Sunday, February 14, 2021

ARP188 Pursuit Across New Jersey


With the British evacuation of Philadelphia that I discussed last week, the Continental Army had to decide how to respond.  

On June 17, 1778, the same night that General Clinton brought the last of his army in Philadelphia across the river into New Jersey, George Washington held a council of war at Valley Forge to debate next steps.  

A handful of officers wanted to attack the retreating column General Anthony Wayne and Pennsylvania General John Cadwalader argued most forcefully for a full-on attack.  General Lafayette also seemed inclined to support this.  General Nathanael Greene wanted to harass the retreating enemy and engage in a full battle if the British were willing to turn and fight.

The Continentals had about 11,000 soldiers fit for duty, along with the possibility of several thousand more New Jersey militia.  The British column had an estimated 10,000 soldiers.  Because they were in retreat, they would not necessarily have favorable defensive ground or good positions if the Americans could engage them.

General Charles Lee, however, argued strenuously against attack.  He did not believe the Americans would stand in general field encounters with British regulars.  That aside, the French were on their way.  Risking a general action at this point could result in a devastating failure or capture of the Continental Army right before the support arrived that could be used to overwhelm the enemy.  Lee argued that the British were in retreat.  That was a good thing.  Let them retreat and we'll take the victory for that.

A majority of the officers agreed with Lee, including General Von Steuben and General Duportail.  The Americans could, of course, harass the retreating column.  In doing so, they should not put the main Continental Army at risk.  Despite the objections and concerns, General Washington opted to pursue the enemy with the intent of engaging in a general action.

Cooper's Ferry
The British had crossed primarily at Cooper’s Ferry directly out of Philadelphia into what is today Camden, New Jersey.  The army marched inland and spent its first night in and around Haddonfield.  The following morning it began marching north toward New York City.

The day the British began the march was Friday June 19.  As anyone from New Jersey can tell you, leaving on a Friday to try to get to the Jersey shore is a nightmare.  Travel is always slow and frustrating.  That was certainly the experience of the British and Hessian troops.

Although they did not have to put up with any traffic circles, they did face a host of obstacles.  Before they had even left Philadelphia, the Continentals deployed hundreds of soldiers under General William Maxwell to delay and harass the enemy.  Recall that General Maxwell, who was from New Jersey, had coordinated much of the Forage War a year and a half earlier.  He had used local militia to harass the British foraging parties and keep the enemy bottled up in defensive entrenchments.  He would use many of these same tactics against the British column marching toward New  York.

Philemon Dickinson

Also working with General Maxwell was General Philemon Dickinson of the New Jersey militia.  Dickinson is another one of the war’s unsung heroes.  He was the brother of John Dickinson - the Pennsylvania delegate who is probably best remembered for his opposition to the Declaration of Independence.

Philemon Dickinson
Along with his brother John, Philemon Dickinson was born in Maryland.  When they were both very young, the family moved to an estate in Delaware.  The Dickinsons also held properties in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  Philemon studied law in Philadelphia, but never practiced.  Instead, he moved to an estate near Trenton.  He married his first cousin, Mary Cadwalader, who was the sister of Philadelphia militia General John Cadwalader.

Shortly after the battle of Lexington in 1775, Dickinson received a commission as colonel of the Hunterdon County Militia.  Several months later, in October he received a promotion to brigadier general of the New Jersey militia.  Dickinson was one of the few militia leaders who joined Washington for the battle of Trenton the following year.  During the battle, Dickinson had to order the artillery to shell his own home, which the Hessians had occupied. Dickinson and his militia then moved north with the Continentals to harass the enemy in northern New Jersey.  His militia captured a regiment of 400 British soldiers during that campaign.

Just before Washington’s crossing, when things were looking really bleak for the patriots, John Dickinson resigned his position in the Pennsylvania militia and wrote a letter to his brother Philemon.  The letter recommended that Philemon also resign his commission and that he not hold onto any Continental dollars. This defeatist letter smeared the reputations of both brothers. 

At least one account I read says that Philemon resigned his commission in the New Jersey militia in February, although I cannot confirm that fact.  It may be that his militia simply returned home for the winter. That was, after all, what militia did when active fighting came to an end. In any case, a few months later, New Jersey named Dickinson a major general and commander-in-chief of the New Jersey militia.  He remained active in New Jersey that year, assisting General John Sullivan with the attack on Staten Island in November 1777, and also confronting a British raid on Trenton in May 1778.

British Move Through New Jersey

With the British army once again in New Jersey, Dickinson was also once again in the thick of things.  Working with Maxwell’s Continentals, the armies felled trees across roads, destroyed bridges, redirected creeks and rivers to flood certain areas, and generally do whatever they could to slow down the British column.  They also provided intelligence to General Washington on the position and movements of the enemy.

The delaying efforts worked well.  Assisting them was a brutal heat wave, along with torrential rains.  British and Hessian soldiers marched in their heavy wool uniforms, each soldier carrying sixty to one hundred pounds of items on his back. The army had several hundred wagons of supplies as well.  The result was extremely slow movement.

Troop movements
The British left Haddonfield on the morning of June 19th and immediately began to take harassing fire from local militia.  After a sixteen mile march to Mount Holly, the army rested for a day.  The camped army still faced occasional harassing fire as soldiers worked to clear impediments from the road ahead.

The next day, the British marched only seven miles to Black Horse (today called Columbus), then moving on to Crosswicks in a night march, arriving at dawn the following morning.  There, Maxwell’s Continentals and Dickinson’s militia had torn up the bridges that crossed the creek.  The patriots took up defensive positions on the far side of the creek.  There were maybe 1000 patriots against the 10,000 man British Army. so there was no chance that this defense could last long.  However, it forced Clinton to deploy into lines of battle, set up field artillery, and attempt to move regiments around the defensive lines to flank the enemy.  The two lines exchanged some fire before the Americans withdrew before the superior force.  With that, the Americans had achieved their intended purpose of causing the British to waste a day getting across the creek.  From there, the British marched to Allentown, New Jersey, a few miles southeast of Trenton.  It had taken the British six days to move about 32 miles, averaging just over five miles per day.

Meanwhile, the Continental Army left Valley Forge on June 19th, the same day that the British began their march from Haddonfield.  Washington had left behind only the 3000 or so sick or disabled soldiers who could not march, under the command of Colonel Philip Van Cortlandt. Most of the invalid corps under Van Cortlandt soon moved to Philadelphia, leaving only 500 at Valley Forge who were too sick to travel.

Washington gave General Lee the honor of commanding the most forward army and the discretion to choose good defensive ground after crossing the Delaware.  Behind Lee was another army under the command of General Anthony Wayne, who had orders to move slowly enough that he kept some distance between himself and General Lee.

The Continental Army reached Coryell’s Ferry on the Delaware River, a few miles north of Trenton.  The army also made use of Howell’s Ferry several miles further upriver  It took a couple of days to get the army and equipment across, then continuing on to Hopewell, New Jersey -  about twenty miles north of the British army at Allentown.  That is where General Lee chose to regroup the army.  By the 23rd, the Continentals had arrived at Hopewell and were ready to move.  They rested there until the 24th while the commanders decided on next steps. In Hopewell, the soldiers cleaned their weapons and prepared several days of rations so that they could eat while on the march.

Plans of Attack

Both Washington and Clinton had good intelligence on the position of their enemy and had to reassess their plans in light of that.

Washington was clearly itching for a fight.  He had ordered the army to leave behind most of its baggage at the ferries so that it could travel light.  He also ordered entrenching tools be distributed to the soldiers so that they could dig in for a battle when needed.  Washington not only had his own army, which was as large as Clinton’s British and Hessian column, but he also had thousands more Continentals in the Northern army near Peekskill, New York under General Horatio Gates.  These men could be brought into action against the British in northern New Jersey.  Another 500 man army, a mix of Continentals and Pennsylvania militia under General John Cadwalader left Philadelphia to support the Continentals.  More Pennsylvania Associators were also being mustered in hopes of adding to the American forces.

Charles Lee

At around 9:00 AM on the morning of the 24th, Washington called another  council of war.  Articulating the same views as at the prior council, General Lee still strongly opposed an attack.  He thought that an attack on such a well-disciplined enemy of equal size only risked a major defeat.  He still wanted to await the arrival of an army from France before seeking another general engagement.

Lee said he thought they should build a “bridge of gold” for the British to assist them with their retreat.  After all, the enemy was going away, as they wanted, and there was no benefit in trying to confront them.  Lee recommended they deploy reinforcements to Maxwell and Dickinson to keep up the harassment of the British column, and keep it on the move to New York.  But he saw no real point in trying to impede or slow down the march, let alone bring on a general engagement between the two armies.

Generals Greene, Wayne, and Lafayette all favored sending a much larger force to annoy the British column, and to bring the remainder of the army behind that force as backup in case the British column turned on them. Lafayette argued that it “would be disgraceful and humiliating to allow the enemy to cross the Jerseys in tranquility.”

In the end, the council agreed to send a 1500 man force to support Maxwell’s and Dickinson’s men harassing the British column.  Lee signed the compromise agreement, as did Lafayette and Greene.  Wayne did not, saying he still believed a much stronger force was needed and that he preferred that they try to push the enemy into a full pitched battle.  Lafayette and Greene also later sent letters to Washington saying they hoped the 1500 reinforcements would draw the British into a larger battle.  Lafayette’s letter said that Generals Von Steuben and Duportail also supported this position.

Later that day Washington deployed about 600 riflemen under Colonel Daniel Morgan to support General Maxwell.  He then deployed another nearly 1500 men under General Charles Scott to annoy the British left flank and rear.  Washington also sent communications to General Dickinson to coordinate attacks with the local New Jersey forces.  He deployed General von Steuben to get better intelligence on the enemy’s movements.

Charles Scott

General Scott is another Continental general I’ve avoided introducing up until now.  Scott took an unusual path to becoming a general, starting his military career as a private.  In 1755, shortly after the death of his father, sixteen year old Scott enlisted the Second Virginia Regiment.  He had been apprenticed to become a carpenter, but apparently decided military life would be more interesting.

Charles Scott
Scott’s first years of service were difficult ones. Following the defeat of the Braddock campaign shortly before his enlistment, the French and Indians dominated the Virginia backcountry and regularly attacked outposts and settlements.  Scott served as a guide for the army and quickly rose to sergeant.

Later in the war Sergeant Scott served under Colonel George Washington in the effort to capture Fort Duquesne in the expedition led by British General John Forbes.  Washington saw merit in the young teenager and commissioned him to ensign.  After the fall of Fort Duquesne, Scott remained with his unit in the Pittsburgh area, rebuilding defenses and manning garrisons on western outposts. Near the end of the war, Virginia needed volunteers to put down a Cherokee uprising on the frontier. Scott volunteered and received his captaincy.  There, he served under Lieutenant Colonel Adam Stephen.

After suppressing the Cherokee uprising, the Governor of Virginia disbanded Captain Scott’s regiment.  Around this same time, Scott’s older brother died, leaving him several valuable estates in western Virginia.  Scott got married and settled into the life of a prosperous tobacco farmer.

As tensions between the colonies and Britain grew, Scott backed the patriot cause.  In 1775, shortly after Lexington, Scott raised a company of soldiers and began drilling again.  He offered his company’s services to Patrick Henry during a military confrontation with the governor.  When Virginia established its first two regiments in late 1775. Scott received commission as lieutenant colonel in the Second Virginia.  He played a key role in the Battle of Great Bridge, helping to capture Norfolk and forcing Royal Governor, Lord Dunmore to flee to a British Navy ship.

In 1776, Scott’s regiment was absorbed into the Continental Army.  He soon received a commission to full colonel, and was assigned command of the 5th Virginia Regiment.  There, he served under his old commander, now-General Adam Stephen.  They both served under General Washington for the Christmas attack on Trenton.  Scott played a conspicuous role in the second battle of Trenton as well as the Forage War that winter.

In March 1777, Scott returned home to Virginia.  Washington soon recalled him, and with Washington’s recommendation, Congress promoted Scott to brigadier general.  He continued to serve under, by this time, Major General Stephen.  Scott led his brigade at Brandywine and was one of the most forceful advocates for the attack at Germantown.

Following Germantown, Generals Scott and Stephen accused each other of failures in leadership during the battle.  This ended with Stephen’s discharge from the army. Scott then served under General Lafayette, and marched out of Valley Forge under the French general’s command. To attack the British column in New Jersey, General Scott had his independent command of 1500 soldiers to harass the enemy.

Deployment of Forces

The morning after Scott’s deployment, Washington ordered the remainder of the army to leave their tents and other equipment behind, and move about seven miles further east to Rocky Hill and Kingston, along Millstone Creek.  From Rocky Hill, Washington deployed General Wayne with about 1000 men to harass and impede the head of the British column as it marched north.  Washington also sent General Lafayette along with Wayne, and also let his aide, Colonel Alexander Hamilton go with them for the purpose of keeping him informed of the brigade’s movements.  Another source says that Lafayette received a contingent of 3000 Continental troops with which to confront the British.

So, Washington was committing far more troops to the field than the council had recommended.  He was deploying them both in front of the British column and behind it.  Regardless of the council consensus, Washington seemed bent on provoking a full-on battle.

Gen. Sir Henry Clinton

Over in the British camp, General Clinton had planned to march north from Allentown to Brunswick, about 25 miles away.  Brunswick had been a major British camp a year earlier, before General Howe had abandoned the post when he pulled all of his troops back to New York.  The British were quite familiar with the terrain.  From there, the column could move east to Amboy and cross into British-controlled Staten Island.

Ordinarily, an army on the march on open roads could make that distance in a single day.  Given Clinton’s pace thus far, it would take him three to five days to get there.  Clinton expected that the Continentals would intercept his column at Cranbury Township, about ten miles to his north.  The Continentals could probably get there first, select good defensive ground and force a confrontation on their terms.

Instead of marching north to confront the Continentals, Clinton turned the British column to the east, marching toward the Jersey shore.  It was a little over thirty miles to Sandy Hook, but it would avoid a confrontation with the Continentals.  From there, the British column would have the support of the British Navy in New York Harbor.  The Continentals likely would not attack in that situation and would allow the British to transport the army across the bay back into the city.

So while the Continentals were trying to provoke a battle, The British under General Clinton were pretty clearly trying to avoid one.  The change of direction moved the British away from a confrontation and created a race to the sea.  General Clinton even debated destroying the 1500 wagons travelling with his army in order to speed up the pace.  In the end, he decided against it, since he thought it would make him look weak and afraid if he just ran as fast as he could.  Clinton already had a morale problem. During the march, he had several soldiers tried and hanged for desertion.  

He did not want to appear to be running away from the Continentals.  He was simply consolidating forces in New York per his orders from London.  Even if he was avoiding a confrontation, he did not want it to appear that way.  Even so, his decision to change direction and avoid a battle, redirected the British column to the east toward a village known as Monmouth Courthouse.

Next week, the Battle of Monmouth.

- - -

Next Episode 189 Battle of Monmouth 



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Further Reading

Websites

Philemon Dickinson https://revolutionarynj.org/rev-neighbors/philemon-dickinson-2/#full-bio2ce3-27ae

Stone, Garry W & Mark Lender “Fatal Sunday” American Heritage Magazine, Vol. 62 Issue 4, 2019. https://www.americanheritage.com/fatal-sunday

Battle of Monmouth https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/battle-of-monmouth

Hamilton, Alexander, and William Irvine. “The Battle of Monmouth. Letters of Alexander Hamilton and General William Irvine, Describing the Engagement.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 2, no. 2, 1878, pp. 139–148. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20084337, also available: https://archive.org/details/jstor-20084337

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Brown, Henry Armitt The Battle of Monmouth, Philadelphia, Christopher Sower Co. 1913. 

De Peyster, John Watts The Engagement at Freehold, known as the battle of Monmouth, N.J., more properly of Monmouth Court-House, 28th June, 1778, New York, A.S. Barnes & co. 1878. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Bilby, Joseph & Katherine Bilby Jenkins Monmouth Court House: The Battle that Made the American Army, Westholme, 2010. 

Griffith, William R. IV A Handsome Flogging: The Battle of Monmouth, June 28, 1778, Savas Beatie, 2020. 

Lender, Mark E. & Garry Stone Fatal Sunday: George Washington, the Monmouth Campaign, and the Politics of Battle Univ. of Okla. Press, 2016. 

McBurney, Christian George Washington’s Nemesis: The Outrageous Treason and Unfair Court-Martial of Major General Charles Lee during the Revolutionary War, Savas Beatie, 2020. 

Morrissey, Brendan Monmouth Courthouse 1778: The Last Great Battle in the North, Osprey, 2004. 

Stryker, William S. The Battle Of Monmouth, Kessinger Publishing, 2010 (this is a reprint of a 1927 book with no free ebook version available).

Ward, Christopher The War of the Revolution, Macmillan, 1952.

Ward, Harry M. Charles Scott and the Spirit of 76, Univ. of Va Press, 1988

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, February 7, 2021

ARP187 Evacuation of Philadelphia


As I discussed over multiple episodes, General William Howe’s major initiative for 1777 was the capture of Philadelphia.  As was his usual practice, Howe went about the process slowly and methodically, Leaving New York in July, he sailed down to the Chesapeake and then marched north to Philadelphia, fighting several battles before finally entering the city two and a half months later, in late September.  He then had to spend even more time defending the city against attacks and clearing defenses on the Delaware River to allow the navy to link up to the city and bring in supplies. 

Philadelphia was as close as the patriots had to a national capital.  It was the largest city in the colonies and the seat of the Continental Congress.  Its capture, however, seemed to evoke only a collective yawn on both sides of the Atlantic. Congress simply moved to York, Pennsylvania, and continued its work.  The Continental Army continued its efforts to keep the British pinned down in the city.  Most importantly, Howe’s focus on Philadelphia divided British forces.  This allowed the Continental Northern Army to capture General Burgoyne’s army at Saratoga.  The capture of that army was a major setback to the British war effort.  It also encouraged France to enter the war, which completely changed events.

As I discussed in more detail last week, the entry of France into the war completely upended the plans of war strategists in London.  Instead of simply focusing on putting down the rebellion, Britain had to defend colonies all over the world as well as a potential invasion of the British Isles themselves.  that was why the Carlisle Commission wanted to wrap up the war based on whatever terms they could get.

London’s New Leader & New Strategy

Shortly after capturing Philadelphia, General Howe submitted his resignation to London.  He had been frustrated for over a year that the Ministry would not provide him with sufficient troops to launch multiple campaigns and capture larger areas of the continent.  Without such reinforcements, Howe thought the whole strategy was unwinnable, and wanted out.  

Gen. Howe's HQ, later Gen. Arnold's

It’s not clear if Howe really wanted to resign, or whether he thought his offer might wake up some folks in London to the need for a substantial increase in soldiers to take and hold North America.  But shortly after his resignation request arrived in London, news of Saratoga also reached the ministry.  The King told Prime Minister, Lord North, that someone had to go as a result, either General Howe, or Secretary of State Lord Germain.  Firing Germain might have brought down the whole government, leading to new elections.  So North opted to accept Howe’s resignation and recall him to London.

Lord North tried to replace General Howe by asking General Jeffery Amherst to take the North American Command.  Amherst had served as commander during the French and Indian War.  Amherst, however, wanted an army of 75,000 in North America before he would agree to the command.  That was more than double the number of troops in North America at the time.  The ministry wasn’t going to pay for an army of that size for General Howe, and it was not going to do so for General Amherst either.   Instead, the King promoted Amherst to full general, what we would call a four star general today, and gave him a title of Commander-in-Chief of Forces, a position that had been vacant for nearly twenty years and which gave him a seat in the cabinet.  Amherst would remain in London, organizing the worldwide effort against France and providing military advice directly to the cabinet.

The ministry then turned to General Sir Henry Clinton to take command in North America.  Clinton, of course, had been second in command under Howe for many years.  He had famously chafed at his position and attempted to resign several times.  With this change, however, he finally got the full command that he had so long wanted.  But his army became a shell of its former self, and nowhere near large enough to retake control of North America.  

General Amherst
Along with his orders to take command, the ministry ordered Clinton to send thousands of his best soldiers to Florida and the West Indies to protect British colonies there from possible French invasions.  Lord Germain had sent orders to deploy 5000 men to take the French island of St. Lucia and another 3000 men to St. Augustine in East Florida.  That was about 40% of the total force what was in Philadelphia at the time.

Between those transfers and the loss of General Burgoyne’s 7000 man army a few months earlier, the British had a much smaller military presence in North America, from the numbers they had a year earlier, when General Howe was complaining that they did not have nearly enough soldiers to get the job done.

To prevent these reduced troop levels from being spread out too much and subject to an attack (like the outpost at Trenton) the military planners in London ordered Clinton to abandon Philadelphia and move the army to New York.  He even had discretion to abandon New York and Rhode Island and take his army to Halifax if he deemed that appropriate. 

This was about the same time that the ministry formed the Carlisle Commission that I discussed last week.  The Commission tried to see if there was any possible diplomatic solution that would end hostilities in North America.  Britain was writing off control of North America for the time being, and focused on not losing more of its empire to France.  

Sir Henry Clinton received his orders in New York and traveled to Philadelphia to take command of the army.  He arrived on May 8, 1778, spending the next few weeks conferring with General Howe, before Howe left for England.  Even before General Howe set sail at the end of May, Clinton focused on packing up the army in Philadelphia and getting ready to move to New York.

For the loyalists in Philadelphia, this was their worst nightmare.  Many of these people had remained quiet during the early war years, trying to avoid being attacked or harassed by patriot mobs.  When the British army arrived in the fall of 1777, the loyalists came forward.  They professed their support and even assisted the occupying army.  So, in 1778, when the British made the decision to leave, the loyalists knew that they would have to answer for what the patriots considered to be treason.

Before the army made public its plans to abandon Philadelphia, rumors abounded that it was about to happen.  One loyalist who had joined the police force in Philadelphia that the British army established, attended the Mischianza party for General Howe's departure.  At that party, he asked the General what the locals should do.  Howe’s suggestion was that they try to “make peace” with the Continental Congress.  That, of course, was a frightening prospect.  The Pennsylvania patriots considered the loyalist actions to be criminal.  At best, their property could be confiscated.  They could also face prison or even the gallows.  The time for making peace with Congress was long gone.

Gen. Sir Henry Clinton
On May 25, the day after Howe left Philadelphia, the city’s leading loyalist, Joseph Galloway, submitted a petition to General Clinton, asking the army to remain in Philadelphia.  Galloway suggested raising a force of several thousand loyalist soldiers. With the backing of British regulars, they could continue to hold Philadelphia against the Continentals.  Of course, Galloway had suggested raising a loyalist army when the British first arrived.  It had not happened because loyalists in the area were unwilling to enlist.  Other than out of a sense of desperation, it was unclear why Galloway or anyone else thought that another attempt on the eve of evacuation would inspire more loyalists to make themselves and their property a target for patriot wrath.

Loyalists, of course, were not the only ones who objected to abandoning a city they had worked so long and hard to capture.  Generals Grey and Erskine still wanted to take the offensive.  They proposed an attack on Valley Forge, pushing the Continentals to retreat across the Susquehanna River and allowing the British to take control of the region.  Erskine said the prospect of retreat made him “ashamed of the name of a Briton.”

Additionally, the recently-arrived Peace Commissioners, who were blindsided by the retreat orders, told Clinton that the decision to retreat completely undercut any attempts to bargain from a position of strength.  It made the British look weak and desperate.  The army had to remain and put up a strong front in order for negotiations to succeed.  The Commissioners requested that Clinton at least keep the army in Philadelphia until the Commission could negotiate an agreement with the Continental Congress.

Despite all these objections from loyalists, his own officers, and the Commission, Clinton had very clear and non-discretionary orders to abandon Philadelphia.  Even a delay was dangerous.  The French Navy was expected to arrive soon.  If the French bottled up the British by occupying the Delaware Bay, the British army might find itself trapped and face the prospect of surrender.

The one concession that Clinton did make was to free up the British ships for civilian evacuation.  Loyalist families could board the ships with what limited property that could fit aboard, and sail with the army to New York.  The soldiers, other than those who were wounded, sick or at risk of desertion, would march to New York across New Jersey.

Evacuation 

On May 20th, the same day that the army marched out to Barren Hill in hopes of catching the Marquis de Lafayette, General Clinton issued orders to remove artillery and stores that could not be carried by the army when it marched.  The heavy ordinance would be loaded aboard ships.  Clinton continued to order offensive forays out of the city toward the American lines, in hopes of keeping the enemy from realizing an evacuation was underway and attacking.

Washington, of course, was well aware that he British were leaving.  On June 10, he wrote to his brother that he had been expecting the British to leave for the prior two weeks and could not figure out why they had not left yet.  Washington also suggested to Congress that it offer a conditional amnesty to the loyalists in Philadelphia.  An amnesty would allow the Continentals to benefit from these artisans and skilled workers who were ready to jump at the chance of continuing to work in Philadelphia.  Congress however, was unwilling to consider such a plan.

At the same time, the loyalists in Philadelphia hoped to send a delegation to York to ask for terms.  General Howe had recommended that they be allowed, but General Clinton refused.  If the Philadelphia loyalists sought and received amnesty, what would prevent New York loyalists from doing the same thing?  For Clinton, the loyalists would have to leave with the army or suffer the wrath of the patriots when they retook control of the city.

In total, between 3000 and 5000 loyalists boarded British transports or merchant ships and sailed to New York.  Some remained there, while others went from there to London or other parts of the Empire.  Thousands of other loyalists, unwilling to give up their homes, opted to remain in Philadelphia and take their chances under patriot rule.

Meanwhile, the army began the process of destroying its defenses and any supplies that they could not take with them.  Rumors spread that the army planned to burn Philadelphia as it left, although those proved to be just rumors.  Thousands of extra blankets, tons of food, even several ships that were under construction, were burned.  Some of the fires ended up burning a few houses, but these were unintentional.  Even some large cannons were spiked and dumped into the river to make room for more civilians and their property aboard the ships.

Many refugees sat aboard ships for weeks, waiting for departure.  These people could not return to land for fear of losing their spots on the ship.  But at the same time, they were getting sick and running out of food before they even left port.  Many of these refugees would arrive in New York in very poor condition.

Prior to the evacuation, Pennsylvania's Supreme Executive Council and attainted hundreds of named individuals of committing treason by cooperating with the enemy.  The vast majority of these people, remarkably, remained in Philadelphia and hoped for mercy.  For many well-to-do Philadelphians, the thought of abandoning all of their property to board ships to live as refugees in another colony was simply too much to bear.  

Hessian Map of Philadelphia area
By June 15, the last of the rearguard British and Hessian regiments began crossing the Delaware into New Jersey from various ferries in or near the city.  It had taken days to cross the thousands of soldiers and their supplies, all the while facing the fear of an enemy attack as the process continued.  By the morning of June 18th, the ships had set sail and the army was fully in New Jersey.  

At 10:00 AM on the morning of June 18, Lieutenant Colonel Cosmo Gordon, a British regular officer, woke up in Philadelphia after a night of heavy drinking.  He quickly discovered that the city had been completely abandoned.  His unit, along with the rest of the army, was marching away in New Jersey.  The final British ships in the river had set sail and were away from port.  The panicked officer quickly grabbed his things and rushed down to the port.  There, he found a friendly boatman who he paid to take him across the river.  As far as we know, Gordon was the last officer to leave Philadelphia.  Around 11:00 AM, Admiral Howe, already aboard his flagship Eagle, weighed anchor and sailed down the Delaware River.

The Continentals Return

That same morning a militia scout named George Roberts, rode out to Valley Forge to report that the British had abandoned Philadelphia.  About the same time that Colonel Gordon was making his escape across the Delaware River to New Jersey, Washington received Roberts’ report.  Another group of Delaware militia on horseback had entered the city that morning and captured about thirty enemy soldiers who had not left the city in time.

Washington dispatched Major General Benedict Arnold with a brigade of 400 soldiers to take control of the city.  Arnold was still recovering from his leg wound at Saratoga when he turned up at Valley Forge a month earlier, ready to return to duty.  Still not ready for combat, Washington designated Arnold to serve as military commander of Philadelphia following the British evacuation.  

Riding with Arnold into Philadelphia was Washington’s Aide-de-camp, Colonel Tench Tilghman, who had been a Philadelphia merchant before the war, as well as Washington’s former aide-de-camp Joseph Reed, a Philadelphia lawyer before the war. At that time Reed was a delegate to the Continental Congress.  Continental General Henry Knox and Philadelphia militia General John Cadwalader also rode with the first occupying force to enter the city.

Home Destroyed During Occuption
The comments of everyone who entered the city was that it was a complete and utter mess.  Piles of garbage lay everywhere, in the streets, in public buildings, and in private homes.  Occupying troops and others had used houses, public buildings, even Independence Hall as to relieve themselves.  The smell of human feces and urine was everywhere.  Some occupying soldiers had filled entire basements with their human waste.

Many churches had their gravestones knocked down so that the churchyards could be turned into horse-riding areas.  Church pews, and a great deal of other furniture had been used for firewood.  Almost no wooden fences had survived the occupation.  In some cases, entire houses had been dismantled and used for firewood.

Even some of the better houses were looted.  Major John Andre, who had occupied Benjamin Franklin’s house, left with a full length portrait of the founder, his musical and scientific equipment, as well as most of his library.  Andre blamed Franklin for bringing France into the war and for getting General Howe recalled.  He defended his looting as a form of payback against his enemy.

Damage to the city was severe.  It would take months of clean up and repair to make Philadelphia functional again.  

Aside from assuming formal control of Philadelphia, the purpose in sending in Arnold and other key officers was to take control of any supplies that the British had left behind that the Continental Army needed.  The following day, Arnold issued a proclamation of martial law and ordered all citizens to provide an inventory of any items held in the city.

The Continental Congress, still in York, had passed resolutions ordering the army to put an embargo on all trade and to secure all valuables within the city until a joint committee made up of delegates from Congress and the executive council of Pennsylvania could determine which items were British property, and therefore subject to seizure without compensation.

Continental and state forces secured warehouses and deployed guards to prevent looting.  They locked down the city to prevent any goods from entering or leaving Philadelphia until there could be an accounting.

General Arnold set up his headquarters at the Penn Mansion, where General Howe had kept his headquarters for the prior nine months.  Arnold spent a considerable amount of money refurbishing the mansion and hiring a domestic staff to run it.  

Despite the condition of Independence Hall, the Continental Congress voted to adjourn its session in York on June 27 and to resume work in Philadelphia the following week.  Although Congress planned to resume on July 2, they did not get a quorum to do business until July 7.

Although General Arnold took control of the city with a few hundred soldiers, the bulk of the army did not waste any time with an entrance back into Philadelphia.  Instead, Washington deployed his army directly to southern New Jersey in pursuit of his foe.  The Continental Army began its summer fighting season with an aggressive pursuit of the British Army as it retreated toward New York.  That is where we will take up the story next week.

- - -

Next Episode 188 Pursuit Across New Jersey 



Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast

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Further Reading

Websites

The British in Philadelphia https://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/britishphila_1.htm

Loyalists and the British Evacuation of Philadelphia: https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/09023_FPS_0.pdf

Duffy, Shannon, Loyalists: https://philadelphiaencyclopedia.org/archive/loyalists

Sullivan, Aaron “In but not of the Revolution: Loyalty, Liberty, and the British Occupation of Philadelphia” Dissertation, Temple Univ. 2014: https://digital.library.temple.edu/digital/api/collection/p245801coll10/id/276077/download

Coleman, John M. “Joseph Galloway and the British Occupation of Philadelphia” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July, 1963), pp. 272-300: https://journals.psu.edu/phj/article/download/22953/22722

Secrest, Jeremy British Policy Towards Loyalists in the Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2017: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1039927.pdf

Mishoff, Willard O. “Business in Philadelphia during the British Occupation, 1777-1778.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 61, no. 2, 1937, pp. 165–181. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20087037

Fisher, Darlene Emmert. “SOCIAL LIFE IN PHILADELPHIA DURING THE BRITISH OCCUPATION.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, 1970, pp. 237–260. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27771875

Rightmyer, Nelson Waite. “Churches under Enemy Occupation: Philadelphia, 1777-8.” Church History, vol. 14, no. 1, 1945, pp. 33–60. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3161021

Wiener, Frederick Bernays. “The Military Occupation of Philadelphia in 1777-1778.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 111, no. 5, 1967, pp. 310–313. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/986047

A History of the Royal Provincial Corps of Pennsylvania Loyalists:  http://royalprovincial.com/military/rhist//paloyal/pal1hist.htm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Cuthbert, Anthony "Assessment of Damages Done by the British Troops during the Occupation of Philadelphia, 1777-1778The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 1901: 

Siebert, Wilbur Henry The Loyalists of Pennsylvania, Univ of Columbus, 1920. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Commager, Henry Steele Commager (Ed) and Richard B. Morris (Ed) The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution As Told by Participants, 2002.  

Drury, Bob & Clavin, Tom Valley Forge, Simon & Schuster, 2018.

Jackson, John W. With the British Army in Philadelphia 1777-1778, Presidio Press, 1979. 

Johnson, Donald Occupied America: British Military Rule and the Experience of Revolution, Univ. of Penn Press, 2020. 

McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign, Vol. 2, Stackpole Books, 2007.

Sullivan, Aaron The Disaffected: Britain's Occupation of Philadelphia During the American Revolution, Univ. of Penn. Press, 2019

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003

Ward, Christopher The War of the Revolution, Macmillan, 1952.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, January 31, 2021

ARP186 Carlisle Peace Commission

 A couple of weeks ago, I covered the British as they sent General Howe back to London, following a big party in Philadelphia.  A couple of weeks after Howe departed, another ship, the Trident, arrived in Philadelphia from London on June 6, 1778.  It carried a group of peace commissioners. The three commissioners, led by the Earl of Carlisle, arrived with substantial bargaining power from London to at long last bring this rebellion to an end.

Britain Gets Conciliatory

Over the winter of 1777-78, following news of the capture of Burgoyne’s Army at Saratoga, political leaders in London feared that perhaps they really had underestimated the military capacity of the Americans.  Perhaps a political compromise could resolve this matter.

Earl of Carlisle
Many British leaders believed that speed was of the essence.  London was already receiving word that France was seriously considering entry into the war through a military alliance with the United States.  Britain’s bargaining power would be much greater before that happened.

Parliament, however, went on recess in December, shortly after word of the defeat at Saratoga arrived in London and would not meet again for six weeks.  Members debated taking a shorter recess to deal with events that were quickly developing into war with France.  The members, however, voted to retain their extended recess and put off any decisions until the following year.

When Parliament returned on January 20, 1778, the North Ministry was ready to get to work.  In the Taxation of the Colonies Act of 1778, Parliament repealed the tea tax.  It also disclaimed the Declaratory Act which had maintained Parliament’s right to tax the colonies.  Going forward, Parliament would only levy tariffs related to the regulation of trade, and never to raise revenue.  This is exactly what the patriot leaders had been demanding about a decade earlier.  The bill also repealed the Massachusetts Government Act.  This was the 1774 law that altered Massachusetts’ colonial charter to reduce the colonists’ power of self-government.  It was one of the main reasons that colonists had taken up arms at Lexington and Concord in 1775.

The ministry also got Parliament’s approval to send a Commission to America to make further concessions.  If London could give into the demands that had originally started the war, perhaps they could reach a political settlement before France entered the war.

William Eden

The man behind the push for a peace commission was William Eden.  Eden was the son of a Baronet, though since he was not the first born, he would not inherit a title.  William did, however, get a top notch education and trained to be a lawyer.

William Eden
His career soon veered into government service in the areas of diplomacy and trade. In 1772, at the age of 27, he received an appointment to serve as Undersecretary of State in the North Ministry.  This was due to family connections.  He was related to Solicitor General Alexander Wedderburn.  Two years later, Eden won a seat in the House of Commons, but also retained his position as Undersecretary of State.

Two years after that, in 1776, he took a third position as a Lord of Trade.  This position on the Board of Trade was one of those honorary jobs that paid £1000 per year but did not require the salary holder to show up for work.  It was the ministry’s way of rewarding members of parliament for political loyalty.

Eden, however, took the unusual step of showing for meetings of the Board of Trade, and taking an active role in debate.  Through his government positions, he also created for himself an informal job of intelligence officer.  Eden began making contacts and sending agents all over Europe to obtain intelligence of interest to the ministry.  One of his agents was Paul Wentworth, who I’ve mentioned before went to Paris to keep tabs on the American Commissioners.  It was through Eden’s intelligence network that the North Ministry received word that France was seriously considering entering the war in early 1777.

Eden was no radical Whig.  In Parliament he had supported taxation of the colonies before the war.  He also supported the use of a large military force to put down the rebellion.

But with war with France imminent, Eden became a vocal proponent of a peace commission, and not one of those BS commissions that had gone before with the power to do nothing, other than to forgive the Americans for their treason.  This commission had to make real concessions and as quickly as possible.

Edward Thurlow
During Parliament’s winter recess, Eden put together the proposals for legislative changes and for the creation of a Peace Commission.  He got Prime Minister Lord North’s approval, as well as that of the conservative Attorney General Lord Thurlow.

Parliament began debate on the conciliatory laws and authorization for the peace commission in mid-February, shortly after it returned.  By early March, both the House of Commons and House of Lords had approved the bills and the commission.  The relatively speedy approval of the plan, after about three weeks, should not belie the fact that it was quite controversial within Parliament.  Many conservative Tories thought that the ministry was essentially giving up on the war after the setback at Saratoga and was surrendering to all the colonial demands. 

At the same time, radical Whigs thought that the reforms and the commission did not go far enough.  Leader of the opposition, Lord Rockingham, recommended during debates that the Commission be empowered to grant independence to the United States.  Rockingham and his faction believed that these were the only conditions that would end the war immediately.  This would allow Britain to negotiate a favorable trading relationship with the US and might successfully short circuit a war with France.  Even if France still did go to war with Britain, the US would not be France’s ally.

The radicals were even calling for Lord North’s resignation. They felt that the Americans needed new leadership to accept the real change in policy.  The call for American independence began with a few radicals.  But, as Parliamentary debate continued, the war with France began, the pro-independence movement in Parliament continued to grow to the point where a majority might support it.  Conservatives had to convince the dying William Pitt, Lord Chatham to return to the House of Lords to make a final speech in favor of holding onto the colonies.  He called the independence of America the dismemberment of the monarchy. Chatham would die a few weeks after this speech, but it was effective in forestalling any continued debate over recognizing American independence.

Peace Commissioners

Even as Parliamentary debate on the commission was getting started in February, Lord North sought to have Eden serve on the peace commission that would go to America.  Eden, however, was not so crazy about the idea.  He feared that he would lose his lucrative government positions.  He preferred to stay in London.  Instead, he requested an appointment to the King’s Privy Council.  

The King nixed that idea, but did agree to Eden’s request for £1000 pounds to pay for his duties as a commissioner.  The ministry also agreed that he could continue to hold his position as Undersecretary of State and on the Board of Trade while he was away.  Eden also got Lord North’s promise that North would not resign while he was in America trying to negotiate a peace, and that the ministry would support a major military operation in America in order to help convince the Americans to accept a negotiated end to the war..

So with all that, Eden was on board. The Ministry then looked for other commissioners.  Eden did not think he should head the commission.  His positions in favor of colonial taxation and the use of Native Americans to help suppress the rebellion might make him an unpopular in the eyes of Americans.  

Instead, the head of the commission went to Frederick Howard, 5th Earl of Carlisle.  Lord Carlisle was 29 years old at the time and a member of the House of Lords.  He had done little of note in the government. However, he was a childhood friend of Eden from when the two attended Eton together years earlier.  His title made it appropriate for him to lead the Commission, and Eden thought that they would work well together and that Carlisle would rely on Eden’s advice. 

George Johnstone
Parliament’s third commissioner was Richard Jackson.  As a member of parliament, Jackson tended to be a radical Whig.  Congress chose him as a commissioner because they thought that he would be popular with the Americans.  Jackson had served as a colonial agent before the war, and was good friends with Benjamin Franklin.  Eden, however, thought that Jackson was too radical.  He had spoken in favor of recognizing American independence.  That was farther than Eden wanted to go, and farther than the Commission was authorized to go.

Instead, Eden arranged for Jackson to be replaced on the Commission by George Johnstone, a Scottish member of Parliament who had been Royal Governor of West Florida and was by this time in his fifties.  Both Johnstone and Eden seemed in agreement and believed they would work together well.  Johnstone was not, however, on the best terms with Secretary of State Lord Germain.  The two men had fought a duel against each other in 1770 after Johnstone had questioned Germain’s honor.

Also added to the commission were Admiral Sir Richard Howe and General William Howe.  Recall that the Howe Brothers had been appointed as peace commissioners two years earlier, but not given authority to make any political concessions.  It was thought that the Commission needed to work in concert with the military commanders to put pressure on the Americans to accept the negotiated peace.  The ministry had already accepted General Howe’s offer to resign and had recalled him to London. However, this was not yet public knowledge and not revealed explicitly to the Commission.  Instead, the ministry gave the commission the authority to swap Howe’s seat with the new North American Commander, General Sir Henry Clinton, if appropriate.

Commission goes to America

With all the details worked out, the commission finally set sail from London on April 12, 1778, bound for New York.  By this time, of course, officials had wasted four precious months since the commission’s initial conception.  In that time, Britain and France had gone to war, and Americans had become aware of their new alliance.

London Cartoon making fun of the Commission
Before the commissioners even reached New York, they encountered a British naval vessel in mid-passage.  The captain informed them that Admiral Howe and General Clinton had both gone to Philadelphia.  The commissioners changed course and headed straight to Philadelphia.  They would need to confer with Clinton and Howe before they could begin any real negotiations.

When the commissioners arrived in Philadelphia on June 6, they were surprised to learn that General Howe had already left for London, and even more surprised to learn that General Clinton was preparing to evacuate Philadelphia.  This was the first that the commissioners were hearing about the evacuation plans.

Back in London, Lord Germain had assured the commissioners that the military would engage in an offensive to encourage the Americans to enter negotiations.  Germain had said nothing about evacuation Philadelphia, even though he had sent orders to General Clinton to do just that more than a month before the commissioners left London.

Eden angrily wrote Germain about having the commission undercut by the evacuation and by Germain’s decision to not bother to mention that fact to the commissioners before they left.  Germain’s pathetic response was that Eden was supposed to be an intelligence agent who knew all the government secrets, so he should have known about that.

The commissioners attempted to get General Clinton to delay the evacuation, but Clinton had direct orders from London and was concerned that a French fleet might trap the British in Philadelphia if he delayed.

No Negotiations

Despite the weakened negotiating position, the commission was able to offer an impressive set of concessions.  Parliament had authorized the commission to void any law passed since the Seven Years War that the Americans found objectionable.  The Commission could offer the Americans representation in Parliament, or in the alternative, recognize the Continental Congress as the legitimate representative body of the colonies within the British Empire.  It could guarantee that Parliament would never again attempt to levy taxes on the colonies and that it would never again alter a colonial charter, except at the request of the colonial legislature.  Further, the commissioners could offer rewards to American leaders who helped to end the war and bring about peace.  There was discussion, for example, of making George Washington a duke.

Commission ridiculed as begging for Peace
On June 13, a week after the commission’s arrival in Philadelphia the commissioners sent a message to the Continental Congress in York, essentially saying that they just wanted the war to end and that they were willing to discuss pretty much any and all the demands that the colonies had articulated as reasons for the war and independence.  General Washington did not permit the messenger to go to Congress, but did allow the message to be delivered.

If the Carlisle Commission had arrived two years earlier with these same concessions, they probably would have been met with celebration by the colonies.  It almost certainly would have ended the hostilities and the calls for independence.  But this was 1778, not 1776.  The Americans had been through too much and had come too far to negotiate a return to colonial status.  

Four days later, President Henry Laurens, on behalf of a unanimous Congress rejected the peace overture and rejected any offers for further meetings. As a condition for any further discussions, the British either had to recognize American Independence, or remove all military forces from the US.  Further, the commander would have to present himself before the army, put his head between his legs, and kiss his own arse.  Ok, maybe that last condition wasn't true, but it was just about as likely as either of the first two.

The bottom line was that Americans were committed to full independence by this time and would accept nothing less. Once that happened they were happy to discuss trade relationships or other friendly intercourse between the two separate countries.  In other words, we can be friends, but we are just not into you in that way.  The time for any political compromise was over.

Continuing Efforts

By July, after the British evacuated Philadelphia, a topic I will cover in more detail in an upcoming episode, the Commission saw there was no real chance of success.  The commission made one desperate attempt from New York on July 11 explicitly saying that Britain was open to any concession short of complete independence and that British forces could not evacuate North America due to the war with France.  This message reached Congress but received no response.

The commission tried to reach out directly to the people issuing public proclamations of the concessions that they were willing to make.  If they thought that there was some silent majority ready for peace and that only the radicals in Congress would show resistance, they would be quickly disappointed.  Patriots around the country held public burnings of the conciliatory bills, making clear they were not interested in anything less than complete independence.  Attempts to get loyalists talking about a negotiated peace only stirred up patriots to publish more pamphlets about the importance of independence.

Lord Carlisle wrote to his wife that the arrival of the French fleet “makes every hope of success in our business ridiculous.”  Eden wrote to Lord Wedderburn that had he known of the decision to evacuate Philadelphia, he never even would have come to America.  Britain could not negotiate from a position of strength, and the commission only looked weak and craven.  He wanted to return home, but officials in London urged him to stay with the commission, which had moved to New York, and was continuing its efforts.  Many believe the ministry wanted him to stay, not because they believed there was any chance of success, but because they did not want him to return to Parliament and join the opposition.

Francis Dana
To make matters worse, Commissioner George Johnstone attempted to bribe three members of Congress, Francis Dana, Joseph Reed, and Robert Morris.  The delegates all reported the attempted bribery and Congress declared that no patriot could have any communications with such a dishonorable character without bringing their own reputation into question.  

The other members of the Commission had to distance themselves from Johnstone and said they had no knowledge of what he had been doing.  Johnstone had to resign from the commission and return to England.  There, he returned to Parliament and continued with his successful political career in support of the ministry.

By the end of August, the commission released another pronouncement that further attempts at conciliation were futile and that if the Americans wanted to resume discussions, they would have to initiate the talks.  Back in London the King had received initial reports of the failure to start talks in June and told Lord North: “The Present accounts from America put a stop to all negotiations.  Further concession is a joke.”

End of the Commission

In October, the Commission issued one last proclamation making an offer to any individuals or states that might want to seek a peace with Britain and return to the empire.  The proclamation went on to emphasize the dangers to the Americans in allying themselves with their traditional enemy of France.  That resulted in Lafayette challenging Eden to a duel.  Eden declined, noting that bad mouthing an enemy during a time of war is not dishonorable.

The proclamation also threatened that the war would become even more harsh as Britain took off the gloves in this all-out war against France and those who allied themselves with it.  Eden had suggested privately that military leaders send in guerilla units into the continent to engage in continuing acts of destruction and devastation in order to convince the people to demand a peaceful resolution.  That, of course, never happened.  

The only thing the Commission managed to do was restore trade privileges to loyalists living in New York City or Newport, Rhode Island, the only two areas within the United States where Britain still had a significant military presence.

By the end of 1778, the Commission had given up completely and returned to England.  The commissioners continued to try to convince the ministry to apply more military pressure to North America, but by that time, the ministry was focused on other concerns with France.  The commission finally disbanded on June 1, 1779.

Next week, the British Army packs up and evacuates Philadelphia.

- - -

Next Episode 187 Evacuation of Philadelphia 



Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast

Join the Facebook group, American Revolution Podcast: https://www.facebook.com/groups/132651894048271

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American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via VenmoZelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)


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You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.



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Further Reading

Websites

IMAGE: https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_J-1-113

Carlisle Commission message to Continental Congress, and Congress’ Response: https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/response-to-british-peace-proposals

Jordan, Myron K. Reconciliation and Reunion, Portland State Univ. (Master’s Thesis) 1775: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3311&context=open_access_etds

Savage, John T. Britain’s Conciliatory Proposal of 1778: A Study in Futility, Univ. of Richmond, (Master’s Thesis) 1968: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1906&context=masters-theses

Rabb, Reginald E. "The Role of William Eden in the British Peace Commission of 1778” The Historian, vol. 20, no. 2, 1958, pp. 153-178. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24437531

Einhorn, Nathan R. “THE RECEPTION OF THE BRITISH PEACE OFFER OF 1778” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, vol. 16, no. 3, 1949, pp. 191-214. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27769029

George Johnstone: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Johnstone,_George_(DNB00)

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Cobbett, William Parliamentary History of England, vol. 19. London: T.C. Hansard, 1814, pp. 775-815 debate on conciliatory bills of 1778 (Google Books). 

Carlisle Commission October Proclamation:

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Commager, Henry Steele and Richard Morris (eds) The Spirit of Seventy-Six, Castle Books, 2002. 

Hibbert, Christopher Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes, W.W. Norton & Co. 1990 (book recommendation of the week). 

Reich, Jerome R. British Friends of the American Revolution, Routledge, 1997.

Stryker, William The Battle of Monmouth, Kennikat Press, 1927 (reprint)

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.