ARP161 Freeman’s Farm (1st Saratoga)

Last week, we ended a series of episodes as General Howe made his long slow sailing voyage from New York to Maryland, then marched his army up to capture Philadelphia. 

Burgoyne Trudges South

While all that was happening, General Burgoyne was marching his northern army from Canada down through upstate New York, with the hope of taking Albany, and eventually linking up with British forces in New York City.  We last left General Burgoyne in Episode 155 as his army suffered a loss at Bennington, in an attempt to capture food and supplies.

Despite that loss, Burgoyne’s main army had reached the Hudson River and planned to march downstream to Albany.  His hope to recruit an army of Tories in upstate New York had proven to be a joke.  Almost all of his loyalist soldiers were men who had already fled New York to Canada and had joined at the outset of the expedition.  Promises of locals in New York who would flock to the King’s banner, had proven empty.

Freeman's Farm (from British Battles)

Burgoyne found his supply lines from Canada too long and attenuated to do much good.  He was frustrated that no British relief force seemed to be on its way from New York City.  After receiving word that General St. Leger’s force had given up on capturing Fort Stanwix and was returning to Canada, Burgoyne lost his only other prospect of reinforcements.  Burgoyne’s situation was becoming more threatened each day.  His army was shrinking, while his opponents were growing.  His men were isolated and largely cut off from additional food and supplies.  At the outset of this campaign, Burgoyne had hoped for more soldiers, better support from Canada, and most importantly a British army marching northward from New York City.

In letters back to London, Burgoyne discussed the option of pulling back to Fort Edward, reestablishing supply lines with Canada and awaiting more reinforcements.  But getting bogged down and refusing to advance was exactly what he had accused his predecessors of doing in order to get this command.  Burgoyne believed his orders were to push forward and take Albany.  He planned to do just that.

Burgoyne ordered the bulk of his small reserves, still at Fort Ticonderoga, to march south and join up with his main army.  He would not rely on maintaining lines back to Canada, but would live off the land. He determined that his army would cross the Hudson River and march down the west bank to Albany.  Crossing the Hudson so far upstream would prevent any problems trying to cross closer to Albany where they might have to do it in the face of the enemy.  But crossing where they did also made it nearly impossible to retreat back to Ticonderoga if they ran into problems.  Burgoyne was committing himself to complete victory or defeat, no option for backing down.

Schuyler Relieved

The Americans, having succeeded in killing or capturing over 1000 of the enemy at Bennington, continued to harass them whenever possible.  They drove off cattle and burned fields of grain and orchards.  They tore up bridges and felled hundreds of trees across roads, all to slow the British advance and deny them the supplies needed to maintain the army.

British March (from Wikimedia)

If time was on the side of the Contientals, it was not on the side of their commander.  Before word of the victory at Bennington or Fort Stanwix reached Congress, the delegates in Philadelphia concluded that the loss of Fort Ticonderoga in July was simply unacceptable.  Congress voted for the removal of General Philip Schuyler from command.  New England delegates especially had never really liked or trusted the New York general.  The loss of Ticonderoga under his command, was the final straw.  New Englanders had captured this fort a few years earlier, only to see it turned over to a New York commander.  That commander’s loss of the fort was unacceptable.  Congress ordered both General Schuyler and General St. Clair to report to Philadelphia for an inquiry into their activities.  The order came, despite the fact that both generals were actively engaged in the ongoing campaign to halt General Burgoyne’s army.

At first, Congress wrote to General Washington and asked him to pick a successor to the northern army.  Congress’ obvious choice was General Horatio Gates, who Washington, by this time, had great reason to distrust.  Washington knew that recommending Gates would be putting someone in charge who he really did not respect.  Picking someone else who did not have the experience in New York and at a time when Washington needed those generals to stop General Howe from capturing Philadelphia, would also be a problem.  Washington would have preferred to keep Schuyler in command.  He could not say that without appearing to thumb his nose at Congress.  So, Washington punted.  He simply informed Congress that if they were going to replace General Schuyler, that they should name the replacement.

Congress then selected General Gates to assume command.  Gates found out about the orders almost immediately.  At the time when almost all the officers in the Continental Army were in the field, either opposing Burgoyne’s advance on Albany or Howe’s advance on Philadelphia, Gates was in Philadelphia complaining about their leadership and lobbying for a new job.  After learning of his commission and knowing that the situation was desperate, Gates took a leisurely two weeks to travel up to New York and take command on August 19, 1777. 

 Gen. Horatio Gates
(from Wikimedia)

General Schuyler, who had received his orders to stand down and return to Philadelphia, felt obliged to remain in command until his successor arrived.  Schuyler then spent the next few days trying to brief Gates on the status of both his and the enemy forces and the strategies in place, but Gates seemed entirely uninterested in anything Schuyler had to say.  Instead, Gates held a large council of war for all Continental offices, as well as Albany militia commanders, but did not invite Schuyler.  Taking the hint, Schuyler finally packed up and left for Philadelphia.

Gates also received reinforcements of about 8000 men.  These included new recruits from New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.  Washington sent some of his own forces, including his highly valued riflemen commanded by Colonel Daniel Morgan.  General Benedict Arnold was marching his 1200 Continentals back from their victory at Fort Stanwix.  By early September, Gates commanded an army of over 10,000 soldiers, finally outnumbering Burgoyne's army.

Gates determined that he should pick out the best defensive ground in the region between Burgoyne and Albany and await the British there.  At first, he gathered his army at a place called Stillwater.  Then, after consulting with the locals, moved his army about three miles further north to Bemis Heights.  There, he relied on Polish Colonel Tadeusz Kościuszko to build the defenses.

Tadeusz Kościuszko

Kościuszko is an interesting figure himself.  He had grown up as a member of minor nobility in Poland.  During the 1760’s he worked as a military instructor for the Corps of Cadets in Poland. When the country descended into civil war, his family sided with the rebels against the King.   Rather than pick a side, Kościuszko fled the country.  He settled in Paris.  As a foreigner, he could not attend the military academy there.  Instead, he enrolled in Paris’ Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture.  At the same time, he audited lectures at the Military Academy and made use of the military libraries in Paris.  If you think about it, this was absurd.  It was a security risk for a foreigner to receive grades and a degree from the military academy, but officials had no problems with him sitting in on the classes and learning everything the instructor had to say.  But, that’s government bureaucracy I guess.

Tadeusz Kościuszko
(from Wikimedia)

After the partition of Poland in 1772, Kościuszko returned home to find his family broke from the war. He attempted to elope with the daughter of the local governor, but the Governor’s soldiers caught the young couple and beat him severely.  He returned to Paris, alone and out of money.

Kościuszko’s education in the French enlightenment, and his experience with petty aristocrats, left him with a fairly hostile view toward tyrannical leaders and a fan of liberation movements.  When Kościuszko heard about the war in America, he volunteered and traveled to Philadelphia. 

At first, he worked as a civilian consultant for some of the defenses along the Delaware River, then received a commission as colonel of engineers and a transfer to Fort Ticonderoga. There, he had worked with General Gates for a time before Gates left for Philadelphia.  Kościuszko had been a part of the retreat from Ticonderoga and remained with the northern army.  On Gates’ return as commander of the northern army, he relied on Kościuszko to oversee the construction of defensive works to oppose Burgoyne.

Benedict Arnold

Also joining Gates at Bemis Heights was General Benedict Arnold, fresh from his victory at Fort Stanwix.  Arnold’s role in capturing Fort Ticonderoga back in 1775 and his success in preventing the British from capturing the fort in 1776 with his improvised navy, among other accomplishments, gave Arnold a fair amount of command credibility.  He was now a major general, but still frustrated that he was more junior to Major General Lincoln who had been commissioned before him.

Arnold and Gates had gotten along well in earlier years when both men were in upstate New York together.  Gates knew of Arnold’s record and his abilities and gave him command of the left wing of the army.

Richard Varick
(from Wikimedia)

However, when General Schuyler left for Philadelphia, Arnold took two of Schuyler’s staff officers onto his own command, Richard Varick and Henry Brockholst Livingston.  Gates’ aide, Colonel James Wilkinson, who you may recall from Episode 118 was mixed up the conspiracy between General Gates and Lee to bring down General Washington, was by this time an old hand at internal petty politics within the army.  Wilkinson pointed out to Gates that Arnold’s decision to take two of Schuyler’s aides onto his staff meant that Arnold might not be particularly loyal to Gates.  He showed Gates letters from both men where they badmouthed Gates’ actions in the past.

Gates hinted to Arnold that he wanted the two men removed from Arnold’s staff.  Arnold, however, refused to take the hint and kept the officers where they were.  A few days later, in what Arnold took to be a petty reprisal, Wilkinson issued orders to move several regiments from Arnold’s command on the left wing to Glover’s command on the right wing.  Arnold lost his temper and wrote an angry letter to Gates. In response, Gates said it was just an oversight that would be countermanded, but it never was. 

The disagreement over staffing grew into a full-blown dispute between the two generals that would never heal.  Gates saw Arnold as part of Team Schuyler and potentially disloyal to him. Arnold saw Gates as a petty officer putting internal politics above the war effort. I don’t think either man was wrong in their assessment of the other.  The relationship between Gates and Arnold would never again be a good one.

Bemis Heights Defenses

On the morning of September 19th, American pickets noted the advance of the British Army toward Bemis Heights.  General Gates was happy to sit behind his defenses and to let the British try to force him out. 

Troop Deployments (from Wikimedia)

General Arnold disagreed.  Arnold feared that the British would send a force against the American right wing to distract the army.  Then, it would send a flanking force through the woods to move on the left flank. Once in the fields, the British could bring up their cannons and roll the American left, pushing everyone to retreat toward the Hudson river.  Sentries detecting movement in the woods confirmed that this was likely what would happen.  Gates seemed to think, bring it on. The British can try to charge up hills against a dug in enemy.  They will take an obscene number of casualties if they do.  He did not seem concerned that British artillery might devastate those defenses or that similar flanking maneuvers on Long Island or most recently at Brandywine had led to embarrassing losses for the Continentals.  His brilliant leadership would lead to a different result.

Arnold, supported by Colonel Morgan, had a different idea.  They wanted to advance the left wing of the army and hit the British in the woods before they could form up in the fields near the heights.  A fight in the forest was not a strength for either British regulars or Hessians.  Most of the Indian scouts had abandoned the British after the loss at Bennington, putting the British at a real disadvantage in that type of warfare.

After considerable badgering and argument, Gates split the difference.  He retained the Continental right wing, under the command of General Benjamin Lincoln, and supported by Generals Glover, Nixon and Patterson.  These armies would hold Bemis Heights against a potential attack.  General Arnold supported by Generals Poor and Learned, and Colonel Morgan could advance into the woods on the American left and engage the enemy there.  If they failed, they could retreat back to the heights and participate in the final defense.

Battle of Freeman’s Farm

The British attack came pretty much as the Americans expected.  General Burgoyne deployed his Germans under the command of General Riedesel down the trail along the Hudson River to attack the American right.  This group also took the bulk of the army’s artillery.  In the center, General Burgoyne rode with division commander General James Hamilton and four regiments supported by artillery.  Against the American left, Burgoyne deployed General Simon Fraser and his regulars, along with a couple of German regiments and the small remainder of Indians and loyalists that remained with the army.

American Assault Freeman's Farm
(from British Battles)

The Germans on the American right found it tough going as the column marched down the river road.  The Americans had burned several bridges across streams and felled numerous trees across the road.  The soldiers struggled to remove the impediments to make it into position by 2:00 PM.  Similarly General Fraser on the American left had to march nearly two miles further west to move around a deep ravine.

On the American left, General Arnold advanced with his division, with Colonel Morgan’s riflemen in the front.  The advancing British ran into Morgan’s riflemen at a small cabin on Freeman’s farm.  Freeman had been a local farmer who had long since fled to Canada due to his Tory sentiments.

There, Morgan’s riflemen startled the British advance skirmishers and forced them to retreat. Morgan’s men charged after the retreating skirmishers, only to run into the entire British center.  The Americans fell under cannon fire and quickly retreated back into the woods.  Both sides took devastating losses.  Morgan’s riflemen picked off the officers from the skirmishing companies before taking heavy casualties themselves from the British cannons.  Many of the British skirmishers took friendly fire as they retreated back to the main British lines. General Arnold rode through the front lines, encouraging his men to advance.  The fighting lasted about 45 minutes until both sides pulled back to assess the damages.

The lull lasted about two hours until shortly before 4:00 PM, both sides reengaged with the fiercest fighting of the day.  The American riflemen picked off artillery officers and crews, allowing the Continentals to capture several cannon.  Hamilton sent in British regular reinforcements to retake the cannons and turn them against the Continentals once again.  General Burgoyne also appeared near the front to encourage the men.  He got within range of Morgan’s riflemen, but they mistakenly picked off a captain that Burgoyne was conferring with.  The captain had a fancier saddle that caused the sniper to mistake him for the general.

Freeman's Farm (from British Battles)

Despite the fierce fighting, General Gates held back the American right at the Heights, not wanting to commit all of his forces to the fighting in case another attack came on the right.  Similarly, Burgoyne held back most of Fraser’s force on the American left in case the Americans tried a flanking attack from that side.  As a result, the Continental forces under Arnold and the British under Hamilton bore the bulk of the intense fighting.

At one point, the Americans almost forced the British center to buckle, but Major General Phillips personally rode in with four cannons to hold the Americans at bay while the British line could regroup.

By late afternoon Burgoyne ordered General Riedesel to secure the baggage and lead his soldiers against the right of Arnold’s advancing Continentals.  This was a risky move since it left the British baggage, and a portion of its artillery, relatively unguarded.  General Gates could have swooped down and captured all of it.  Gates, however, remained secure in his entrenchments, unwilling to venture out.

Benedict Arnold
(from Wikimedia)

Riedesel advanced with several hundred soldiers and two cannons to find the Continentals close to overrunning Hamilton’s center.  Riedesel ordered a charge and pushed back the startled Continentals.  This attack near the end of the day secured British possession of the field.  Only sunset and darkness finally put an end to the intense fighting, as the Americans drew back to their lines.

General Arnold was, in fact, fighting two battles at once.  One with the British, the other with General Gates.  Over the course of the battle, Gates had refused to comply with Arnold’s increasingly desperate calls for reinforcements.  At one point, Gates even sent orders for Arnold to send back a regiment to protect Gates’ headquarters.

In frustration, Arnold finally rode back to headquarters himself to make his demands in person.  Gates finally relented and sent off a brigade under the command of General Ebenezer Learned.  Gates, however, refused to allow Arnold to return to the battle and kept him in camp.  Learned’s reinforcements got lost in the woods and missed most of the battle.

At one point, after receiving concerning reports about the course of the battle, Arnold had enough and galloped off on his horse determined to enter the action.  Gates ordered his aide, Wilkinson, to chase after Arnold and bring him back.  Arnold reluctantly obeyed the direct order to return.  Thus Arnold missed the end of the battle.

Aftermath

At the end of the day, the British held the field, so Burgoyne declared victory in his letters to London.  However, the British had taken nearly 600 casualties that they could ill-afford.  The Americans had lost about half that number.  Although the British held the field of battle around Freeman’s farm, they had not even reached the main American lines still several miles away at Bemis Heights. Even most British officers conceded that the Americans had fought well and held their own against the regulars.

That night, the wolves came down from the hills to feed on the dead and dying as each side considered their next moves.  Many of Burgoyne’s officers wanted to advance again the next morning in hopes of catching the Americans still in disarray.  Burgoyne, however, decided against it.  The men were too exhausted.  He did consider another offensive on the 21st.  However, before dawn, he received a letter from General Henry Clinton in New York City.  Clinton's letter said that he would attempt an attack on some American forts in the lower Hudson valley in order to distract the Americans.  Burgoyne took this as hope that perhaps he might get some support from New York City after all.  He knew London had planned to send reinforcements to New York City and that their arrival might encourage Clinton to go on the offensive.

Burgoyne opted to halt his offensive and await more information on a possible relief column. For the next couple of weeks, both sides nursed their wounds, buried their dead, and planned their next steps.

Next week, during this pause, the Americans strike at Burgoyne’s rear, including a raid on Fort Ticonderoga.

- - -

Next Episode 162 Raid on Fort Ticonderoga 

Previous  Episode 160 Paoli Massacre & Fall of Philadelphia

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Further Reading

Websites

Horatio Gates: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/horatio-gates

Tadeusz Kościuszko: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/tadeusz-kosciuszko

Battle of Freeman’s Farm: https://www.britishbattles.com/war-of-the-revolution-1775-to-1783/battle-of-freemans-farm

The Battle of Saratoga (First)/ Freeman’s Farm: https://revolutionarywar.us/year-1777/first-battle-saratoga

Halsey, Francis Whiting. “GENERAL SCHUYLER'S PART IN THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN.” Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, vol. 12, 1913, pp. 109–118. www.jstor.org/stable/42890006

Brandow, John. H. “GUIDE TO THE SARATOGA BATTLEFIELD.” Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, vol. 12, 1913, pp. 315–320. www.jstor.org/stable/42890016

Strach, Stephen G. “A MEMOIR OF THE EXPLOITS OF CAPTAIN ALEXANDER FRASER AND HIS COMPANY OF BRITISH MARKSMEN 1776-1777 (Continued).” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 63, no. 255, 1985, pp. 164–179, www.jstor.org/stable/44229658

Hargreaves, Reginald “Burgoyne and America's Destiny” American Heritage Magazine, Volume 7, Issue 4, June 1956: https://www.americanheritage.com/burgoyne-and-americas-destiny

Lynch, Wayne “Debating Arnold’s Role at Freeman’s Farm” Journal of the American Revolution, September 12, 2013: https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/09/debating-arnolds-role-freemans-farm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Anbury, Thomas Travel through Various Parts of North America, Vol. 1, William Lane, 1789.

Baster, James (ed) The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1887.

Bird, Harrison March To Saratoga General Burgoyne And The American Campaign 1777,
Oxford Univ. Press, 1963

Brandow, John H. The story of old Saratoga; the Burgoyne campaign, to which is added New York's share in the revolution, Brandow Printing, 1919.

Clay, Steven E. Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 June to 8 November 1777, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2018 (US Army Website):.

Eelking, Max von, (translated by Stone, William L.) Memoirs of Major General Riedesel, Vol. 1, J. Munsell, 1868.

Hadden, James Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1884.

Hudleston, Francis J. Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne : misadventures of an English general in the Revolution, Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1927.

Luzader, John Decision on the Hudson, National Park Service, 1975.

Moore, Howard P. A Life of General John Stark of New Hampshire, New York self-published, 1949.

Riedesel, Friederike Charlotte Luise, Freifrau von Letters and journals relating to the war of the American Revolution, and the capture of the German troops at Saratoga, Joel Munsell, 1867.

Stone, William Leete, The Campaign of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne  and the expedition of Lieut. Col. Barry St. Leger, Albany, NY: Joel Munsell, 1877.

Walworth, Ellen H. Battles of Saratoga, 1777; the Saratoga Monument Association, 1856-1891, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1891.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Furneaux, Rupert The Battle of Saratoga, Stein and Day 1971.

Gabriel, Michael P. The Battle of Bennington: Soldiers & Civilians, History Press, 2012.

Ketchum, Richard M. Saratoga, Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War, Henry Holt & Co, 1997.

Logusz, Michael O. With Musket and Tomahawk, The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777, Casemate Publishing, 2010

Luzader, John F. Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, Casemate Publishers, 2008

Mintz, Max M. The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates, Yale Univ. Press, 1990.

Philbrick, Nathaniel Valiant Ambition: George Washington, Benedict Arnold, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Viking, 2016.

Snow, Dean 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga, Oxford Univ. Press, 2016.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

ARP159 Battle of the Clouds

Last week I covered the Battle of Brandywine, which was the major battle both sides had hoped would be decisive.  General Washington had hoped to halt the British advance on Philadelphia.  General Howe hoped to wipe away the American rebels and take their capital.  Howe won the battle and forced the Continentals to retreat, but he did not capture the enemy army.  Washington and the bulk of his soldiers escaped to fight another day.

Brandywine Aftermath

Following the battle, General Howe made no real effort to follow up and crush his opponent.  Instead, the British and Hessian soldiers remained in camp near Brandywine Battlefield for five days.  Remember, the British had only landed in Maryland a little over two weeks earlier.  Most of the soldiers were sick or out of shape after being kept aboard ship for six weeks. Most of their horses had died, and the remainder were in terrible condition.  After fighting a major battle, Howe did not want to push his men too hard.

Gen. William Howe
(from Wikimedia)

Although Howe had tried to put a stop to looting in hopes of winning over the local populace, he was fighting a losing battle.  At least two British soldiers were executed in the days after the battle for looting and marauding.  The British army did spend its time looking for American soldiers in hiding and for stashed supplies.  They also commandeered necessary food, horses, and anything else the army needed from the local population.

Howe deployed General James Grant with a couple of regiments, to look for American stragglers during the Continental retreat.  Grant's men scoured the area, finding little. Without horses, the soldiers on the march could cover little ground.  The feeble horses they had to pull their cannons could barely make it up some of the hills.

The British also had a large number of their own wounded, as well as several hundred wounded American prisoners.  Howe sent a message under a flag of truce inviting him to send doctors to care for the wounded prisoners held by the British.  Several Philadelphia surgeons, including Dr. Benjamin Rush (as signer of the Declaration of Independence) entered British lines under a flag of truce to care for the wounded prisoners.  While there, Rush met with a number of British officers, and spoke with an old friend, Joseph Galloway, who had also been a delegate to the Continental Congress at one time.  Rejecting independence, Galloway had thrown in his lot with the British and was assisting General Howe.  The two men, now enemies, spoke cordially and respectfully to each other.

Continental Retreat

The Continental Army had retreated from Brandywine in relatively good order.  The men were exhausted, but did not panic.  Most of the army marched into the village of Chester for the night.  The next morning, Washington moved his soldiers up to the Schuylkill River where they crossed a pontoon bridge and entered Philadelphia.  Fearing an imminent attack on the city, Washington removed his wounded to Trenton and to other towns north of Philadelphia.  The wounded General Lafayette went to Bethlehem.

George Washington
(from Wikimedia)

The Schuylkill River was the last major barrier separating the British from Philadelphia.  It took the army two days to move across the narrow bridge to the east bank of the Schuylkill.  If the Continentals removed that bridge, there would be no way for the British to cross in the face of the enemy.

Of course, Washington knew that Howe could also move north further upstream and cross where it was easier further up river.  Then Howe could march down and turn Washington’s flank just as he had done on the banks of the Brandywine.  Washington could easily find himself pinned in Philadelphia and forced to surrender his army along with the city.

Washington’s other concern about this position was that his position left Reading exposed.  Reading was a village to the west where the Continental Army had stored a great quantity of food and supplies.  The British would undoubtedly receive intelligence about this supply depot.  Howe could send an army to capture the supplies that his own army needed and deny them to the Continental Army.

So, on September 14, while the British continued to camp near Brandywine for days after the battle, and after Washington had given his army one day’s rest, he provided his soldiers with more ammunition and crossed back over the Schuylkill River.  He crossed further upstream across one of the fords, near what is today called Conshohocken.  Washington put the Continental army in a position where they could contest any British movement to the north, either toward Reading, or to move upstream where the regulars might ford the Schuylkill and take Philadelphia.

British Take Wilmington

With the Continentals on the march, the British remained in camp.  The British spent much of September 12 burying the dead from both sides and tending to the wounded.  They sent out foraging parties to collect food for the army.  On September 13, Howe sent a detachment to capture Wilmington, Delaware.  The local militia there put up no fight, and fled, abandoning their cannons without a shot fired.  The British captured Delaware’s President John McKinly, who had remained in town to oversee the town’s so-called defense.  After taking the town, Howe moved his wounded and his American prisoners to Wilmington as well.

As planned, at least a few ships from Admiral Howe’s navy also reached Wilmington about this time and helped to remove the wounded.  The Continentals still had forts and other defenses that prevented the navy from sailing further upstream to Philadelphia.  But the lower part of the Delaware was relatively open to the British.

Philadelphia Threatened

Although the British Army took its time and Washington prepared to put up another defense once it started to march again, most people feared that Philadelphia would fall within days.  On September 12, Thomas Paine penned his Crisis #4 where he began by noting the loss at Brandywine:

The event of yesterday was one of those kind of alarms which is just sufficient to rouse us to duty, without being of consequence enough to depress our fortitude. It is not a field of a few acres of ground, but a cause, that we are defending, and whether we defeat the enemy in one battle, or by degrees, the consequences will be the same.

Paine went on to point out that with Howe’s limited number of soldiers, being reduced with every battle, he must eventually fail, no matter how many field victories he had.

Thomas Paine
(from Wikimedia)

The Continental Congress began in inquiry into the loss at Brandywine.  It ordered General Washington to open a court of inquiry against General Preudhomme du Boore for his actions at Brandywine.  As you may recall from last week, the Continental general from France had been in command of the left wing on Birmingham Heights.  The soldiers were out of position and ran when attacked.  The fall of the left flank led to the general retreat of all the divisions on Birmingham Hill and could have proven much more disastrous, but for the rear guard action led by General Nathanael Greene.

When informed that he would face a court of inquiry, General de Borre instead submitted his resignation on September 13, blaming his failure on ill-trained and incompetent soldiers.  Congress accepted his resignation the next day.  That would be the end of de Borre’s career in the Continental Army, but not his end in the Revolution.  De Borre returned to France and to his commission as a colonel in the French Army.  A few years later, he would return to America with the French Army after France entered the war.  But that is getting ahead of our story.  For now, de Borre was going home.

Congress also requested General Sullivan, who was supposed to be commanding the division on Birmingham Hill, also be recalled from duty until there could be a court of inquiry.  On this request, Washington demurred.  He needed Sullivan to remain commander of the Maryland troops.  He told Congress that he could not afford to suspend Sullivan or conduct an inquiry at that time because he anticipated another battle within days.  Sullivan would retain his command.  He would face a court martial later that year, not only for Brandywine but also for his actions on Staten Island a month earlier and for other things.  The court martial would acquit Sullivan of all charges and cleared him to return to duty.

Casimir Pulaski

Congress was not just looking for leaders to blame.  They also had praise for many of the commanders at Brandywine.  The Marquis de Lafayette’s battlefield wound only improved the young general’s reputation.  The other foreign hero from Brandywine was Casimir Pulaski.  On September 15, Congress granted Pulaski a commission as a brigadier general in the Continental Army.

Gen. Casimir Pulaski
(from Wikimedia)

I mentioned Pulaski last week when he organized a cavalry charge to halt the British advance and give the rest of the army time to retreat.  Congress had been debating whether to give him a commission since he had arrived in America in late July.  His leadership and daring at Brandywine was enough to convince the delegates that he was the man for the job.

Pulaski had been born in Warsaw in 1745.  At the time, Warsaw was capital of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  It had a king who was elected by the nobles.  Coming from a noble family, Pulaski was a member of the national elite.  He served as a cavalry officer and grew in reputation.  The King, Stanislaw II Augustus, allied himself with the Russians and sought to turn the country into a Russian protectorate.  Stanislaw cut off alliances with France and Austria, leading to war.  The war went bad for Poland.  Russia, Prussia, and Austria partitioned the country in 1772.

During the war that led to the partition, Pulaski was part of a conspiracy to kidnap the King.  This led to charges of attempted regicide and made him a wanted man throughout Europe.  Pulaski had to flee his homeland, first to Prussia, then to the Ottoman Empire, and then again to France.  He attempted to join other armies, but the criminal charges against him meant that no other king would offer him a commission.

Facing debtors prison, Pulaski heard that American agents in Paris were looking for officers to go fight in America.  He met with Benjamin Franklin and impressed him with his military experience and zeal for liberty.  French officials strongly encouraged Franklin to give Pulaski a commission, and even offered to pay his travel costs to America.  France was eager to get him to leave the country before his presence created an international incident.

Pulaski took Franklin’s recommendation and boarded a ship for America in June 1777.  He arrived in Boston in late July, studying English during his voyage.  After presenting his credentials to Congress in August, he rode off to join the Continental Army without waiting for Congress to act.  He served as an unofficial gentleman volunteer to George Washington in the weeks leading up to Brandywine.

Along with his commission as general, Pulaski served as the Continental Army’s first Cavalry commander with the title “Commander of the Horse.”

Baron de Kalb

Also, on September 15, the same day Congress granted a commission to Pulaski, it also granted a commission as major general to Baron Johannes de Kalb.  Remember that de Kalb had traveled with Lafayette and several other would-be generals to America months earlier, but got caught up in the political dispute over having too many French generals.

Gen. Johann de Kalb
(from Wikimedia)

Congress had offered Lafayette a commission as major general after Lafayette agreed to serve without pay.  Congress left de Kalb and others cooling their heels in Philadelphia while they decided what to do.  In the weeks leading up to Brandywine, Congress had voted not to accept de Kalb’s offer of service.  Delegates then took a few weeks to debate how much to pay for his travel expenses and costs of returning home to France.

In the meantime, de Kalb did a little sightseeing, visiting the Continental medical facilities in Bethlehem.  Lafayette’s performance at Brandywine raised the reputation of French officers generally, and is credited in part with Congress’ change of heart.  It was probably also Lafayette’s strong support for de Kalb, who had been his superior and mentor in the French Army, that contributed to the change.

Congress voted to make de Kalb a major general. When de Kalb received the news of his appointment the following day, he sent a letter rejecting the offer.  Two days later, he had a change of heart and requested several conditions before he would accept his appointment.  One was the request that Congress back date his commission to the date of Lafayette’s.  That way de Kalb would not suffer the indignity of ranking below his former subordinate.  He also wanted the option to return to France if he determined his superiors disapproved of his service in the Continental Army.  He wanted his aide to be commissioned as a Lieutenant Colonel, that he receive a pension, and that his wife receive a pension if he was killed in service.

As a result of these negotiations, de Kalb did not join the army immediately, but remained in Bethlehem, where he remained with the wounded General Lafayette.  He would not accept his commission and join the army until well after the British occupied Philadelphia.

Battle of the Clouds

As Congress debated about officers, General Washington prepared for round two in the British Army’s advance toward Philadelphia.  As I said, the Continentals had retreated across the Schuylkill River.  When the British remained in camp near Brandywine, the Continentals moved back toward the British and prepared to contest any advance.

Troop Movements 

On September 15, General Howe learned that the Continentals had advanced toward his camp and were about ten miles north of his army.  Washington seemed to be daring him to fight another direct battle on open fields, something the British thought they would win every time.  Further, Washington’s forces had fallen to around 10,000 after Brandywine, so Howe had a numerical advantage.

In the early pre-dawn hours of September 16, General Howe assembled his army and began a march to meet the Americans near White Horse Tavern a few miles to the north.  Around 9:00 AM, Washington received word from Pulaski’s cavalry that the British were on the march.  Rather than take up an immediate defensive position, Washington marched his army three miles toward the advancing British.

Around 1:00 PM, General Cornwallis reported that his British regulars had encountered Pulaski’s cavalry and a few hundred militia, who fled as the first shots were fired.  Next, General Knyphausen’s Hessian jaegers ran into Continentals under General Anthony Wayne and William Maxwell.  An American charge unnerved the jaegers, and almost led to the capture of Hessian Colonel von Donop.  British grenadiers provided support to the jaegers and stopped the American advance.

The British formed a line of battle as General Matthews joined Knyphausen in a preparation to attack the Americans.  The Continentals were forced onto muddy ground which made maneuverability of their cannons difficult and was not an advantageous defensive position.  Washington ordered a withdrawal to higher ground, but it looked as though the British would be able to charge the American position before the Ameircans could withdraw.

Then, just as things were looking bleak, the sky darkened and a driving thunderstorm unleashed across the region.  One Hessian officer said that the rain  "came down so hard that in a few moments we were drenched and sank in mud up to our calves."  The wet powder prevented either side from being able to fire their guns.  The thick mud and driving rain made it impossible even to order a bayonet charge.

With the loss of their powder, and given the relatively weak defensive position, General Washington gave the order to withdraw as the worst nor’easter many had ever seen flooded everything.  The Continentals slogged north through the mud and rain, marching about five miles before reaching camp around 10:00 PM.  There, the soldiers spent a miserable wet night in the field before marching back to the Schuylkill River the next day.

The British march north, attempting to get around the American right flank and push the Continentals back against the flooded Schuylkill River.  The two camps eyed each other the next day, but neither seemed ready to re-engage.  By the following day, Friday September 19, the Schuylkill water levels had fallen enough that the Continentals could move across the fords and take up positions on the other side of the river.

Thus, thanks to the weather, what could have become a decisive major battle at White Horse Tavern was called on account of rain.  Both sides suffered about 100 casualties in the early fighting, but no full battle could play out.  The event became known as the Battle of the Clouds.

The British advanced as the Americans tried to remove supplies stored at Valley Forge and other areas around the region.  With their powder destroyed by the rain, it was not clear if the Americans even could put up a defense at the Schuylkill river. Washington directed Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton as one of many officers instructed to remove or destroy supplies that might fall to the enemy.  Hamilton was in the process of doing so when his small unit fell under enemy fire.  The team fled back to a flat bottom boat on the Schuylkill river, exchanging fire with the enemy as they polled back across to the American side.  The British Army was poised to cross the Schuylkill.  Hamilton wrote to President of Congress John Hancock that day: “If Congress have not yet left Philadelphia, they ought to do it immediately without fail, for the enemy have the means of throwing a party this night into the city.”

With most of the Continental Army along the east bank of the Schuylkill, Washington left one contingent of soldiers under General Anthony Wayne in the field  on the west bank to harass the enemy and delay their advance.  Wayne’s army camped at a small village called Paoli.

- - -

Next Episode 160 The Paoli Massacre

Previous Episode 159 The Battle of Brandywine

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Further Reading

Websites

Virtual Marching Tour, Battle of the Clouds: https://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/clouds_1.htm

Paine, Thomas Crisis #4: http://libertyonline.hypermall.com/Paine/Crisis/Crisis-4.html

Casimir Pulaski https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/casimir-pulaski

Johann de Kalb: https://thehistoryjunkie.com/johann-de-kalb-facts

Letter From Alexander Hamilton to John Hancock, [18 September 1777]: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0282

Itinerary of George Washington:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1keqVPXxJl4zpAAQNfvdEqA7iAKXaKQ77e7a9IYx7G0c

Fyers, Evan W. H. “GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S OPERATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1777. The Battle on the Brandywine Creek—11 September—and the Action at Germantown—4 October.” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 8, no. 34, 1929, pp. 228–241. www.jstor.org/stable/44232285

Ecelbarger, Garry “Aggressive Minded Gamblers: Washington, Howe, and the Days between Battles, September 12-16, 1777, Journal of the American Revolution, March 10, 2020: https://allthingsliberty.com/2020/03/aggressive-minded-gamblers-washington-howe-and-the-days-between-battles-september-12-16-1777

Sullivan, Thomas. “Before and after the Battle of Brandy-Wine. Extracts from the Journal of Sergeant Thomas Sullivan of H.M. Forty-Ninth Regiment of Foot.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 31, no. 4, 1907, pp. 406–418. www.jstor.org/stable/20085398

Battle of the Clouds Battlefield https://www.chescoplanning.org/HisResources/BattleClouds.cfm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Kapp, Friedrich, The life of John Kalb, Major-General in the Revolutionary Army,
New York: H. Holt and Co. 1884.

Manning, Clarence A. Soldier Of Liberty Casimir Pulaski, Philosophical Library, 1945.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965 (borrow only)

Smith, John S. Memoir of the Baron de Kalb, Baltimore: J.D. Toy 1858.


Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Harris, Michael C. Brandywine: A Military History of the Battle that Lost Philadelphia but Saved America, September 11, 1777, Savis Beatie, 2014.

Kauffman, Gerald J. and Michael R. Gallagher The British Invasion of Delaware, Aug-Sep 1777, lulu.com, 2013.

McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign Vol. 1, Stackpole Books, 2006.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Pioneer Press, 1980 (orig. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003 (book recommendation of the week).

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

ARP158 Battle of Brandywine

Last week, I left off with the British Army commanded by General Howe, having landed in Maryland, skirmished with the continentals in Delaware, and then moved westward into Pennsylvania in a march toward Philadelphia.  The Continentals under General Washington pivoted from Delaware into Pennsylvania.  They deployed along Brandywine Creek, prepared to confront the British advance there.

Brandywine Creek is a relatively small waterway that begins with the merger of two smaller creeks about thirty miles west of Philadelphia.  It then flows down to Wilmington, Delaware, before merging with the Christiana Creek and then into the Delaware River.  It is not big enough to sail ships, but was deep enough in most places during this era to prevent men from fording across.

Continental Defenses

That said, there were a number of fords along the creek where an army could cross. The Continentals deployed around those fords and planned to force the enemy to cross that water in the face of enemy fire if it wanted to advance.

Battle of Brandywine

General Washington believed the most likely crossing point would be at Chadds Ford, a small village in Pennsylvania, about two miles north of the border with Delaware.  By September 9, 1777, his Continentals had secured the Chadds Ford, as well as two other fords just upstream from Chadds.

They also secured Pyle’s Ford to the south in Delaware.  This left flank of the Continental Army included divisions commanded by Major Generals Anthony Wayne and Nathanael Greene, along with Pennsylvania militia.  Major Generals John Sullivan, Adam Stephen, and Lord Stirling took command of the heights above Chadds Ford which covered the army’s right flank.  Beyond their divisions further north, Colonel Moses Hazen covered two smaller fords further upriver, Buffington’s Ford and Wistar’s Ford (aka Shunk’s Ford).  In the event of enemy movement toward those fords, the nearby reinforcements of the army’s right flank could be deployed there.  Buffington’s Ford was actually north of the place where the Brandywine splits into two smaller branches. To reach that, the enemy would have to ford both the west branch and the east branch of the creeks to reach the Continental’s side.

British Lines

On the British side General Wilhelm von Knyphausen and marched his Hessians to Kennett Square, only a few miles from Chadds Ford where the Americans were already deployed.  General Howe did not realize that Knyphausen would move so quickly and expected him to camp several miles further back.

Gen. Wilhelm von Knyphausen
(from Wikimedia)

By the time Knyphausen received Howe’s orders, he had already set up camp in Kennett Square and had no interest in marching backward several miles that night.  Instead, he ordered his army to camp without campfires in hopes of keeping their position a secret from the enemy.  By the morning of September 10, Howe’s Regulars also reached Kennett Square.  The entire army of about 15,000 Regulars and Hessians was united and ready.

General Howe was not going to charge into battle without getting the lay of the land.  Although he landed in Maryland with few detailed maps or intelligence about the area, He had been working with local Tories to get what he needed.

Joseph Galloway, who had opted to confirm his loyalty to the King after attending the First Continental Congress, had fled from his home near Philadelphia to join the British in New York City.  He had traveled with Howe to Maryland and served as a local guide. Howe also received guidance from other local residents, including many Quakers, who lived in the area and knew the area well.  On top of that, Howe sent out scouts to determine enemy positions.  So the two armies sat on September 10, as Howe gained intelligence and finalized his plans.

The Battle Begins

On the morning of September 11, General von Knyphausen marched an army of about 6800 mostly Hessian soldiers toward Brandywine Creek.  Although the day would be a hot one, the morning was still chilly and a dense fog hid much of the two armies from each other.  The hilly terrain also made it difficult to track the enemy.  Leading the column was Ferguson’s riflemen and the Queen’s Rangers, a loyalist militia regiment.  Both Ferguson’s riflemen and the Queen’s Rangers wore green coats, resulting in them being mistaken for Hessians during much of the battle.

Brandywine Battle map (from Wikimedia)

That same morning, as the British and Hessians began their march, American General William Maxwell had sent scouts across the Brandywine to track enemy movements.  An American company was eating some breakfast at Welch’s Tavern when Ferguson’s riflemen and the Queens Rangers approached. The two sides exchanged fire as the Americans withdrew. These first shots were fired around 9:00 AM.

Maxwell’s Continentals continued to harass the advancing British in a series of ambushes as the column moved toward the Brandywine.  The few hundred Americans could not halt the British advance.  Their intent was to harass the enemy until they reached the Brandywine, where the Americans would make their stand.  As the battle moved slowly toward the creek, both sides took casualties.  Ferguson’s riflemen proved their worth as they picked off retreating Americans.  Among those wounded was a young captain from Virginia named John Marshall, the future Chief Justice.

By around 10:30 AM, Knyphausen’s main column had reached Brandywine Creek.  Rather than attempt to cross, he brought up his artillery and simply fired across the creek at the enemy.

General Washington was observing the battle through a telescope from a house a short distance from the battle.  It became clear that the force attacking them was not the entire British Army.  Many of his generals feared that the army in front of them was simply meant to amuse them while another force marched around in a flanking maneuver to attack them from a different direction. This was exactly the same tactic Howe had used against them on Long Island.

Washington sent out scouts in search of another enemy column, but received frustratingly inconclusive intelligence.  In fact, General Howe had left camp before dawn and before General Knyphausen began his march.  Howe moved his regulars north.  Washington considered several options.  One was that Howe was attempting a flanking maneuver on the Continental right flank. Another was that Howe was simply keeping the Continentals busy while he marched his army out to Lancaster to seize food and supplies that were stored there.  A third possibility was that Howe had marched north in order to get Washington to send part of his own army north to find Howe.  Then, Howe could double back, join Knyphausen, and crush Washington’s divided army.

By noon, Washington had decided that if Howe’s army really had marched north, they would not participate in the day’s battle.  It would take them too long to find an unguarded ford upstream and march back south.  Washington maintained a strong right flank in case they did show up there, but also began to send regiments across the Brandywine to engage with the enemy.  If he could defeat Knyphausen’s division before Howe arrived, he could then focus all of his army on Howe’s division and defeat the divided army in detail.

Before he could commit his army to the attack, General Sullivan sent intelligence which he received from Major Spear, that there was no sign of the enemy to the north.  If that was true, Howe was likely doubling back to meet up with Knyphausen.  Fearing that, Washington opted not to commit his army to an attack across the creek, but held in his defensive positions.  Washington also recalled Lord Stirling and General Stephen’s divisions to move from the right flank back to the center so that the army could be united against an expected full-on British assault across the creek.

Howe’s Flanking Maneuver

Washington’s intelligence, however, proved incorrect.  General Howe had, in fact, marched more than half of his army north, leaving in the pre-dawn hours before von Knyphausen began his march to the Brandywine.  As many officers guessed, von Knyphausen’s attack was a feint to distract the Continentals while Howe’s larger force could move into position to attack the American right flank.

Washington, Lafayette at Brandywine (from British Battles)

Howe took advantage of local information from Tories to march his army six miles to the north on back roads.  He crossed the Brandywine north of where it forked into two branches.  He crossed both the west branch and east branch of the Brandywine at unguarded fords.  One of the Hessian officers leading his column, Johann Ewald, noted that the army had to pass through a narrow ravine where a few hundred defenders could have held the army at bay for hours.  He was concerned about a possible ambush as he marched his men through.  But the Americans were nowhere to be found.  General Howe had moved his entire division of about eight thousand soldiers onto the east bank and prepared to attack the American right flank from the north.  Howe had marched north about eight miles north to get around the army.

By the time Howe had gotten his army across the Brandywine, it was a little after 1:00 PM.  A local, who supported the patriots, spotted the army and galloped down to inform General Washington.  At first, Washington was convinced of his earlier intelligence that said the British were not to his north, and brushed off the information as an excited local who was exaggerating what he saw.  However, after receiving several more reports, Washington realized he was in trouble, that Howe was about to crash into his right flank and crush the. Continental Army.

Washington redeployed the divisions under Stephen and Stirling to move back to the north and reinforce the right flank.  He ordered General Sullivan to advance on Howe’s army and engage the enemy.  The Continental divisions that had been recalled earlier, had to run back to their positions to the north in order to meet the enemy.  Stephen and Stirling marched their men over three miles in less than half an hour.

The American defenses were still in chaos when the British advance corps came within eyesight of the Americans, less than a mile away.  General Howe could have ordered a charge and scattered the disorganized Continentals.

Regulars rest before going into battle (from history on net)

Instead though, Howe ordered his army to rest and have lunch.  Howe sat with his officers for half an hour to an hour.   They enjoyed tea and talked over their options.  Instead of taking advantage of the surprised and disorganized American defenses, Howe gave them time to organize their lines.  This is just another example of General Howe taking a pause just when he is about to deliver the death blow, and why some of his detractors argue that Howe had no intention of winning this war.

Again, I don't think Howe deliberately sabotaged the British cause.  His men had just marched a grueling seventeen miles and were tired and hungry.  Giving them a short rest before charging into battle might help them to fight better.  Further, it is unclear whether Howe appreciated how disorganized the American lines were, and how much that time would give them to set their defenses.

Birmingham Hill

Taking advantage of the short reprieve, the Americans deployed a defensive line along Birmingham Hill.  General Stephen commanded the right flank.  General Lord Stirling commanded the center.  General Sullivan commanded the left flank.  Stephen and Stirling got their men into place relatively easily.

Brandywine Battlefield (from British Battles)

Sullivan’s division had to march through heavily forested and rocky terrain, meaning that it took the soldiers longer to get into position and could not see the other divisions’ positions as they were forming.  By the time Sulllivan had established his line, he realized he was too far forward and had left a large gap between his division and the Stirling’s center.  Sullivan rode off to meet with Stirling and make sure they were coordinated in their defense.  He left his second in command, the French General Preudhomme de Borre in command of his division.  General de Borre did not speak English and did not really command the respect of his subordinates, leading to further command problems.

While Sullivan was still away from his division, General Howe launched his attack around 4:30 PM.  Stirling and Stephen’s divisions stood firm and repelled several assaults on their positions over the next hour and a half of intense fighting.  Howe had left most of his artillery with Knyphausen, meaning that this had to be primarily an infantry assault.  British grenadiers and others among Howe’s best regiments pushed back the soldiers from Sullivan’s division and threatened the American left flank.

During the fighting, General Washington, along with General Lafayette arrived on the scene and assessed the situation.

British Take the Field

At the same time Howe’s forces were storming Birmingham Hill, General Knyphausen, who had been distracting the Americans all day near Chadd’s Ford, heard the distant gunfire and understood that Howe was attacking.  With that, Knyphausen ordered his division, which was nearly half of the entire British Hessian force, to storm across the Brandywine and take the American position.  Since Washington had moved most of the defenders to Birmingham Hill, Knyphausen only had to contend with a smaller force, composed mostly of militia.  This force, under the command of General Anthony Wayne, and supported by Generals Maxwell and John Armstrong, could not hold off Knyphausen’s assault.

General Washington realized that the two pronged attack meant that both lines were about to fail.  He had held in reserve General Greene’s division to reinforce whichever line needed it.  But even if he deployed Green to one of these two lines, the other would certainly fall.  Instead, Washington ordered Green to move into a defensive position where he could form a rear guard action for the retreating army.  Greene rushed his men into position, marching about three miles in just over half an hour.

Continental lines at Brandywine (from British Battles)

As the American divisions defending Birmingham Hill gave way and retreated, Howe’s forces advanced.  At the same time, Wayne’s defenders along the Brandywine also retreated, giving Knyphausen control of the battlefield there.

As Howe continued his advance, hoping to capture the American army, he ran into Greene’s line, which had been reinforced by many of the soldiers retreating from Birmingham Hill.  Howe attempted to roll up the right flank of Greene’s defensive line as the soldiers put up a solid defense.  Casimir Pulaski, the Polish officer with the Continentals, saw this and organized an impromptu American cavalry charge into the British infantry advance, thus forcing the British to halt their attack.  Pulaski had only arrived in America a few months earlier.  Congress was still debating whether to give him a commission, so technically, he had no command authority.  But at Washington’s request, he organized and led this critical cavalry charge anyway.

With the surprisingly strong American defensive line and with dusk approaching, Howe called off his offensive and allowed the Continentals to retreat from the field.

Aftermath

With nightfall, the Battle of Brandywine ended.  With about 30,000 soldiers engaged on both sides, this would be one of the largest battles of the American Revolution.  The British reported nearly 600 casualties, which is probably an under count.  The Americans estimated they inflicted over 2000 British casualties, which is probably an over count.  The true number is probably closer to the British number, but likely a little higher.

Especially hard hit was Ferguson’s regiment and the loyalist regiment of Queen’s Rangers.  These units had led Knyphausen’s column and took the brunt of the American ambushes as the column advanced.  Captain Ferguson himself was shot in the arm and risked amputation for several weeks.  His arm never fully recovered.

There are no good records of the American casualties.  Most estimates are that they were about double that of the British, about 1200-1300.  About a third of those were captured prisoners, although almost all of those captured were also wounded on the field.  Thanks to General Greene’s rearguard action, almost all of the Americans who were able to walk, or run, were able to escape capture.  The Americans did lose quite a few cannons, including several that they had captured from the enemy at Trenton a few months earlier.

Wounding of Lafayette (from British Battles)

General Lafayette took a ball in the leg late in the day.  It proved to be a relatively minor wound that would allow him to return to duty rather quickly.  After the battle, Captain Ferguson reported that he had seen two American officers on the field whom we could have shot from his position with his rifle.  However, since the officers had their backs turned toward him, he considered the shot to be dishonorable and did not take it.  Later, from the description and known position in the battle, Ferguson became convinced that he had had General Washington in his sights, possibly while conferring with Pulaski.  Even so, he said later he did not regret his decision not to shoot.  Sniping at officers was considered murder by many officers at the time.

The highest ranking officer who died over the encounter was not even on the field.  On the day before the battle, French General Philippe du Coudray, who sought to become the Continental commander of artillery, jumped on a horse in Philadelphia and rode out to join the Continental Army in the field.  As he crossed the Schuylkill River, either on a ferry or a pontoon bridge, accounts differ, his horse got spooked and jumped into the river.  With du Coudray caught in the horse’s stirrups, both horse and rider drowned.  Later, his body was recovered and buried in Philadelphia.

With the battle at an end, General Howe and General Knyphausen made camp near the battlefield and rested their army.  General Washington and the Continentals spent another sleepless night making their escape from the British Army.  Despite the loss, Washington put the best face on the day, reporting to Congress: "despite the day's misfortune, I am pleased to announce that most of my men are in good spirits and still have the courage to fight the enemy another day."

- - -

Next Episode 159 Battle of the Clouds

Previous Episode 157 Head of Elk & Cooch's Bridge

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

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You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

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Further Reading

Websites

Virtual Marching Tour, Brandywine: https://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/tobrandywine.htm

Battle of Brandywine: https://www.americanheritage.com/encounter-brandywine

Battle of Brandywine Creek: https://www.britishbattles.com/war-of-the-revolution-1775-to-1783/battle-of-brandywine-creek

Letter From Washington To John Hancock, 11 September 1777: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-11-02-0190-0009

Casimir Pulaski: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/casimir-pulaski

Montrésor, John, and G. D. Scull. “Journal of Captain John Montrésor, July 1, 1777, to July 1, 1778, Chief Engineer of the British Army.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 5, no. 4, 1881, pp. 393–417. www.jstor.org/stable/20084519

Fyers, Evan W. H. “GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S OPERATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1777. The Battle on the Brandywine Creek—11 September—and the Action at Germantown—4 October.” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 8, no. 34, 1929, pp. 228–241. www.jstor.org/stable/44232285

“COUNT CASIMIR PULASKI AT THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE.” The American Catholic Historical Researches, vol. 7, no. 4, 1911, pp. 381–383.  www.jstor.org/stable/44374975

ESLING, CHARLES H. A. “WASHINGTON'S HEADQUARTERS AT THE BATTLE OF BRANDYWINE, IN THE HOUSE OF JOHN HOLAHAN, A CATHOLIC.” The American Catholic Historical Researches, vol. 3, no. 4, 1907, pp. 356–358. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44374708

Sanborn, Paul J. “The Battle of Brandywine: An Intelligence Evaluation of General George Washington's Tactical Operations During The Battle Along The Brandywine, 11 September 1777.” American Intelligence Journal, vol. 16, no. 2/3, 1995, pp. 69–80. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44326518

Sullivan, Thomas. “Before and after the Battle of Brandy-Wine. Extracts from the Journal of Sergeant Thomas Sullivan of H.M. Forty-Ninth Regiment of Foot.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 31, no. 4, 1907, pp. 406–418. www.jstor.org/stable/20085398

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Hooton, Francis C.The Battle of Brandywine with its lines of battle, Wm. Stanley Ray, 1900.

Lewis, Charlton Thomas Lafayette at Brandywine, Chester County Historical Society, 1896.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965 (borrow only)

Townsend, Joseph Some account of the British army, under the command of General Howe; and of the battle of Brandywine, on the memorable September 11th, 1777, and the adventures of that day, Townsend Ward, 1846.

Trussell, John B.B. Jr. The Battle of Brandywine, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1992.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Harris, Michael C. Brandywine: A Military History of the Battle that Lost Philadelphia but Saved America, September 11, 1777, Savis Beatie, 2014 (book recommendation of the week).

Kauffman, Gerald J. and Michael R. Gallagher The British Invasion of Delaware, Aug-Sep 1777, lulu.com, 2013.

McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign Vol. 1, Stackpole Books, 2006.

Mowday, Bruce September 11, 1777: Washington's Defeat at Brandywine Dooms Philadelphia,  White Mane, 2002.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Pioneer Press, 1980 (orig. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.