Showing posts with label 1782. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1782. Show all posts

Sunday, September 8, 2024

ARP326 Fort Carlos


Last week we covered some of the closing events of the war as news of the peace treaty and the cessation of hostilities arrived in Philadelphia in the spring of 1783.  Getting the word out about peace was a lengthy process though.  Some corners of the war continued to do battle.

Spanish Control

Spain had maintained control of the area around New Orleans throughout the war.  It had received the Louisiana Territory from France at the end of the Seven Years War.  When Spain entered the war against Britain in 1779, it looked for any opportunities all over the world to take land from Britain.  After Spanish forces under Bernardo de Gálvez captured Pensacola in 1781, the British pretty much gave up on West Florida.

Counterattack at Arkansas Post
Spain wanted to use its control of the region to secure control of the Mississippi River.  It maintained posts as far north as St. Louis, in what is today Missouri.  The region’s commander, Governor Bernardo de Gálvez, had returned to Spain after the 1781 victory.  By 1783, Gálvez was back in the West Indies, planning an invasion of Jamaica. Colonel Esteban Rodríguez Miró was serving as acting governor.

Miró was the son of a Spanish official, born in what is today California.  He joined the army at age 16 while the Seven Years War was raging.  Following that war, he received a military education in Spain before transferring to Louisiana in 1778.  Miró served as Galvez’s aide during the regional fights with the British beginning in 1779.  He was a trusted officer who could administer the region from New Orleans.

By 1782, the British were no longer a military threat to the region.  Spanish leaders focused their attention more on the Mississippi River, and many of the hostile native forces that contested for control.  Further north on the Mississippi River, American forces, specifically George Rogers Clark, under the authority of Virginia, was asserting control of areas up to the eastern bank of the Mississippi River.  Spain disputed this territory, but seemed content to control the west bank, at least that far north.  Further south, in the area around Louisiana, Spain claimed control of the entire area.  Exactly where the lines would be drawn were still in dispute until the Treaty of Paris in 1783.

Spain never allied itself with the Americans against Britain.  It generally supported American efforts to attack the British and weaken their enemy.  But when American and Spanish interests bumped up against each other in the west, the relationship became much more gray.  Throw into the mix that British agents were still trying to exert influence, primarily through Indian allies, the lines between allies and enemies got even murkier.

James Logan Colbert

By the time the British had largely been pushed out of the region in 1781, the leader of the opposition to Spain fell to a man of Scottish ancestry named James Logan Colbert.  His personal background seems to be a matter of dispute.  Some sources say that he was born in Scotland, but traveled to Georgia in 1736.  One source even claims that he arrived on the same ship as future Continental General Lachlan McIntosh.  These stories have been called into question.

Other sources say that Colbert was born in the Carolinas.  One credible source believes that Colbert was the son of Joseph Calvert,  who lived on the North Carolina - Virginia border and that his last name got changed over time to from Calvert to Colbert.  This makes sense since Joseph Calvert had a father-in-law named James Logan, which would have been an obvious source for his son’s name James Logan Colbert.  According to some accounts, he had been a British officer for some time, although this seems unlikely.  It could be that he received some informal commission during the war.  It could also be that he simply claimed a command as a way to get others to follow him.  But he did go by "Captain Colbert" during the war.

Whatever his origin, Colbert, who often seems to be called by his middle name of Logan, made his way west into the region that is today Arkansas.  One account says that he was indentured to an Indian trader named Abe Colson.  However he got there, he began living with the Chickasaw Indians some time in the late 1730’s or early 1740’s.  He lived with the Chickasaw and started a family with a Chickasaw woman.  Records before the war report that he was an adopted member of the Chickasaw tribe, and also registered as a British Indian trader.  Over his many years with the Chickasaw, he had three wives and eight children. By 1783, he was in his 60’s, a well established figure among the Chickasaw.  He owned a large plantation with 150 slaves.

The Chickasaw were a relatively small tribe that had opposed the French and Spanish incursions for many generations.  In 1752, Colbert participated in a war against the French army, which attempted to wipe out the Chickasaw Nation entirely.  The French had taken 700 French regulars as well as Choctaw allies, to eliminate the Chickasaw.  This is sometimes called part of the Second Chickasaw War.  The French had also fought an earlier war in the 1720’s.  In this instance, as in the last, the French were beaten back and ceded the territory to the Chickasaw.

Because of their opposition to the French and later Spanish, the Chickasaw remained allied with Britain, who provided them with arms and supplies.  In 1781, Colbert led a Chickasaw attack on Fort Jefferson, an outpost built by George Rogers Clark’s men on Chickasaw land in what is today part of western Kentucky.  The attack led to an eight day siege on the fort, followed by a full on assault.  Although they failed to take the fort, after the battle, Clark abandoned Fort Jefferson, believing it too much of a target for future attacks.

Colbert and the Chickasaw seemed more focused on protecting their territory from any outside intrusion, and never seemed to form a strong alliance with any outside group.

In 1782, Colbert focused on harassing Spanish shipping in the Mississippi River.  His fighters consisted, not only of Chickasaw, but as others described as Englishman, and still others of African descent.  In May, they captured a boat carrying pay and provisions to the Spanish outpost at St. Louis.  Among their prisoners was the wife and children of the Spanish commander at St. Louis.

Colbert released the commander’s family and nine other prisoners, allowing them to return to New Orleans on parole.  The prisoners were on their honor to be exchanged for nine English prisoners being held by the Spanish at Natchez.  Miró refused the exchange.  He regarded Colbert not as an enemy combatant, but as a pirate and a criminal.  

In response, Colbert stepped up his raids on Spanish shipping. The Spanish tried to get their Indian allies to go after Colbert’s forces.  The Kickapoo attempted several raids, but were largely unsuccessful.  Since the British were no help at this point, Colbert attempted to establish an alliance with the Americans in South Carolina.  The response was that the Americans would help only if the Chickasaw would cede some of their lands to them. Colbert refused the deal.

In the early months of 1783, Colbert’s army seemed to grow.  They were supplied primarily by the boats that they captured.

Arkansas Post

Colbert decided he wanted to step up his attacks by going after a target on land.  The French had originally built the Arkansas Post about a century earlier.  It was about halfway between New Orleans and St. Louis on the Arkansas River near its junction with the Mississippi River.  The post had been moved and abandoned a few times, but had been continuously garrisoned for about the last 50 years.  

The Spanish named it Fort Carlos, after their King, Carlos III of Spain.  They maintained a small garrison of about 20 soldiers.

A few dozen families and their slaves had settled around the fort.  The town also served as a trading post for trappers, hunters, and others who were coming and going to locations further west.

The fort itself had pretty formidable 13 foot walls made of thick tree trunks. They would stop any small arms fire. Four cannons provided fire power against any attack and could also be used against any ship trying to make its way up the Arkansas River without authorizations.   

Concerned for the security of the fort, Miro deployed Captain Jacobo Dubreuil St.-Cyr to take command.  Dubreiuil arrived in January 1783.  He was no newcomer to the region.  For several years prior, Dubreuil had provided military escorts to supply convoys up the river and had commanded a small outpost just south of St. Louis.

When he redeployed to Fort Carlos, Dubreuil brought reinforcements, bringing the garrison to 67 Spanish soldiers.  He reported that three of the four wooden gun carriages had rotted and were being replaced.  Dubreuil also had his men carve musket slits into the fort walls. The larger garrison needed food stores in the case of an attack.  They formed hunting parties to provide meat, which could be dried and stored.

The Spanish also had a good relationship with the local Indians, from the Quapaw tribe.  Indians often served as scouts for the Spanish and also traded with the local trading post.  Dubreuil was aware that there could be an attack on the fort.  He used the Quapaw to scout the region and warn him of any approaching enemy.

The Attack

Dubreuil’s belief that an attack on the fort was coming was correct.  By mid-April, Colbert had assembled a force to attack the fort.  English speaking Americans made up the bulk of the force, 64 of them.  Most were loyalists.  A few were Whigs who just didn’t like the Spanish controlling the region.  There were also five African Americans, eleven Chickasaw and one Frenchman.

Colbert hoped to hit the fort by surprise, meaning he had to get his force past the Quapaw village undetected.  The men paddled down river in canoes using muffled oars at night. They passed the Quapaw village and landed near the fort at around 2:30 AM on April 17.  

The attackers encountered a ten man guard near the fort which they managed to overwhelm.  They killed two defenders and wounded two others.  The rest were taken prisoner, except for one man who managed to flee and warn the fort.

Colbert’s men had to secure the village which consisted of seven families.  Within a half hour they were at the gates of the fort. By that time, the garrison was waiting for them.  The two sides exchange fire for hours, into the morning.  The fort canons kept the attackers pinned down in a gully where they remained safe from the cannon fire. The attackers' musket and rifle shots at the fort did little damage as they could not penetrate the fort walls.

By 9:00 AM, it was light out but neither side was having much impact on the other.  One of the families that Colbert had captured was that of the Fort’s second in command, Lieutenant Luis de Villars.  Colbert sent Mrs. Villars under a white flag with a demand to surrender the fort.  The demand instructed the fort to surrender by noon, or the attackers would storm the fort, supported by 500 Chickasaw warriors.  If that happened they would kill everyone.  If the garrison attempted to alert their Quapaw allies, Colbert would kill the families he had taken hostage.

At the same time that Colbert was delivering his message under a flag of truce, Dubreuil was sending out his own offensive.  Ten Spanish soldiers and four Quapaw warriors rushed out of the gates, past the messenger under a flag of truce and charged the enemy.  The Spanish killed one of the attackers and wounded another.  The surprised attacking force under Colbert panicked and ran. They returned to their boats, taking their male prisoners with them, but releasing the women and children.

By noon, when Colbert had threatened to return with 500 Chickasaw warriors, The Quapaw Chief Angaska arrived with 100 of his own warriors to break the siege and aid the Spanish garrison. The enemy was gone, but Dubreuil scolded Angaska for failing to alert the fort to Colbert’s arrival and for the hours it took for him to show up with a pretty small relief force.  

According to Dubreuil’s report, the chief apologized that the attackers had passed his village unnoticed.  It took him time to gather a fighting force since most of his men were out hunting by the time they became aware of the situation.  It also appears that many Quapaw warriors had no interest in getting involved in a war between two groups of white men.

Dubreuil deployed twenty of his soldiers to accompany the 100 Quapaw warriors in search of the enemy and to retrieve the prisoners.  About a week later, this party caught up with Colbert’s men on the banks of the Mississippi.  Colbert was with the Chickasaw and the Quapaw chief really didn’t want to start a war.  Instead, he kept his warriors back, and approached Colbert to talk.  He told Colbert he had about 250 warriors, more than double his actual numbers, and that he would attack unless they could come to an agreement.

After some discussion Colbert released most of his prisoners, including Lieutenant Villars.  He held back eight prisoners: four Spanish soldiers, three slaves, and one child.  He told Villars that he was being given parole and that he expected the Spanish to release five loyalists who had been captured at Natchez in exchange.

Word of Peace

Unbeknownst to everyone there, word of the peace treaty had already reached the West Indies.  General Galvez had already ordered the parole of the Natchez prisoners, on the condition that they leave Natchez forever.  The parolees that Colbert was trying to get released were already on a ship headed for British Jamaica.

For the next few weeks though, Dubreuil continued to track Colbert’s forces.  Dubreuil considered Colbert a pirate.  He wanted to catch and execute this English criminal.  

Colbert continued to attack Spanish shipping along the Mississippi. On May 11, a Spanish convoy spotted Colbert’s camp.  Dubreuil’s men attacked as Colbert’s men withdrew.  The Spanish managed to kill a few of them, including Colbert’s second in command.  The attackers also managed to free three of the prisoners that Colbert had taken from Fort Carlos.

A few days later, word arrived from New Orleans about the peace treaty.  It included a newspaper that announced the treaty, as well as an English translation of the treaty itself.  Dubreuil had instructions to parley with Colbert and inform him of the end of the war.  Dubreuil sent a message that included a letter demanding the release of the rest of the prisoners taken at Fort Carlos, and for reimbursement for the supplies stolen by the raiders.

By this time, however, Colbert and his men were in full retreat.  It took nearly four months for him to receive the letter from Dubreuil.  When he finally received it, he replied that he would release the prisoners, but also inquired about Chickasaw prisoners still being held by the Spanish in St. Louis.  Colbert was not ready to pay for the supplies he had taken, but said he would consult with the British Governor in St. Augustine.

By that time, the Chickasaw had already made their own peace with Spain.  They had reached Dubreuil at Fort Carlos in August, telling the Spanish commander that the Chickasaw were prepared to live in peace with Spain, and that they had disowned Colbert and his family.

Colbert’s End of the War

Colbert, finding himself on the losing end of the war, was not sure what to do.  In July 1783, several months after his attack on Fort Carlos, Colbert wrote a letter to Virginia Governor Benjamin Harrison.  His letter tried to downplay his loyalist reputation and said that his fight was with the Spanish and the French. He was an American and he supported the Americans.

Colbert’s main concern in the letter is that he wanted his Chickasaw to have a good relationship with the Americans as they would all likely continue to struggle against the Spanish.  By all appearances, Colbert had learned that the Americans had won the war.  He was looking to be a part of the winning side, both for himself and the Chickasaw.

Colbert never received a response from Governor Harrison.  In January 1784, Colbert was riding through West Florida.  It’s unclear if he had been to St. Augustine to discuss matters with the British there, or whether he was meeting with Creeks in Georgia, or perhaps both.  

In a letter dated January 7, Alexander McGillvray, the son of a Scottish father and Creek mother, wrote a letter to Captain Arturo O’Neal, an officer employed by the Spanish government who was fighting with the Chickasaw.  McGillvray wrote that Colbert had been killed.  He had been returning to the Chickasaw nation.  While traveling through West Florida, in modern day Alabama, his horse threw him, killing him instantly.  

There has been some speculation that Colbert was actually killed by a slave who was riding with him, or perhaps at the instigation of Chickasaw chiefs who saw Colbert as an impediment to them being able to reach a peaceful settlement with Spanish officials.  Whatever the true reason, Colbert was dead.

For everyone else, the war was over.  It was time to make peace.

Next week, Continental Soldiers march on Philadelphia, and they are not happy!

- - -

Next Episode 327 Continental Instability

Previous Episode 325 The Threat of Peace

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Further Reading

Websites

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Colman, Roger Arkansas Post Story, Santa Fe, NM: SW Cultural Resources Center, 1987. 

Gayarré, Charles History of Louisiana, New York: William J. Widdleton, 1867. 

Martini, Don Chickasaw Empire The Story of the Colbert Family, 1986. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Haynes, Robert V. The Natchez District and the American Revolution, Univ. Press of MS, 1976. 

Kling, Stephen L. Jr. and Guy B. Braden James Colbert and His Chickasaw Legacy, THGC Publishing, 2022. 

Paquette, Gabriel (ed) & Gonzalo M. Quintero Saravia (Editor) Spain and the American Revolution: New Approaches and Perspectives, Routledge, 2019. 

Walker, Rickey Butch Chickasaw Chief George Colbert: His Family and His Country, Bluewater Publishing, 2013. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, September 1, 2024

ARP325 Threat of Peace


Last time, we covered the struggles of the Continental Army in late 1782 and early 1783 to deal with the fact that the war was coming to an end, and that Congress seemed inclined to break every promise that it had made to the officers and men who had sacrificed so much to end the war.  Washington had to snuff out a potential mutiny by the officers at Newburgh, NY.  This week, we take a look at the crisis from Congress’ point of view.

Financial Breaking Point

A big part of the problem was the Congress was broke. This was nothing new.  Congress had financed the first few years of the war based on printing paper promissory notes that would somehow be reimbursed later.  Those reimbursements never came and Congress just needed more and more money to fund the war.  By 1779 hat paper money, the Continental dollar, was worthless and Congress could not issue more.  By 1780, most of its money came from French loans, and a handful of other European loans.  Even those loans, however, were not enough to cover the costs of the war.  

In 1781, Congress had appointed Robert Morris as Superintendent of Finance.  Morris created the Bank of North America to receive loan money from abroad, and issued paper notes against that money to circulate as currency.  These so-called “Morris Notes” carried Morris’ personal guarantee of payment, meaning that people who might no longer trust Congress to repay might trust one of the wealthiest merchants in North America instead.

While Morris could play some financial games to keep things going, there also had to be some permanent solution to pay for the war.  Congress had tried to compel the states to provide funds, based on the relative wealth of each state.  The states, however, simply refused to pay.  Congress could do nothing about it.  

In late 1782, Morris received part of the final French loan. With it came word that this was the last loan the US would receive.  France only provided this last loan to ensure the US remained in the war until France finalized its peace treaty with Britain. Once that happened, France had zero interest in pouring more money into US coffers.  In fact, it wanted the US to start repaying its older loans.

With debts continuing to pile up, and no future revenue in sight, Morris decided to up the ante.  In June 1782, he just stopped making interest payments on all government debt.  Many of the creditors who relied on these interest payments were local merchants who had supported the cause for years, eventually hoping to be repaid.  The failure even to pay the interest on the debt made clear to all that Congress was reneging on its financial promises.  When creditors began to accost Morris about their money, he pointed out that he was one of the largest creditors who was being cut off.  He recommended that the creditors unite and petition Congress and the states to do something about repaying their debts.

Proposed Tariff

In July, Morris issued his Report on Public Credit essentially saying that the US had massive debts from the war and no way to repay them.  Morris suggested a number of options to raise revenue.  The main source would be a 5% tariff on all imports.  Unlike earlier efforts, this would be a direct tax collected by Confederation agents at all major ports.  The problem was that any revenue act needed the support of all 13 states.  Congress got twelve states voted to support the tariff, but Rhode Island refused.  

The leaders there thought that a tariff on imports was unfair since most of their revenue came from imports. Rhode Island wanted to raise revenue from some other source, such as a property tax instead, or funding the war from the sale of western lands.  Also, the whole Revolutionary war had been fought over the idea that states should be the only entity allowed to collect taxes.  Giving that power to an outside entity seemed to run against that whole premise of the war itself.  

Morris and others in Congress pressured Rhode Island for months to agree to the tariff.  Morris even hired Thomas Paine to publish a series of articles in support of the tariff.  At one time, years earlier, Morris and Paine had been political foes.  But Paine needed the money and seemed to support the idea that a national tariff would help to bind the union together.

In December, Congress sent a delegation to Rhode Island to put some in-person pressure on the state to accept the tariff as an absolute necessity.  While on their way, the delegation learned that Virginia decided to repeal its approval of the tariff.  With that, the delegation simply returned to Philadelphia.  Rhode Island was no longer the only hold out.

Virginia’s change of heart was largely the result of Arthur Lee.  You may recall that Lee had been a diplomat in Europe for many years.  There, he made enemies of Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams. Lee seemed to see conspiracies wherever he went, and was not shy about spreading misinformation about them.  As a delegate to Congress, Lee set his sights on Robert Morris.   Lee simply did not trust the financier and figured there had to be some corruption if the man had access to so much money.  Lee got Virginia legislators to kill the tariff bill simply as an effort to cut Morris’s power. I think its also telling that Lee wanted Morris to resign and probably wanted to replace Morris as Superintendent of Finance sot hat he could be in charge of all that money.

Army Demands Money

About the same time the Congressional delegation returned to Philadelphia to face a dead tariff bill, the Continental Army delegation headed by General Alexander McDougall showed up, demanding answers on pay and pensions.  

A few weeks later, in January of 1783, Morris delivered more bad news.  Congress had already overdrawn against its loans from France, and essentially had no choice but to keep over drawing those accounts as it was the only source of funds available.  Congress’ counter offer, via Morris, was a promise to provide just one month’s pay in specie to help tide them over.

Around this same time, after Morris promised one month's pay, he received a note from General Nathanael Greene saying that Greene had to promise his men two month’s pay to keep them from walking away. Morris knew that if he gave one month’s pay to the northern army and two month’s pay to the southern army the northern army was going to be particularly unhappy.

Even coming up with that one month of pay would be nearly impossible. Morris hoped to continue to overdraw his French credit.  He received a note from French Minister Luzerne ordering him to stop drawing on his French credit.

Morris was also counting on the sale of Morris Notes in Cuba in exchange for specie that he could use to pay the army.  Morris was constantly shuffling around money to do whatever he could to make money available.  Morris also agreed to pay the two months pay to the southern army, but sent one month for pay and the remainder of the money on the books as repayment for supplies.  He hoped this would prevent the northern army from finding out the southern army got more pay.  

Even if the money from Cuba arrived to pay the army, Morris saw no hope beyond that of continuing.  With ever mounting debts and no hope of revenue, Morris did not see anything he could do.  He submitted notice of his resignation to the President of Congress, effective May 31.  Some historians have argued that Morris announced this privately and several months in advance, hoping to get Congress to approve some sort of revenue bill.  That was certainly a possibility, but Morris had grown frustrated and was fed up with trying to find new ways to juggle credit for money they did not have and never would have.  Morris confided in his diary that he believed that failure to repay debts was simply unjust and if that was the road Congress was going to take, he did not want to be a part of that.

Congress Argues

Congress remained divided. Delegates like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison strongly advocated for revenue measures to pay the army and government creditors.  Others, like Arthur Lee feared giving Congress any power over money, seeing it as a threat to states' rights.

Hamilton took the initiative in Congress, rising to introduce four resolutions.  The first supported providing the one month’s pay to the army that the committee had promised.  Second was a resolution that the state would be responsible for all back pay of their soldiers up until August 1, 1780.  From that point on, Congress would be responsible for all the back pay.  The third resolution called on Congress to make every effort to obtain the necessary money, either through state requisitions or direct revenue measures, but that it needed to raise the money to pay off its creditors.  It was vague on how to make this work.  Finally, Congress needed to confirm its half pay pensions for life for Continental officers as promised, or come up with some lump sum payment for a certain period of years in lieu of that promised pension.

With the army on the verge of mutiny Congress approved the payment of one month’s pay.  The other resolutions ran into considerable debate.  Some states wanted to move up State responsibilities from August to December, 1780, but eventually the August 1 date passed.  That was when Morris had taken over the Department of Finance and wanted to deal with costs during his tenure.  Debate over the third resolution, actually raising money, ground into a debate over which forms of revenue were constitutional under the Articles of Confederation.  That never went anywhere.

The debate over pensions was a larger one.  It wasn’t just the money.  Opponents of pensions believed that making men dependent on government pay was a blow against freedom.  It would make them lazy and dependent on government handouts.  It would also create political support for a stronger central government that had to be there to make those payments, something many delegates opposed.

Much of the debate at this time centered around how much of a lump sum to provide instead of that lifetime pension.  Hamilton proposed six years.  Congress rejected that. Other proposals ranging from 5 to 6 ½ years were also rejected.  It became clear that many New England delegates would not support any pay at any level.  Congress ended up tabling discussion until the states could consider whether to send new delegates.

By February 1783, word arrived from Europe that the two sides had reached a preliminary peace treaty.  While most people took this as good news, it also made it difficult for Congress to do anything for the army since the soldiers would no longer be needed. There was also a pressing concern that when the Congress ordered the army disbanded, the men might not return home until they got what they were promised.  In short, the end of the war created a deadline for Congress to decide how it would keep its promises for when the war ended.

Congress continued to debate a funding scheme that would allow them to pay back the debts that they owed.  It also debated who should be paid back.  A new argument developed among some who thought the army should get priority for payment and that other creditors would just have to wait.  Another faction thought all creditors deserved repayment.  Making the other creditors wait behind the army might mean they never get repaid at all since the real political pressure was coming from the army.  Also, many of the creditors were some of the most powerful men in each state.  If these men saw little or no hope of repayment, they would likely oppose the taxes that Congress had to raise to pay off all the debts.

Tempers flared in Congress, but neither side could get anything done.  The nationalists, led by delegates, such as Alexander Hamilton, believed it to be a moral duty for Congress to repay everyone who had lent money or property to the cause, as well as the soldiers who had sacrificed so many years.  

Another supporter of the nationalists was Gouverneur Morris who was an assistant to Robert Morris in managing the nation's finances.  Although the two men shared a last name, they were not related.  Robert was from Pennsylvania.  Gouverneur had come to Philadelphia as a delegate from New York and was now working in the Department of Finance.  

Gouverneur wrote to General Henry Knox, warning the general about plans to force states to pay the army rather than having Congress make sure everyone got paid.  He also warned about the idea of Congress paying the army first.  While officers might find that tempting, Morris told him that the plan would destroy any effort to implement a tax that could begin to pay everyone.  He urged the army to express support for the nationalist plan to raise direct revenue to pay both the army and other creditors.  A few days later, Morris wrote a similar letter to Nathanael Greene in Charleston on these same matters.

The officers were reluctant to support either side.  They did want to alienate any delegates and were open to just about any solution the delegates adopted that meant they would get their pay and benefits.  Exactly how that would happen was up to Congress and not up to them to say.

Unable to come up with a solution, some delegates in Congress proposed another solution: don’t allow the army to disband and go home, even after the peace treaty was final.  The army would remain intact until it was paid its benefits.  This put off the concern that soldiers would riot if sent home without their promised pay and benefits.  It would allow the soldiers to remain under control.  Some Continental officers, including General Knox, approved of this idea.  It would keep pressure on the Congress to resolve the pay issue quickly.  It would also mean the men would not mutiny on their own and march on Congress.

This option, of course, came with more problems.  For starters, most of the soldiers were more than ready to go home. They needed to get back to work and wanted to be with their families.  They had enlisted for the length of the war.  The government had no authority to hold them to service once the war was over.  Such a solution also meant that Congress would be obligated to pay for food, clothing, and pay for additional months.  Standing armies in peacetime had been argued as a sign of tyranny. Most delegates believed that Congress should never support such an idea.  On the other hand, trying to disband the army and have the army refuse the orders to disband could be even worse.

No good solution seemed in sight.  Hamilton wrote to general Washington about the impasse in Congress, and recommended that the army, probably through Knox, put more pressure on Congress to find a resolution.  Some historians have taken these letters to mean that Hamilton wanted to let the Army mutiny and march on Philadelphia.  Of course, the correspondence does not say that explicitly, but they argue Hamilton had to be circumspect about what he really wanted.  To me, the letter indicates that Hamilton wanted more efforts by the army to petition and have top officers meet with Congress to lobby them, but no suggestion of mutiny seems even implied.

Around this same time, Hamilton put more pressure on delegates by spreading his view that General Washington was losing popularity within the army because Washington was standing by Congress.  In a discussion with several other delegates in a private setting, Hamilton suggested that the officers might overthrow Washington and follow a new leader who would fight for their interests.  Although the name of this alternative leader was not recorded, it appears that he was talking about General Horatio Gates.

At the end of February, Congress once again took up debate over pensions. The delegates finally agreed to offer a lump sum payment of five years salary in lieu of half pay pensions for life. While they finally agreed on a number, that still did nothing to settle where the money to pay those lump sums would come from.

In March things reached a boiling point in Newburgh.  As we covered last week, the officers met with an apparent intent of taking action, but General Washington was able to talk them down and await further action by Congress.

Once Washington resolve the matter, he wrote to President Boudinot and other members of Congress, telling them the crisis was calmed for now, but that Congress had to do something soon to keep its promises to the army.  Around this same time, Robert Morris doubled down on his threat to resign in may, telling Congress he planned to make his decision public.  This would have created complete financial panic.  Congress called his bluff and granted the request.  Almost immediately delegates began attacking Morris in the press for being the cause of all of America’s financial woes.

Meanwhile Congress also got serious about coming up with a funding plan. To allay the fears about a permanent national tax, some members suggested limiting the tax to 25 years.  Opponents argued they could not do this unless they could also guarantee that all the debts would be paid off in that time.

Several months earlier the states had been asked to survey their lands and report back on their value.  Congress looked at a number of possible formulations for taxes, taking into account the various state populations, wealth possession of western lands, how much they had already paid to the war effort, etc.  One point of contention was how to count slaves.  Northerners wanted to count slaves in the population.  Southerners objected on the basis that slaves would be counted twice. They were counted for population, but also for property value.  Benjamin Harrison proposed a compromise where slaves would be counted as ½ of a person.  A delegate from New England suggested a compromise of ¾.  Finally, on a proposal by James Madison, the delegates finally agreed to count a slave as ⅗ of a person.

News of Peace

Debate was interrupted on March 12, when a ship arrived with the preliminary peace treaty between the US and Britain.  While this was preliminary, the ship had left France three months earlier.  By the time it arrived, most people assumed that everything had been finalized in Europe.  Less than two weeks later, another message arrived reporting a general peace agreement that resulted in the cessation of all hostilities.

These messages came at the same time that Washington’s reports of his Newburgh address, and his urgent petitions for Congress to act also arrived.  Amidst all this pressure, Congress finally agreed to a commutation of officer pensions into a lump sum.

Meanwhile Washington’s letters to friends in Philadelphia, including Hamilton, revealed his suspicion that the nationalists in Congress were using the army as a pawn in order to create a larger source of Continental currency.  He suspected that delegates were willing to refuse to disband the army and provide separation pay in a scheme to force Congress to adopt a stronger national economic plan.

In one if his letters, Washington famously warned Hamilton that “the Army (considering the irritable state it is in, its sufferings & composition) is a dangerous instrument to play with.”

Next week, although the war is coming to an end, not everyone has received word. The British attack the Spanish Fort Carlos in what is today Arkansas.

- - -

Next Episode 326 Fort Carlos 

Previous Episode 324 Newburgh Conspiracy

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

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Further Reading

Websites

Schoderbek, Michael P. “ROBERT MORRIS AND REPORTING FOR THE TREASURY UNDER THE U.S. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.” The Accounting Historians Journal, vol. 26, no. 2, 1999, pp. 1–34. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40698202

Nuxoll, Elizabeth M. “The Bank of North America and Robert Morris’s Management of the Nation’s First Fiscal Crisis.” Business and Economic History, vol. 13, 1984, pp. 159–70. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23702711

Report on Restoring Public Credit, [6 March] 1783: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-06-02-0100

Robert Morris to the President of Congress, 15 January 1782: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0151-0002

Wensyel, James W. “The Newburgh Conspiracy” American Heritage Magazine, April/May 1981. https://www.americanheritage.com/newburgh-conspiracy

The Newburgh Incident: https://research.colonialwilliamsburg.org/foundation/journal/Autumn14/civilian.cfm

Newburgh Conspiracy: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/newburgh-conspiracy

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

A Collection of papers, relative to half-pay and commutation of half-pay, granted by Congress to the officers of the army. Compiled, by permission of His Excellency General Washington, from the original papers in his possession.  Fishkill, NY: Samuel Loudon, 1783. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Head, David A Crisis of Peace: George Washington, the Newburgh Conspiracy, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Pegasus Books, 2019.

Martin, James Kirby & Sean Hannah Leading with Character: George Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy, George Washington Leadership Inst. 2017. 

Richards, Dave, Swords in Their Hands: George Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy, Pisgah Press, 2015. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, August 18, 2024

ARP324 Newburgh Conspiracy


Last week, we covered the effective end to the war in the south, when the British evacuated Charleston, South Carolina in December 1782.  After that, the only significant British presence in the United States was the main army in and around New York City.  

General Washington’s greatest foe in 1782 was the fight against the idea that the war was over.  Over the course of that year, all Americans waited for word from Europe about the peace negotiations.  Officers and men wanted to go home and Congress and the states were sick of paying for an army.

Despite this, Washington faced a very real British army in New York that consisted of thousands of Regulars, Hessians and loyalists.  He needed to have an army that was ready to confront this enemy.  Washington continued to conduct regular drills, rejected most requests for furloughs, and continually hounded Congress for more uniforms, shoes, food, and supplies.

With the British still reeling from the surrender at Yorktown, Washington, and many others, believed that one final blow would end the war more quickly.  In early 1782, Washington was pushing for another joint campaign with the French army under Rochambeau against New York City, or even  possibly Charleston.  

Rochambeau’s Army

In July, Washington received word that the French army that had been encamped near Yorktown since the battle the previous fall, was marching up to New York.  He also received word that a French naval squadron was sailing to North America from the West Indies. 

Washington met with Rochambeau in Philadelphia to discuss a possible fall campaign.  He was disappointed to learn that Rochambeau had no plans for another campaign.  Instead, he simply planned to move the French Army into New York and await word on the peace negotiations.  Still hopeful, The Continental Army moved to Verplanck’s Point, on the east bank of the Hudson River, about a day’s march from the British lines at the northern tip of Manhattan.

Word of the Evacuation of Charleston and the expected evacuation of New York meant that Rochambeau had no interest in sending his army into a fight to take ground that would be given away in a few months.  After a few weeks, the French army marched to Boston. There, the army awaited transports to take them to the West Indies, where they would either invade Jamaica, or perhaps cooperate with Spain on another target.  The French army would depart from Boston on Christmas Day, 1782, headed for the West Indies.

Winter Quarters

Without any military campaign that year, keeping the soldiers busy was critical for other reasons.  Men left with little to do typically turned to drinking and fighting with each other.  A fair percentage of soldiers simply deserted. 

By late 1782, it was not only the enlisted soldiers, but also the officers, who voiced greater discontent.  Unlike enlisted men, officers could resign their commissions and go home.  The ability to keep an army in the field depended on a reliable officer corps.

Earlier in the war, when things were desperate and Congress had no way to pay anyone, Congress passed resolutions offering pensions, eventually offering all officers a pension of half-pay for life if they served until the end of the war.  Many officers were still holding out for that promise.

The growing concern, though, was that Congress would simply refuse to honor that promise, much like it had refused to honor the promises of pay and adequate support while the army was in the field.

The Continental Army went into winter quarters in October of 1782.  The bulk of the army moved north from Verplanck’s Point to an area around the towns of Newbergh and New Windsor, two relatively small communities on the western bank of the Hudson, a few miles north of West Point.  

Enlisted men had to build their own quarters.  Timothy Pickering, the Quartermaster General, procured the use of 1600 acres west of New Windsor to build the winter encampment.  The men would build log huts with 1100 square feet of living space divided among two rooms.  Each cabin would house 16 men ,with one fireplace for heat.  

Those rooms must have been pretty miserable, especially when you consider you were bunking with 15 other men who probably had not had a bath in months.  The men also had a bad habit of urinating inside the house much of the time.  Even if they did not appreciate the health aspects, you would think the stench alone would be enough to discourage that behavior.  Yet it appears to have been a common practice.

Gates Returns

While many soldiers wanted to return home, one officer was returning to duty.  Major General Horatio Gates had left service after his embarrassing performance at the Battle of Camden, South Carolina, in 1780.  After his army’s defeat and Gates fleeing his own army, Congress had suspended his service pending an inquiry.

That inquiry or court martial never materialized, so Gates sat at home in Virginia awaiting a new assignment.  Many in Congress hoped the general would simply resign.  But Gates had no intention of that.  In February 1782, Gates wrote to Washington to congratulate him on Yorktown and to ask about what role he might play in the next campaign.  Washington brushed off Gates with a letter saying that the Secretary of War Benjamin Lincoln, would be responsible for any new assignments.  

That was actually good for Gates because Lincoln and Gates got along well.  Lincoln had served under Gates at Saratoga, and after surrendering an army at Charleston in 1780, Lincoln appreciated a general’s need for rehabilitation.  Lincoln recommended that Gates be returned to active duty.  Gates traveled to Philadelphia to lobby for his new assignment.  A congressional committee made up of Richard Henry Lee, John Rutledge, and Ezekiel Cornell, held hearings with General Gates over several days in August.  Gates managed to round up several officers who supported his return to duty.  

On the committee’s recommendation, Congress repealed its resolution that Gates face a court enquiry and that he return to duty with the main army.  Based on his seniority, Gates was second in command of the Continental Army, behind only George Washington.  After Congress cleared his name, Gates returned home to Virginia for a few weeks.  He then traveled to New York where Washington gave him command of the right wing of the army, in charge of the New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut lines.

Almost as soon as he arrived, Gates started complaining about housing.  Officers typically took over local homes, often forcing the residents to cram themselves into one or two bedrooms.  Gates wanted a house owned by John Ellison.  General Henry Knox had lived there for a while, but it was currently  being used by the Director of the military hospital, Dr. John Cochran.  The doctor refused to vacate, even threatening to challenge Pickering to a duel over the matter.  Pickering, as Quartermaster General, was responsible for procuring Gates’ quarters.  Gates wrote to several delegates in Philadelphia about the matter, before Pickering was finally able to evict Cochran and move Gates into the house.

Petitions and Grievances

While Gates was pleased with his return to duty, other officers remained deeply concerned about the coming end of the war.  Officers were owed back pay.  Many of them had fronted their own money to pay for the needs of those under their command and expected Congress to provide reimbursement.  Many of them had also given up years of service, meaning they were personally bankrupt and had no jobs to return to when the war ended.

Many were relying on the promises of a pension that they had received years earlier. But they already saw that some officers who already retired due to illness or injury, were not receiving their promised pensions.  Many saw that their years of service and sacrifice might be rewarded simply by being discarded, and possibly even facing debtors’ prison.

The officers of the Massachusetts line began working on a strategy to demand their pensions.  They initially planned to send a delegation to Congress, but learned that Congress had already tabled any discussion of pensions until at least January, 1783.  

Instead, they opted to petition the Massachusetts state legislature.  They were pretty confident that Massachusetts would deny their petition.  But that at least meant that when they could petition Congress, that Congress could not give the expected response of "go speak with their state government first."

The officers sent a delegation to Boston in September.  They got the runaround for several months.  Eventually they learned that Samuel Osgood, a Massachusetts delegate to the Continental Congress, had written state officials to inform them that if they offered any pensions, they would not get any credit toward the state’s share of war expenses.  The Massachusetts legislature then tabled their own discussion of pensions in order to wait and see what Congress would do.

After returning to camp, the Massachusetts officers recruited General Henry Knox to voice their concerns.  They also reached out to officers from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and New Hampshire .  The officers of the Rhode Island line, who were stationed in Albany, would join the group later.

The Knox Committee asked officers to submit their complaints.  Most of the complaints centered around the obvious: lack of pay, poor living standards, and the lack of confidence that they would receive their promised pensions.  Most officers noted that they planned to resign soon if these matters were not addressed to their satisfaction.

The Committee met at Hortons Tavern in New Windsor during late November and early December, in an attempt to summarize the complaints into a single petition.  The committee documents essentially said that in joining the Army, they had made a contract. The government was not keeping up its obligations.  As they continued to work on drafts, the focused more on the frustration and misery that the men were feeling.

In December, the committee finalized its Memorial to Congress. The point of the document the level of desperation that the army was reaching.  One famously quoted paragraph reads: 

We have borne all that men can bear; our property is expended, our private resources are at an end, and our friends are wearied out and disgusted with our incessant applications. We therefore most seriously and earnestly beg that a supply of money may be forwarded to the army as soon as possible. The uneasiness of the soldiers, for want of pay, is great and dangerous; any further experiments on their patience may have fatal effects.

Fourteen officers, including Henry Knox and three other generals, signed the document on December 7th.  The committee appointed three officers, Major General Alexander McDougall from New York, Colonel John Brooks from Massachusetts, and Mattias Ogden of New Jersey to carry the Memorial to Philadelphia.  Before leaving, committee members had to take up a collection to try to help the three officers cover their travel expenses.

The group arrived in Philadelphia on December 29.  By that time, Congress had already ended its session until January.  The officers still met with Robert Morris, superintendent of finance, and with other key delegates who were still in town.

When Congress reconvened on January 6, it received the officers and their Memorial, and appointed a grand committee, with one delegate from each of the 13 states, to consider the problem.  Three days later, McDougal wrote to Knox that Congress had received the memorial positively, but the fact remained that it simply did not have the money to keep its promises.

The following day, the officers met with the grand committee.  The basic gist was that Congress didn’t have the money they owed to the army and asked the officers what they thought would happen if the demands were not met.  The officers essentially said that the army was on the verge of mutiny, that officers had already put down several, and that with officers’ morale so bad, it was not clear that they could stop another one.  Colonel Brooks warned “a disappointment might throw them blindly into extremities.”  There was some discussion about eliminating the pension and giving a lump sum payment for a few years instead. But since Congress had no money for a lump sum, it didn’t seem like a useful solution.

The grand committee formed a subcommittee to work with Morris to come up with some response.  Morris could not make any promises on just about anything  Instead he focused on just trying to pay the army their pay for one month, January.  Morris offered payment to the soldier of 50 cents per week.  Since a private was supposed to make $6.67 per month. Offering to actually pay that out that one month's pay over four months seems rather pathetic.  Yet it was more than the men were used to receiving.  For the officers, Morris offered a choice. Either they could accept pay in the form of his paper Morris Notes, or they could wait until after the enlisted men got paid, and then receive specie  for one month, some time after that. Essentially, Morris was only offering to pay their January salaries some time in April, with no promise of back pay, front pay, or anything else.

As Congress considered the matter, those in winter camp continued to suffer.  A local sheriff arrested the Quartermaster General, Timothy Pickering for unpaid debts.  Pickering’s signature was on just about every promissory note issued by the army.  Since New York did not provide any immunity for officers engaged in official duties, one creditor attempted to use this local collection practice to collect what the army owed him.  This was another sign of disrespect to the army.  To the officers, they were giving everything, and the public simply did care.

Temple of Virtue

To keep the army busy, Washington ordered the construction of a new building.  This new building could be used for larger meetings or other events.  It was 110 feet long by 30 feet wide.  Washington simply called it  the “New Building”.  Others began to call it the “Temple of Virtue.” A reference to some Masonic literature from the time.  The Temple opened on February 6, 1783 occasioned by a parade, after which officers listened to a sermon preached by Reverend Israel Evans.  Washington used the celebration as an opportunity to pardon several prisoners and ordered the issuance of an extra half-cup of rum to each soldier.

Around this same time rumors of peace began to arrive.  The King’s November address to Parliament, where he recognized that they colonies in North America were now "free and independent states” was falling on delighted ears.  While this was a cause for celebration, it also made clear that a need for a resolution to the problem of paying the army was closer than ever.

On March 8, Colonel Walter Stewart returned from Philadelphia after several months of sick leave.  Stewart was the inspector general for the northern department, and also a former aide to General Horatio Gates.  The night after his return to camp, Stewart met with about a dozen officers at Gates' headquarters to give them the latest news from Philadelphia.  He brought word that Congress was still dithering on how to respond to the memorial and that Congress was not even paying the interest on its debts anymore.  

The officers decided to call a larger meeting at the Temple of Virtue two days later, to consider what next steps the army should take to get what it was owed.  Gates’ aide de camp, Major John Armstrong, wrote a notice for the meeting - although it was circulated anonymously.

The notice simply said that a fellow soldier wanted to address the officers.  But the tone of the notice made clear this was going to focus on the frustration that had been building over Congressional inaction.  Here is a short snippet from the notice:

After a pursuit of seven long years, the object for which we set out, is at length brought within our reach.—Yes, my friends, that suffering courage of yours, was active once; it has con­ducted the United States of America, through a doubtful and a bloody war—it has placed her in the chair of independency, and peace returns again to bless—Whom? A country willing to redress your wrongs, cherish your worth, and reward your services?—A country courting your return to private life, with tears of gratitude and smiles of admiration?—Longing to divide with you that independency which your gallantry has given, and those riches which your wounds have preserved?—Is this the case? Or is it rather a country that tramples upon your rights, disdains your cries, and insults your distresses?

The following morning, this anonymous pamphlet began spreading all over camp.  The mutinous language of the notice was of concern enough. But of similar concern to General Washington was the fact that he was not even notified of this army-wide meeting of officers.  It seemed clear that this was an effort to bypass Washington’s efforts to keep the army under control. 

Hours before the meeting was supposed to begin, Washington issued his general orders for March 11, condemning the meeting as disorderly, and instead notified the army that there would be a meeting four days later on March 15 for the Committee that had met with Congress to provide a report on progress to the officers.

Washington then dashed off letters, including one to the President of Congress, Elias Boudinot, urging Congress to come up with a solution to the pay and pension issues right away.. He also wrote to Alexander Hamilton, where he was more direct about his concerns of an uprising, and his suspicion that Colonel Stewart had consulted with others in Philadelphia about stirring up the army in order to get Congress to act.

Everyone seemed well aware that the army was at a precipice. Frustrated officers seemed sick of Congress’ failure to live up to its promises.  With a peace treaty expected any day, the army might be disbanded without getting any of the things it was promised.  Many wanted to refuse any orders to disband and to use the military’s power to take what they were owed.

In the days leading up to the meeting, officers argued with one another about whether to remain patient and respect the civil authority, or whether it was time to act.  Washington met with many officers over these days.  Although meetings were private and we don’t have a record of what was discussed, we can be confident Washington was trying to both calm the situation and probably also determine which senior officer were still with him.

Washington’s orders from the 11th only said that a senior officer would address the officers on Saturday.  When the meeting began, General Horatio Gates called the meeting to order, with over 100 officers present.

Everyone was shocked when Washington personally entered the Temple of Virtue shortly after the meeting began.  Washington never spoke to large groups, and rarely even ever spoke at length.  His presence underscored the importance of this moment.

As he spoke to the men, Washington essentially condemned the attempt to reject military discipline.  The anonymous letter calling a meeting without going through the commander, the threats to refuse lawful orders to disband, the distrust of Congress as the lawful government, seemed to go against everything they had fought for and sacrificed.

To back up his views, Washington tried to read from several documents, including a recent letter he had received from a member of congress.  After stumbling over the first few lines, he paused and put on his glasses.  Most of the men were shocked because they had never seen him wear glasses before. He commended in doing so “Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my Spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country.”

With that line, the audience burst into tears.  Washington had underscored his own sacrifice to the cause of liberty and was begging his men to not let all of that be thrown away.

After Washington completed his address, the officers resolved unanimously thank the commander for his address, to express continued confidence in the justice of Congress, that they would rely on Washington to continue discussions with Congress, and would reject with disdain the propositions of the anonymous pamphlet. With that, the Continental Army's flirtation with mutiny was set aside, at least for now.

Next week, we’ll take a look at why Congress was having so much trouble addressing the concerns of the army.

- - -

Next Episode 325 Threat of Peace

Previous Episode 323 Evacuation of Charleston

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

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Further Reading

Websites

“General Orders, 29 August 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-09301

Head, David “The Officers’ Spirited Memorial: A Prelude to the Newburgh Conspiracy” Journal of the American Revolution, Nov. 14 ,2019. https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/11/the-officers-spirited-memorial-a-prelude-to-the-newburgh-conspiracy

“General Orders, 11 March 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-10811

Wensyel, James W. “The Newburgh Conspiracy” American Heritage Magazine, April/May 1981. https://www.americanheritage.com/newburgh-conspiracy

The Newburgh Incident: https://research.colonialwilliamsburg.org/foundation/journal/Autumn14/civilian.cfm

Newburgh Conspiracy: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/newburgh-conspiracy

Washington Newburgh Address: https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/t-2437.09443.pdf

Kohn, Richard H. “The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d’Etat.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2, 1970, pp. 188–220. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1918650

Nelson, Paul David. “Horatio Gates at Newburgh, 1783: A Misunderstood Role.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1, 1972, pp. 143–58. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1921331

Skeen, C. Edward, and Richard H. Kohn. “The Newburgh Conspiracy Reconsidered.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 1974, pp. 273–98. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1920913

Haggard, Robert F. “The Nicola Affair: Lewis Nicola, George Washington, and American Military Discontent during the Revolutionary War.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 146, no. 2, 2002, pp. 139–69. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558199

Washington, George THE LAST OFFICIAL ADDRESS, OF HIS EXCELLENCY General WASHINGTON, TO THE Legislatures of the United States. TO WHICH IS ANNEXED, A COLLECTION OF PAPERS RELATIVE TO HALF - PAY, AND COMMUTATION OF HALF - PAY, Granted by CONGRESS to the OFFICERS of the ARMY. HARTFORD: PRINTED BY HUDSON AND GOODWIN. M.DCC.LXXXIII (1783) (from Oxford Text Archive). https://ota.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/repository/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12024/N14414/N14414.html

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Cutler, William Parker Life, Journals and Correspondence of Rev. Manasseh Cutler, LL. D, Cincinnati, R. Clarke & Co. 1888. 

A Collection of papers, relative to half-pay and commutation of half-pay, granted by Congress to the officers of the army. Compiled, by permission of His Excellency General Washington, from the original papers in his possession.  Fishkill, NY: Samuel Loudon, 1783. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Head, David A Crisis of Peace: George Washington, the Newburgh Conspiracy, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Pegasus Books, 2019.

Martin, James Kirby & Sean Hannah Leading with Character: George Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy, George Washington Leadership Inst. 2017. 

Richards, Dave, Swords in Their Hands: George Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy, Pisgah Press, 2015. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.