Sunday, October 18, 2026

ARP404 The Quasi-War Army


Last week we covered the XYZ affair.  France’s main complaint against the US was that it continued to trade with Britain while France and Britain were still at war.  President Adams sent a three member commission to France to resolve the matter diplomatically.  John Marshall, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Elbridge Gerry tried to discuss the matter, but Foreign Minister Talleyrand refused even to open formal discussions.  Instead, he used some backchannel efforts to get US concessions, including efforts by three intermediaries, identified as X, Y, and Z in the reports, to provide a bribe before any formal talks would begin.

The Commissioners arrived in Paris in October 1797, but Adams did not receive any substantive reports until March 1798.  Adams’ initial instinct was that America should go to war with France, but he thought better of it, and tried to bury the insults that France had hurled at the US diplomats.

The Democratic-Republicans in Congress thought Adams was hiding successful diplomacy and trying to force the US into a war.  They demanded the documents, which Adams released. Once the documents became public in April, 1798, most Americans demanded war.  Many Republicans, including Vice President Jefferson, were still trying to find a way to avoid war, but even they were afraid it was too late.

War Fever

The release of the reports kicked off war fever around the country.  Even the Democratic-Republicans were sympathetic to the view, or simply stayed silent.  College students began marching in favor of war.  Rallies around the country called for a war to defend the national honor.  One Federalist toast at the time became “Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute.”

Quasi-War Recruiting Poster
Taking advantage of war fever, the Federalists went on the offensive in Congress, pushing through bills that the Democratic Republicans had opposed for months or years.  On April 8, just days after Adams revealed the reports, Congress passed laws to approve arming American merchant ships and voting nearly $1 million for harbor fortifications and cannon foundries.  Remember that in 1797 total federal expenditures for the entire government were only around $6 million.

A couple of weeks later, Congress authorized the President to purchase twelve ships with up to 22 guns each.  A few days after that, it approved the formal establishment of a US Navy and a Marine corps. 

There are a whole bunch of measures which took place simultaneously over 1798 and 1799 as the country ramped up for war.  I’m going to cover separate issues in separate episodes.  Although the establishment of the Navy and the Marines is a really big deal, I want to focus this week on the US Army.

The army was a constant source of contention for Congress from the very beginning.  There essentially was no army when Congress first met under the Constitution.  The two main reasons were that there was no money to pay for an army, and that many Americans considered a standing army in times of peace to be a symbol of tyranny.  There was no reason for a free people to have professional soldiers.

Under President Washington, Congress had reluctantly authorized some increases in the army so that it consisted of about 4000 soldiers by the time Washington left office.  Almost all of these soldiers were stationed along the western frontier, either deterring or actively fighting Indian resistance to western settlements.

Following Adams’ speech during the special session of Congress in 1797, the Federalists proposed establishing a much larger provisional army to prepare for a war with France.  The Democratic Republicans voted it down.  Instead, Congress passed a resolution noting that the President could call up to 80,000 state militiamen if the need arose.  This eliminated any immediate cost and also reaffirmed the preference for the militia as the defenders of liberty rather than a standing army.

In May of 1798, a few weeks after the XYZ reports became public, with the public mood changed, Congress approved raising a Provisional Army of 10,000 men.  This was in addition to the 4000 man army in the west.  This Provisional Army would be focused on the potential threat from France.

Meet the New Boss…

It was up to President Adams to pick a commander who would lead this new provisional army.  The commander of the Legion of the United States, the army out in Ohio, had been General Anthony Wayne, up until December of 1796 when Wayne died rather suddenly and under suspicious circumstances.  Wayne’s second in command, General James Wilkinson, became the new commander.  Wilkinson was a paid Spanish agent, although that wasn’t proven - just a rumor.  There was also some suspicions that Wilkinson might have poisoned General Wayne.  In any event, no one seemed to think Wilkinson should play any role in this new Provisional Army.  He would remain in command of the Legion in the Ohio Territory.

Adams’ cabinet had already made their decision for a new commander in chief of the army: Alexander Hamilton.  As I mentioned in earlier episodes, even though Hamilton had retired from the government and was working as a private attorney in New York, the cabinet seemed to view him as their de facto leader.  

Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott had been Hamilton’s assistant before he left, and continued to view Hamilton as his superior.  Secretary of State Timothy Pickering and Secretary of War James McHenry also closely allied with Hamilton.  All three men regularly corresponded with Hamilton, keeping him informed of all matters related to the government.  This included sending him top secret information, such as the reports from the French Commissioners before they were given to Congress.  

These cabinet members often awaited Hamilton’s responses and repeated his thoughts as their own when advising President Adams.  All the cabinet members were holdovers from the Washington Administration and had no personal loyalty to Adams.

The irony is that Adams and Hamilton seemed to agree on a great many things politically. But Adams hated Hamilton.  There were many reasons, but the big one was that Adams thought that Hamilton had manipulated the 1796 elections in an attempt to keep Adams from winning the presidency.  Adams knew that his cabinet was close to Hamilton, but he probably did not understand at the time just how much Hamilton was controlling the government.

So when Adams’ cabinet recommended that he appoint Hamilton to command the new Provisional Army, Adams balked.  Adams noted that Hamilton wasn’t even a general in the American Revolution.  At a cabinet meeting he threw out names like Horatio Gates, Benjamin Lincoln, or Daniel Morgan, all top generals in the last war, who would be better candidates as a commander.  The cabinet shot down all of those ideas, and kept insisting on Hamilton.

The cabinet meeting ended without a decision, but later in the day, Adams decided on a leader who wasn’t Hamilton and who no one could criticize: George Washington.

Adams wrote to Washington, saying that he was considering appointing Washington as the military commander.  The former president, by this time 66 years old, and having thought he had finally retired for the last time must have thought: just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in!

Whatever Washington’s personal thoughts, and he did convey to others that he had no desire to come out of retirement again.  Washington’s response to President Adams, written on July 4, 1798 confirmed that if the president needed him, he would serve.

Adams did not wait for Washington to respond.  He nominated Washington and asked the Senate to confirm.  Adams then sent Secretary of War James McHenry to Mount Vernon to deliver Washington’s commission as lieutenant general.  Adams also asked McHenry to get Washington’s opinions on other key appointments, including inspector general, adjutant general and quartermaster general.  All three would hold the rank of major general, but they would have to decide a chain of command between the three.

Before McHenry left Philadelphia, Hamilton arrived in the city and met with him.  Hamilton gave several suggestions on how to approach several issues with Washington.  He also gave McHenry a sealed letter to give to the President.  Secretary of State Timothy Pickering also gave McHenry a letter for Washington.  Adams was kept in the dark about all of this.

Fight Over Officers

McHenry took two days to ride to Mount Vernon, arriving in the late afternoon.  Before Washington retired for the night, McHenry gave him the three letters.  When the two met the following morning, he found Washington having arisen before dawn and was already hard at work compiling a list of officers for the new army.

Over the next two and a half days, the men discussed how to organize the army.  Washington made clear that he did not plan to leave Mount Vernon unless France actually invaded.  Because of this, the inspector general would have practical command of the army as it prepared for an invasion.

The three men under consideration for the top jobs were Henry Knox, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, and Alexander Hamilton.  Knox should have been the favorite for the job.  He had been a capable officer throughout the war, serving as a major general.  He had fought with Washington in almost every major engagement and proved himself a highly valued officer.  He took over command of the Continental Army after Washington resigned his commission at the end of the war, and managed the army as the Secretary of War under both the Confederation period, as well as under President Washington.

By contrast, the other two contenders, Pinckney and Hamilton had not risen above the rank of colonel in the Continental Army during the war.  Pinckney’ main appeal was his political popularity in the South.  If France did attack, it would almost certainly start there.  Pinckney’s enthusiastic support for the army would help raise enlistments there and increase southern support.

McHenry, however, pushed hard for Hamilton to get the top job, as did Pickering via his letter to Washington.  Both men were devoted political supporters of Hamilton.  Even though they both knew Adams did not want Hamilton for a top job, they knew that if Washington recommended it, Adams would go along.  Hamilton’s letter to Washington did not recommend anyone since he knew he was in contention and did not want to seem overly ambitious.

McHenry reminded Washington that Knox had let him down during the Whiskey Rebellion.  Knox had to return home to handle some personal business while Washington was riding out to western Pennsylvania.  It was Hamilton who accompanied the president on that mission.  

McHenry also argued that Pickney would not mind serving under Hamilton and that his services would be just as valuable as the third or fourth ranked highest officer as they would as the second ranked.

After lengthy discussions, Washington and McHenry agreed to offer Hamilton the highest rank, Pinckney the next highest, and Knox the third.  Just in case Knox refused an appointment that would place him under the command of two former subordinates, Washington recommended Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee for the third major general in Knox’s place.

They also agreed on a number of other top appointments.  The only other possibly controversial nomination was William Smith as one of the brigadier generals.  Smith had served honorably throughout the war, spending its final years as Washington’s aide-de-camp.  What made him controversial was that, after that, he took an appointment as the secretary to the American legation in London, where John Adams was ambassador.  Smith then courted and married Adams’ daughter Nabby.  This made him the president’s son-in-law, which meant his appointment could invite charges of nepotism.

With the officer recommendations decided, McHenry returned to Philadelphia to brief the president, carrying with him Washington’s letter of acceptance. As expected, Adams expressed concerns over Hamilton’s rank.  McHenry and Pickering, however, strongly endorsed the idea.  They also stressed that this is what Washington wanted.  In the end the president went along with Washington’s proposal in full, including Hamilton and Smith.

Adams also suggested that Aaron Burr and Peter Muhlenberg, whose brother Frederick Muhlenberg had been Speaker of the House, be appointed as a way of including some Democratic Republicans among the military leadership.  The Federalists in his cabinet and in the Senate rejected these as well.  Washington personally said Burr would be a bad choice given his proclivities for political intrigue.  The notion of Burr serving under Hamilton also would have been fraught with problems.

The Senate confirmed most of the list.  Secretary of State Pickering lobbied hard to get Hamilton through, but did not fight for Smith.  Senators raised concerns about the president’s son-in-law’s qualifications and ultimately rejected him.  Smith would end up as a lieutenant colonel.

As many feared, Knox ultimately rejected his appointment.  He could not accept the insult of serving under two former subordinates after leading the army for so many years.  The discussion, however, that led to his final refusal, lasted for months.  After Adams returned home to Massachusetts, Knox visited him to discuss his concerns.  Adams admitted that he would have preferred Knox to be the senior officer but that he was acceding to Washington’s wishes on the matter.  

Adams also wrote to McHenry to say he was having second thoughts about Hamilton as the most senior major general. The Secretary of War panicked.  He reached out to Washington and Hamilton. Both McHenry and Pickering argued to Washington that Adams was considering these changes because of his personal animus toward Hamilton and that Washington should simply insist on his original decision to keep Hamilton at the top.

In the end, after both Hamilton and Washington threatened to resign if Knox was given seniority, Adams confirmed his approval of Hamilton at the top.  Knox refused his appointment under such insulting circumstances.  Light Horse Harry would end up serving as the third major general.

Reaching that conclusion took months.  The original proposals began in July, 1798, and were not resolved until October.

Recruitment

Organization of the army became a nightmare.  Secretary of War McHenry had to make most of the arrangements.  But he also had to run most major decisions by Washington, who remained home in Mount Vernon, and Hamilton, who remained home in New York, meaning that time-consuming correspondence slowed every major decision.

While all this was going on things were made even more difficult by outside events.  In Quincy, President Adams was distracted by his wife Abigail’s illness which lasted for months and was very severe.  Adams stayed by her sick bed almost constantly. The government in Philadelphia also had to flee the city again during the summer of 1798 when yellow fever returned to the city.

Meanwhile Congress continued to fight over the larger army.  While it had agreed on a provisional army of 10,000, The House passed another bill later in July that raised the size of the army to 50,000.  This would be far larger than the Continental Army ever was during the Revolutionary War.  There were also proposals, at Hamilton’s urging, for a national conscription to achieve the enlistment goals.

Divisions

These proposals, along with other measures, caused the Democratic-Republicans to recoil from any support.  First, there was no good evidence that France even intended to land a large invading army.  Britain still dominated the Atlantic Ocean, and there was no easy way for France to bring an army to America.  Also, all of the army leadership were Federalists, which was a huge concern for the other party.

Republicans viewed the army as part of  a Federalist plot to seize more power and crush opposition. They began referring to the proposed army as the presidential army and argued that this large standing army would be used primarily to quash political dissent

They also accused the Federalists of plans to engage in an offensive war, capturing Louisiana and the Floridas. There were even claims that the US would join Britain in taking control of all of South and Central America.

As it turned out, one of the opponents of the enlarged army was President Adams himself.  Adams believed that if there was fighting, it would take place at sea, meaning the US needed to focus on building a navy, not an army.  He told McHenry that there was “no more prospect of seeing a French army here, than there is in Heaven.”

Also the taxes and loans required for such an army would break the country. Treasury Secretary Wolcott agreed on this point - a rare departure from supporting Hamilton. President Adams also feared that Hamilton might use this army to trigger a civil war and take control of the United States and perhaps build an empire expanding into South America.

Adams’ fears were not unfounded. There is evidence that Hamilton was particularly interested in invading Louisiana and the Floridas, despite the fact that these were Spanish possessions and that the war was directed at France.  Hamilton reached out to the commander of the western army for support with such a plan - General James Wilkinson.  Recall that Wilkinson remained a paid secret agent for the Spanish.  He complied with Hamilton’s instructions but attempted to slow walk Hamilton’s orders and prevent any possibility of success.  In the end, Hamilton thought he could not take the offensive without Washington’s approval.  Washington refused to go along with any of this and the plans for any offensive actions collapsed.

Adams also slowed down efforts to build the new army. He rejected the idea of national conscription.  Pay was set at $5 per month, which was less than soldiers were paid during the Revolutionary war and about one-third of what a man could make as an unskilled laborer or in the Navy.

Hamilton’s insistence that officers be Federalists led to problems finding sufficient numbers of qualified officers, particularly in the south, where the Democratic-Republicans were more predominent.

When recruitment began in early 1799, no one seemed ready to enlist.  Although Congress had authorized an army of 10,000, Only 2000 men enlisted over the summer.  More would dribble in, but the army never reached half of its goal.

Logistics proved perhaps even worse than during the Revolution. Soldiers didn’t get paid.  They often didn’t get fed.  There were not even enough barracks, weapons, or basic equipment.  As a result, many recruits deserted.

Thanks to partisan games, political opposition, and some very real incompetence, the Provisional Army never really amounted to much of anything.  Adams continued to focus on peace negotiations with France, over Hamilton’s objections. In February, 1800 Congress ended recruiting, and the army was disbanded a few months later.

Next week, we will look at the efforts to build and use a Navy during the Quasi War. 

 - - -

Next Episode 405 The Quasi-War Navy (coming soon)

Previous Episode 403 The XYZ Affair

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Further Reading

Websites

Quasi War https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/quasi-war

Coleman, Aaron N. “‘A Second Bounaparty?’ A Reexamination of Alexander Hamilton during the Franco-American Crisis, 1796-1801.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 28, no. 2, 2008, pp. 183–214. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043587

Murphy, William J. “John Adams: The Politics of the Additional Army, 1798-1800.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 2, 1979, pp. 234–49. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/364841 

PERL-ROSENTHAL, NATHAN. “Private Letters and Public Diplomacy: The Adams Network and the Quasi-War, 1797–1798.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 31, no. 2, 2011, pp. 283–311. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41261613

“John Adams to George Washington, 22 June 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0270

“George Washington to John Adams, 4 July 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0290

“George Washington to James McHenry, 4 July 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0295

“George Washington to John Adams, 13 July 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0314

.“George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, [14 July 1798],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-22-02-0002-0002

“Henry Knox to George Washington, 29 July 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0374

“Henry Knox to George Washington, 26 August 1798,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/06-02-02-0438

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Adams, Charles F. The Life of John Adams, Vol. 2, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1871.

Bowers, Claude G. Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America, London: Constable and Co. 1925.

Brown, William L. An examination of the causes and conduct of the present war with France, London: T. Cabell, 1798. 

Godfrey, Carlos E. Organization of the Provisional Army of the United States in the Anticipated War with France, 1798-1800, [publisher unknown] 1914. 

Morse, Jr. John T. John Adams, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1884. 

Wood, John The History of the Administration of John Adams, Esq., Late President of the United States, New York: Barlas and Ward, 1802. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Brown, Ralph A. The Presidency of John Adams, Univ. of Kansas Press, 1975. 

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. Making the Presidency John Adams and the Precedents That Forged the Republic, Oxford Univ. Press, 2024.

DeConde, Alexander The Quasi War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared war with France, 1797-1801, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Kurtz, Stephen G. The Presidency of John Adams: The Collapse of Federalism, 1795-1800, Literary Licensing,  LLC, 2011.

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, Little Brown & Co. 1962 (borrow on archive.org).

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001.  

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (borrow on archive.org) 

Nester, William The Hamiltonian Vision, 1789-1800, Potomac Books, 2012 (Chapter 19 on XYZ available at JSTOR)

Palmer, Michael A. Stoddert's War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801. Naval Institute Press, 1987 (borrow on archive.org).

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

Shaw Peter The Character of John Adams, Univ. of NC Press, 1976. 

Smith, Jean E. John Marshall: Definer of a Nation, Henry Holt & Co. 1996. 

Staloff, Darren Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson: The Politics of Enlightenment and the American Founding, Hill and Wang, 2005. 

Stinchcombe, William The XYZ Affair, Praeger, 1980. 

Vaughn, Harold C. The XYZ Affair, 1797-1798, Franklin Watts, 1972.

Wood, Gordon S. Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815, Oxford Univ. Press, 2009.

 * As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


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