Sunday, August 20, 2023

ARP279 Race to the Dan


In our last episode, we took a detour to cover Arnold’s invasion of Virginia.  Before that, we covered the showdown between General Daniel Morgan’s army and the British army under Colonel Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens.

Even before General Cornwallis received word of the British defeat at Cowpens, he was preparing to renew his offensive into North Carolina.  With the arrival of General Alexander Leslie’s reinforcements, his army was upwards of 3300 men, about two-thirds of whom were regulars.

On January 18, 1781, Leslie’s men made their final march from Camden to link up with Cornwallis at Winnsboro.  That same day, Colonel Tarleton had returned to camp with less than 200 men, from a force of over 1200 that had led a couple of weeks earlier.  Cornwallis’ new army was now closer to 2500 men.

Into North Carolina

Undeterred, Cornwallis was ready to move  The following day, his army began its march northward.  At first, Cornwallis hoped to confront Morgan and finally defeat that division of the Continental Army.  Cornwallis not only wanted to defeat Morgan’s army, he also wanted to reclaim the 600 prisoners that Morgan had taken at Cowpens.

Greene Crosses the Dan River

But Morgan was not looking for a fight.  He had moved his men out of South Carolina and back into North Carolina, taking his prisoners with him.  His goal was to get the prisoners to a safe location, then reconnect with General Greene’s army somewhere in central North Carolina.

The British Army under Cornwallis found the march slow going.  His army moved only about twelve miles per day, taking nearly a week to make the march to Ramsour’s Mill, the site of a battle months earlier.  When Cornwallis arrived on January 25, he learned that Morgan’s army had passed through the area two days earlier.  Despite sticking to back roads, Morgan was averaging close to twenty miles per day.

Cornwallis spent a few days  at Ramsour’s Mill.  He was frustrated by his army’s slow movement and by his lack of good intelligence following the loss of Tarleton’s legion.  The general made the decision to burn his own supply wagons.  They were slowing down his army. He needed to move much more quickly if he was going to catch Morgan and Greene. It was not just the officers’ china and other luxuries that got tossed.  Tents, clothing, even the rum supply, went into the bonfire.  The men only carried what they could take on their backs.

One of the things each man was required to carry was an extra set of soles for his shoes.  Cornwallis expected to do a lot of walking in this campaign and wanted every soldier ready for that.

With the British on the march, so were Greene and his Continentals.  Greene hoped to reunite with Morgan’s army.  He also sent messages to Francis Marion and Light Horse Harry Lee in South Carolina, calling on them to bring their 300 horsemen to join the main army.

Greene and Morgan met up at Beattie’s Ford on the Catawba River on January 30.  Greene personally had raced ahead of his own army to catch up with Morgan.  He ordered General Isaac Huger to lead the army to Salisbury, further to the north.  When Greene met with Morgan at Beattie’s Ford, the men were aware that the enemy was already in sight.

On the other side of the river, Cornwallis’ British Regulars had encamped.  Only heavy rains and a swollen river kept them from attacking in force.

Greene had hoped that the American victory at Cowpens and the British invasion of North Carolina would turn out the local militia.  About 800 militia had turned out under General William Lee Davidson.  But these were not enough, even if the men could be trusted to fight.  Further, hundreds of Virginia militia who had been marching with Greene’s army, insisted on going home after their enlistments ended.  Morgan’s force was exhausted and much smaller than the enemy army facing them across the river. 

Greene held a council of war with Morgan, Colonel William Washington and militia General Davidson to decide what to do next.  The enemy would be able to ford the river within a few days, and Greene did not have the army assembled that he needed to defeat them.

The council agreed that retreat was the best option.  Davidson would keep the local militia at fords along the river, hoping to delay Cornwallis’ advance as long as possible.  Meanwhile the rest of the army would retreat north.

Cowan’s Ford

Cornwallis camped at Beattie’s Ford, wait for the river to fall enough for his men to cross.  Knowing that the Americans would contest the crossing, Cornwallis sent the bulk of his army four miles down river to Cowan’s Ford, which was not as good a crossing, but where Cornwallis hoped it would be less guarded.  

Cowan's Ford Crossing
On the American side, Davidson suspected that Cornwallis might attempt a crossing at Cowan’s Ford, so he deployed about 250 of his infantry militia there to contest any attempted crossing.  The main ford was two to four feet deep, and crossed an island in the river part way.  But another passage that was a little deeper, used primarily by wagons allowed for a crossing a little farther upstream.  Davidson only posted a small picket guard at the wagon crossing and put the bulk of his forces at the main crossing. 

The British began their night march at about 1:00 AM on February 1, moving about half the army down to Cowan’s Ford.  They began crossing the ford at around dawn.  The men tied their ammunition belts around their necks in order to avoid them being soaked in the deep water.  They used their muskets with bayonets to dig into the rocky soil as they crossed the river in order to keep the currents from sweeping them downstream.

Even so, the current was pretty brutal, especially in the wagon crossing.  Several soldiers and horses were carried away by the river, and many drowned. 

The militia quickly alerted to the crossing and began firing on the British.  Cornwallis returned fire from cannons he had set up on the British side of the river.  As General Williamson attempted to rally his militia at the riverside, a British rifleman knocked him off his horse, killing him instantly.  

The militia continued to fire, but the British kept up their crossing.  When enough had gotten across, they formed a bayonet charge to disperse the remaining militia.  Soon, the militia were marching on the road to Salisbury, trying to catch up with the main army.

By mid-morning, the British had established a force on the other side of the river and were forming to begin their chase.  Cornwallis reported only four killed and thirty-six wounded in the crossing, but that appears to be woefully inaccurate.  Locals reported dozens of bodies found over the next few days or weeks.  Many of the bodies did not appear to be shot.  The soldiers had simply drowned while trying to cross the river.

Torrence’s Tavern

Many of the militiamen who had escaped from Cowan’s Ford after the British had crossed, moved about ten miles north to Torrence’s Tavern.  There, the whiskey flowed freely and the soldiers attempted to calm their nerves from the battle they had just fought. The tavern was a local rallying point. The militia who gathered there expected to meet up with more militia from the area before they would move again.

Torrence's Tavern
Early that afternoon, a rider galloped up to the tavern with the news that Tarleton was on his way.  Captain Nathaniel Martin attempted to set up a defense, but many of the men were too drunk and exhausted to do much.  Soon about 200 green-coated horsemen rode into view.

Tarleton saw he was facing a much larger force, but they were disorganized. The heavy rain made it unlikely that the militia’s rifles would fire. Tarleton shouted “remember the Cowpens” and ordered a saber charge directly into the enemy lines.  He later claimed that his legion killed 50 men on the spot, wounded many others as they fled, and dispersed about 500 of the enemy.  This was probably an exaggeration.  Another British officer who arrived on the scene of the battle a few hours later reported seeing less than ten enemy bodies.

Nathanael Greene was at a farmhouse only six miles away from the tavern that morning.  From captured prisoners, Tarleton learned of Greene’s presence and rode off in pursuit.  But Greene had received warning of the British crossing and had already moved on.

Trading Ford

The next goal for both armies was Trading Ford on the Yadkin River.  This was just above the rendezvous point at Salisbury.  Greene arrived there on February 3, finding Morgan and his Continental Army already at the site.  Isaac Huger, with the rest of the Continental Army, still had not arrived.

Trading Ford
Torrential rains had made the river impassable.  Greene feared he might have to face Cornwallis there, with no avenue for escape.  Fortunately, Greene had planned ahead and did have some boats available. Given the swift currents, even passage across in a boat was slow going and dangerous.  The army spent the day and night ferrying men and equipment across the river.  

The following morning the vanguard of the British Army under General Charles O’Hara arrived on the scene.  Only about 150 militia were still on the near side of the river.  They fired a few shots at the approaching British column and then fled.  Greene had prepared for this contingency, leaving canoes a few miles downstream for the militia to cross.  

Once again, the British found a swollen river between them and the enemy.  Greene had removed all the boats. Cornwallis could only fire a few cannonballs across the river as he saw his target, once again, retreat further north.

Guilford Courthouse

The next rendezvous point for the army was Guilford Courthouse.  Morgan continued to push his men through knee deep mud roads.  They managed to make the fifty mile march in two days.  Once there, Morgan gave his men a well deserved rest, while sending some scouts to search the area for food and supplies.  

Otho Williams

Over the next few days, the army grew.  Isaac Huger finally arrived at Guilford Courthouse with the hundreds of Continentals that he had marched up on an eastern route.  Light Horse Harry Lee also made it with his legion.

It was at this point that Morgan had had enough.  His sciatica had put his body through unbearable pain.  He could barely sit in a saddle.  Greene begged him to stay, but saw that his condition made that impossible.  On Morgan’s recommendation, Greene gave command of the division to Colonel Otho Holland Williams.  Morgan managed to get a carriage and rode home to Virginia to recuperate.

Meanwhile, with Trading Ford still impassable, Cornwallis sent Tarleton upriver in search of another place to cross the Yadkin.  Tarleton found an unguarded ford known as Shallow Ford.  As the Americans rested and assembled at Guilford Courthouse, the British had to march forty miles upriver to cross, then forty miles back all through torrential rains and deepening mud soaked paths.

With the Continental Army finally combined, Greene considered a fight at Guilford Courthouse.  But the men were still in no condition for a fight.  His army consisted of less than 1500 men, with perhaps another 500 local militia, some of whom were not even armed.  The large numbers of militia he hoped for had never appeared.  Greene knew Cornwallis had an army of close to 2500 men, most of whom were regulars or Hessians, with the remainder being mostly battle-hardened provincials.

Even so, the failure to stand and fight would mean the army would have to retreat into Virginia.  They would effectively cede North Carolina to the British without a major battle.

Greene held another council of war with Huger and Williams.  Morgan, who had not left yet, also attended.  The unanimous verdict was that the army had to retreat to Virginia.

Race to the Dan

At the time, the British were about twenty-five miles to the west, at Salem, North Carolina (Modern day Winston-Salem).  Cornwallis received intelligence that Greene and his Continentals would move north to the Dan River and cross into Virginia.  The fords on the Dan were due north of both armies, meaning that Cornwallis could head off Greene’s march and get to the fords at least as fast as Greene.

British and Continental Routes to the Dan
Once again though, Greene had other plans.  Greene split his army, sending Morgan’s old division under Otho Williams north toward the Dan River fords.  At the same time, Greene moved the rest of his army northeast, away from the British and toward a target that would reach an unfordable part of the Dan River.

Williams’ force of about 700 men kept the enemy occupied, without entering into a full battle. Williams had to keep a respectable distance between his army and the British in order to avoid a massacre.  He used scouts to locate the enemy.  When there was enough distance at night, Williams would camp, only to rise at about 3:00 and march away, in order to avoid a dawn attack.  His men would then stop for breakfast a few hours later, for their only meal of the day, then continue their march.

Bruce’s Crossroads

Riding with Williams was Colonel Lee, whose horsemen remained closest to the enemy.  On February 11, Lee stopped at a local farmhouse for breakfast.  He soon got word that British dragoons were only a few miles away.  Lee immediately mounted and rode out with a local man and his bugler to investigate.  A few miles down the road, they encountered a few of Tarleton’s dragoons on horseback.  The Americans fled as the dragoons charged them.  Unfortunately the young bugler was on a slow moving pony.  The dragoons quickly overtook him and hacked the boy to death with their sabers.

By this time part of Lee’s squadron had caught up with the men and charged the dragoons.  The squadron killed or chased off the dragoons.  Hearing the sounds of battle from a distance, Tarleton brought up more of his legion to attack.  As they charged down the road, they ran into an ambush quickly set up by Lee’s men.  The British dragoons suffered 13 dead and several captured.  The only American death was the unfortunate bugler.

Crossing the Dan

As Williams led Cornwallis closer to the fords on the Dan, it became clear that this was not where the main Continental army was headed.  Greene, with his ever-methodical planning, had arranged for boats to carry his army across the Dan further downstream.  Williams had been a distraction to allow Greene time to get his men across in the boats. 

Dan River Monument
As Williams got closer to the river, he had orders to march quickly downstream to the boats and cross before the British could arrive.  As Williams rode downriver toward the crossing point, he saw campfires still on the near side of the river.  If Greene had not yet crossed, the British would be upon them before they could do so. 

Williams began to dread the notion that he would have to fight a hopeless delaying action against the entire British army in order to buy time for the crossing.  As Williams entered the camp, he was relieved to find it empty.  Greene had already moved his army to the crossing and had left a few men to stoke the campfires as a distraction.

By the evening of February 14, Greene sent a courier to Williams letting him know that the main army had crossed.  Now Williams had to get to the crossing and get over before the British overtook them.  Williams drove his already exhausted men in an all-night march to the crossing point, and began to get his men and horses into the boats for the crossing.  Greene was there waiting for him, and the men crossed the Dan together.  

The last men to cross that night were Light Horse Harry Lee and Colonel Edward Carrington, the man who had arranged for the boats that carried the army to safety.

Frustrated Again

When the lead British forces under General O'Hara, got to the crossing point on the Dan, they found the Americans already on the other side and, once again, no way for them to cross the river.

Cornwallis had marched his army with amazing speed through horrible conditions, but the Americans were still faster.  By this time, Cornwallis had been marching hundreds of miles without tents and supplies, trying to engage an enemy who kept slipping away.  He was now more than 240 miles from his nearest supply base back at Camden, South Carolina.

Tarleton, who had been in the lead against the Americans described the retreat as “judiciously designed and vigorously executed."  Cornwallis wrote to Lord Rawdon that “the fatigue of our troops and the hardships which they suffered were excessive.” He found himself cut off from his own supply lines and communications, deep in enemy territory.

Although Cornwallis had crossed over North Carolina, he did not really occupy it.  Rather than chase the Americans into Virginia, Cornwallis gave up on his northward march.  Instead, he moved his army at a relaxed pace about 50 miles south to Hillsborough.

There, he raised the King’s standard, claimed that the British had successfully reclaimed North Carolina, and called for the loyalists of the state to turn out and join his army.  Less than a hundred men joined.  Even worse, the area offered next to nothing in terms of food or supplies for his army.  Cornwallis further created ill-will by the need for his soldiers to go house to house and confiscate food for the army.  The men also had to butcher oxen and even some of their own draft horses in order to feed the hungry and exhausted regulars.

Meanwhile, Greene’s army was celebrated in Virginia.  Lee, a Virginian himself, described the army as being received as brethren and enjoying the abundant supplies of food available in the area.

Even so, Greene could not cede North Carolina to British control  Within days, he was planning to return to North Carolina and finally confront the British Army.  But we’ll have to leave that for next time, when we cover the Battle of Guilford Courthouse.

- - -

Next Episode 280 Guilford Courthouse 

Previous Episode 278 Arnold Raids Richmond

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Further Reading

Websites


Peterson, Bruce L. “The Importance of a Small Skirmish During the Race to the Dan” Journal of the American Revolution, Sept. 1, 2021. https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/09/the-importance-of-a-small-skirmish-during-the-race-to-the-dan

Cecere, Michael “Race to the Dan” Journal of the American Revolution, Feb. 18, 2014. https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/02/race-to-the-dan-pushed-with-great-expedition





Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Connor, R. D. W. Revolutionary leaders of North Carolina, Greensboro, N.C. State College, 1916. 

Crow, Jeffrey (ed) The Southern Experience in the American Revolution, Univ. of NC Press, 1978.


Greene, George Washington The Life of Nathanael Greene, Vol. 1, Vol. 2, & Vol. 3, New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 1867-1871. 

Weigley, Russell Frank The Partisan War: the South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782, Univ. of SC Press, 1970 (borrow only). 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Aaron, Larry G. The Race to the Dan: The Retreat That Rescued the American Revolution, Halifax Co. Historical Society, 2007. 

Carbone, Gerald Nathanael Greene: A Biography of the American Revolution, St. Martin’s Griffin, 2010 (borrow on Archive.org). 

Edgar, Walter B. Partisans and Redcoats: The Southern Conflict That Turned the Tide of the American Revolution, New York: Morrow, 2001 (borrow on archive.org) 

Ferling, John Winning Independence: The Decisive Years of the Revolutionary War, 1778-1781, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021. 

Golway, Terry Washington's General : Nathanael Greene and the triumph of the American Revolution, H. Holt, 2006. (borrow on Archive.org)

Lumpkin, Henry From Savannah to Yorktown: the American Revolution in the South, Univ of SC Press, 1981 (borrow on archive.org). 

Russell, David Lee. The American Revolution in the Southern Colonies. McFarland & Company, 2000 (borrow on Archive.org).

Swisher, James K., The Revolutionary War in the Southern Back Bountry, Pelican Publishing, 2008 (borrow on Archive.org). 

Tonsetic, Robert L. 1781: The Decisive Year of the Revolutionary War, Casemate, 2011 (borrow on archive.org). 

Waters, Andrew To the End of the World: Nathanael Greene, Charles Cornwallis, and the Race to the Dan, Westholme Publishing, 2020. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, August 6, 2023

ARP278 Arnold Raids Richmond


We last left General Benedict Arnold in Episode 264, when he hatched a plot with the British to turn over West Point and betray his country.  In exchange, he would receive a large sum of money and  a commission in the British Army.

Benedict Arnold

The Americans discovered the plot when they captured British Major John André with documents outlining the plan.  Arnold, however, managed to escape to British-occupied New York and begin a new life as a British officer.

Secretary Germain in London confirmed General Clinton’s promise to grant Arnold a commission as brigadier general in the regular army.  Arnold’s new mission was to raise an army of loyalists and help bring the war to an end.

Arnold’s American legion fell short of hopes.  He managed to raise between 200 and 400 soldiers from loyalists and deserters from the Continental Army.  Among his recruits was an American spy sent to look for an opportunity to kidnap Arnold and return him to Continental lines.

British Interest in Virginia

The British commander, General Henry Clinton had to find a mission to test his new general’s capabilities as a British officer.  By the end of 1780, Clinton was eyeing Virginia.  

Other than the Portsmouth Raid in 1779, Virginia had largely avoided any real battles during the war.  It served as a source of food and supplies for the Continental Army.  By 1780, it was developing into the main supply base for General Nathanael Greene’s southern army in the Carolinas.

General Clinton believed that he could at least disrupt operations in Virginia. This would impact supplies for the enemy’s southern army.  He also wanted to establish a port on the Chesapeake, at Portsmouth, which could serve as a naval port for ships supporting the southern colonies.

Alexander Leslie

In late 1780, Clinton had deployed 2500 soldiers under General Alexander Leslie to establish a British presence at Portsmouth.  Leslie had begun to build defenses, when he received instructions from General Cornwallis to move even further south.  After the British lost their loyalists at King’s Mountain, Cornwallis needed reinforcements if he wanted to do much of anything in the Carolinas. So, Leslie’s forces left Portsmouth only a few weeks after arrival, and headed for Charleston by ship.

Clinton then tasked General Arnold with securing the Chesapeake for the British.  Arnold’s command consisted of between 1500 and 1800 soldiers, almost entirely American loyalists.  Aside from his own small legion, Clinton gave Arnold the Queen’s American Rangers, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe.  Other loyalist regiments came from the mid-Atlantic. Most of them had been with the army for years and were experienced combat veterans.  The only regular regiment assigned to Arnold was the 80th Regiment of Foot, a Scottish regiment under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Dundas.  Also joining the expedition were 100 Hessian Jaegers under the command of Captain Johann Ewald, and a few pieces of field artillery.

Clinton had no expectations that Arnold would take all of Virginia.  In fact, given Arnold’s reputation for reckless aggression in battle, he explicitly warned Arnold against going too far.  His mission was to continue the setup of a British-controlled port at Portsmouth, and to encourage loyalist enlistments only in the neighboring counties where the British could assert control.  

He also told Arnold to consult with Colonels Simcoe and Dundas before taking any major actions.  Clinton even issued secret instructions to Simcoe and Dundas to take command of the operation if Arnold got out of control.

British Fleet Arrives in Virginia

A fleet carrying Arnold’s army departed Sandy Hook, New Jersey on December 20, 1780.  By December 30, parts of the fleet sighted Hampton Roads in the Chesapeake.  A storm had scattered the fleet en route.  Arnold was missing about one-third of his army.  

John Graves Simcoe

He did not want to wait very long since the enemy would see his fleet, giving them time to put together a defense.  Arnold first attempted to land near Jamestown, but received reports that a large militia group was preparing to challenge him there.  Instead, he kept his forces aboard ship.

The fleet captured about twenty smaller boats at the mouth of the James River, taking them as prizes.  Rather than land immediately, Arnold used those smaller boats to move his forces up the James River towards Richmond.

During one attempt to seize a ship on January 2, 1781, Arnold had his first exchange of fire with land forces.  A local battery along the shore of the river fired on his ship.  Clinton had ordered Arnold not to engage in indiscriminate destruction since they still hoped to recruit Virginians to the loyalist cause.  In response to the fire from shore, Arnold simply sent them a note under a flag of truce.  It said in part: 

I have to acquaint you, that however disagreeable It may be to me, unless you immediately desist firing, and suffer the Prise to be taken away with all Her Materials, I shall be under the Necessity of landing and burning the Village, which I wish to Avoid.

The militia ceased fire and Arnold was able to capture the prize ship without any further interference.

The following day, Arnold’s fleet proceeded up the James River to Hood’s point, about 35 miles below Richmond.  There, the patriot militia had established another artillery battery to contest the British advance.  Once again, Arnold sent a note similar to the one he had sent before.  

When he received no response, Arnold landed Colonel Simcoe with about 130 Queen’s Rangers, as well as the light infantry and grenadier companies of his regulars.  By the time Simcoe reached the artillery, the militia had fled.  Simcoe’s men spiked the guns, rendering them useless, and managed to capture a few militia stragglers.  They also seized a howitzer, which they carried back to the ship as a prize.  They did not pillage the countryside or take any punitive actions against civilian property.

Following Simcoe’s return, the fleet continued upriver.  He arrived at Westover, the following day.  Westover Plantation was a large and prosperous plantation owned by the Byrd family.  The Byrds were politically divided, some of them fighting with the patriots, others with the loyalists. The plantation owner, a widow named Mary Byrd, received Arnold and his men warmly.  Mary was the cousin of Arnold’s wife, Peggy Shippen Arnold.  She provided breakfast for Arnold and his officers, and engaged in pleasant conversation.

Westover Plantation
Arnold had hoped that his presence would encourage Virginia loyalists to turn out, and for some who had supported the patriots to reconsider their positions and join Arnold in restoring the King’s peace.  However, Clinton had ordered him not to make bold proclamations this far inland from the coast.  Clinton did not want to make promises that turned out loyalists, then leave those loyalists and their families hanging in areas where the British could not be assured of retaining control.

Arnold limited his efforts with the locals to get intelligence on the region and possible defenses that he might face.  Many local Tories were willing to volunteer their services.  Things looked promising that Virginia might be willing to move into the British camp.

Locals told Arnold that the twenty-five miles between his camp at Westover and Richmond were virtually undefended.  He could continue to move upriver and take the capital.

American Defenses

These intelligence reports proved correct.  The Americans had been caught nearly defenseless.  Governor Thomas Jefferson had ordered the state capital moved from Williamsburg to Richmond back in April of 1780.  Williamsburg was too close to the coast and an easy target for British raiders.

Even Richmond’s inland location did not prove much of a deterrent though.  Most of the Virginia line had been captured at Charleston earlier in 1780.  Much of its militia had been dispersed at Camden a few months later.  Since then the Continentals had been desperately trying to raise more soldiers in Virginia to send down to Nathanael Greene in North Carolina.  In fact, Greene’s second in command, General Von Steuben, was still in Virginia at the time of Arnold’s landing, trying to raise troops and supplies for the southern army.

The result of that was that any men of fighting age still in Virginia, were probably mostly either loyalists or among those who were unwilling or unable to fight.  When Jefferson received word of a British fleet arriving, he attempted to activate the militia and had hoped to oppose a British landing near Jamestown.  But when Arnold simply ignored that defense and sailed upriver, Jefferson’s government was caught with almost no defenses at all.

The governor dashed off a few more letters calling out the militia, but primarily focused on removing state papers and supplies out of Richmond to Westham, about six miles west of the capital.  Officials hoped that if the British burned and looted Richmond, that their critical papers and supplies would be safe.

Advance on Richmond

Given the reports of minimal patriot defenses, Arnold was tempted to continue on to Richmond.  However, he was still missing one-third of his army and was cognizant of Clinton’s orders about not being too rash or aggressive.  

Arnold held a council of war with Colonels Simcoe and Dundas.  The three men decided that they could send a force on the one-day march to Richmond with minimal risk to the overall mission.  They decided that Arnold and Simcoe would lead a raiding party of 800 men to Richmond, while leaving their base of operations at Westover with Dundas.

The British made no attempt to hide their intentions through a night march or a lightning raid.  The column left Westover at around two in the afternoon on January 4.  It marched about half of the distance that day, camping at Four Mile Creek, about twelve miles from Richmond.  The following morning, the column continued its march , approaching the city limits by about 1:00 PM on the fifth.

A few local militia shadowed the column, but ran off when Colonel Simcoe dispatched riders to engage with them.  The British managed to complete its two day march with no one firing a shot against them.

Johann Ewald

The city itself was in chaos. The legislature had skipped town as soon as word arrived of the approaching British.  Private citizens struggled to remove their property from town along jammed country roads.  Governor Jefferson was still seeing the removal of state property from Richmond to Westham, that morning, finally riding away just hours before the British entered the capital.

The city defenses consisted of several hundred local militia setting up on Richmond Hill, which was the best high ground in the town.  Arnold once again dispatched Colonel Simcoe, along with Captain Ewald and his Hessian jaegers to contest the hill.  But as the British moved up Richmond Hill, the patriot militia fled without a shot fired.  

Another small group of militia gathered on Shockoe Hill.  Again, they fled as soon as the enemy approached.  Simcoe managed to capture six stragglers who fled their defenses a little too slowly.   

Destruction

Having captured Richmond with almost no resistance, the British spent the afternoon of the 5th destroying government buildings and property.  After Arnold learned that the Americans had moved much of their property to Westham, he dispatched Simcoe with half of his force to ride to Westham and burn all the government buildings and property that were located there.  Westham also contained an iron foundry, workshops, and a munitions magazine, all of which were put to the torch.

British Sketch of Richmond Raid
Back in Richmond, Arnold set up headquarters at Galt’s Tavern.  He oversaw the destruction of government buildings and property, but made every effort to prevent the destruction of private property or looting by his soldiers.  Despite efforts, there was some collateral damage of private property, especially when some of the building fires got out of control and wiped out several city blocks.

Arnold though, mostly sought to protect private property.  He believed that Richmond, much like Philadelphia, saw most of its private property in the hands of loyalists.  He wanted to establish good relations with these city leaders in hopes of turning the state back to a British-ruled colony.

Even so, Arnold could not resist an opportunity to make a buck.  He issued a proclamation to the local inhabitants, informing them that property such as  "Tobacco, Rum, Wine, Sugar, Molasses, Sail Cloth and Coffee" were subject to seizure and confiscation as military prizes.  But being the nice guy that he was, Arnold offered to buy these items from the locals at fifty cents on the dollar.

The merchants took the offer to Governor Jefferson for a response.  Jefferson indignantly refused to bargain or correspond with the traitor Arnold in any way.  So when Arnold got no response, he seized or destroyed a great deal of the supplies in Richmond and the surrounding area.

The British continued their work into the night and the following morning.  By the afternoon of January 6, Arnold was ready to leave Richmond.  Simcoe wanted to remain another night, but Arnold was concerned that Virginia might be able to call in enough militia to create a significant resistance if given enough time.  Arnold had no desire to occupy Richmond permanently, and did not want to look like he was being chased out of town by militia.

Withdrawal 

That afternoon, Arnold reassembled his column and marched back to Four Mile Creek. The following day, they returned to Westover.  Again, on the march back, they faced no opposition.  Some of Simcoe’s men were accused of looting homes on the return march, but mostly followed the orders to leave private property alone.

Arnold even left twenty guineas (about $16,000 in today’s money) to care for the poor of the city.  Governor Jefferson later insisted the money be returned.

Following the British departure from Richmond, the city was in chaos.  There were reports of local patriot militia and other residents looting in the city before the Americans could restore order.  The British reported losing nine men during the raid.  It is not clear if the missing men deserted, or were captured while straggling.  But there were no reported losses from fighting.

After the return to Westover, Arnold received a report that several hundred militia were assembling at Charles City Court House about nine miles from the British camp.  Simcoe led forty mounted rangers to disperse the militia.  In brief fighting there, one ranger was killed and three wounded.

The other significant action taken was against the Berkeley Plantation, near Westover.  Berkeley was the home of Benjamin Harrison, a member of the Continental Congress and a signer of the Declaration of Independence.  Arnold, of course, had never liked most members of Congress, even before he switched sides, and allowed a little retribution in this case.

The British looted the plantation, seizing or killing all the livestock. Although they did not burn the home, they did pillage it, removing all the furniture and paintings to the front lawn, where they held a large bonfire.  They also absconded with forty slaves, although it’s not clear if the slaves left voluntarily.

Beverly Robinson

Arnold also received word that the Americans had reoccupied Hood’s Point, which could prove a danger to British river traffic.  He deployed some troops under loyalist Colonel Beverly Robinson to march overland to secure the point again.  The men walked into an ambush set by Colonel George Rogers Clark.  It turns out Clark happened to be in Richmond to lobby for more support for his western campaign, and was able to engage with the British raiders.  The attack was a quick hit and run, but led to the greatest number of casualties during the raid.  The loyalists lost three killed and seventeen wounded.

Over the next couple of days, the British began the process of moving eighty miles back downriver in small boats.  Arnold had never planned his move up the James River to be anything more than a short raid.  He returned to Portsmouth, per his original orders, which he fortified and prepared for use as his army’s winter quarters.

On January 19th part of Arnold’s raiding party reached Portsmouth, with the remainder arriving the following day.

Aftermath

The raid had much of its intended effect.  The fact that Arnold had been largely unopposed led to criticisms of Jefferson’s government and its inability to defend the state.  Many Americans grudgingly credited Arnold with moving quickly, before militia could assemble and mount any real defense.  But it’s unclear that even if they had more time, the militia would have been able to mount any credible threat to Arnold’s forces. By this time the missing third of his army had made it to Portsmouth.  Absent a large effort by Continental forces, they were there to stay.

Much of the local patriot militia surrendered to the British and accepted parole.  Many men wanted this since they could avoid turning out for further militia duty or duty in the Continental Army if they were on parole.  It was a great excuse to stay home.  The problem got so bad that Governor Jefferson declared that the militia paroles were void and that they would continue to be expected to report for duty.

Despite the surrendering militia, loyalists did not turn up in great numbers to join Arnold.  The general blamed this on his predecessor, General Alexander Leslie, who had encouraged loyalists to come out of hiding when he arrived the previous year.  Then, when Leslie was called away to the Carolinas, the Virginia loyalists had to face retribution from their patriot neighbors.  No one was going to stick their neck out again until convinced that the British were there to stay.

Arnold’s raid helped to secure his reputation with the British leadership.  He had proven himself an effective combat officer, doing more with fewer men than other British raids in the area had ever been able to accomplish.

Arnold spent the next few months building his defenses at Portsmouth, and sending patrols inland to break up any reported militia gatherings.  On February 13, Arnold learned of the approach of three French men-of-war.  The ships stayed for less than a week then sailed off without engaging.  But their mere presence inspired 2500 militia to organize and advance on Portsmouth.  

The ships sailed away without engaging.  The militia also returned home once the French left, without firing a shot.  But the event demonstrated to Arnold that he would face opposition if the opportunity arose.  While Virginia was not organized enough to defend itself, it also was not ready to return to British rule.

Next week: General Nathanael Greene moves into Virginia, not to attack Arnold, but to escape from the British under Cornwallis in the Race to the Dan.

- - -

Next Episode 279 Race to the Dan 

Previous Episode 279 Battle of Cowpens

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

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Further Reading

Websites

Benedict Arnold and William Phillips in Virginia, 1780-1781: http://www.virginiaplaces.org/military/benedictarnoldraid.html

“Benedict Arnold in Richmond, January, 1781: His Proposal Concerning Prize Goods: With Historical Introduction by George Green Shackelford.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 60, no. 4, 1952, pp. 591–99. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4245878

Lender, Mark Edward and James Kirby Martin “A Traitor’s Epiphany: Benedict Arnold in Virginia and His Quest for Reconciliation.” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 125, no. 4, 2017, pp. 314–57. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26322642

“From Thomas Jefferson to the County Lieutenants of Charlotte and Certain Other Counties, 2 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-04-02-0343  

Hannum, Patrick H. and Christopher Pieczynski “Skirmish at James’s Plantation: Victory and Defeat for Benedict Arnold in Virginia, Journal of the American Revolution, October 14, 2021. https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/10/skirmish-at-jamess-plantation-victory-and-defeat-for-benedict-arnold-in-virginia

Decker, Michael M. Baron Von Steuben and the military forces in Virginia during the British invasions of 1780-1781, Univ. Richmond Masters Thesis, 1979. https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1437&context=masters-theses

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Arnold, Isaac Newton The Life of Benedict Arnold; His Patriotism and His Treason, Chicago: Jansen, McClurg & Co. 1880. 

Eckenrode, H.J. The Revolution in Virginia, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1916. 

Harrell, Isaac Samuel Loyalism in Virginia; chapters in the economic history of the Revolution, New York, AMS Press, 1965. 

Lassiter, Francis Rives Arnold's invasion of Virginia, 1781, Longmans, Green & Co. 1901. 

Ward, Harry M. Richmond during the Revolution, 1775-83, Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1977 (borrow only).  

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Cecere, Michael The Invasion of Virginia, 1781, Westholme Publishing, 2017. 

Ferling, John Winning Independence: The Decisive Years of the Revolutionary War, 1778-1781, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021. 

Kranish, Michael Flight from Monticello: Thomas Jefferson at War, Oxford Univ. Press, 2010. https://www.amazon.com/dp/0195374622?&linkCode=ll1&tag=amrevpodcast-20&linkId=3b9ad090545a7776dbdace5678f2f7fe&language=en_US&ref_=as_li_ss_tl

Tonsetic, Robert L. 1781: The Decisive Year of the Revolutionary War, Casemate, 2011 (borrow on archive.org). 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

         

Sunday, July 23, 2023

ARP277 Cowpens


We last left the war in the south back in Episode 274 when General Nathanael Greene took command of the southern army at the end of 1780.  Greene promptly divided his army.  He moved his forces southeast of Charlotte, North Carolina across the South Carolina border to Cheraw.  He sent the other part of his army under General Daniel Morgan to the southwest, also into South Carolina.

Deployment of Forces

The main British army under General Charles Cornwallis sat in between these two forces, at Winnsboro, South Carolina.  Cornwallis had been forced out of North Carolina following the loss of his loyalist militia army at King’s Mountain.  Much of the British army also fell ill with malaria, forcing them to take several months to recuperate.

Battle of Cowpens
Cornwallis was awaiting the arrival of General Alexander Leslie with an army of regulars.  Leslie had been deployed to the Chesapeake Bay region of Virginia, but Cornwallis requested he bring his troops by ship to Charleston, then support his efforts to make another offensive into North Carolina.  Leslie’s army arrived at Charleston in December, but spent weeks trying to make its way inland to link up with Cornwallis at Winnsboro.  Heavy rains made travel slow and difficult, especially crossing the many rivers and streams throughout South Carolina.

By remaining inland, Cornwallis could not get supplies from British ships easily.  He complained throughout the winter about his inability to get sufficient food and supplies for his army.  A lack of wagons hampered his efforts.  It would have been easier if he had pulled his army back to Charleston for the winter.  But that would have meant either ceding most of South Carolina back to the rebel partisans, or leaving his outposts at Camden and Fort Ninety-Six vulnerable to attack.

Instead, Cornwallis remained at Winnsboro throughout the winter, keeping close tabs on the Continental armies now encamped to his east and to his west.  The garrison at Camden under Lord Rawdon was about a day’s march to his east.  Fort Ninety-Six sat about two days’ march to Cornwallis’ west.  That fort was under the command of loyalist Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger.

On New Year’s Day 1781, Cornwallis received intelligence that General Morgan was leading an army of 3000 against the outpost at Fort Ninety-Six.  Two days earlier, Morgan’s cavalry, under the Command of Colonel William Washington, had attacked and decimated a large loyalist force near the fort.  Cornwallis now feared that Fort Ninety-six could fall unless he sent a relief force.

Cornwallis had his main focus on destroying Greene’s Army and then moving into North Carolina. But he could not leave Morgan’s army to do mischief in the western part of South Carolina.  He had to snuff out that threat first.  To do that, he turned to the ever reliable Colonel Banastre Tarleton.

Tarleton Advances

By January 2, Tarleton was already on the move.  He had with him his own British legion, which consisted of 250 cavalry and 200 infantry.  He also took two companies of British regulars, an additional troop of mounted light dragoons, an artillery battery with two cannons and some assorted loyalist companies and guides.  In total, Tarleton had nearly 1200 men under his command.

Banastre Tarleton

Cornwallis and Tarleton both suspected that the British intelligence estimates of Morgan commanding an army of 3000 were exaggerated.  They were correct.  There is some dispute over how many men Morgan had with him.  Morgan later reported that he commanded about 800 men.  Most historians, however, believe this is a low number.  Some estimates believe Morgan’s account was close, putting the numbers at 800-1000 men.  Other estimates put the American army at 1900.

Part of the problem in determining the exact numbers was that various local militia groups kept coming and going.  The core of Morgan’s force consisted of about 300 Continentals from Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, as well as less than 100 Continental Dragoons under Colonel William Washington.  There were probably a few hundred more Virginia militia, many of whom were former Continental soldiers.  So, while they were serving as militia at the moment, these were experienced combat soldiers.

Supplementing these forces were hundreds of North Carolina and South Carolina militia, along with a few dozen Georgia militia.  Many of the militia served under Colonel Andrew Pickens, who was a proven combat officer.  Many of these men had fought under General Thomas Sumter, who was still recovering from his battlefield injuries.  Sumter was also peeved that Greene had given command of the western army to Morgan rather than himself.  Sumter understandably remained out of the field given his injuries. But he was still issuing orders to the militia which made it difficult for Morgan to keep his army supplied.  This tension between the Continental Army and the militia, remained an ongoing problem.

The total militia numbers who joined Morgan are very soft, and subject to dispute by experts who have examined this question much more thoroughly than I can.  The estimates of Carolina militia range from a few hundred to more than a thousand.

Even if the higher estimates are correct, both the British and the American military leaders gave the edge to the British under Tarleton.  The conventional wisdom was that militia would not stand and fight in a pitched battle.  They tended to run when faced with a bayonet charge and abandon the field.  This is what happened at Camden a few months earlier.  So, in terms of reliable combat soldiers, it seemed as if the British had the advantage.

Tarleton set out in pursuit of Morgan almost immediately after receiving Cornwallis’ orders on January 2.  At the time, he only had about half of his force with him.  He wrote to Cornwallis on January 4, telling his commander that he did not think the Americans were going to attack Fort Ninety-Six, but that he had an opportunity to take out the threat of Morgan's force.  Tarleton requested the two regiments of regulars, which Cornwallis provided.  He also requested a company of Hessian Jaegers, which Cornwallis did not provide.

Daniel Morgan

Morgan, in fact, was moving north, back toward the North Carolina border.  He had been warned to avoid a major battle with the British, and agreed that it probably would not go well for him if he had to fight.  Travel along this frontier country was slow-going for both armies.  This was made worse by torrential rains that made river crossings almost impossible.

Morgan tried to keep a river between his army and Tarleton’s.  Pickens’ South Carolina militia guarded all the fords along the Pacelot river. On the night of January 15, Tarleton was determined to cross and attack the rebels before they could retreat back into North Carolina.  His army moved up the river, followed by militia on the opposite bank, prepared to contest any river crossing.  

Finally, a frustrated Tarleton made camp for the night.  The militia kept an eye on his camp from across the river. But they did not watch closely enough.  While Tarleton’s men appeared to settle in for the night, the bulk of his force rode six miles back downstream and crossed the river at an unguarded ford.

Tarleton immediately sent out scouts to locate Morgan’s camp.  They found the enemy was only six miles away.  Tarleton’s soldiers reached the American camp shortly after dawn on the 16th.  They found the camp empty.  Morgan had received warning a few hours earlier, and managed to get his army on the march before the enemy arrived.  He left in such a hurry though that the British found campfires with breakfast still cooking.  The British ate the breakfast prepared by their now-departed hosts.

Andrew Pickens

Morgan hoped to cross the Broad River before Tarleton could catch him.  But he had to travel on back trails that made his movement slow.  By the time he reached the river it was dark, and attempting a night crossing was too dangerous.  If he tried cross in the morning, Tarleton would likely attack while the army was still crossing, which would be devastating.

As much as he wanted to avoid a battle, Morgan decided that battle was his best option. By evening, the army had reached the Cowpens.  This was an open field where cowboys herded cattle before driving them to the coast for sale.  It was a well known gathering point in the backcountry.  It’s where the Overmountain men gathered and assembled before marching to King’s Mountain a few months earlier.  Morgan set up camp for the night, allowed his men to rest, and prepared for battle the following morning.  

Looking at the situation as it stood, the British under Tarleton had several advantages.  Although Morgan probably had more men, most of them were militia.  Tarleton’s legion had a long reputation for tearing apart militia with bold strikes and brutal tactics.  Of even greater concern the position that Morgan chose, had the Broad River behind his troops.  If his men broke and ran, they would have nowhere to retreat.  The British could cut them down and turn the battle into a massacre.

Morgan had also only been in command for a few months.  The troops under him were not the trusty riflemen that he commanded earlier in the war.  So he had real questions: would the men stand and fight as needed?

John Eager Howard
Conventional wisdom at the time would be to put your best troops in front, and hope that the militia would be inspired by their stand against an assault to stick with them.  Morgan decided to try something different.  He placed his Continental troops in the back.  The Continental line came under the direct command of Colonel John Eager Howard.

Morgan next planned to deploy about 300 militia from Georgia and the Carolinas about 150 yards in front of the Continentals.  These were the men who had been acting as scouts and skirmishers during the march.  Some were still returning to camp late into the night.  They did not know how many they would have the following morning.  This militia line fell under the command of Colonel Andrew Pickens.

One serious danger for militia was a flanking attack, something Tarleton employed frequently.  To protect against this, Morgan deployed about 100 Virginia riflemen on the militia’s right flank. In front of the militia, Morgan deployed another 120 riflemen from Georgia and North Carolina to act as skirmishers.  

Colonel Washington’s Continental cavalry would be held in reserve behind the Continental line, ready to charge into any weak points that developed.

Morgan had been in enough fights that did not expect the militia to stand and fight.  Instead, he asked that they fire two or three shots at close range before retreating.  The men would then pull back to the left flank of the Continental line and reform as a reserve corps once the Continentals engaged.

After informing his officers, Morgan spent the rest of the night walking among the soldiers in camp, joking with them and talking about their homes and girlfriends.  According to at least one account, Morgan lifted his shirt and showed some men the scars from when he was given 500 lashes for striking an officer during the French and Indian War.  Morgan liked to tell the story that he counted only 499 lashes and thought they still owed him one more.  But what he was really doing was making  clear what he expected of them: three shots, then retreat.

About two hours before dawn, scouts informed Morgan that Tarleton was riding hard and on his way.  With that, Morgan took his position and prepared for battle.

The Battle

As usual, Tarleton had ridden his men hard and fast, and without much sleep.  Just before dawn on the morning of January 17, the head of the British column came into the sites of the front of the American lines.  The Carolina and Georgia riflemen in the front line began trying to pick off British officers as they struggled to form their lines.

Americans Advance on Highlanders
Tarleton ordered fifty of his mounted legionnaires to charge the American lines and disperse the riflemen.  The horsemen charged the Americans, but took significant casualties before they turned and retreated.  Next Tarleton formed a line of infantry to form a line of battle and advance.  Because of the harassing fire, Tarleton really had no time to get a good sense of the field or the enemy’s deployment.

The British regulars advanced to a point about 300 yards from the enemy, with Tarleton’s provincial infantry providing support.  Tarleton then ordered the line forward even before some of the field officers had all of their men in position.  Tarleton also deployed his two small field cannons to fire grapeshot at the enemy lines.

As planned, after getting off several shots, the riflemen retreated back to the line of militia commanded by Pickens and prepared for the British assault.  The American officers struggled to prevent their men from firing until the British were close enough for a shot to do damage.  Eventually, the Americans fired a staggered volley, while the British returned fire.  The American lines, which still included many riflemen, did considerable damage to the British line, while the British muskets seemed to do little harm.  Some experts attribute this to the fact that the regulars were a relatively new regiment and not experienced at firing from a range.

As the British line charged forward with bayonets, the American militia began to retreat.  Tarleton ordered his mounted troops to run down the Americans. Morgan, however, ordered Colonel Washington to charge into the fray and disrupt the British horsemen.  As the mounted troops engaged in fierce hand to hand combat, Tarleton ordered his infantry forward, now against the main Continental line.

Despite taking some losses, Tarleton felt pretty optimistic at this point.  It was only 15 minutes into the battle and he had dispersed the American skirmishers and the first line of soldiers.  His men were already moving to engage what he thought was the reserve force.  Tarleton rode back to order his reserve force of about 250 Highlanders into the fight, along the left flank where they could enter the battle.

At the same time Morgan had ridden back to help rally the retreating militia to hold the flank of the Continental line.  As the British focused on the relatively small Continental line that continued to hold.

Then, as often happens in battle, confusion took hold.  Colonel Howard saw the British Highlanders advancing on his right, and ordered his right flank to turn and face their attack.  The commanding officer on the right flank misunderstood the command and thought Howard was ordering him to fall back. So he ordered his men to about face, and march off the field.

The British saw this and thought the American line was crumbling.  The British infantry charged the lines but ran into a solid defense and heavy hand to hand fighting.  By this time Morgan had reached the retreating right flank and got them to turn around again and face the enemy.  When the charging British were only a few yards from their lines, the Americans fired a devastating volley, followed by Howard’s command to the Continentals to charge bayonets.

At that point the British line did something that almost never happened. The soldiers dropped their guns and surrendered.  Not ready to stop, Howard then ordered a portion of his Continentals to charge the British field cannon and capture them.  

Tarleton ordered his British legion reserves to enter the battle and support the Highlanders, but the men did not move.  As Tarleton rode across the field to see about the delay, the Americans shot his horse out from under him.  A British doctor then gave Tarleton his own horse, before surrendering to the Americans so that he could treat the wounded.

Finally, the Americans swarmed the Highlanders.  After killing most of their officers, Howard called for their surrender.  The outnumbered Highlanders grounded their weapons as well.

Tarleton had been unable to get his infantry reserves to enter what appeared to be a lost battle.  In frustration Tarleton led a company of light cavalry in an attempt, at least, to recapture his field cannon.  Washington saw this and led a troop of Continental cavalry to engage with Tarleton.  During this melee, Washington’s sword broke while fighting with an enemy officer.  His aides came to his defense, but Tarleton himself attempted to kill Washington, first with his sword, then drawing his pistol to fire. The pistol shot missed Washington, but hit his horse.

By 8:00, one hour after the battle began, it was over.  The British suffered devastating casualties. 86% of Tarleton’s force was dead, wounded or prisoners.  The Americans captured the cannons, hundreds of muskets, and wagons full of supplies. American casualties were relatively light for such an intense battle, twenty-five killed and 124 wounded.

Tarleton was forced to retreat with the remnants of his legion.  He managed to link up with his supply wagons which were held far back from the battle with a guard of about 100 infantry. At that point, Tarleton ordered most of the wagons destroyed and moved quickly to return to the main army, still a day’s ride away.  Washington attempted to ride down Tarleton, but could not catch up with him in time.

Battle of Cowpens
Morgan, still concerned that Cornwallis might bring up the rest of the British Army against him, continued his retreat, getting his army and prisoners across the Broad River the following day.

Two days after the battle, Morgan wrote to General Greene telling him, “The troops I had the Honor to command have been so fortunate as to obtain a compleat Victory over a detachment from the British Army under Lt. Col. Tarelton”  To a friend, Morgan wrote more informally, “I have Given him a devil of a whipping, a more compleat victory never was obtained”

The American victory at Cowpens was met with great celebration in Philadelphia. Congress ordered a gold medal for General Morgan, and silver medals for Colonels Washington and Howard.  For the British, it meant another loss of a division that they simply could not afford to lose.

Next week: British General Benedict Arnold strikes into Virginia and raids the capital at Richmond.

- - -

Next Episode 278 Arnold Raids Richmond 

Previous Episode 276 Mutiny in the Continental Army

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

 Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast

 Join the Facebook group, American Revolution Podcast 

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Discuss the AmRev Podcast on Reddit

American Revolution Podcast Merch!

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American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account. You may also donate via Venmo (@Michael-Troy-20) or Zelle (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)


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You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option making monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

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Further Reading

Websites

Battle of Cowpens: https://www.nps.gov/cowp/learn/historyculture/the-battle-of-cowpens.htm

Cowpens, Facts and Summary: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/revolutionary-war/battles/cowpens

Cowpens: https://www.carolana.com/SC/Revolution/revolution_battle_of_cowpens.html

Lynch, Wayne “Eyewitnesses at Cowpens” Journal of the American Revolution, July 26, 2016. https://allthingsliberty.com/2016/07/eyewitnesses-at-the-cowpens

Lynch, Wayne & Jim Piecuch “Debating Cowpens: How could Tarleton Lose?” Journal of the American Revolution, July 24, 2013. https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/07/debating-cowpens-how-could-tarleton-lose

Montross, Lynn  “America’s Most Imitated Battle” American Heritage Magazine, April 1956. https://www.americanheritage.com/americas-most-imitated-battle

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Bailey, J. D. Cowpens and Woffords Iron Works, 1908. 

Crow, Jeffrey (ed) The Southern Experience in the American Revolution, Univ. of NC Press, 1978. 

Fleming, Thomas J. Cowpens, Washington: National Park Service, 1988 (borrow only). 

Graham, James The Life of General Daniel Morgan, of the Virginia line of the army of the United States, with portions of his correspondence New York: Derby & Jackson, 1859. 

Landrum, John Belton O'Neall Colonial and Revolutionary History of Upper South Carolina, Greenville, S.C., Shannon & Co., 1897. 

McCrady, Edward The History of South Carolina in the Revolution, 1780-1783, New York: Macmillan Co. 1902. 

Roberts, Kenneth Lewis The Battle of Cowpens: The Great Morale-Builder, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1958 (borrow only). 

Weigley, Russell Frank The Partisan War: the South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782, Univ. of SC Press, 1970 (borrow only). 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Babits, Lawrence E. A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens, Univ. of N.C. Press, 1998 (borrow on archive.org). 

Brown, Robert W., Jr. Kings Mountain and Cowpens: Our Victory Was Complete, History Press Library, 2009. 

Buchanan, John The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas, Wiley, 1999. 

Davis, Burke The Cowpens-Guilford Courthouse Campaign, Lippincott, 1962 (borrow on archive.org). 

Ferling, John Winning Independence: The Decisive Years of the Revolutionary War, 1778-1781, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021. 

Lumpkin, Henry From Savannah to Yorktown: the American Revolution in the South, Univ of SC Press, 1981 (borrow on archive.org). 

Stempel, Jim American Hannibal: The Extraordinary Account of Revolutionary Hero Daniel Morgan at the Battle of Cowpens, Penmore Press, 2018. 

Tonsetic, Robert L. 1781: The Decisive Year of the Revolutionary War, Casemate, 2011 (borrow on archive.org). 

Waters, Andrew (ed) Battle of Cowpens: Primary & Contemporary Accounts, Regiment Press, 2019. 

Zambone, Albert Louis Daniel Morgan: A Revolutionary Life, Westholme Publishing, 2018.  

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.