/stable/44232285

Ecelbarger, Garry “Aggressive Minded Gamblers: Washington, Howe, and the Days between Battles, September 12-16, 1777, Journal of the American Revolution, March 10, 2020: https://allthingsliberty.com/2020/03/aggressive-minded-gamblers-washington-howe-and-the-days-between-battles-september-12-16-1777

Sullivan, Thomas. “Before and after the Battle of Brandy-Wine. Extracts from the Journal of Sergeant Thomas Sullivan of H.M. Forty-Ninth Regiment of Foot.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 31, no. 4, 1907, pp. 406–418. www.jstor.org/stable/20085398

Battle of the Clouds Battlefield https://www.chescoplanning.org/HisResources/BattleClouds.cfm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Kapp, Friedrich, The life of John Kalb, Major-General in the Revolutionary Army,
New York: H. Holt and Co. 1884.

Manning, Clarence A. Soldier Of Liberty Casimir Pulaski, Philosophical Library, 1945.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965 (borrow only)

Smith, John S. Memoir of the Baron de Kalb, Baltimore: J.D. Toy 1858.


Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Harris, Michael C. Brandywine: A Military History of the Battle that Lost Philadelphia but Saved America, September 11, 1777, Savis Beatie, 2014.

Kauffman, Gerald J. and Michael R. Gallagher The British Invasion of Delaware, Aug-Sep 1777, lulu.com, 2013.

McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign Vol. 1, Stackpole Books, 2006.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Pioneer Press, 1980 (orig. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003 (book recommendation of the week).

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.