American Revolution Podcast

Sunday, February 2, 2020

Episode 134 Battle of Bound Brook

Today we return to northern New Jersey in spring 1777. As you recall, General Washington’s Continentals attacked outposts at Trenton and Princeton at the beginning of the year, bringing the fight back to New Jersey after the British thought they had conquered it. This kicked off the Forage War that I discussed back in Episode 127. The Continental fighting had re-energized the New Jersey patriot militia to attack British or Hessians soldiers whenever they ventured out in small groups, or even some larger ones.

The fighting made it almost impossible for the British to forage for food or fuel in New Jersey over the winter. Instead, they hunkered down in larger fortified bases and relied on supplies from New York to sustain them. The British held a few strongholds in northern New Jersey. They kept armies in Elizabethtown, Amboy, and Brunswick.

Washington at Morristown

While fighting the Forage War and keeping an eye on British forces, Washington had moved the bulk of his Continental Army to Morristown New Jersey, about thirty miles due west of New York City. From there, he could maintain a defensive position in the Watchung Mountains. He could pivot his army north if the British moved up toward the Hudson River Valley, or to the south if the British moved once again across New Jersey toward Philadelphia.

Washington was also struggling to keep an army in the field. Remember, the 10,000 man Continental Army that he had brought from Boston to New York had shrunk to about 2000 just before he made his desperate attack across the Delaware River on Trenton. That victory helped with recruiting initially and also inspired more militia to turn out.

That said, even much of Washington’s core of dedicated soldiers from the Trenton campaign had been expected to be released at the end of 1776 when their enlistments expired. Washington and his officers had inspired many of them to stay on for a short time by pleading with them and convincing the majority that their service for just another month or two was of critical military importance. Their willingness to stick it out another couple of months allowed Washington to fight the second battle of Trenton, the Battle of Princeton and lock down the British for several months of the Forage War.

Continental Soldiers (from Wikimedia)

By March though, even these extended enlistments had ended. Many of the men had begun to leave by late January. The two armies were not in active large scale combat, and many of these soldiers were more than ready to go home. Many of the final holdovers from 1776 had left the army.

Washington realized he needed a large professional army, as large as the British force, or preferably larger. To get that army Washington needed to overcome push-back among many Americans against the idea. Large standing armies of paid soldiers under long term enlistments smacked of tyranny for many patriots. Many preferred a militia army where civilians would take up arms when needed but then go back to their lives. This assured the people that the army could not become a tool of oppression, because the army was the people.

The reality though, was that during this time of war, militia could not cut it. They were not as reliable, not as well trained, and would often leave when they were needed most after short term enlistments expired. Washington finally convinced Congress to give him a professional army, and a huge one at that. He got Congress to authorize an army of 75,000 Continental soldiers for 1777. Now there was no way they would ever get to that size, but the goal at this time was a massive build up. Washington also wanted an army of that was trained, disciplined, and would remain under arms for the multi-year campaigns ahead.

Congress offered sizable enlistment bonuses for a three year enlistment. It also promised free land to those who volunteered for the duration of the war. These enticements, along with the American victories in New Jersey, inspired a new group of recruits that gave Washington over 11,000 Continentals at his command by spring. Another 17,000 militia were also available in the region for Washington should he need them.

While growing in numbers, the army under his command still had little training or combat experience. Most of those soldiers who had fought at Boston or in the New York campaign had gone home, with new inexperienced replacements filling the ranks. Even many who had just fought in the New Jersey campaign were leaving. Washington still had no experienced professional officers capable of training and drilling the new recruits to fight like professionals. This was the beginning of the professional standing army that Washington thought he had needed since he had taken charge. While he had soldiers who had committed to multi-year enlistments, those soldiers did not yet have the experience or training that he thought they needed before they could challenge the regulars on the battlefield.

Spring Offensive

As winter becomes spring, a soldier’s thoughts turn to fighting. Although this winter had been pretty busy, traditionally new offensives began in the spring when the weather made fighting, camping, and marching bearable for the soldiers.

The problem was, no one was quite sure what the plan was for the spring offensive. As I discussed a couple of weeks ago, the British commander in North America, General William Howe did not get the reinforcements he wanted to launch multiple offensives against New England, New York and the middle colonies. Instead, he was talking about taking Philadelphia. No one was actually sure though since they also thought he was going to have to send troops up the Hudson Valley to link up with the northern army. General Burgoyne would soon be leading that army down from Canada. London wanted at least some portion of Howe’s main army available to support Burgoyne as he moved down the Hudson Valley.

Last week we looked at the first British raid up the Hudson River on Peekskill, essentially testing Continental defenses and seeing what they could do. This week, the British are going to do something similar in New Jersey but on a larger scale.

As I said, the British learned during the Forage War over the winter, that sending out even a few hundred soldiers could invite an ambush and random attacks. An offensive in New Jersey would have to be on a larger scale.

Since the British had some larger bases along the New Jersey coast further to the south, Washington deployed several detachments that protected his main army from a southern attack. He ordered now Major General Benjamin Lincoln to Bound Brook, New Jersey, along the Raritan River. Congress had commissioned Lincoln to major general in February.

Before then, Lincoln was not in the Continental Army. He had been a general in the Massachusetts militia. Lincoln was more politician than soldier and had been involved primarily in supply and logistics during the Siege of Boston. He had remained in Massachusetts after the Continental Army left for New York.

Benjamin Lincoln
(from Wikimedia)

Lincoln had brought a supporting militia army to New York after the British already had captured most of the area. He played a role in the failed attempt to take Fort Independence, something I discussed back in Episode 128. Although the mission was a failure and General Washington heavily criticized the mission’s commander, General William Heath, Washington apparently came away with a good impression of General Lincoln.

This was also about the same time Major General Artemas Ward resigned his commission due to age and infirmity. Ward’s resignation made room for another major general from Massachusetts. Washington seemed to see some military potential in Lincoln and had recommended to Congress that he receive a commission.

Lincoln became a major general in the Continental Army on the same day that that congress promoted four other brigadier generals to major general: William Alexander (Lord Stirling) of New Jersey, Arthur St. Clair and Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania, and Adam Stephen of Virginia. Congress expected to increase the size of the army and needed more generals. In truth, they never were able to recruit as large an army as they had planned and would have more generals than needed.

Perhaps more importantly, all of these new major generals had been junior to Brigadier General Benedict Arnold and had nothing close to his fighting record. As I discussed a few weeks ago, this had almost led to Arnold’s resignation. Lincoln was one of those politician-generals that particularly irked combat generals like Arnold. Lincoln had done almost nothing beyond a support role as a militia officer. He only had played a role assisting the commander at the failed assault on Fort Independence. Now he was joining the army as a major general. Lincoln was the only American officer outside of that first group at the founding of the Continental Army to join the Continentals at that level.

The village of Bound Brook was Lincoln’s first command as a Continental officer where he was not directly under the supervision of Washington. Initially, Lincoln commanded a force of about one thousand infantrymen and an artillery unit to provide defensive support. His primary mission was to protect three bridges across the Raritan River that the British might use for an attack on Morristown from the south. By late March though, expiring enlistments reduced his force by half, to about 500 men. Most of those remaining were Pennsylvania men who had seen little combat so far.

Lord Cornwallis
(from Wikimedia)

Back in Brunswick, British General Charles, Lord Cornwallis, was itching to do something. In December, he had been just about to get on a ship back to London where he was looking forward to time with his wife and children, and chatting with top officials in London about the war. Instead, General Howe got word of Washington’s attack on Trenton and sent Cornwallis at the head of an army to deal with it. On the one hand, Howe’s decision to send Cornwallis rather than the far more senior General Henry Clinton indicated that Cornwallis was a rising star. On the other hand, Cornwallis spent most of the winter chasing around New Jersey, and accomplishing little rather than enjoying time back in England. This was not really what he wanted.

A year earlier, Cornwallis had begun his American adventure under General Clinton. His forces had attempted and failed to capture South Carolina’s Fort Moultrie on Sullivan’s Island in Charleston Harbor, something I discussed back in Episode 96. Cornwallis had impressed General Howe with his leadership at the Battle of Long Island and his work pushing the Continentals out of New York. As Generals Clinton and Lord Percy were getting pushed aside, Cornwallis was taking a more prominent role under General Howe’s overall command.

Cornwallis had chased Washington down to Trenton, only to see the Continentals slip around behind him and attack the British rear at Princeton. For the rest of the winter, Cornwallis sat mostly on defense, trying to protect his soldiers during the Forage War and making sure the Americans did not take another outpost like they had at Trenton. It was an irritating and frustrating winter for the British generally and Cornwallis in particular.

As the weather began to warm and the rivers melted, Cornwallis wanted to start doing something more like a strategic offensive. With intelligence that Lincoln’s army at Bound Brook had shrunk and was somewhat isolated from the main army. Cornwallis planned a day raid that would capture Lincoln’s army. The British could toss them into the New York prison ships and claim a quick victory to begin the spring campaign.

As early as February, Cornwallis has asked Hessian jäger Captain Johann Ewald to develop a plan to take the Continental force at Bound Brook. Since the plan required fording the river, they had to wait for spring to implement it. In April, Cornwallis assembled a force of about 4000 British and Hessian soldiers. A force of Hessians under the command of Colonel Carl von Donop, would assault one of the bridges directly. Major General James Grant would command another group of British and Hessians on the right flank to threaten the Continentals from another direction. Cornwallis himself would take another brigade on the British left flank. They would ford the Raritan further upriver and prevent any Continental retreat in that direction. Another group of several light infantry companies would move north of the area to cut off the road from Bound Brook back to the main Continental army at Morristown. With four separate forces coming at them from different directions, the Continentals would be trapped and would have to surrender.

The Attack

On the night of April 12, 1777, the British and Hessian armies prepared themselves for a night march so that they could hit the enemy before dawn on the morning of the 13th. Ewald’s small force at the center was the first to engage the enemy. Its goal was to draw the attention of the enemy while Von Donop moved in from another direction to surprise the defenders.

Battle of Bound Brook (from Wikimedia)

Ewald’s men, however, were overly enthusiastic. They chased back the American sentries to the main lines where they ran into Continental artillery. In doing so, this small advance group found themselves almost surrounded by the Continentals.

Fortunately for Ewald, Von Donop and Cornwallis both appeared with their forces from other directions. The Continentals could not focus on capturing Ewald. Instead they had to run for their lives. General Lincoln, had to flee along with his small army in a hurry. He lost all of his papers and personal property as he ran from the field. Von Donop later reported that he thought Lincoln must have fled in his underwear since they found his uniform still in his tent.

The Pennsylvania artillery put up a sustained defense, as it covered the retreat of the infantry. As a result, it suffered the bulk of the battle casualties as well as the loss of its field guns to the enemy.

The Americans were fortunate that the British light infantry deployed to cut off their escape up the road toward Morristown was late getting into place. This delay allowed the bulk of the Continentals to escape. The actual fighting was over quickly. The Americans suffered somewhere between thirty and sixty killed or wounded (accounts differ). The British also captured 80 or 90 prisoners. The British only suffered a few wounded by American defenders.

Up in Morristown, Washington received word of the attack by mid-morning. He authorized a counter-attack under the command of Major General Nathanael Greene. Washington feared the British might continue up to Morristown and attack the main army there. Cornwallis had no such intent. This was meant to be a short one day raid. By 11:00 AM, the British collected their prisoners, the captured guns, and began the march back to their base at Brunswick.

By the time Greene’s force made it to Bound Brook, his soldiers found the last of the British rearguard trying to cross the Raritan River. A short skirmish resulted in eight British dead and sixteen captured. The Continentals occupied Bound Brook again that same afternoon.

Aftermath

The battle was technically a British victory. Cornwallis captured the town, along with a few prisoners and some supplies, as he had hoped. Widely varying reports indicate that in total, somewhere between 40 and 120 of the 500 Continentals as Bound Brook were killed, wounded, or captured. The British only reported seven wounded in the battle itself. They lost another eight killed and 16 captured in the rearguard action that the Continentals fought during their withdraw.

Nathanael Greene
(from Wikimedia)

Cornwallis’ main objective though, was to capture the entire American force at Bound Brook. This failed because the British did not cut off the escape route by the time the attack began. Most soldiers, including the commander General Lincoln, were able to escape, even if the retreat was panicked and disorganized.

Following the battle, General Washington directed his officers to improve the defenses against another attack. General Greene surveyed the area and reported back that there was no good way to defend against another large British attack. Washington also provided more reinforcements to the southern detachment so that they would not be so outnumbered if attacked again.

However, the southern force was still isolated and exposed. If the British wanted to launch another raid, the force could still be vulnerable as it was separate from the main army. Therefore it was still subject to being surrounded. More importantly, if Washington had to deploy more of his army to back up the force at Bound Brook, the British could send an even larger offensive army. Washington would risk the capture a Continental force of perhaps thousands who did not have the natural protection provided by the Watchung Mountains. That was why Washington did not have his main force there in the first place. That was why his headquarters was in Morristown, in the safety of the Watchung mountains.

After several weeks of evaluation and debate, Washington, in late May, pulled back the southern flank of his army to Middlebrook. Although not far away, it would give the soldiers a natural defensive position in the Watchung Mountains. From the heights they would be better able to see the approach of an enemy army. The British would be able to cross the Raritan river unopposed, but then they would have to challenge the Continentals in their mountain defenses.

As it turned out, this would not be an issue. The British sat out the entire month of May and much of June as well with no significant activity in New Jersey. Washington had the time he needed to adjust his defenses. After Washington’s forces had made the move to Middlebrook, the British would make one more thrust into the area in late June. I’ll get to that in a future episode a few weeks from now.

Before we get to those events, a couple of weeks after the raid on Bound Brook, the British would launch another raid against Danbury Connecticut. For that story, you will need to wait until next week, when I discuss, you guessed it, the Danbury Raid.

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Next Episode 135 The Danbury Raid

Previous Episode 133 The Peekskill Raid

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Sunday, January 26, 2020

Episode 133: The Peekskill Raid

Last week I went over all the confusion in London over who planned to attack what and where in 1777. This week the British start moving out of winter quarters and begin their first tentative action for spring 1777.

Hudson River Valley

As I hope I’ve stressed enough times by now, British military leaders had long held that the key to victory was cutting off New England from the rest of America by taking control of the Hudson River Valley between Quebec and New York City. By the end of 1776, the British had a large army in Quebec and an even larger one in New York City.

That the two armies had not created this link so far was due primarily to the heroic efforts of General Benedict Arnold. Remember, just after Lexington and Concord, Arnold scraped together an army, and along with Ethan Allen, captured Fort Ticonderoga. This deny the British that important launching off point into the Hudson Valley. Arnold then attempted to take Quebec. The Continental Army’s lack of resources and a scrappy last minute defense by Scottish immigrants in Canada prevented Arnold from taking that stronghold before British reinforcements arrived.

British map of Peekskill area 1777
(from Wikiwand)

Even after the British deployed an overwhelming force in Quebec and pushed the patriots out of Canada, Arnold still managed to control Lake Champlain with a small fleet, effectively preventing the British from retaking Fort Ticonderoga throughout 1776.

To protect the Hudson valley, the Continentals focused on securing Fort Ticonderoga to prevent an invasion from Quebec toward New York. Well, focused on securing the fort may be an overstatement. Everyone thought it was an important fort to hold, but after General Arnold left in late 1776, the defensive plan for holding the fort to was, in hindsight, a clearly wrong-headed approach. That’s a topic for a future episode. For now, I’ll just say that the Continentals tried to improve the fort’s defenses, but did nothing like Arnold had done to prevent the British from reaching the fort at all. The intent, though, was to hold the British at Ticonderoga and prevent them from moving into the Hudson Valley from the north.

On the southern end, the Continentals did little to prevent British General William Howe from continuing to move up the Hudson River after his victory at White Plains, NY. In part, this was because Howe was not in any hurry to move upstate in late fall when the wilderness in winter would probably do more harm to his soldiers than the Continentals or the militia could.

Besides, General Washington had retreated back through New Jersey toward Philadelphia. In the fall of 1776, it made much more sense for General Howe to chase Washington rather than venture further upriver where American General Charles Lee commanded a large force to oppose them.

Recall that after Howe’s British and Germans pushed the Continental Army out of New York City, Washington had deployed an army to the north under Lee’s command, while Washington led the forces who retreated toward Pennsylvania. As Washington’s army dissolved, he begged Lee to move south and join forces with him. Lee kept putting him off, until the British captured Lee in December. At that point, the remainder of Lee's Northern Army moved south to assist Washington with his counter-attack that began at Trenton.

As Washington fought to take back most of New Jersey over the rest of the winter, there was not much of anyone to defend the Hudson Valley. General Arnold was off sulking and contemplating resignation because Congress had promoted several junior officers over him. General Phillip Schuyler still served as the commander of the region, but his political fighting with General Horatio Gates had left the command a complete mess. Their attention focused on Fort Ticonderoga, which the British would have to take before moving south, not an attack from the south into the Hudson Valley.

General Howe’s army controlled the land for miles surrounding New York City. He was fighting with the Continentals in New Jersey over the winter, but had successfully captured Providence, Rhode Island without a fight and felt confident that he could move British ships up the Hudson River whenever he wanted.

So with spring approaching, it was time to consider the 1777 offensives. By this time, Lee was a prisoner of war, and the remainder of his forces had joined Washington in New Jersey. As I discussed in detail last week, in the spring of 1777, Britain planned once again to push into New York, from Canada, this time with General Johnny Burgoyne in charge.

General William Howe
(from Wikimedia)

Howe was more interested, at this point, in taking Philadelphia. He did not think he had enough troops to do that and mount a full scale invasion of the Hudson Valley. Therefore, he had no intention of doing the latter. As I said last week, such a move would only contribute to Burgoyne’s glory by supporting his primary offensive from Canada. As commander of North American forces, Howe was not terribly interested in playing a support role for a subordinate. While a full scale invasion of the Hudson Valley from the south was not a serious consideration, the British did want to begin to test the resolve of the Continental and militia forces in the area.

Washington, of course, would want to oppose any British movements. But at this point, he was not quite sure what the British might do next. They had a force in Rhode Island that might move up through New England. Washington had recaptured most of New Jersey over the winter. It was quite likely that Howe would try to take back the State and continue his offensive into Pennsylvania. From there he could capture Philadelphia.

So while the Americans, hoped to prevent a British incursion into upstate New York, coming up with the soldiers to defend that area was a big problem. Washington kept the bulk of his troops in New Jersey, to prevent a move on Philadelphia, with the other significant force further north at Lake Champlain and Fort Ticonderoga, preparing to oppose the British push from Canada.

Peekskill

The Continentals had created a supply depot at Peekskill, New York, about 20 miles north of White Plains, along the Hudson River. Area mills produced leather, wood, flour, and gunpowder. Local slaughterhouses also provided meat for the Continental army and patriot militia. Washington thought the area would prove a good location for supplies, since it was in between the two expected British invasion zones that were likely for 1777. If the British attacked the northern army at Fort Ticonderoga, the supplies could be taken north to the soldiers defending upstate New York. If the British launched another attack across New Jersey in pursuit of Philadelphia, the supplies could be moved south to support that army.

The Continentals had not built any serious defenses at Peekskill itself. Until February 1777, General William Heath of Massachusetts had commanded from Peekskill. However, after his disappointing raid on Fort Independence, which I discussed back in Episode 128, Washington had written him a rather scolding letter. Heath requested and received a leave of absence. He returned to Boston and shortly took over there after General Artemas Ward finally retired.

Alexander McDougall
(from find-a-grave)

The Peekskill command then fell to General Alexander McDougall. You may recall that McDougall had been an active member of the Sons of Liberty in New York City, and played a role in the pre-war battle of Golden Hill. That was where British soldiers and the Sons of Liberty had a street riot over the city’s liberty pole, see Episode 32. McDougall had received a general’s commission in the Continental army. We last heard from him in Episode 112 when he was serving under Washington at the Battle of White Plains. At Peekskill, he commanded the area with a force of 250 soldiers, most of whom appeared to be local militia.

McDougall’s small independent command at Peekskill kept a check on British incursions up the Hudson River. Over the winter, Washington deployed a few New England regiments there to be used as reserve reinforcements either in upstate New York or in New Jersey as needed.

There was no notion the Americans would launch a full blown offensive against British controlled New York City. The Continentals focused on trying to resist whatever spring offensive the British might execute.

New Yorkers had attempted to block British ships from moving up river by placing a chain across the Hudson at Fort Montgomery, also under McDougall’s command. This chain was a few miles further upriver from Peekskill, so it would not play a role in this raid. In any event, it was not going to prove very effective. It actually broke once on its own during the winter and had to be repaired. When the British actually did move upriver later in 1777, they had no problem disabling the chain and continuing on their way. I mention this only to note that the Americans were at least concerned about the British moving up the Hudson and cutting off New England from the middle and southern states, even if they did not garrison large numbers of soldiers in the area.

The Raid

As soon as the ice melt made river travel safe again, the British moved up the Hudson river. In March, Colonel John Bird took a fleet of 12 ships transporting over 500 soldiers up river to Peekskill. On March 23, the British landed at Lent’s cove, about a mile and a half south of Peekskill. They deployed about 500 British regulars and at least two cannon unopposed.

The British force set fire to houses near where they landed. They also used their cannon against a number of structures in the small village. The initial goal seemed to be to terrorize the local citizenry.

The American General McDougall realized that he was outnumbered by about two to one. He pulled his soldiers out of Peekskill and back to a hill known as Fort Hill behind the town. As he pulled out of town, McDougall set fire to some of his own supplies in order to deny them to the enemy. The only way he could win would be to provoke the British into attempting a charge up a hill where the outnumbered Americans would have the better entrenched position.

British Colonel Bird, however, was not terribly interested in confronting the Continentals. His troops took control of Peekskill and continued what the Americans had started, destroying the food, supplies, and equipment left in the town.

The two sides did fire on each other with their cannon, killing one or two on either side with an occasional lucky shot. But the British were not intent on driving off Americans. They were there to destroy the supply depot, which they did. They burned the mills, workhouses, barracks and storage houses in and around the town. They carried away some materials, but given the limited space on the ships, they destroyed most of what they found.

George Clinton
(from Wikimedia)

Even though the British did not seem to be preparing to take the hill, the cannon fire was enough for McDougall and the Americans to retreat back another two miles or so to Gallows Hill, where they were out of range of the British cannon. Meanwhile New York General George Clinton put out a call for militia in the region to muster. By the way George Clinton was a distant cousin of British General Henry Clinton. He was mostly a politician who would soon become Governor of New York and would eventually serve as Vice President under Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. At this time though he was a New York militia general.

It would take time to get the word out to local militia and for them to muster. This sparsely populated region could not muster within hours like other regions. There were smaller numbers of soldiers ready to go a few miles upriver at Forts Montgomery and Independence.

Fort Montgomery was the larger fort several miles upriver. The Continental officers at Fort Montgomery did not want to send large numbers of men from their fort. If they took the fort garrison to Peekskill, the British could climb aboard ship again, sail upriver and capture the fort defended by only a skeleton crew. The Continentals wanted to wait for militia to arrive and occupy the fort before sending any soldiers to Peekskill.

Fort Independence was closer to Peekskill. It was not much of a fort. It had only been built a few months earlier, just north of the town. Just to avoid confusion, this is not the same Fort Independence near New York City occupied by the British and which General Heath failed to capture. This is a totally different fort in a different place with the same name. To make things even more confusing some primary documents refer to Fort Independence as Fort Constitution.

Fort Independence was not only closer to Peekskill, it was not a terribly well built fort that the patriots needed to occupy and defend. General McDougall ordered the commander Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willet to leave just a handful of soldiers and to bring as much as he could from the 3rd New York Regiment. Willet did not wait for reinforcements. He set out almost as soon as he got the message with about 80 soldiers from his regiment, expecting more to follow later..

Several hundred New York militia had heeded the call and began marching directly toward Peekskill to join the battle. However, most of them would not arrive in time to fight.

The day following the British landing, the regulars deployed an advance line about a mile northeast of Peekskill to prevent the Americans from moving forward on them while they occupied the town. Willet and his militia from Fort Independence arrived that morning, joining the McDougall’s men on Gallows Hill.

Marinus Willett
(from Wikimedia)

From the hill, McDougall and Willet could observe the British plundering the area around Peekskill, burning farms and supplies. Willet noted that about 200 of the British were far enough separated from the main force that they might be attacked. He encouraged McDougall to order a strike on this separated force.

McDougall sent a small group against the British left flank to distract them, while another force under the command of Willet tried to sneak up on the enemy’s right flank and attack them. They lost the element of surprise when inexperienced New York militia got nervous and fired on the enemy from too far away to do any damage. They only alerted the British to their position and gave them more time to react.

Realizing they had lost the element of surprise, Willet gave the order to fix bayonets in preparation of a charge on the British lines. Before they could charge though, the British retreated back to their main lines, telling Colonel Bird that “the woods were full of rebel soldiers.” The British lost 13 killed or wounded in the skirmish. The Americans reported two killed and four or five wounded. By this time it was dusk. The British could not tell whether there would be a larger attack. They remained on alert for a night attack that never came.

Overnight Colonel Bird prepared to withdraw his troops back to their ships. The British had destroyed the American supplies, which had been their objective. Rather than wait to see if the enemy could collect more militia from the area and mount a larger attack, the British simply packed up and left. That was probably the right decision. Over the next few days, hundreds more New York patriot militia would descend on the area, ready to contest the British.

Continental General McDougall indicated in his reports that the British left sooner than they would have liked. There was still a fair amount of supplies that they had not destroyed. The Continentals recovered a portion of their supplies and regained control of the area.

Conclusion

So in the end, both sides claimed victory. The British fleet moved back downstream to report a successful raid. The American leaders reported successfully chasing off the British after two days.

The fighting at Peekskill was not a terribly significant battle by itself, more of a skirmish. There were less than a thousand troops engaged on both sides combined. Casualties were minimal, and the amount of damage to Continental supplies was annoying but not fatal to any larger strategic plan. In fact, far more significant for American supplies, the same month of this raid, a ship arrived from France full of equipment for the Americans.

The Peekskill raid proved more of a test by the British to see the resolve of New Yorkers further upriver to challenge their movements. If the British wanted to control more territory further up river, they would have to come in much larger numbers to overwhelm the enemy. Following the raid, the British did not attempt another raid all summer.

They did send one small fleet in April. But as it turned out, that was only sent as a distraction to try to get the Americans to deploy more forces to the Hudson Valley while the British launched a real raid on Danbury Connecticut. The Danbury raid will be the topic of a future episode. The launch of a few troop transports on that occasion up the Hudson River turned out to be nothing. It would not be until October that they would attempt another serious move up the Hudson.

The raid also should have been a warning to the British. General Burgoyne based his invasion of the Hudson Valley on the premise that a majority of the citizenry would turn out in loyal support of the British as they made their way from Canada to New York City. This raid proved that there was no evidence of a loyalist majority waiting to show itself, quite the opposite. Perhaps the British thought a larger force would bring out the loyalists, as it had in New Jersey during the earlier invasion there. If so, it was a fatal error that, as we will see in future episodes, put Britain on the road to defeat.

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Next Episode 134 the Battle of Bound Brook

Previous Episode 132 Britain Adjusts its War Plans

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Further Reading

Websites

Sheehan, Michael J. F. “An American Perspective on the Peekskill Raid” Journal of the American Revolution, May 13, 2015: https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/05/an-american-perspective-on-the-peekskill-raid

Attack on Peekskill, N. Y. – British account of the Attack on Peekskill
http://www.historycarper.com/1777/03/31/attack-on-peekskill-n-y-british-account-of-the-attack-on-peekskill

Van Cortlandtville Skirmish of March 1777
https://patch.com/new-york/peekskill/the-van-cortlandtville-skirmish-of-march-1777

The Van Cortlandville Skirmish of March 1777:
https://patch.com/new-york/peekskill/the-van-cortlandtville-skirmish-of-march-1777

Letter from Gen. McDougall to Gen. Washington March 29, 1777: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-09-02-0018

Letter from Ann Hawkes Hay to Gen. Washington March 23, 1777:
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-08-02-0670

Letter from Colonel Henry Beekman Livingston Gen. Washington March 29, 1777:
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-09-02-0017

Letter from George Washington to William Heath, Feb. 3, 1777: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-08-02-0246

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Clinton, George Public papers of George Clinton: first Governor of New York, 1777-1795, 1801-1804, Vol. 1, New York: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co.1900.

Kemble, Stephen The Kemble Papers, New York Historical Society, 1884:

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Champagne, Roger J Alexander McDougall and the American Revolution in New York,
NY State American Revolution Bicentennial Comm. 1975.

Diamant, Lincoln Chaining the Hudson: Fight for the River in the American Revolution, Carol Publishing Group, 1989 (book recommendation of the week).

Logusz, Michael O. With Musket & Tomahawk: The West Point-Hudson Valley Campaign in the Wilderness War of 1777, Carrell Books, 2016.

MacDougall, William L. American Revolutionary: a Biography of General Alexander McDougall, Greenwood Press, 1977.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, January 19, 2020

Episode 132: Britain Adjusts its War Plans

General William Howe had hoped to end his 1776 campaign with the subjugation of New Jersey in December. With that, he expected the remainder of the Continental Army would dissolve and he could focus on granting pardons to everyone who swore loyalty to the King. Of course, General Washington had other ideas, fighting the battles of Trenton and Princeton and keeping up the Forage War across New Jersey for most of the winter. This kept the Continental Army and the counter-offensive alive for at least another year.

Howe left the skirmishing in New Jersey to his subordinates. Howe himself, spent the winter in New York enjoying one party after another and his mistress, Betsy Loring. His professional focus remained on the inevitable campaign that would begin again in the spring of 1777.

More Shock and Awe

Even before Washington counter-attacked at Trenton, indeed even before Howe had completed pushing the army out of White Plains New York, Howe had begun writing Secretary of State Lord George Germain and others in London calling for more reinforcements. Remember, Howe had begun the New York campaign a combined Army and Navy force of about 42,000 men, not even counting the 8000 or so stationed in and around Quebec.

General William Howe
(from Wikimedia)

With about 10,000 sailors and marines, only about 32,000 of the British and German forces in New York were army. Over the course of the campaign, he had lost nearly nine thousand soldiers as prisoners or through desertions or death. Most deaths coming from disease. Howe would need more reinforcements for the 1777 campaign.

Remember, when preparing for the 1776 campaign, officials had decided to deploy an overwhelming force in order to crush this rebellion. In 1775 the entire British army worldwide consisted of only about 50,000 soldiers. Sending 40,000 to New York and Quebec had been quite a burden. They did so in the hope that they could end this war quickly, rather than having an expensive drawn out effort lasting many years.

Howe’s letters to Lord Germain in the fall of 1776 informed him that there was no way the campaign would end that year and that they needed to send many more reinforcements in order to crush patriot moral and force a surrender. This had to frustrate Germain. Howe also said he found that he could raise almost no Tory regiments from among the locals, meaning they would need more from recruits Britain or mercenaries from Europe.

By late November, about the time General Lord Cornwallis was chasing the rapidly disintegrating Continental Army across New Jersey, Howe provided more specifics on his planned campaign for 1777. He would deploy one army of about 10,000 men from Providence, Rhode Island, marching through New England toward Boston. He would launch another army of 10,000 men up the Hudson river toward Albany, presumably linking up with forces from Quebec and cutting off New England from the colonies to the south. Another army of 8000 would occupy New Jersey and create a threat against Philadelphia, thus preventing Washington from moving troops to deploy against the other two armies. Finally, he would maintain a force of around 5000 in and around New York City to defend his base of operations there. Once Howe has subdued New York and New England early in the season, he would then capture Philadelphia and begin moving south to subdue the southern colonies.

To accomplish all of this he would need another 15,000 soldiers. Again, his hope seemed to be that overwhelming force would get the patriots to surrender without even having to fight a major bloody battle.

Howe wrote about all of these plans even before Washington had launched his attacks against Trenton and Princeton, capturing about 1400 prisoners and putting almost all of New Jersey back in contention.

Following the revitalization of the patriots after those victories, Howe conceded that he would have to fight a decisive battle to defeat the rebels, something he had not really tried to do in 1776.

No Reinforcements

Sir George Germain, Lord
Sackville (from Wikimedia)

Howe had hoped for more reinforcements to shock and awe the patriots into surrender. It seems, though, that the only people shocked were officials back in London who saw no good justification for spending more money to raise and deploy another 15,000 reinforcements. Germain told Howe that he was not getting anywhere near that number of soldiers. First Germain thought 15,000 was excessive because 7800 soldiers should give Howe the 35,000 total he said he required. A few years later, at a Parliamentary inquiry over the events of 1777, Howe testified that Germain’s numbers only made sense if Howe counted his soldiers who were disabled on sick leave and those who had been captured as available for duty.

Even beyond that dispute, Germain further determined that the ministry simply was not willing to pay for an army of 35,000 to put in Howe’s command. He ended up sending about 2300 reinforcements for Howe’s 1777 campaign. Howe needed to find a way to win this war with the already massive force under his command, a force that far outnumbered anything the Continentals had put in the field.

Focus on New York

Like every commander at time, Howe had subordinates who did not think he was up to the job, that they could do a much better job, and were not afraid to say that to anyone back in London who would listen.

General John Burgoyne had left Canada in December 1776 after the northern army had taken Crown Point following the battle of Valcour Island, and then retreated back to Canada without attacking Fort Ticonderoga. Commanding General Guy Carlton’s caution in not taking Ticonderoga that winter had upset many officers, including Burgoyne. So Burgoyne’s personal mission in London focused more on bad mouthing Carleton rather than Howe, but he of course made clear that he had better ideas than all the commanders in North America.

In February 1777, Burgoyne drafted a memorandum: Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada where he described in detail how he would lead an army of 8000 regulars, 2000 Canadian militia, and 1000 Indians (or “savages” as he called them) down from Canada, capturing Fort Ticonderoga. A diversionary force would leave from Montreal and move down Lake Ontario toward the Mohawk River. The main force would move from Quebec, down Lake George to capture Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Ultimately, the force would continue on to Albany, where the northern army would either link up with Howe’s forces moving up from New York City, or at least establish communications with New York City via the Hudson River.

General John Burgoyne
(from Wikimedia)

This was not an original idea. It was very similar to what Carleton had proposed and failed to do the year before. It was also what military planners had suggested from the very beginning, as a strategy to cut off troublesome New England from the rest of the continent.

Burgoyne, with his detailed plan, successfully lobbied to lead the campaign himself. Lord Germain, Lord North, and King George all agreed that Burgoyne was best for the job. The King even weighed in with very specific Remarks on the conduct of the War from Canada about Burgoyne’s plan. The main concern was that London did not want to send more expensive reinforcements to Canada, and also that they wanted a sufficient force in Canada to protect it from another invasion. As a result, they shaved Burgoyne’s request to send a force of 11,000 down to about 7200 regulars and Hessians, with around 3800 remaining in Canada.

With Burgoyne’s acceptance of the reduced numbers, he left London near the end of March so that he could be back in Quebec by early May. He needed to get moving if he would have time to organize his troops, obtain the necessary supplies, and begin his campaign by some time in June.

This left leaders with two uncomfortable problems. First, giving Burgoyne command of the northern army invading New York would be a slight against General Carlton, who was senior to Burgoyne and the current commander of the northern army in Canada. Some historians indicate this was an issue of personal animosity between Germain and Carleton. If there was any ill will between the two men, there certainly was also good objective reasoning not to put Carleton in charge. Carleton’s inability to secure Ticonderoga, despite marching right up to its walls the year before did not exactly enhance his reputation as an aggressive fighter to officials in London.

General Sir Guy Carleton
(from Wikimedia)

The administration was clearly frustrated with the slow pace of events in America, and laid the blame on Howe and Carleton. Giving an independent command to an aggressive fighting general like Burgoyne might be just the thing to bring the rebellion to a faster conclusion.

No one, however, wanted to disgrace or attack Carleton. Instead, they used the argument that whoever led the expedition would have to link up with Howe’s army and come under Howe’s command. They wanted Carleton to retain his independent command of Canada. After all, he also was the Governor of Canada. So, Carlton had to remain in Canada while Burgoyne led the bulk of the northern army into New York.

Regardless, Carlton would take this action as a slight against his leadership abilities. Sure enough, when Carlton received word of Burgoyne’s assignment, he immediately sent word that he wished to be recalled to London. But there would be no time for him to fight or challenge the orders once received. He had to go along with it. The Ministry kept Carlton in Canada. He would remain there, discontented, until the summer of 1778.

The second ego bruised was that of General Henry Clinton, who had been seeking an independent command of his own and expressed continued frustration at serving under Howe. Before Burgoyne arrived in London, Lord Germain and others had already been considering a similar plan to Burgoyne’s, with the intention of giving command of the force to General Clinton. As second in seniority to Howe, and given the fact that he had been frustrated with Howe’s refusal to take his strategic advice the year before, Clinton would be the obvious leader. Howe had actually assumed Clinton would get the northern command and had requested that London send Burgoyne back to America to become Howe’s second in command.

General Sir Henry Clinton
(from Wikimedia)

But with the decision to give the command to Burgoyne, the administration had to find a way to appease Clinton. To make things even more uncomfortable, Clinton was already on his way to London. As I mentioned back in Episode 119, Clinton had secured Rhode Island for Howe, after being left out of the entire New Jersey campaign. Frustrated, he boarded a ship for London in January and arrived in March, just after the administration had handed the New York expedition to Burgoyne. Even before hearing of this latest slight to his honor, Clinton had planned to resign his commission. He felt everyone held him responsible for the failure to take Charleston, South Carolina back in the spring of 1776, and that he was getting dumped into unimportant posts where he could do little to restore his reputation.

The ministry did not want Clinton to resign, but they also did not seem to want to give him any important command either. Instead, they opted to stroke his ego. The King honored him with a Knight of the Bath for his services, promoted him to Lieutenant General, and let him address Parliament. After giving him all that, Germain told him he had to go back to New York and babysit New York City while Burgoyne invaded New York and Howe took his army to on its spring campaign.

Howe Plans to Take Philadelphia

So with the northern army’s invasion of New York approved and ready to go, planners could consider Howe’s other suggestions, an invasion of New England and the capture of Philadelphia. Howe’s grand program that he had proposed in the fall looked even more sketchy after Washington attacked Trenton and Princeton and took back most of New Jersey. London still was not willing to send the reinforcements that Howe wanted. As a result, he dropped his plans for New England. The British outpost in Rhode Island would remain with a limited force to provide a check on New England, but the planned offensive came to nothing.

Burgoyne's proposal for 1777 (solid) and
Howe's attack path for Philadelphia (dots)
(from US History)

Instead, Howe focused on capturing Philadelphia. In his correspondence with Germain and others over the winter, Howe did not say explicitly how he planned to assault Philadelphia. Everyone assumed he would march his army across New Jersey, cross the Delaware River at some point and assault the city. His plan to put his entire army on ships, sail down to Maryland and assault Philadelphia from the south seems to have come later.

And this is really where things break down. Germain and others in London assumed that Howe would provide support for Burgoyne’s invasion in New York. An attack across New Jersey would occupy the attention of the Continental Army, thus relieving pressure on Burgoyne. Germain also seemed to think that at some point, Howe would march northward to link up with Burgoyne’s army, either in Albany or somewhere in upstate New York.

Germain thought Howe would take Philadelphia early in the season. Everyone in London believed that Pennsylvania harbored a great many loyalists who would rise up, as they did in New Jersey, once the King’s troops entered the colony. Howe would take Philadelphia easily, set up a reserve force of mostly locals to hold the city, then move the bulk of his combat troops north to assist Burgoyne by late summer or early fall.

Confusion Reigns

Overall, the war planning over the winter of 1776-77 left none of the generals completely happy. As I mentioned, General Carlton was mortified that Burgoyne got command of the army invading New York. He wanted to return to London.

General Clinton also more senior to Burgoyne was similarly upset and tried to resign. His resignation refused, he returned to New York and commanded the tiny contingent holding New York City while others engaged with the enemy. Although he commanded a force of around 7000, almost all of them were German mercenaries or local loyalist militia. He had almost no regulars under his command.

I mentioned in an earlier episode that General Lord Percy had returned home in early 1777 to resign as well. The King accepted his resignation and he left the army permanently.

General Lord Cornwallis
(from Nat. Portrait Gallery)

General Lord Cornwallis was ticked off that he was getting the blame for Washington’s successes in NJ that winter and that he could not return to London to advocate for himself.

General Howe was frustrated by London’s refusal to give him the reinforcements he needed to carry out his plans for three armies. He could not strike at New England, nor did he have enough men to send a separate army up the Hudson River to coordinate with Burgoyne. He had to settle for capturing Philadelphia only.

Even General Burgoyne, who got the plumb command over two more senior generals and got his plan of attack approved, only received less than two-thirds of the number of soldiers he had sought for the mission.

Having all the leading generals upset and angry at each other was bad enough. What was worse was that no one seemed to have a sure understanding of the overall strategy for the year ahead. Burgoyne thought that Howe or Clinton would assist with his offensive by pushing up from New York City toward his advance, or at least attacking New England to draw away some of the enemy. Clinton did not receive any such orders. When later urged to push up the Hudson to relieve Burgoyne, he refused to do so because it would leave New York City vulnerable to attack.

Similarly, Howe made his only goal for the year capturing Philadelphia. There was some discussion that he might assist Burgoyne in the fall after pacifying Philadelphia. But He never received explicit orders to do so. Many historians put the blame on Lord Germain for this. They point to a story just before Easter 1777, when Germain was eager to get out of London and return to his country home. His secretary reported that he never sent explicit orders to Howe to assist Burgoyne. Not wanting to wait in London, Germain had his staff work on the orders and send them to his home for his signature later. But all Howe ever got was a copy of Burgoyne’s orders that indicated that Howe might be of some assistance at some point. Howe never even started his move on Philadelphia until the end of July, and did not even enter Philadelphia until the end of September.

Howe, therefore never made any effort to send a force up the Hudson to relieve Burgoyne in the late summer when it might have helped. But the truth is he knew what Burgoyne was doing and even if Germain gave him some discretion in how to act, it seems he should have been prepared to support Burgoyne. Later, during a Parliamentary inquiry into the matter, Howe justified himself as follows:

Had I adopted the plan to go up the Hudson River, it would have been alleged that I had wasted the campaign with a considerable army under my command, merely to ensure the progress of the northern army, which could have taken care of itself, provided I had made a diversion in its favour by drawing off to the southward the main army under General Washington. Would not my enemies have gone further, and insinuated that, alarmed at the rapid success which the honourable General [Burgoyne] had a right to expect when Ticonderoga fell, I had enviously grasped a share of the merit which would otherwise have been all his own? and let me add, would not Ministers have told you, as they truly might, that I had acted without any orders or instructions from them?

In other words, Howe would have been criticized for sitting around New York all summer waiting to assist the northern army rather than doing something proactive like capturing Philadelphia. Howe blamed Burgoyne for getting the reinforcements that Howe wanted for his own plans. Howe reasoned that if Burgoyne got the soldiers, he should be capable of defeating the Americans without more help from another army.

None of the other generals would ever admit to such a thing, but all were probably waiting for Burgoyne to fail. Burgoyne had criticized everyone else for being too cautious and for lobbying for his own command over the backs of more senior generals. He was an upstart who was junior to all these other generals. Further, he had no family in Parliament to support him politically if he did fail. If Burgoyne’s aggressive offensive failed, it would show why those cautious tactics he criticized were the right strategy. As it was, everyone started the fighting season of 1777 with a different idea of how things would work. We will see in a future episode the results of that confusion.

Next week: British test American resolve on the Hudson by raiding the town of Peekskill.

- - -

Next Episode 133 Peekskill Raid

Previous Episode 131 Congress - Baltimore Edition

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Further Reading:

Websites

Hargreaves, Reginald "Burgoyne and America's Destiny" American Heritage, June 1956,
Vol. 7, Issue 4. https://www.americanheritage.com/burgoyne-and-americas-destiny

Sir Guy Carleton: http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/carleton_guy_5E.html

Fleming, Thomas “The Enigma Of General Howe” American Heritage, Feb. 1964: http://www.americanheritage.com/content/enigma-general-howe

Burgoyne, John, Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada (transcript):
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1wTItb7HmaZnbCzpkQ72zyHMiNdFVhCbYim_YR_Zws3g

King George, Remarks on the conduct of the War from Canada (Transcript):
https://docs.google.com/document/d/17nm75ZMjKu3gdXFvKE_I_haUvfVZDetTY7YeFgwrNsI

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

The Detail and Conduct of the American War, under Generals Gage, Howe, Burgoyne, and Vice Admiral Lord Howe, (original reports and letters) The Royal Exchange, 1780.

Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts Report on the manuscripts of Mrs. Stopford-Sackville, of Drayton House, Northamptonshire Vol. 2, Hereford: Hereford Press, 1910
(includes Germain’s correspondence related to America).

Burgoyne, John A State of the Expedition from Canada: as laid before the House of Commons, London: J. Almon, 1780.

Donne, W. Bodham (ed) The Correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North from 1768 to 1783, Vol 1, London: John Murray, 1867.

Howe, William The Narrative of Lieut. Gen. Sir William. Howe, H. Baldwin, 1781.

Publication date 1781

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

O'Shaughnessy, Andrew The Men Who Lost America: British Leadership, the American Revolution, and the Fate of the Empire, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.

Saxon, Gerald Brown The American Secretary: The Colonial Policy of Lord George Germain, 1775-1778, Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1963.

Watson, J. Steven The Reign of George III 1760-1815, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960.

Whiteley, Peter Lord North: The Prime Minister Who Lost America, London: Hambledon Press, 1996.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.