Showing posts with label 1776 18th Century Wars. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 1776 18th Century Wars. Show all posts

Sunday, October 27, 2019

Episode 120: The American Crisis




Last week I covered a few side events in Rhode Island and Canada that took place in late 1776.  But we all know the main event was along the Delaware River.  Over the last few weeks, I addressed the British push to take New Jersey and the Continental retreat to Pennsylvania.  Continental soldiers were leaving in droves as their enlistments ended, or just plain deserting.  General Washington had another very large enlistment expiration at the end of December, leaving him with little more than a few regiments to command.  Very few soldiers saw any chance of victory and were eager to go home.

One of the soldiers retreating with the Continentals was Thomas Paine.  The author of Common Sense had enlisted in the Pennsylvania militia sometime after writing his famous pamphlet.  He ended up in Fort Lee where he volunteered to serve as General Nathanael Greene’s aide-de-camp.  Paine marched with the rest of the army from Fort Lee as the British under Cornwallis pursued them.

According to legend, Paine marched with the army during the day and penned The American Crisis, No. 1, during the evenings as the army marched from Newark to the Delaware River. It is hard to imagine, though, having much time to do anything during the march.  Perhaps he had time to scratch out a few notes.  There is no good record as to exactly how much of The Crisis he wrote during the march.  Years later, Paine said that he wrote The Crisis in Philadelphia after his arrival in the city on December 8th.

The purpose of Paine’s essay was not to inspire the troops.  It was an attempt to rally the public to the cause and encourage more men to enlist.  Although it is a bit lengthy for this podcast, I’m going to read it in full since it is such a powerful work.

THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives every thing its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should not be highly rated. Britain, with an army to enforce her tyranny, has declared that she has a right (not only to TAX) but "to BIND us in ALL CASES WHATSOEVER," and if being bound in that manner, is not slavery, then is there not such a thing as slavery upon earth. Even the expression is impious; for so unlimited a power can belong only to God.

Printing from "American Crisis"
(from Wikimedia)
Whether the independence of the continent was declared too soon, or delayed too long, I will not now enter into as an argument; my own simple opinion is, that had it been eight months earlier, it would have been much better. We did not make a proper use of last winter, neither could we, while we were in a dependent state. However, the fault, if it were one, was all our own*;       

* The present winter is worth an age, if rightly employed; but, if lost or neglected, the whole continent will partake of the evil; and there is no punishment that man does not deserve, be he who, or what, or where he will, that may be the means of sacrificing a season so precious and useful.we have none to blame but ourselves. But no great deal is lost yet. All that Howe has been doing for this month past, is rather a ravage than a conquest, which the spirit of the Jerseys, a year ago, would have quickly repulsed, and which time and a little resolution will soon recover.

I have as little superstition in me as any man living, but my secret opinion has ever been, and still is, that God Almighty will not give up a people to military destruction, or leave them unsupportedly to perish, who have so earnestly and so repeatedly sought to avoid the calamities of war, by every decent method which wisdom could invent. Neither have I so much of the infidel in me, as to suppose that He has relinquished the government of the world, and given us up to the care of devils; and as I do not, I cannot see on what grounds the king of Britain can look up to heaven for help against us: a common murderer, a highwayman, or a house-breaker, has as good a pretence as he.

'Tis surprising to see how rapidly a panic will sometimes run through a country. All nations and ages have been subject to them. Britain has trembled like an ague at the report of a French fleet of flat-bottomed boats; and in the fourteenth [fifteenth] century the whole English army, after ravaging the kingdom of France, was driven back like men petrified with fear; and this brave exploit was performed by a few broken forces collected and headed by a woman, Joan of Arc. Would that heaven might inspire some Jersey maid to spirit up her countrymen, and save her fair fellow sufferers from ravage and ravishment! Yet panics, in some cases, have their uses; they produce as much good as hurt. Their duration is always short; the mind soon grows through them, and acquires a firmer habit than before. But their peculiar advantage is, that they are the touchstones of sincerity and hypocrisy, and bring things and men to light, which might otherwise have lain forever undiscovered. In fact, they have the same effect on secret traitors, which an imaginary apparition would have upon a private murderer. They sift out the hidden thoughts of man, and hold them up in public to the world. Many a disguised Tory has lately shown his head, that shall penitentially solemnize with curses the day on which Howe arrived upon the Delaware.

As I was with the troops at Fort Lee, and marched with them to the edge of Pennsylvania, I am well acquainted with many circumstances, which those who live at a distance know but little or nothing of. Our situation there was exceedingly cramped, the place being a narrow neck of land between the North River and the Hackensack. Our force was inconsiderable, being not one-fourth so great as Howe could bring against us. We had no army at hand to have relieved the garrison, had we shut ourselves up and stood on our defence. Our ammunition, light artillery, and the best part of our stores, had been removed, on the apprehension that Howe would endeavor to penetrate the Jerseys, in which case Fort Lee could be of no use to us; for it must occur to every thinking man, whether in the army or not, that these kind of field forts are only for temporary purposes, and last in use no longer than the enemy directs his force against the particular object which such forts are raised to defend. Such was our situation and condition at Fort Lee on the morning of the 20th of November, when an officer arrived with information that the enemy with 200 boats had landed about seven miles above; Major General [Nathanael] Green, who commanded the garrison, immediately ordered them under arms, and sent express to General Washington at the town of Hackensack, distant by the way of the ferry = six miles. Our first object was to secure the bridge over the Hackensack, which laid up the river between the enemy and us, about six miles from us, and three from them. General Washington arrived in about three-quarters of an hour, and marched at the head of the troops towards the bridge, which place I expected we should have a brush for; however, they did not choose to dispute it with us, and the greatest part of our troops went over the bridge, the rest over the ferry, except some which passed at a mill on a small creek, between the bridge and the ferry, and made their way through some marshy grounds up to the town of Hackensack, and there passed the river. We brought off as much baggage as the wagons could contain, the rest was lost. The simple object was to bring off the garrison, and march them on till they could be strengthened by the Jersey or Pennsylvania militia, so as to be enabled to make a stand. We staid four days at Newark, collected our out-posts with some of the Jersey militia, and marched out twice to meet the enemy, on being informed that they were advancing, though our numbers were greatly inferior to theirs. Howe, in my little opinion, committed a great error in generalship in not throwing a body of forces off from Staten Island through Amboy, by which means he might have seized all our stores at Brunswick, and intercepted our march into Pennsylvania; but if we believe the power of hell to be limited, we must likewise believe that their agents are under some providential control.

I shall not now attempt to give all the particulars of our retreat to the Delaware; suffice it for the present to say, that both officers and men, though greatly harassed and fatigued, frequently without rest, covering, or provision, the inevitable consequences of a long retreat, bore it with a manly and martial spirit. All their wishes centred in one, which was, that the country would turn out and help them to drive the enemy back. Voltaire has remarked that King William never appeared to full advantage but in difficulties and in action; the same remark may be made on General Washington, for the character fits him. There is a natural firmness in some minds which cannot be unlocked by trifles, but which, when unlocked, discovers a cabinet of fortitude; and I reckon it among those kind of public blessings, which we do not immediately see, that God hath blessed him with uninterrupted health, and given him a mind that can even flourish upon care.

I shall conclude this paper with some miscellaneous remarks on the state of our affairs; and shall begin with asking the following question, Why is it that the enemy have left the New England provinces, and made these middle ones the seat of war? The answer is easy: New England is not infested with Tories, and we are. I have been tender in raising the cry against these men, and used numberless arguments to show them their danger, but it will not do to sacrifice a world either to their folly or their baseness. The period is now arrived, in which either they or we must change our sentiments, or one or both must fall. And what is a Tory? Good God! what is he? I should not be afraid to go with a hundred Whigs against a thousand Tories, were they to attempt to get into arms. Every Tory is a coward; for servile, slavish, self-interested fear is the foundation of Toryism; and a man under such influence, though he may be cruel, never can be brave.

But, before the line of irrecoverable separation be drawn between us, let us reason the matter together: Your conduct is an invitation to the enemy, yet not one in a thousand of you has heart enough to join him. Howe is as much deceived by you as the American cause is injured by you. He expects you will all take up arms, and flock to his standard, with muskets on your shoulders. Your opinions are of no use to him, unless you support him personally, for 'tis soldiers, and not Tories, that he wants.

I once felt all that kind of anger, which a man ought to feel, against the mean principles that are held by the Tories: a noted one, who kept a tavern at Amboy, was standing at his door, with as pretty a child in his hand, about eight or nine years old, as I ever saw, and after speaking his mind as freely as he thought was prudent, finished with this unfatherly expression, "Well! give me peace in my day." Not a man lives on the continent but fully believes that a separation must some time or other finally take place, and a generous parent should have said, "If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, that my child may have peace;" and this single reflection, well applied, is sufficient to awaken every man to duty. Not a place upon earth might be so happy as America. Her situation is remote from all the wrangling world, and she has nothing to do but to trade with them. A man can distinguish himself between temper and principle, and I am as confident, as I am that God governs the world, that America will never be happy till she gets clear of foreign dominion. Wars, without ceasing, will break out till that period arrives, and the continent must in the end be conqueror; for though the flame of liberty may sometimes cease to shine, the coal can never expire.

Thomas Paine (from Wikimedia)
America did not, nor does not want force; but she wanted a proper application of that force. Wisdom is not the purchase of a day, and it is no wonder that we should err at the first setting off. From an excess of tenderness, we were unwilling to raise an army, and trusted our cause to the temporary defence of a well-meaning militia. A summer's experience has now taught us better; yet with those troops, while they were collected, we were able to set bounds to the progress of the enemy, and, thank God! they are again assembling. I always considered militia as the best troops in the world for a sudden exertion, but they will not do for a long campaign. Howe, it is probable, will make an attempt on this city [Philadelphia]; should he fail on this side the Delaware, he is ruined. If he succeeds, our cause is not ruined. He stakes all on his side against a part on ours; admitting he succeeds, the consequence will be, that armies from both ends of the continent will march to assist their suffering friends in the middle states; for he cannot go everywhere, it is impossible. I consider Howe as the greatest enemy the Tories have; he is bringing a war into their country, which, had it not been for him and partly for themselves, they had been clear of. Should he now be expelled, I wish with all the devotion of a Christian, that the names of Whig and Tory may never more be mentioned; but should the Tories give him encouragement to come, or assistance if he come, I as sincerely wish that our next year's arms may expel them from the continent, and the Congress appropriate their possessions to the relief of those who have suffered in well-doing. A single successful battle next year will settle the whole. America could carry on a two years' war by the confiscation of the property of disaffected persons, and be made happy by their expulsion. Say not that this is revenge, call it rather the soft resentment of a suffering people, who, having no object in view but the good of all, have staked their own all upon a seemingly doubtful event. Yet it is folly to argue against determined hardness; eloquence may strike the ear, and the language of sorrow draw forth the tear of compassion, but nothing can reach the heart that is steeled with prejudice.

Quitting this class of men, I turn with the warm ardor of a friend to those who have nobly stood, and are yet determined to stand the matter out: I call not upon a few, but upon all: not on this state or that state, but on every state: up and help us; lay your shoulders to the wheel; better have too much force than too little, when so great an object is at stake. Let it be told to the future world, that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet and to repulse it. Say not that thousands are gone, turn out your tens of thousands; throw not the burden of the day upon Providence, but "show your faith by your works," that God may bless you. It matters not where you live, or what rank of life you hold, the evil or the blessing will reach you all. The far and the near, the home counties and the back, the rich and the poor, will suffer or rejoice alike. The heart that feels not now is dead; the blood of his children will curse his cowardice, who shrinks back at a time when a little might have saved the whole, and made them happy. I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. 'Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death. My own line of reasoning is to myself as straight and clear as a ray of light. Not all the treasures of the world, so far as I believe, could have induced me to support an offensive war, for I think it murder; but if a thief breaks into my house, burns and destroys my property, and kills or threatens to kill me, or those that are in it, and to "bind me in all cases whatsoever" to his absolute will, am I to suffer it? What signifies it to me, whether he who does it is a king or a common man; my countryman or not my countryman; whether it be done by an individual villain, or an army of them? If we reason to the root of things we shall find no difference; neither can any just cause be assigned why we should punish in the one case and pardon in the other. Let them call me rebel and welcome, I feel no concern from it; but I should suffer the misery of devils, were I to make a whore of my soul by swearing allegiance to one whose character is that of a sottish, stupid, stubborn, worthless, brutish man. I conceive likewise a horrid idea in receiving mercy from a being, who at the last day shall be shrieking to the rocks and mountains to cover him, and fleeing with terror from the orphan, the widow, and the slain of America.

There are cases which cannot be overdone by language, and this is one. There are persons, too, who see not the full extent of the evil which threatens them; they solace themselves with hopes that the enemy, if he succeed, will be merciful. It is the madness of folly, to expect mercy from those who have refused to do justice; and even mercy, where conquest is the object, is only a trick of war; the cunning of the fox is as murderous as the violence of the wolf, and we ought to guard equally against both. Howe's first object is, partly by threats and partly by promises, to terrify or seduce the people to deliver up their arms and receive mercy. The ministry recommended the same plan to Gage, and this is what the tories call making their peace, "a peace which passeth all understanding" indeed! A peace which would be the immediate forerunner of a worse ruin than any we have yet thought of. Ye men of Pennsylvania, do reason upon these things! Were the back counties to give up their arms, they would fall an easy prey to the Indians, who are all armed: this perhaps is what some Tories would not be sorry for. Were the home counties to deliver up their arms, they would be exposed to the resentment of the back counties who would then have it in their power to chastise their defection at pleasure. And were any one state to give up its arms, that state must be garrisoned by all Howe's army of Britons and Hessians to preserve it from the anger of the rest. Mutual fear is the principal link in the chain of mutual love, and woe be to that state that breaks the compact. Howe is mercifully inviting you to barbarous destruction, and men must be either rogues or fools that will not see it. I dwell not upon the vapors of imagination; I bring reason to your ears, and, in language as plain as A, B, C, hold up truth to your eyes.

I thank God, that I fear not. I see no real cause for fear. I know our situation well, and can see the way out of it. While our army was collected, Howe dared not risk a battle; and it is no credit to him that he decamped from the White Plains, and waited a mean opportunity to ravage the defenceless Jerseys; but it is great credit to us, that, with a handful of men, we sustained an orderly retreat for near an hundred miles, brought off our ammunition, all our field pieces, the greatest part of our stores, and had four rivers to pass. None can say that our retreat was precipitate, for we were near three weeks in performing it, that the country might have time to come in. Twice we marched back to meet the enemy, and remained out till dark. The sign of fear was not seen in our camp, and had not some of the cowardly and disaffected inhabitants spread false alarms through the country, the Jerseys had never been ravaged. Once more we are again collected and collecting; our new army at both ends of the continent is recruiting fast, and we shall be able to open the next campaign with sixty thousand men, well armed and clothed. This is our situation, and who will may know it. By perseverance and fortitude we have the prospect of a glorious issue; by cowardice and submission, the sad choice of a variety of evils—a ravaged country—a depopulated city—habitations without safety, and slavery without hope—our homes turned into barracks and bawdy-houses for Hessians, and a future race to provide for, whose fathers we shall doubt of. Look on this picture and weep over it! and if there yet remains one thoughtless wretch who believes it not, let him suffer it unlamented.

Thus ended the Crisis.

These powerful word began to spread across North American in late December 1776.  Historians also don’t agree on the day it was published.  Most say December 19, but it may have been as late as December 23.  Popular legend says he published it in the Pennsylvania Journal and that Washington had it read to his army just before they crossed the Delaware to attack the Hessians.  But again, there is no contemporary evidence that Washington did this.  Paine’s first printing came as an independent pamphlet. The Pennsylvania Journal had ceased publishing entirely in early December because of the expected British invasion of Philadelphia.  It did not resume publishing until mid-January.

Another paper, the Pennsylvania Packet reprinted the first half a few days after Christmas. It did not publish the second half until January.  That said, it is quite possible that copies of the original American Crisis pamphlet reached the Continental Army a few days before the crossing and that many soldiers either read it or had it read to them.

Whatever the details of its release, Paine’s Crisis called on the nation to rally against the British Army.  Next week, we will cover the beginning of the country’s counterattack.

- - -

Next Episode 121 Battle of Iron Works Hill

Previous Episode 119: Fort Cumberland (Nova Scotia) and Newport, RI


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Further Reading

Websites

The American Crisis series (full texts): http://www.ushistory.org/paine/crisis

The American Crisis Before Crossing the Delaware, by Jett Conner, Journal of the American Revolution 2015: https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/02/american-crisis-before-crossing-the-delaware

A Brief Publication History of the “Times That Try Men’s Souls,” by Jett Conner, Journal of the American Revolution 2016:
https://allthingsliberty.com/2016/01/a-brief-publication-history-of-the-times-that-try-mens-souls

How Thomas Paine's Other Pamphlet Saved the Revolution: https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/how-thomas-paines-other-pamphlet-saved-the-revolution

Biography of Thomas Paine: http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/biographies/thomas-paine

Thomas Paine: https://www.biography.com/scholar/thomas-paine

The Writings of Thomas Paine: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/31270/31270-h/31270-h.htm

Thomas Paine, works: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/thomas-paine

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Clarke, Harry Hayden Thomas Paine, American Book Company, 1944.

Conway, Moncure The Life of Thomas Paine, Vol 1 and Vol. 2, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1908.

Conway, Moncure (ed) The Writings of Thomas Paine, Vol. 1 1774-1779,  New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1906.

Drake, Samuel A. The Campaign of Trenton 1776-77, Lee and Shepard, 1899.

Foner, Phillip (ed) The Complete Works of Thomas Paine, Citidel Press, 1945.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Atkinson, Richard The British Are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777, Henry Holt & Co. 2019

Dwyer, William The Day Is Ours: How a Ragged Rebel Army Stood the Storm and Saved the Revolution,  Viking, 1983.

Fischer, David Hackett Washington’s Crossing, Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975.

Foner, Eric Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976

Foner, Eric Thomas Paine: Collected Writings: Common Sense / The Crisis / Rights of Man / The Age of Reason / Pamphlets, Articles, and Letters, Library of America, 1995 (book recommendation of the week).

Kaye, Harvey J. Thomas Paine and the Promise of America: A History & Biography, New York: Hill and Wang, 2006.

Kean, John Tom Paine: A Political Life, London: Bloomsbury, 1995

Lefkowitz, Arthur S. The Long Retreat, The Calamitous American Defense of New Jersey 1776, Upland Press, 1998.

Nelson, Craig Thomas Paine: Enlightenment, Revolution, and the Birth of Modern Nations, New York: Viking, 2006.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, March 3, 2019

Episode 086: Evacuation of Boston




Last week, the Continental Army took Dorchester Heights.  The British could not retake the heights by force, and put their entire force under risk of attack of bombardment from the heights.

Decision to Evacuate

Now months earlier, British General William Howe had planned to evacuate Boston.  Secretary of State Germain had even sent communications authorizing evacuation months earlier, but Howe felt a winter evacuation would be to difficult.

He had planned to move his army down to New York and make New York City his base of operations in the spring.  London was sending large numbers of reinforcements in a few months.  Howe was mostly awaiting their arrival.

Howe Evacuates Boston (from Mt. Vernon)
Gen. John Burgoyne was deploying to Canada, where he would reassert control there.  Burgoyne would then move down the Hudson as Howe moved up the Hudson.  With this, the two armies would cut off New England and isolate the most troublesome part of the continent.  New England colonists would suffer under a British blockade while the regulars pacified and reasserted control over the middle and southern colonies, where they thought patriot sentiment was not as universal.

It seemed like a good plan. The problem was Washington and the Continental Army had pushed up Howe’s timeline.  Howe’s reinforcements from London were not there yet.  He did not want to take his relatively small force to New York.  Part of the Continental Army, along with New York militia was already building defenses around New York.  The last thing Howe wanted was to land his relatively small force and possibly face an attack under possibly worse circumstances than the one he just left.  Howe wanted to invade with overwhelming force there to make sure they could overcome any resistance.  That could not happen for a few more months.

Admiral Shuldham made clear he was not going to leave his ships in the harbor under rebel guns.  Without the navy, Howe could not stay.  He would lose his already difficult access to food and supplies.  The regulars had to leave now.  So, Howe decided to move everyone up to Halifax in Nova Scotia, Canada.  Halifax remained under Royal control and would not be a combat zone.  Howe would wait there until he could coordinate his much larger invasion of New York with the reinforcements coming from Britain.

Evacuation Logistics

By March 7, 1776, Howe had made the decision to evacuate to Halifax.  Putting that plan into effect was a major task in itself.  First, there were over 8000 soldiers in Boston, some sources say nearly 9000, about a quarter of whom were sick.  Some sources say it was closer to 11,000, but I think that is including the estimated 2400 camp followers, wives and children of the soldiers who could not be left behind.  Some say records say the number of camp followers was smaller, but that is because records exist for only about half the regiments being evacuated.  In addition, there were more than 1100 Tory colonists who could not be left behind to face patriot vengeance.  It total, Howe had to board an estimated 12,000 people, along with all their belongings aboard ship under enemy fire, all the time worried that the patriots might attack while the regulars were in the process of evacuating.

The British had about 125 ships at their disposal, enough to carry all the people, though there was an uncomfortable amount of crowding aboard ships. There was not enough room for all the equipment, supplies, and personal effects of the colonists trying to move with the army.  Even worse, the navy had been losing sailors to disease and desertion all winter.  They did not have enough sailors to man all the ships they had at their disposal.  They ended up destroying several ships that they could not take with them.

Informal Agreement

In an attempt to make the evacuation easier, Howe sent out a notice to the patriots on March 9.  The Notice declared that the British had decided to evacuate Boston.  If the rebels fired on them while evacuating, they would burn the city.  If left alone, they would leave the city intact and allow the Continentals to take control.

Howe could not seek a direct agreement with Washington.  The problem was that Howe refused to address Washington as “General” or any other title conferred on him by the Continental Congress.  Doing so would have legitimized the authority of Congress, something he could not do.  Washington refused to accept any communication from the British which failed to address him as General.  Instead, Howe had several Boston Selectmen sign a note stating Howe’s position and had that note carried under a flag of truce out to the patriots.

Washington did not respond formally, but apparently agreed to the deal and did not fire on the regulars as they packed their ships for departure.  He did not want to waste ammunition nor see the destruction of Boston.  If the regulars would pack up and go, that was good enough for Washington.

Battle of Nook Hill

But that is not to say Washington simply sat and waited for the British to leave.  Washington had already begun deploying soldiers under the command of General Charles Lee to New York, thinking that would be where the regulars would be headed.  Lee had been hard at work setting up defenses in and around New York City.  Now Washington prepared to deploy more of his army to New York, to greet any British landing there.

But Washington also could not be sure that Howe’s planned evacuation was a trick.  He could be stalling for time as he waited for expected reinforcements to arrive.  Or, he could load up the ships, carry his men a few miles up or down the coast, land them and march back toward Boston and attack the Continentals from the rear.

Continental Artillery
(from Boston 1775)
So, Washington continued work on his defenses.  Nook Hill was a smaller hill on Dorchester Heights closest to the Harbor and well within range of British artillery at Boston Neck.  On March 9, the Continental Army began construction of a fort on Nook Hill.  They began work after nightfall in hopes of erecting a fortification by morning.

But the workers could not see enough to work and lit a fire to help them see.  The regulars immediately spotted the fire on Nook Hill.  The regulars were not ready to march out of Boston to attack, but they unleashed an artillery barrage against Nook Hill.  One report indicates the Patriots later collected over 700 cannonballs fired at them that day.  For all the firing, the regulars killed only five Continentals on Nook Hill.  That was enough to discourage the construction of the fort.  The Continentals evacuated Nook Hill.

This repeated itself over the next few days, as Continentals attempted building more fortifications in plain view of the regulars.  The British would fire artillery and the Continentals would back away.

Finally, on the night of March 16, the Continental successfully established a fortification on Nook Hill during the night.  Washington wanted the fortification in case the Regulars really were not leaving, he could be in a better position to attack the town.  By that time though, the British were so close to leaving, that they did not put up much resistance.  They fired a few cannons that they still had in place, old ones that they planned to spike on their way out of town.  Under much reduced fire, the Continentals held their occupation of the fort on Nook Hill and mounted cannons aimed directly at Boston.

Looting and Leaving Boston

While Gen. Howe had agreed not to burn Boston, he also did not want to leave anything of use in the city that could be used by the enemy to further their rebellion.  At first, Howe ordered that citizens turn over all woolens and linens.  These were apparently in short supply in the Continental Army, but also would probably be needed when the regulars arrived in Halifax.  Later, he extended the order to salt, sugar, flour, furniture, and any remaining weapons.  Soldiers looted houses looking for such goods, and taking whatever else of value they happened to find.  Howe ordered that looters be shot on site, but that didn’t happen.  No one in the army was in much mood to fight about protecting colonist property.

One of the notable looters was a man named Crean Brush, an Irish born Tory.  Brush had moved to New York back in 1762.  He had settled in the Green mountains.  That put him in direct conflict with Ethan Allen who had been fighting New York’s control of the region.  Brush had been on the committee that declared Allen an outlaw to be shot on sight.  After fighting started, Brush went to Boston to get authority to raise a Tory regiment tasked with hunting down and killing Allen and the Green Mountain Boys.

Crean Brush (from Boston 1775)
Instead, Gen. Gage had put him to work in Boston, finding housing for his soldiers, which often meant kicking locals out of their homes.  Brush later worked for Gen. Howe trying to find supplies for the army by taking control of warehouses and confiscating whatever the army wanted.  As you might guess, this did not make him many friends.  To top it off, Howe put Brush in charge of searching all the houses and confiscating everything the army wanted during the last days of the occupation.  Brush loaded up one of the ships leaving with the British fleet loaded with anything of value that he could carry.

Unfortunately for Brush, his ship, the Elizabeth was the one ship in the fleet captured by a patriot privateer and returned to patriot controlled Boston.  The patriots tried him, but amazingly could not convict him.  Still, they just kept him in jail because, you know, regardless of any trial, the guy was a Tory and a looter.  After 19 months, near the end of 1777, his wife came to visit him.  Using her clothes, he snuck out of prison dressed as a woman and fled to British controlled New York.  He could not get any help from the army getting compensated for all the property he lost.  He died the next year, allegedly from suicide.

At the risk of getting really off topic here, I should also mention that Brush’s humiliation did not end with his death.  Years, later Ethan Allen, the man who for years he had tried to kill, married his stepdaughter.  Ironically, Allen then took up the family claims from New York on Brush’s confiscated properties, putting him against the New Hampshire claims he had fought for all his life.

Map of Boston during Siege, 1776 click to zoom (from Reddit)
Anyway, back to the evacuation: On March 16, Howe ordered all Boston civilians not leaving with the fleet to remain confined to their homes, to ensure the soldiers would not have any problems and to keep the streets free for the military.

Despite their efforts, the British left behind a great many things. They spiked dozens of cannons and threw tons of food and other supplies into the Harbor.  They even had to scuttle a few ships that did not have enough sailors to take with them.  Even so, they left tons of supplies for the Continentals to capture when they re-entered the city, including stables with at least 110 horses.  Later, Washington estimated the Continentals captured supplies worth at least £30,000.

For the next week, the British Army made every effort to strip everything of value from the city, either destroying it or loading it aboard ship.  Finally, on the morning of March 17, they had packed everything they could, made their final boarding, and sailed out of Boston Harbor for the last time.

One of the last tasks fell to Cap. Jesse Adair, who you may recall was the marine lieutenant who had ordered the regulars to confront the militia on Lexington Green a year earlier rather than continue marching past them.  Howe tasked Adair with covering Boston Neck with crows feet, little spikes that would pierce a soldier’s foot unless they walked very slowly to avoid them.  The point was to slow down any entry into Boston as the last ships were leaving.  Adair started at the British entrenchments and worked his way toward the Continental lines, spreading them as close as he could until he came under enemy fire.  Brain trust that he was, he then realized he had to run back over the ground he just covered with crows feet in order to escape the enemy.  He was nearly captured, but managed to pick his way back across the neck and get back into Boston safely.

Howe was one of the last officers to board a ship and depart Boston.  He knew many in London would not understand his fleeing the city without a fight.  He had been writing letters for months saying there was no way the Continentals could ever attack Boston without being slaughtered.  Now he had to flee to save his army.  But there really was no other option.  To this day, Boston celebrates March 17 as Evacuation Day.

Continental Army Enters Boston

As the fleet sailed away, the Continental Army moved into the city.  Washington gave the honor of retaking the city to Generals Ward and Putnam, both New Englanders who had been at the siege since it began 11 months earlier when the militia chased the regulars from Lexington and Concord back into Boston.  Ward and Putnam took a select force of about 1000 soldiers into the city.  All of the soldiers selected had already survived smallpox and were therefore immune from the disease that was still ravaging Boston.

As the troops entered the city, they halted upon seeing that there were still regulars manning some of the fortifications a Boston Neck and on Bunker Hill.  On closer examination though, it turned out the defenders were simply scarecrows wearing old uniforms.

John Hancock House (from Col. Society of Mass)
The Continentals began recovering anything the British had left behind or attempted to destroy.  They were surprised by how much they could recover, including guns, ammunition, as well as other supplies.  Also, almost as soon as they entered the town, they began building fortifications to defend the harbor should the British decide to return.

Washington himself entered the city a few days later to take command.  While the British had looted most houses, Washington was pleased to report to John Hancock that his mansion was surprisingly intact.  Gen. Clinton had lived in Hancock’s home during much of the occupation, and had made an effort to protect the personal items of his unwilling host.  Washington also took note of the defenses that the regulars had built through the city, and realized that if he had attacked by water if planned, his men would have run into almost impregnable defenses.

The Departing Fleet

Although the British had left Boston, most of the fleet remained just off the coast, waiting for favorable winds.  Admiral Shuldham sent messenger ships to London to inform the ministry of the evacuation and to the other colonies to warn British ships headed for Boston to head to Halifax instead.

All of those leaving were crammed into crowded quarters.  Benjamin Hallowell, a member of the Board of Customs, left with the fleet.  He reported sharing a cabin with 36 other people, all crammed together and sleeping on the floor.  Roughly 100 of the Tories fleeing Boston with the fleet were government officials.  Most of them would settle in Canada, England, or somewhere in the Caribbean.  The other 1000 or so were private citizens, many without much of anything in the way of assets.  They had to make new lives for themselves having left the only home they ever knew.  Most of them would find themselves on lists permanently barred from ever returning to Massachusetts on pain of death.  For now, they found themselves stuck on crowded ships going nowhere.

On March 20, the final garrison at Castle William on Castle Island, blew up the walls of the fort, then burned all wooden structures on the Island, leaving nothing for the enemy.  They also boarded ships and joined the fleet in open waters.  Everyone sat miserably in crowded ships listening to Boston patriots celebrate their victory.  It would be another week before favorable winds allowed the fleet to set sail for Halifax on March 27.

Continental Army to New York

Until the fleet actually left, Washington had to keep his forces on alert in case the enemy returned.  He had to hold off on sending most of his forces to New York, where he still thought the fleet might be headed, in case of an attack.  Once the fleet definitely set sail for Halifax, he began deploying almost all of the Continental Army to New York, leaving only a small garrison in Boston.  Washington himself left to catch up with his Army on April 4.

Reproduction of the Congressional Medal (from CoinCommunity)
Among those left behind in Boston were Gen. Artemas Ward and Col. Richard Gridley.  Ward, the first Commander in Chief, and Gridley the first Chief of Artillery and Chief Engineer did not make the cut to remain with the Continental Army.  Both men were old and had health issues.  Ward submitted his resignation to Washington before the Army moved south.  Washington forwarded the resignation to Congress, which rejected it.  Instead, Ward remained in Boston as commander of the “Eastern Army” which consisted of only a few hundred Continentals.  The fighting had left New England and there just wasn’t that much to do there.  Ward finally resigned the following year and went into retirement.

Gridley had already given over command of the Artillery to Henry Knox.  Following the Evacuation of Boston, Gridley also passed over Command of the Engineering Corps to Rufus Putnam, who had designed defenses for Dorchester Heights.  Gridley remained in Massachusetts where he used his forge to manufacture locally made howitzers and mortars for the Continental Army.

The Continental Congress praised Washington for his success in the Siege of Boston.  It ordered a gold medal struck in his honor.

- - -

Next Episode 87: Canada Spring, 1776

Previous Episode 85: Dorchester Heights



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American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.
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Further Reading

Resources to learn more about today’s topic.

Websites

What forced the British to Leave Boston? http://historyofmassachusetts.org/what-forced-british-leave-boston

Letter from Boston Selectmen to Washington, March 8, 1776: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-03-02-0314

Crean Brush vs. Ethan Allen: A Winner’s Tale, by John Duffy and Eugene Coyle (PDF):
https://vermonthistory.org/journal/70/vt703_402.pdf

Bell, J.L. Crean Brush in Very Distressed Times, March 2008: http://boston1775.blogspot.com/2008/03/crean-brush-in-very-distressed-times.html

Jolley Allen Missed Evacuation Day in 1776 and it Cost Him Everything:
http://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/jolley-allen-missed-evacuation-1776-cost-everything

Richard Gridley, the Nearly Forgotten Patriot, by Steven Baule, Journal of the American Revolution (2013): https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/09/richard-gridley-nearly-forgotten-patriot

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Brooks, Noah Henry Knox, a Soldier of the Revolution, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900.

Buell, Rowena (ed) The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam, Boston: Houghton & Mifflin Company, 1903.

Dana, Elizabeth Elery (ed) John Barker diary - The British in Boston, 1774-1776, Cambridge: Harvard Univ Press, 1924.

Drake, Francis The Life and Correspondence of Henry Knox, Boston: Samuel B. Drake, 1873.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 4, Vol 4, Washington 1837.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 4, Vol 5, Washington 1837.

French, Allen The Siege of Boston, New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Frothingham, Richard History of the Siege of Boston, Boston: CC Little & J. Brown, 1851.

Martyn, Charles The life of Artemas Ward, the first commander-in-chief of the American Revolution, New York: Artemas Ward, 1921.

Neeser, Robert (ed) The despatches of Molyneux Shuldham, vice-admiral of the Blue and commander-in-chief of His Britannic Majesty's ships in North America, January-July, 1776, New York: Naval Historical Society, 1913.

Stark, James H. The Loyalists of Massachusetts and the other side of the American Revolution, Boston [self-published], 1910.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)

Beck, Derek The War Before Independence: 1775-1776, Naperville, Ill: Sourcebooks, 2016.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975 (book recommendation of the week).

Lockhart, Paul The Whites of Their Eyes, New York: Harper Collins, 2011.

McCullough, David 1776, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Philbrick, Nathaniel Bunker Hill: A City, A Siege, A Revolution, New York: Penguin Books, 2013.

Puls, Mark Henry Knox: Visionary General of the American Revolution, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010.

Smith, David Whispers Across the Atlantick: General William Howe and the American Revolution, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2017.



Sunday, February 24, 2019

Episode 085: Dorchester Heights





When we last left Cambridge at the end of January 1776, Colonel Henry Knox had successfully returned with the cannon from Fort Ticonderoga.  But Washington and his generals still did not have a clear plan in place for how to use them.

How to Attack Boston

For months, Washington had been arguing for a direct assault on Boston.  He proposed a plan where wanted to have the army row across Boston Harbor in small boats, land in the face of enemy fire, and then assault the town.  His generals convinced him that this would be suicide.  Even if the soldiers did not break and run in the face of deadly artillery from the British Army and Navy, they would be cut to pieces before they could reach the shore.  Even if they somehow reached the shore and surprised the enemy, an urban combat battle much like Quebec but on a larger scale would almost certainly result in the capture or massacre of the Continentals.

On February 13, 1776, the British launched an evening raid across the ice, attacking Dorchester Neck.  Col. Alexander Leslie led several hundred regulars on the The raid burned a few houses, captured a few unlucky sentries, and then retreated back to Boston before the Continentals could react. This raised the concern that it was a prelude to a full British assault on Dorchester Heights.

A few days later, on February 16, Washington held another council of war with his generals. With the harbor frozen, he proposed  to march the army across the ice in a direct assault on Boston.  Again, all of his his generals resisted such a battle, arguing that it would be suicide.  Washington, usually calm and restrained, was clearly frustrated that he could not convince his generals to engage in a frontal attack.

Artemas Ward (from Wikimedia)
Over these same months, General Artemas Ward, the army’s second in command had argued that the best strategy would be to occupy Dorchester Heights.  This was high ground consisting of two hills on a peninsula just south of Boston.  Placing artillery on the heights, would give the Continental Army the ability to bombard the army in Boston as well as the navy in the harbor.  They would be at that elevation, the British would not be able to return fire effectively.  It would force the British to come out of Boston, either over the heavily fortified neck, or conduct a water landing then retake the heights by force.  Even if they could take the heights, it would almost certainly be at a terrible cost, making the battle of Bunker Hill look small in comparison.  The charge up the hill would not just be against militia with muskets.  The British would face a line of Continental canon.

The British had considered trying to capture the heights in summer of 1775.  It was the planned assault to take Dorchester that motivated the patriots to occupy Bunker and Breed’s Hills to the north and provoke that battle instead. After those losses, British General Gage and following his departure, General Howe did not want to risk another horrific loss trying to occupy Dorchester Heights.  Instead, they used threats to intimidate the Continentals from occupying it, leaving it a valuable no man’s land for months.

With spring approaching though, and now with a pile of heavy cannon to mount on the heights, the Continental generals agreed that it was time to occupy Dorchester Heights.  With a twist.  Washington agreed to occupy Dorchester.  If the British moved out of Boston to the south to attack Dorchester, Washington wanted to use that distraction to have his army row across the harbor from the north sending his army directly into Boston.  The council of war generally agreed to this plan.  One strong dissenter was General William Heath who thought that even if Howe sent half his army to attack Dorchester, there would still be thousands of entrenched British infantry and hundreds of army and navy cannon blasting away at militia trying to row across a mile and a half of open water to attack the city.  Heath was sure it would be a disaster and a bloodbath.  But everyone seemed to think they had to do something, and this was the best plan that drew a consensus.  The first step would be occupying Dorchester Heights.

Making a Plan

The problem was how to do it.  Mounting cannon on the heights could take weeks, or even months with the ground frozen solid.  There was no easy way to dig entrenchments without the enemy seeing what they were doing and sending out an army to take the heights before the Continentals were ready to defend it.

To tackle this problem. General Heath reached out to Rufus Putnam, a Massachusetts native and cousin of General Israel Putnam.  Rufus Putnam had worked with British engineers during the French and Indian War, but was not what you would call an expert in the science of military engineering.  After meeting with Washington to discuss the plan, Putnam decided to stop by Heath’s house on his way home.  While visiting, Putnam noticed a book on Heath’s table by a British Military Engineer called Attack and Defense of Fortified Places.

Rufus Putnam (from Wikimedia)

Putnam asked if he could borrow the book but Heath refused, saying he never lent out his books.  Putnam pointed out that Heath had stuck him with this job despite his lack of knowing anything about military engineering.  Now he had to build a fortification and Heath had the only book around that might explain how he could do it.  Really? You won’t let me read it? Finally, Heath agreed and let Putnam borrow the book.

A few pages in, Putnam saw the solution to his problem.  His men could not dig entrenchments in the frozen soil.  However, the book suggested building “chandeliers”.  In the terms of 18th century military engineering, a chandelier was a wooden frame.  Once built, the defenders filled the frame with sticks and branches, then covered the whole thing with dirt.  This created a defensive wall that would stop most bullets.

The soldiers could pre-build the chandeliers, then carry them up to Dorchester Heights at night, fill in the sticks and dirt, then mount the cannons.  With enough men, they could build a credible defensive wall and mount cannon in a matter of hours.

Putnam took the plan to Washington, who also conferred with Colonel Knox.  Of course, Knox would have to man the artillery once mounted there.  Washington also conferred  with Colonel Richard Gridley, still the Continental Army’s chief engineer.  All agreed it was a sound plan and supported it.  The only added suggestion was to add barrels filled with dirt or rocks as part of the defenses.  In addition to providing cover, if the British tried to storm the hill, the Continentals could roll the barrels  down on them, killing some and breaking up the attacking lines.

Preparations

Even with a plan, it would not be easy to execute.  The first step was to put hundreds of men to work building the wooden frames.  They also set to work building 45 flat bottomed boats, which could carry 80 men each.  Washington planned to use these for his assault on Boston.  With all this work, the British would almost certainly know the Continentals were up to something.  Next, the chandeliers would have be carried across Dorchester Neck, in plain view of the enemy.  If the British realized the Continentals were planning to occupy Dorchester Heights, they could rush out and storm the heights before the defenders were ready.
Chandelier packed with Fascines (from Salina Baker)

To avoid this problem, the Continentals set up large hay bales to block the road from view in Boston.  To cover the sound, they planned to start a cannonade against Boston from other locations.  This, they hoped, would distract the regulars and prevent them from hearing the sounds of hundreds of carts hauling equipment and guns up to the heights.

General Ward took charge of building the chandeliers and other prefabricated defenses that would be carried up to the heights.  Washington invited Colonel Thomas Mifflin, who was at this time Quartermaster General, to assist with logistics.  Mifflin proposed the night of March 4th for the occupation.  That way, if the British attacked the following day, it would be the anniversary of the Boston Massacre.  Others, thought that date was a mistake.  It’s not clear why, but possibly because it was a full moon, making it easier for the British to spot the work.  In any event, the council decided to adopt the date by a single vote.

Occupying the Heights

Colonel Knox had his artillery begin an attack on Boston on the night of March 2.  The plan was to continue the bombardment on the next two nights, so that by the night of March 4, the British would be focused on the artillery, but not find it so unusual that they would suspect it was being use to cover the sounds of thousands of infantrymen occupying Dorchester Heights and installing the chandeliers and mounting the cannon.

The Continentals still did not have much gunpowder, making their cannons of limited use.  The British Navy at New York had been blockading the harbor.  But they cut a deal, allowing merchant vessels to enter there in exchange for New York providing them with fresh food to feed the sailors. Taking advantage of this, the patriots smuggled in 3000 pounds of gunpowder on February 29.  They then hauled the powder overland on wagons up to Washington’s army, just in time for use in this action.

Map of Boston during Siege, 1776 click to zoom (from Reddit)
But even that amount of powder would not last long with artillery.  Since the first night was mostly about rousing the enemy, they fired a total of only around two dozen shots into Boston.  Sadly, the patriots did more harm to themselves than the enemy.  Knox’s inexperienced artillerymen destroyed three mortars and one cannon through improper use.  A British officer in Boston noted no significant damage to anything.  Of course, the barrage triggered a response from the regulars who used their own artillery to bombard Continental camps for several hours.

The next night, March 3, Knox’s artillery once again fired on Boston.  At least this time they did not damage any of their own weapons.  Once again, the British responded.  When the Continentals opened up again on the third night, March 4, the British again returned fire, but did not suspect anything else would be different that night.

The night of March 4, turned out to be an exceptional choice.  It would not be the last time that an unusual weather occurrence helped the patriots.  A bright moon helped the patriots with their labors in getting the defenses in place on Dorchester Heights.  But the bright moon did not help the British detect them, as a haze fell over the harbor, preventing the regulars from seeing much of anything across the water.

Col. Mifflin arranged for 350 ox carts to pull all the equipment up the heights beginning shortly after sundown.  They next sent 800 soldiers to occupy the heights, just to sit there with muskets and watch for any attack from the regulars in Boston.  Half of them sat near shore, watching for an attack from Castle Island.  The other half watched for an attack from Boston Neck.

Washington gave the task of emplacing all the artillery and entrenchments to Gen. John Thomas who organized 1200 more troops to do the work.  Washington himself appeared on the heights to encourage the men and see that everything went according to plan.  Colonels Knox and Gridley also worked on site, making sure everything was installed where it was planned.

But remember, occupying the heights was only half of Washington’s plan.  Washington fully expected the British to discover the occupation, either that night or certainly by morning, and that they would then scramble to launch an offensive force out of Boston to take the heights.  As soon as they did that, Washington had 4000 soldiers under the command of General Israel Putnam, ready to launch two raiding parties under the command of Generals Greene, and Sullivan.  These men would row across Boston Harbor, landing on the north side of town, fight their way through the city and link up with the soldiers on the south side commanded by General Ward at Roxbury.  For the moment, these men were just sitting and waiting for a signal that the regulars were attacking Dorchester Heights.

Dorchester Heights (from Twitter Boston NPS)
The plan seemed to move along with no significant problems.  By 10:00 PM, they had established two forts on the heights, and continued with the installation of chandeliers along the line.  Several hours before dawn, everything was in place and ready to go.  In total, if you count the guards, the men building the fortifications and those hauling the material to the site, there were a little over 3000 men involved.

Now, you may remember during the battle of Bunker Hill, no one made any attempt to relieve the men who built the entrenchments overnight, nor did anyone set up supply lines to bring them food and ammunition.  The Continentals did not make that same mistake at Dorchester.  In the morning, 3000 fresh troops came up to replace the men who had spent all night building the defenses.  But it turned out the men who did the digging did not want to let the next shift get the glory of going to battle.  Most of the night shift stayed on the heights as well, leading to as many as 6000 defenders.  By morning, the Continental Army was fully embedded on the heights, with all the infantry and artillery they needed to repulse any assault.

British Reaction

In Boston, General Howe, had received intelligence from deserters that the Continentals were planning something on Dorchester, but he did not know the date or other details.  Rather than act proactively, Howe waited until they actually did something.  He would then assault the heights while they were building the defenses.

During the night, while the Continentals secretly built the defenses, at least one officer in Boston detected activity and reported to his superior that the rebels were occupying the heights.  That superior was General Francis Smith, the same man who had led the original expedition to Lexington the previous April.  General Smith had always been a “follow orders” kind of officer, who did not grab the initiative or act with great energy.  In this case, he decided he would take up the matter with General Howe in the morning.

When dawn broke, the regulars were shocked to see not one, but two fully-built forts, and a line of entrenchments, complete with cannon, built on the top of Dorchester Heights.  According to one account, Howe said it would have taken his army months to complete such an emplacement.  Howe’s chief engineer estimated it must have taken 15,000-20,000 men to build those works overnight.

The British immediately turned their artillery fire on the new defenses but found that they were too high for them to hit effectively, either from Boston or from ships in the harbor.  At the same time, the Continentals could lob shots into the city or at naval vessels in the harbor unopposed.

Dorchester Heights
(from Twitter SW O'Connell)
Despite the entrenchments being pretty well in place, Howe launched a contingent of soldiers that morning to take the heights.  British General Valentine Jones loaded a force of just over 1200 men into boats to take them over to the Dorchester Peninsula.  They planned to attempt a water landing, in the face of cannon, musket, and rifle fire, then form up and charge the hills, defended by as many as 6000 patriots.  In other words, the British would have only a fraction of the force they had an Bunker Hill, and faced a much larger force supplemented by artillery.  This really seemed like a suicide mission.

Fortunately for the British attackers, the weather once again intervened.  High winds kicked up and prevented the force from being able to land before high tide that morning.  Once the tide was coming out, it would be even harder to effect a landing.  So, they got the force to Castle Island and planned a nighttime attack during the next high tide, just after midnight.  But the storm kicked up again even worse with hurricane force winds preventing any landing.

The following day, wind and rain continued, making a landing still nearly impossible.  Howe convened a council of war, at which just about every officer argued against an attack.  The rebels had had another 24 hours to make their defenses even stronger and there was no realistic way they were going to take the heights.

Although Howe had received reinforcements all winter, he was also losing men at a fair clip due to smallpox and other diseases.  He also had allowed Gen. Clinton to leave with some of his regulars to go conquer the Carolinas.

General Howe had maybe 6000 men ready for duty.  Even if he sent all of them against Dorchester, it probably would not have been enough to dislodge an entrenched enemy.  At the same time, and all out attack would encourage Washington to launch his invasion of Boston from the north side of the harbor.  There was just no way for Howe to win this one.

A frustrated General Howe agreed with the council of war that an attack would never work.  He admitted he only planned to order the attack for the honor of the army.  Now, accepting that plan was a pointless waste of lives in a no-win situation, Howe called off the attack completely.

This may have been a good thing for the Continentals too.  If Howe had launched his attack against Dorchester, Washington likely would have launched his ill-conceived amphibious attack on Boston.  The regulars almost certainly would have cut down that 4000 man attack force, leading to a terrible defeat for Washington.  It might even have led to his dismissal as Commander in Chief.  None of that happened though.  When Howe called of his attack, Washington called off his as well.

No attack though, meant Howe was stuck in a situation where the rebels could fire on the army and navy at will without the British being able to return fire effectively.  Well before all this happened, Howe had determined that the army should evacuate Boston and move down to New York as the center of operations.  Howe had hoped to make that move in a few more months, later in the spring, and after more reinforcements arrived from Britain.  Now he would have to move up that timetable.  He would also have to evacuate under the embarrassment of an amateur rebel army having out maneuvered him and forcing his retreat.

- - -

Next Episode 86: The Evacuation of Boston

Previous Episode 84: The Battle of Moore's Creek Bridge



Click here to donate
American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.
Thanks,
Mike Troy


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You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.  Thanks again!



Further Reading

Websites

What forced the British to Leave Boston? http://historyofmassachusetts.org/what-forced-british-leave-boston

Baker, Salina The Taking of Dorchester Heights, 2018: https://salinabakerauthor.com/2018/03/02/the-taking-of-dorchester-heights

Dorchester Heights, National Park Service: https://www.nps.gov/bost/learn/historyculture/dohe.htm

Council of War Feb. 16, 1776: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-03-02-0229

Letter from Lt. Col. Rufus Putnam, to George Washington  Feb. 11, 1776 re: Dorchester Heights: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-03-02-0214

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Blake, Francis Dorchester Neck. (Now South Boston.) The raid of British troops, February 13, 1776,
Boston: David Clapp & Son, 1899.

Brooks, Noah Henry Knox, a Soldier of the Revolution, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900.

Buell, Rowena (ed) The Memoirs of Rufus Putnam, Boston: Houghton & Mifflin Company, 1903.

Dana, Elizabeth Elery (ed) John Barker diary - The British in Boston, 1774-1776, Cambridge: Harvard Univ Press, 1924.

Drake, Francis The Life and Correspondence of Henry Knox, Boston: Samuel B. Drake, 1873.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 4, Vol 4, Washington 1837.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 4, Vol 5, Washington 1837.

French, Allen The Siege of Boston, New York: Macmillan, 1911.

Frothingham, Richard History of the Siege of Boston, Boston: CC Little & J. Brown, 1851.

Martyn, Charles The life of Artemas Ward, the first commander-in-chief of the American Revolution, New York: Artemas Ward, 1921.

Muller John The Attack and Defence of Fortify'd Places, Woolwich: Royal Academy of Artillery, 1757 (Google Books).

Neeser, Robert (ed) The despatches of Molyneux Shuldham, vice-admiral of the Blue and commander-in-chief of His Britannic Majesty's ships in North America, January-July, 1776, New York: Naval Historical Society, 1913.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)

Beck, Derek The War Before Independence: 1775-1776, Naperville, Ill: Sourcebooks, 2016.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975 (book recommendation of the week).

Lockhart, Paul The Whites of Their Eyes, New York: Harper Collins, 2011.

McCullough, David 1776, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Philbrick, Nathaniel Bunker Hill: A City, A Siege, A Revolution, New York: Penguin Books, 2013.

Puls, Mark Henry Knox: Visionary General of the American Revolution, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010.

Smith, David Whispers Across the Atlantick: General William Howe and the American Revolution, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2017.