Sunday, October 12, 2025

ARP367 Grand Compromise of 1790

For the last few episodes, I’ve been going through some of the most important legislation that the new Federal government created during its first year or two in office.  There are two controversial issues that I’ve largely avoided discussing because I wanted to devote a full episode to those issues and how they came to be resolved together.

Moving the Capital

One of the biggest debates was over where to move the new federal capital.  During the Revolutionary War, the Congress had met primarily in Philadelphia, which was relatively central and was also the largest city on the continent.  Congress fled a few times, moving temporarily to Baltimore, Maryland and York, Pennsylvania when the British army threatened.  Toward the end of the war, delegates didn’t think Pennsylvania was doing enough to protect them from angry Continental soldiers who were demanding their promised pay and benefits.  Congress moved to Princeton, New Jersey for a time, then to Annapolis, Maryland, which is where they were when the army finally disbanded in 1783.  Congress moved to Trenton, New Jersey the following year and then to New York City the year after that.  It remained in New York City for four years until the US Congress took over in 1789.  Congress also continued to meet in New York City.

Even before the first day that the Federal Congress obtained a quorum, elected officials were bickering over moving the capital.  The Pennsylvania delegation came to New York with a plan to move Congress back to their home state.  All of the central states, including New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, were all vying to move the capital to their home state.

Getting the capital meant more money for the local economy.  Members of Congress would rent rooms and make use of local taverns.  Many appointed officials would move to town.  It would also be much easier for local delegations to travel between home and the capital, if it was nearby.  Plus there was the prestige of hosting the nation’s capital.

There were all sorts of debates over whether the capital should be near the center of wealth or population.  Bigger cities argued they had the facilities in place to host the government.  Smaller towns and more rural areas touted the idea that the capital should be built to suit the new government.  

Some argued that the capital should be built on the western frontier, somewhere out in the Northwest Territory so that as the population moved further west, the capital would become more central.  Others argued that a capital on the coast would make it easier for many delegates to travel there by ship.  Some argued for no permanent capital at all, arguing that the capital should move every few years so that no one region benefitted permanently.

Of course, there were all sorts of personal interests as speculators who owned land in a particular area hoped that the capital would boost the value of their land.  There were also a range of parochial interests.  Southerners feared that if the capital moved to Pennsylvania, they would be unable to be attended by their slaves while working there.

The debate entered the House floor in August of 1789 when Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania urged the government be moved to his state.  Congressman Fisher Ames of Massachusetts wrote about the politicking, deal making, and vote swapping being considered as each faction tried to get its way.  Most of the southern block was willing to back a capital on the Potomac River, since Virginia was about as far south as any northern state was willing to consider.

By September, the Pennsylvania delegation negotiated an agreement with James Madison of Virginia to move the capital back to Philadelphia temporarily, with the intent of building a permanent capital on the Potomac.  Pennsylvanians were gambling that once the capital moved there, they could fight to make it permanent in a later fight.

To counter this proposal, the New England States and New York threw their support to a permanent capital on the banks of the Susquehanna river in central Pennsylvania, while temporarily remaining in New York City.  This divided the large Pennsylvania Delegation on the question.

Madison still tried to sell the Potomac option as the most central and also with easy access to the western territories as the nation grew.  Some southerners also backed this location with the argument that the northern federalists had already won votes on so many other issues, that forcing a northern capital might cause southern delegates to rethink remaining in the Union at all.  They also argued that the southern population was the fastest growing region, meaning a more southern capital would be closer the population center in future years.

Massachusetts Congressman Theodore Sedgwick retorted that the growing south was mostly slaves, who shouldn’t really be considered part of the population.  This was not racism. Remember I talked about Sedgwick in an earlier episode, he had represented Mumbet, now Elizabeth Freeman, arguing in court that the Massachusetts Constitution invalidated slavery in that state.  Sedgwick also argued that the Potomac was just too miserable an environment, especially for northerners.  He noted the number of New Englanders who died of disease soon after moving to those southern climates.

In the fall of 1789, the House had voted pretty decisively, 32-19, to move the permanent capital to the banks of the Susquehanna in Pennsylvania.  They voted to appoint three commissioners to select the best site, to purchase land, and to begin a four year construction of the new capital. In the meantime, the capital would remain in New York.

The plan, however, fell apart in the Senate.  Even Robert Morris, one of the Pennsylvania Senators, refused to support the site in Pennsylvania.  He wanted the capital in the Philadelphia suburb of Germantown.  Morris offered a gift of $100,000 to start the building process if Congress agreed to his site.  Morris managed to change enough votes to get a tie in the Senate for Germantown, with Vice President Adams breaking the tie vote in favor of the Germantown location.

The amended bill then returned to the House.  In order to prevent a final vote, Madison amended the bill again for another change near the end of the session.  He Demanded an insertion that Pennsylvania law would apply in the new capital, at least until federal laws could be created.  This change, as any change would, sent the bill back to the Senate, which then voted to postpone the question until the next session since they were too busy finishing other work in the final days.

When Congress returned for its second session in January, 1790. Opponents of the Germantown location blocked immediate consideration by establishing a rule that all proposed laws had to be reintroduced from scratch in the new session.  Congress could not simply continue with its work on the existing bill.  The result was that the issue languished for months as Congress focused on other matters.

Debt Assumption

One of the other matters that took up Congress’ attention was that of the federal debt.  Remember that one of the main reasons that many leaders wanted this new federal government was so that they could finally do something to pay down the war debt.  Both the Continental Congress and the States had borrowed heavily to finance the war.  All those Continental Dollars were notes that promised that the holders could exchange them for gold and some future date.  Many doubted that date would ever come.  It had been more than a decade since most of those notes had been issued and almost nothing had been repaid.

By the end of the war, in the early 1780s, this paper had become virtually worthless.  It took between $500 and $1000 Continental Dollars to buy anything that would take only $1 in specie.  The term “not worth a Continental Dollar” became a common expression to describe something of no value at all.  This began to turn around after the adoption of the new Constitution.  Speculators began buying up more Continental paper, hoping that the new government would finally exchange it for its face value.

I mentioned back in Episode 365 when Washington gave his State of the Union Address, that he made the debt a priority for his administration.  He had Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton working on a report, which was released just after the President’s address.

His Report on Public Credit identified about $77 million dollars worth of public debt.  This included both the original emissions, plus compounded interest over time.  The bulk of the debt, about $42 million, was owed to Americans holding Continental paper.  Another $11-$12 million was foreign debt, owed primarily to France, and to private banks in the Netherlands.  The remaining roughly $25 million was state debt.  This was not incurred by the federal government but rather by state governments as part of their effort to win the Revolutionary War.

Hamilton proposed that the federal government assume the war debts held by the states, allowing all debt to be repaid in a more organized way. Hamilton argued that keeping the debt divided between the states and the federal government would only lead to collision, confusion, and interfering regulations.

The proposal was a daunting one.  The interest alone on the national debt would  be about $4.5 million per year.  That was more than three times the total revenue that the federal government expected to raise.  Hamilton proposed to renegotiate some of this to a lower interest rate, which would help, and that the government could borrow additional funds in Europe at a lower interest rate, and use that money to repay the higher interest loans.  His plan also called for higher taxes to be used in a sinking fund.  That essentially means that the taxes raised would be dedicated to the purpose of repaying debt and could not be used for other things that Congress might want to spend money on.  This would help assure investors of repayment and would help him to negotiate the lower interest rates that they needed.

Politically, this plan had the benefit of strengthening the federal government.  Wealthy creditors waiting to be repaid would be more willing to support higher taxes to raise the funds.  They would also be more focused on the well being of the federal government and would support policies that protected the new government’s stability and well-being.  

States, relieved of their debts, could also reduce property taxes that had led to unrest such as Shays Rebellion.  Not all states, however, liked this idea. Many states, like Virginia, had not taken on as much war debt as others.  Some states had also been more aggressive than others in paying down their debts.  Maryland and North Carolina had already repaid all of its war debt. Massachusetts and South Carolina accounted for 40% of all state debt.  Why should the slacker states be relieved of debt that all the other states would be responsible for repaying.  The result was that states that did not have much or any debt opposed the idea of state assumption.

Another major criticism was that most of the money raised would be going to money speculators. These were the men who bought up this paper and pennies on the dollar, and now expected to be paid in full.  Opponents argued that original holders of the paper, of which there were almost none, could be paid in full, but that others would be able to sell their paper at market rates, which before his plan were still only a few cents on the dollar.  Speculators had even rushed to southern states to buy up paper before word of Hamilton’s plan reached those states.  Many believed that money speculators should not be rewarded for their sharp dealings.  They should get their money back, and maybe a little more, but not this huge windfall that repayment at face value would give them.

Hamilton opposed this idea.  It would be ruinous to federal credit if the government refused repayment , as promised, at face value.  This would make it harder to negotiate lower interest rates on all the debt.  The government must keep its promises to repay the debt in full to the current holder of that debt.  

The Compromise

Hamilton had expected James Madison to support his plan.  Back in 1787, the two men had discussed all of this at the Constitutional Convention, and found themselves in agreement on this and many other issues.  Even as late as November of 1789, Hamilton had written to Madison about the debt issue and Madison said nothing about any concerns about assumption of state debt.

But by 1790, Congressman Madison had to support the interests of Virginia.  It was not in Virginia’s interests to let the Federal government assume state debts, and Virginia voters were not crazy about enriching money speculators at the expense of higher taxes on themselves.  Madison had written before that enriching speculators at the expense of workers would only encourage more people to engage in speculation and less of the population to do actual work.

Madison also disliked the plan for the same reason that Hamilton liked it.  The debt would help to consolidate power in the federal government at the expense of the states. Government taxing power would give it too much economic power over the state economies.

Madison became a leading opponent of Hamilton’s plan.  He proposed numerous changes, such as buying debt from speculators at market value, and of having the federal government reimburse states for debts they had already paid.  Madison also hoped to keep the revenue at the state level, rather than having the federal government collect and disburse everything.

The result of Madison’s opposition was that the House Committee of the Whole voted against Hamilton’s debt plan in April of 1790.  Two weeks after that, the House voted to discontinue debate on assumption of debts.  In early June, Congress voted to support some portions of the plan, including trying to get new loans to pay interest on existing debt and to create a sinking fund to reassure creditors.  Strong support from northern delegates also agreed to pay off all debts at full face value.  But there was no assumption of state debts.

Despite these votes, negotiations continued.  Northern states were demanding assumption of all state debts.  Hamilton believed it was a key component of his plan.  Shortly after the June vote leaving out assumption, Hamilton met with members of the Pennsylvania delegation, hoping to trade their support for assumption by agreeing to round up more votes to move the capital to Pennsylvania.

At the same time those Pennsylvania delegates were negotiating with the Virginia delegation to move the permanent capital to Virginia after moving it temporarily to Philadelphia.

There is a famous story told by Thomas Jefferson years after these events, that he came across a dejected looking Hamilton a few weeks after his assumption loss in Congress.  As Jefferson tells the story, he agreed to have Hamilton, Madison and several others delegates from Maryland and Pennsylvania to a dinner at his house to discuss a compromise plan.  It was at this dinner that Jefferson got all the major players to agree to a compromise plan where Congress would vote to allow the assumption of debts, and that the capital would move to Philadelphia for a few years, but then finally establish its permanent location on the banks of the Potomac.

There is no reason to doubt this story that the final details of the agreement were worked out at Jefferson’s dinner.  But it is clear that the various parties had been discussing this deal for a few weeks prior.  Madison could not support the assumption bill, not if he wanted to be reelected.  He did, however, agree not to actively oppose the bill, and also agreed that he would find at least three southern congressmen who would back assumption.  

In exchange, Hamilton agreed to use his influence with New England and New York Senators and  Congressmen to permit the permanent location of the capital on the Potomac.  To get the Pennsylvania delegation on board, they also agreed to move the capital back to Philadelphia right away, and that it would remain there for ten years.  Hamilton also agreed to recalculate Virginia’s debt in a way that assured that taxes collected from Virginians would be about equal to the amount that Virginia would receive for its assumed debts.

The compromise seemed to work. Madison secured two votes from Virginia and two from Maryland to support the assumption bill, thus allowing it to pass in late July.  A few weeks prior, the House narrowly passed a Residence bill, moving the capital to Philadelphia for ten years, then permanently to a location on the Potomac.  President Washington, who supported both bills, happily signed both of them into law.  By August, everything was done.  Days after completion of this grand compromise, Congress completed its session and returned home.

New York in particular was unhappy with this deal.  They were not crazy about assumption and very much wanted to keep the capital.  Opponents saw this blatant political horse trading as indecent.  Many New Yorkers were even critical of President Washington, claiming he pushed this through so that the capital would be near his home.  

Also as expected, Virginians were unhappy with what they saw as a surrender to northern speculators.  Opponents also saw this as a betrayal of Republican liberty by putting so much economic power in the hands of the federal government.  Back in Richmond, Patrick Henry got the Assembly to vote on an official condemnation of the compromise.  They petition congress to repeal the assumption law.  They did however, see ok with moving the capital to Virginia.

Despite these angry responses by some, most moderates seemed to accept the deal and were happy to put two divisive disputes behind them.  Washington’s approval of the deal also seemed to satisfy many.  Many New Englanders, as well as indebted South Carolina, were happy with the assumption plan.  Philadelphians were happy to get the return of the capital. Even though it was temporary, many still hoped they could make it permanent before the end of the decade.

While there was a great deal of fighting and conflict, the First Congress had completed its work.  Members returned home at the end of the summer to prepare for their first reelection bids in the fall.

Next week, we will take a closer look at the new country as it begins its first national census.

- - -

Next Episode 368 The Census of 1790 (coming soon)

Previous Episode 366 Rhode Island and the Treaty of NY 

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Further Reading

Websites

“Assumption of the State Debts, [22 April] 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0117.

Federalism and the Problem of State Debts: https://www.hamilton.edu/documents/Blosser%20Levitt%20paper.pdf




Bates, Whitney K. “Northern Speculators and Southern State Debts: 1790.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 19, no. 1, 1962, pp. 30–48. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1919956

Bowling, Kenneth R. “Dinner at Jefferson’s: A Note on Jacob E. Cooke’s ‘The Compromise of 1790.’” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 4, 1971, pp. 629–48. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1922191

Edling, Max M. “‘So Immense a Power in the Affairs of War’: Alexander Hamilton and the Restoration of Public Credit.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 64, no. 2, 2007, pp. 287–326. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4491623

Cooke, Jacob E. “The Compromise of 1790.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 4, 1970, pp. 524–45. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1919703

Risjord, Norman K. “The Compromise of 1790: New Evidence on the Dinner Table Bargain.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 2, 1976, pp. 309–14. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1922168

“James Madison to James Monroe, 1 June 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-13-02-0164

“George Washington to David Stuart, 15 June 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0334

“Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 20 June 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-16-02-0312

“Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr., 20 June 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-16-02-0314

“Memorandum from Thomas Jefferson, 29 August 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-02-0176

“X. Jefferson’s Account of the Bargain on the Assumption and Residence Bills, [1792?],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-17-02-0018-0012


August 4, 1790: Debt Plan of Alexander Hamilton, America’s First Chief Operations Officer, Becomes Law: https://constitutingamerica.org/august-4-1790-debt-plan-of-alexander-hamilton-americas-first-chief-operations-officer-becomes-law-guest-essayist-scot

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Brant, Irving James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1950 (borrow only). 

Byran, Wilhelmus B. A History of the National Capital, Vol. 1: 1790-1814. New York: MacMillan Co. 1914. 

Losing, Benson (ed) The Diary of George Washington, From 1789 to 1791, Richmond: Press of the Historical Society, 1861. 

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Rights of Man, Little Brown and Co. 1951.  (borrow only)

Tindall, William Origin and Government of the District of Columbia, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1909. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Bordewich, Fergus M. The First Congress: How James Madison, George Washington, and a Group of Extraordinary Men Invented the Government, Simon & Schuster, 2016. 

Cerami, Charles A. Dinner at Mr. Jefferson's: Three Men, Five Great Wines, and the Evening That Changed America, Trade Paper Press, 2008. 

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Ellis, Joseph J. Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation, Knopf, 2000.

Ellis, Joseph J. The Quartet: Orchestrating the Second American Revolution 1783-1789, Alfred A. Knopf, 2015. 

Ferguson, E. James The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790, V-Books LLC, 2011. 

Leibiger, Stuard (ed) A Companion to James Madison and James Monroe, Wiley-Blackwell,  2012. 

Leibiger, Stuart Founding Friendship George Washington, James Madison, and the Creation of the American Republic, Univ. of Virginia Press, 1999. 

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases. 




Sunday, October 5, 2025

ARP366 Rhode Island & Treaty of New York, 1790

In our last regular episode, George Washington laid out an agenda in his State of the Union Address for the new cession of .  In that address, Washington noted with satisfaction, that North Carolina had ratified, making it the twelfth state to to join the Union making it  the 13th and final of the original state to ratify the Constitution.

Rhode Island Ratification

As you may recall, the Constitution, by its own terms, went into effect once nine of the thirteen states ratified.  By the time elections were organized, eleven states had ratified.  Only North Carolina and Rhode Island refused to do so.  As I mentioned a few weeks ago, North Carolina, buoyed by the proposal of the Bill of Rights, and seeing threats of trade sanctions if they did not ratify, finally ratified in November of 1789.  That left little Rhode Island on its own.

Alexander McGillivray
When we discussed Rhode Island’s refusal to ratify a few months ago, you may recall that much of the reason was financial.  A populist government had been elected which had flooded the state with new paper money, which quickly devalued.  For the vast majority of voters, who were heavily in debt, this was great news.  They would pay off their debts with the nearly worthless dollars and become debt free.

Merchants and moneyed interests, of course, were aghast at this idea.  It motivated the Constitutional Convention to give exclusive authority to the federal government to print paper money.  Thus, Rhode Island’s paper money party would come to an end when they joined the new government.

Between September of 1787 and January of 1790, Rhode Island’s legislature, or the people themselves through referendum, rejected all efforts to ratify the US Constitution.  In an attempt to put more pressure on them, Congress had approved import tariffs that would essentially make trade between Rhode Island and the other states uneconomical.  North Carolina faced this same threat and got Congress to delay implementation until January, 1790.  By that time North Carolina was in the Union, but Rhode Island still was not.

In January, Rhode Island officials convinced Congress to delay implementation of tariffs a second time so that Rhode Island could hold another ratifying convention in March.  The ratifying convention met and adjourned without a vote on ratification.  Finally, on May 18, about a week before the Rhode Island convention would reconvene, a frustrated Congress passed a bill barring all commercial trade between Rhode Island and the other twelve states.  It barred US vessels from docking in Rhode Island ports and insisted that Rhode Island make a payment, in lieu of taxes, toward paying off their share of the national war debt.

It would go into effect on July 1, and it was made clear there would be no further delays.  Only one member of Congress voted against the bill, which President Washington signed into law..

Federalists in Providence, and a few other areas, debated seceding from Rhode Island and joining the US on their own.  The merchants were never happy with the state’s monetary policies, and saw the new trade ban as fatal to their commercial future.

So when the Ratification Convention met again in late May, there was intense pressure to accept the Constitution.  Despite the pressure, the initial vote failed pretty decisively. Over the course of the next week, debate continued.  At least one town that had been against ratification sent instructions to have its delegates vote in favor.  In another case, a town replaced a delegate who refused to vote for ratification.

Finally, late in the afternoon of May 29, the Convention held another vote.  It finally agreed to ratify the Constitution by a vote of 34-32.  As part of the vote, the delegates called on Congress to protect 18 separate rights and to make 21 amendments to the Constitution, including one to protect the state’s paper money policy.  But ratification was not made contingent on any of these changes.  Rhode Island had agreed to become part of the United States.  Couriers sped the news of ratification to New York, where President Washington reported the official news to Congress on June 1. 

A couple of weeks later, the convention convened again to ratify the Bill of Rights that Congress had already proposed.  The legislature appointed two US Senators who took their seats on June 25.  One Federalist, Theodore Foster, and one Anti-Federalist, Joseph Stanton, Jr.  The state held its first election in August, sending Federalist Benjamin Bourne to take up the state’s only House seat in early September.

With Rhode Island’s reluctant ratification, the ratification of the Constitution by all of the states was finally unanimous.

Southwest Territory

While officials in New York were pleased with Rhode Island’s acquiescence, their attention during most of the spring and summer was focused more on the west.  The issue of western expansion continued to create challenges for the new federal government.

Northern settlers had already begun moving into the territory north of the Ohio River in what had been established as the Northwest Territory. At the same time settlers from Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia were pushing westward.

Back in Episode 335, I talked about the State of Franklin which was created out of lands that were part of western North Carolina.  The settlers had formed their own state after North Carolina had given the land to the Continental Congress.  When Congress did nothing to accept the land, the people formed a new state in 1784 and sought recognition from Congress.  Both North Carolina and the Continental Congress refused to recognize the state.  For several years though, the state existed and made treaties with Indians in the region.

Franklin’s president, John Sevier, who had been a leader at the Battle of Kings Mountain, made treaties with the nearby Cherokees.  The Indians disputed the treaties.  Congress’ 1785 Hopewell Treaties that I covered in Episode 339 recognized Cherokee claims on the land.  After being rejected by the Americans, Sevier reached out to Spain to see if it could get support from them.

This was too much for the Americans.  North Carolina attempted to seize Sevier’s property for non-payment of taxes to North Carolina.  Sevier was arrested for treason.  Soon afterward, the State of Franklin fell apart.  Seeking to put the fight behind them, Sevier swore allegiance to North Carolina, and the Governor pardoned him.   The locals would elect him as a state Senator in North Carolina.

Having reunited Franklin as part of North Carolina, the North Carolina legislature once again in early 1790, ceded the territory to the US Congress as part of its creation of a new federal territory.  The Southwest Territory consisted of western lands south of the Ohio River that had been ceded by the other states.  Virginia had not yet ceded Kentucky.  That was still a few years away. So, for the moment, the territory consisted of North Carolina’s session, which would eventually become the state of Tennessee.

Congress essentially governed the Southwest Territory under the same terms as it did the Northwest territory, appointing a territorial governor, and expecting that it would become a state when the population was sufficient.  The most significant difference between the Southwest Territory and the Northwest Territory was governed was that it allowed slavery.

Washington appointed William Blount as the new territorial governor.  Sevier had wanted the job, but his past actions kept him out of consideration.  Blount had been born and raised in western North Carolina, but his path differed greatly from Sevier.  Bount’s father, Jacob Blount had been a Justice of the Peace, and had helped Royal Governor William Tryon crush the Regulator movement in the early 1770s.  As a young man, William joined the army that was sent to crush the regulators, although he did not see any action..

When the Revolution came though, the Blounts sided with the patriots and served in the militia. Both of William’s brothers accepted commission in the Continental Army.  But William remained in the militia.  In 1780 he served as commissary to General Hortio Gates, for a few months, until the battle of Camden.

After that, he focused more on politics.  Beginning in 1782, Bount served in the Continental Congress with the North Carolina Delegation.  In 1783, he returned to state politics.  He was the politician who introduced what became known as the Land Grab Act, allowing certain influential North Carolinians to obtain large amounts of western land.  He was also active in the settlement of Western lands.

When the state of Franklin became an issue in North Carolina, Blount did not take a strong position with either side.  Blount had opposed the Hopewell treaty that Congress signed with the Cherokee.

In 1787, Blount went back to Philadelphia as a North Carolina delegate to the Constitutional Convention.  It was there that he and Washington got to know each other a bit.  Blount did not stay for the entire convention.  He went back to New York where he was still serving in the Confederation Congress, but returned near the convention's end to sign the final document.  He then became a leader in the fight for North Carolina’s ratification, which took two tries before the state ratified in November 1789.

It was probably Blount’s reputation as a leading federalist in the state that gave Washington the confidence to nominate him as territorial governor in 1790.  Blount appointed Sevier as one of two brigadier generals in the territorial militia, and appointed a number of other former Franklinites to various government positions. Among his appointments was a young attorney who had just passed the bar two years earlier.  Blount appointed Andrew Jackson as a prosecutor for the territory.  With the Hopewell treaties in place, the population increase in this territory created relatively few incidents with the Indians.

McGillivray and the Creeks

The real threat remained further south.  The Cherokee and Muskogee in the Southwest territory had agreed to treaties with Congress in 1785 and were largely in compliance.  Congress had also approached the Creeks at the same time, but they refused to sign away their land.

A big part of the Creek resistance was the work of Alexander McGillivray.  I’ve mentioned McGillivray before.  He was the son of a Scotsman who had settled in South Carolina and married a Creek woman who was herself the daughter of a Frenchman and another Creek woman.  So McGillivray was only one-quarter Creek.  He was raised in Charleston and lived in white society.  When the Revolution began, McGillivray remained loyalist and went to live inland with his Creek relatives as Hoboi-Hili-Miko.  Patriots seized his family’s property in South Carolina and McGillivray received a colonel’s commission in the British Army.

When the British left after the war, McGillivray continued to hold a position of power and influence among the Creeks.  He discouraged them from giving away more land to the Americans when other tribes signed on in 1785.  Instead, he travelled to Pensacola to get support from Spain to protect their land.  Spain very much wanted the Creek to serve as a buffer between their control of the Mississippi and the Georgians who were pushing westward.

With Spanish backing, McGillivray tried to consolidate power among the Creek.  Traditionally, each village could negotiate for itself.  McGillivray wanted to negotiate with the Americans on behalf of all Creeks so that the Americans could not simply pressure one village after another to sell out.

Smaller groups of Creeks had signed treaties with Georgia  The Treaty of Augusta in 1783 purported to give away Creek lands to which the signatories had not control.  Other Creeks actually living on that land objected.

American negotiators had tried to negotiate a new treaty with the Creek in 1785.  Congressional and state negotiators met with the Creek in Galphinton, Georgia.  McGillivray, however, did not come.  The Creek who did show up did not have authority to negotiate on behalf of all Creeks.  Because of this, the federal negotiators gave up and left.  However, state negotiators from Georgia were happy to negotiate with those who did show up.  Presumably after offering gifts and other personal benefits, got the Creek representatives to sign another treaty that confirmed the land cessions from the Treaty of Augusta in this new Treaty of Galphinton.

Because McGillivray and the majority of the Creeks did not recognize the validity of either of the treaties with Georgia, they went about attacking settlements on their land.  They wiped out a settlement at Muscle Shoals, and continued to raid frontier homesteads as they appeared.  

Representatives of Congress realized they needed a real treaty that the Creek leadership accepted.  The Creek leaders wanted to deal with Congress, and not state officials based on the history of bad faith negotiations.  

The Confederation Congress appointed James White as superintendent of Indian affairs in 1786 to engage in negotiations.  White was a doctor and a Revolutionary war veteran who had established a home near the new settlement of Knoxville.  At the time, this was still the state of Franklin.  White ended up resigning his commission in 1788 after Congress failed to back Franklin and instead went to work for the Spanish trying to form an alliance with Franklin.  In this role, White ended up helping to supply the Creeks with Spanish arms to use against Georgia settlers.  When the state of Franklin collapsed later that year, White returned to his home near Knoxville.

This experience seemed to convince the Creeks that the Confederation Congress seemed more open to a fair treaty than did state officials in Georgia.  Around this same time Spanish officials told McGillivray that they could not provide more supplies and military support, forcing the Creek to rely on negotiations with the Americans.

Treaty of New York

Shortly after Washington took office as President, he sent invitations for Creek leaders to meet in New York City to discuss a strong and lasting treaty that would settle the ongoing disputes. Marinus Willet, who I’ve mentioned before for his active role in the War, and who was currently serving as Sheriff of New York, carried Washington’s message to the Creek.

During the summer of 1790 McGillivray led a delegation of Creek and Seminole leaders to New York to negotiate a new treaty with the Americans.  The delegation arrived in late July.

While in New York the delegation was greeted by the newly organized Society of Saint Tammany, which was developing into a political organization.  It was named after the Delaware Chief Tammany, who had successfully established a peaceful land cession agreement with William Penn a century earlier.  The Chiefs were paraded through town, and onlookers celebrated their arrival as they would foreign royalty.  President Washington personally received McGillivray and the other Chiefs.  He treated them as he would foreign dignitaries.

Meetings between the two sides continued for about three weeks.  Secretary of War Henry Knox led the negotiations for the Americans, with some support from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson.  In the evenings, President Washington hosted dinners for the Creek leaders, giving them a chance to interact with Senators and Congressmen, and other people.  The groups smoked pipes together and exchanged wampum belts. Washington also revealed for the first time a full length portrait of himself, painted by John Trumbull.  Newspapers reported that Washington’s dinners were more lavish and festive than anything New York had seen since the inauguration.

In about three weeks the two sides had drafted an acceptable treaty.  The Treaty of New York guaranteed boundaries between Creeks and Georgians.  No US citizen would be permitted to settle on Indian lands.  If they tried they forfeited the protection of the US.  The Creek were free to deal with them as they wished.  No American could even hunt in Creek territory without a US passport authorizing them to do so.  The Creeks agreed to turn over criminals or escaped slaves that had taken refuge among the Creek.  If people of either side committed an offense, the other would reach out to authorities to assure they would be punished by their own government, rather than simply seeking retribution.

Beyond setting up borders, the treaty also hoped to bring what the Americans called “a greater degree of civilization” to the Indians.  They would provide domestic animals and farm implements in hopes of getting the Creek to take up farming, rather than living primarily as hunters.  The Creek would also send a few of their own to live among the Americans, learn their language so they could serve as interpreters and also learn American customs.

To get McGillivray to support the treaty, there were also several secret provisions that impacted only him.  McGillivray received a commission as a brigadier general in the US Army, which entitled him to a salary of $1200 per year.  By putting the Creek leader on the US payroll, he had a strong incentive to maintain good relations going forward.  McGillivray also got a one-time $100,000 payment for properties confiscated from his father during the war.

On August 13, both sides signed the treaty, which the Senate would ratify.  McGillivray and the chiefs returned home. A little over a week later, President Washington issued The Proclamation of 1790, warning US citizens to stay out of Indian lands.

With the establishment of the Treaty of New York, Washington and others hoped that the threat of war with the Indians would subside, at least for the time being.

Next week: we take a look at how the new federal government resolved two of the most contentious issues facing the new nation in the Grand Compromise of 1790.

- - -

Next Episode 367 the Grand Compromise, 1790 (coming soon)

Previous Episode 364 New England Tour and NC Ratifies

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Further Reading

Websites

Rhode Island Ratifies the Constitution: https://www.ebsco.com/research-starters/politics-and-government/rhode-island-ratifies-constitution

“George Washington to the United States Senate and House of Representatives, 1 June 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-05-02-0284

Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Vol. 24-26: https://search.library.wisc.edu/digital/ATR2WPX6L3UFLH8I

Spanish Treaties with West Florida Indians 1784-1802 https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3143&context=fhq

Kinnaird, Lawrence, et al. “Spanish Treaties with Indian Tribes.” The Western Historical Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 1, 1979, pp. 39–48. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/967131

Stock, Melissa A. “Sovereign or Suzerain: Alexander McGillivray’s Argument for Creek Independence after the Treaty of Paris of 1783.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. 92, no. 2, 2008, pp. 149–76. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40585053

Kinnaird, Lucia Burk. “THE ROCK LANDING CONFERENCE OF 1789.” The North Carolina Historical Review, vol. 9, no. 4, 1932, pp. 349–65. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23515214

Goodpasture, Albert V. “DR. JAMES WHITE. PIONEER, POLITICIAN, LAWYER.” Tennessee Historical Magazine, vol. 1, no. 4, 1915, pp. 282–91. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/42637324

Spanish Treaties with West Florida Indians 1784-1802 https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3143&context=fhq

Kinnaird, Lawrence, et al. “Spanish Treaties with Indian Tribes.” The Western Historical Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 1, 1979, pp. 39–48. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/967131

Stock, Melissa A. “Sovereign or Suzerain: Alexander McGillivray’s Argument for Creek Independence after the Treaty of Paris of 1783.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. 92, no. 2, 2008, pp. 149–76. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40585053

Wright, J. Leitch. “Creek-American Treaty of 1790: Alexander McGillivray and The Diplomacy of The Old Southwest.” The Georgia Historical Quarterly, vol. 51, no. 4, 1967, pp. 379–400. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40578728
Southwest Territory 1790-1796: https://www.tngenweb.org/tnletters/territories/sw-terr.html

Southwest Territory https://tn250.com/voices-volunteers/posts/southwest-territory

Indian Relations 1782-1789 (American Revolution in Georgia) https://ugapress.manifoldapp.org/read/the-american-revolution-in-georgia-1763-1789/section/9569afb7-0b49-4aea-bb2f-4308eaf5be29

William Blount: https://northcarolinahistory.org/encyclopedia/william-blount-1749-1800

Alexander McGillivray: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexander-McGillivray

Alexander McGillivray: https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/alexander-mcgillivray-ca-1750-1793

George Washington and Native American Policy: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/native-american-policy

“Henry Knox to George Washington, 6 July 1789,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0062

“George Washington to the Commissioners to the Southern Indians, 29 August 1789,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0326

“Proclamation, 14 August 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-06-02-0122

Treaty of New York (1790): https://encyclopediaofalabama.org/article/treaty-of-new-york-1790

Treaty with the Creeks, 1790: https://treaties.okstate.edu/treaties/treaty-with-the-creeks-1790-0025

Proclamation of 1790: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/gwproc13.asp

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Arthur, John Preston Western North Carolina: A History (from 1730 to 1913), Raleigh, NC: Edward Buncombe Chapter of the DAR, 1914.  

Chappell, Absalom Harris The Oconee War. Alexander McGillivray. Gen. Elijah Clark. Col. Benjamin Hawkins, Columbus, GA: Thos Gilbert, 1874 (Google Books). 

Hawkins, Benjamin Creek Confederacy and a Sketch of the Creek Country, Savannah, 1848. 

Henderson, W. A. Alexander McGillivray, The Last King of the Creeks, Atlanta: Foote & Davies Co. 1903. 

Kaminski, John P. et. al (eds) Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Vol. 24, Rhode Island (from Univ. of Wisconsin digital library). 

Losing, Benson (ed) The Diary of George Washington, From 1789 to 1791, Richmond: Press of the Historical Society, 1861. 

Mooney, James Myths of the Cherokee, Government Printing Office, 1902. 

Turner, Francis Marion Life of General John Sevier, New York: The Neale Publishing Co. 1910. 

Wilson, Woodrow George Washington, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1896. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Boiler, Jean Lufkin The Most Perfect Justice: Alexander McGillivray and George Washington Strive to Save the Creek Nation, Escambia Press, 2020. 

Bordewich, Fergus M. The First Congress: How James Madison, George Washington, and a Group of Extraordinary Men Invented the Government, Simon & Schuster, 2016. 

Caughey, John W. McGillivray of the Creeks, Univ. of OK Press, 1938 (borrow on archive.org).

Chernow, Ron Washington, A Life, Penguin Press, 2010. 

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Ellis, Joseph J. His Excellency. George Washington, Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. 

Ellis, Joseph J. The Quartet: Orchestrating the Second American Revolution 1783-1789, Alfred A. Knopf, 2015. 

Haynes, Joshua S. Patrolling the Border: Theft and Violence on the Creek-Georgia Frontier, 1770–1796, Univ. of Ga. Press, 2018.

Holinshead, Byron (ed) I Wish I'd Been There: Twenty Historians Bring to Life Dramatic Events That Changed America, Doubleday, 2006. 

Kaminski, John P. et. al. (eds) Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, Volume 24: Ratification of the Constitution by the States: Rhode Island, No. 1 (Volume 24) Wisconsin Historical Society Press, 2011 (or download for free from Wisconsin web site). 

Leibiger, Stuart Founding Friendship George Washington, James Madison, and the Creation of the American Republic, Univ. of Virginia Press, 1999. 

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001. 

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

Unger, Harlow Giles Mr. President: George Washington and the Making of the Nation's Highest Office, De Capo Press, 2013. 

Waring, Alice Noble The Fighting Elder: Andrew Pickens, 1739-1817, Univ. of S.C. Press, 1962 (borrow on archive.org). 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.William Blount

Sunday, September 28, 2025

AR-SP39 Threshold to Valley Forge, with Sheilah Vance

In September 2025 the American Revolution Round Table hosted Sheilah Vance, author of Threshold to Valley Forge: The Six Days of the Gulph Mills EncampmentThis is a summary of the discussion, which was recorded on Zoom.

The discussion centers on the critical, yet often overlooked, period when George Washington’s Continental Army was encamped at Gulph Mills. This encampment lasted approximately six days, from December 12th to 19th, 1777, immediately preceding the march to Valley Forge. The author, Sheila Vance, decided to focus on this topic because she grew up in Gulph Mills and discovered historical information that confirmed the importance of the encampment, which she had never learned in school.

Context and Prelude to Gulph Mills

The Gulph Mills encampment occurred during a low point for the Continental Army, shortly after Washington lost the battles of Brandywine and Germantown during the Philadelphia Campaign.

The White Marsh Encampment and Challenges:

  • Before moving to Gulph Mills, Washington’s army spent six weeks at the White Marsh encampment, which was situated across the Schuylkill River from Gulph Mills.
  • During this time, Washington faced severe scrutiny over his leadership because General Horatio Gates had recently won a major victory at Saratoga. This political challenge was tied to the Conway Cabal, as politicians, including John Adams and Patrick Henry, considered replacing Washington. Thomas Conway, an anti-Washington officer, was appointed the first Inspector General of the Army, largely as a way to challenge the Commander-in-Chief.
  • General Howe attempted one last engagement at White Marsh before the British settled into winter quarters in Philadelphia. However, this Battle of White Marsh essentially did not happen in a "big way," involving only skirmishes before Howe retreated back to Philadelphia.
  • Washington had been alerted to Howe’s planned attack at White Marsh by Lydia Darragh, a woman in Philadelphia who overheard the British plans at her commandeered home and managed to relay the information, concealed in a needle case, to Washington’s key advisor, Elias Boudinot.

The Move to Gulph Mills (Matson’s Ford):

  • Determining that his army was too close to the enemy, Washington decided to cross the Schuylkill River to place that substantial river between his forces and the British in Philadelphia.
  • Washington initially intended for the army to cross at Matson's Ford on December 11th. This effort resulted in an almost accidental engagement called the Battle of Matson's Ford (or the battle in the Gulph).
  • Washington's advanced parties, including General Potter's Pennsylvania militia, encountered a large British foraging party led by General Cornwallis, involving several thousand troops.
  • Continental soldiers who had crossed a makeshift bridge at Matson’s Ford were ordered to retreat back across and dismantle the bridge after spotting the British.
  • After consulting, the generals realized this was only a foraging party, not the entire British army. However, Washington declared Matson's Ford too dangerous—"the hornets nest"—and rerouted the army downriver to Swedes Ford.
  • The army spent the night at Swedes Ford and crossed into Gulph Mills early on December 12th or 13th. The engagement at Matson's Ford resulted in the loss of 20 lives. The British foraging operation itself was described as "brutal," seizing about 2,000 cattle from Gulph Mills farmers.

The Gulph Mills Encampment and Strategic Decisions

Gulph Mills proved to be a necessary, strategic way station.

  • Strategic Location: The encampment was located on the high ground, specifically Rebel Hill (400 ft.), which offered Washington a strategic vantage point to monitor British movements toward Philadelphia.
  • Decision Making: While at Gulph Mills, Washington consulted with his generals regarding their plans. The options considered for winter quarters included remaining near Philadelphia, or moving further afield to places like Wilmington, Lancaster, or York. Washington delayed making a public choice, potentially to keep his options open or due to concerns about spies.
  • Valley Forge Announcement: Washington finally announced the decision to enter winter quarters on December 17th and indicated the location—about seven or eight miles from Gulph Mills—on December 18th. The march to Valley Forge was delayed until December 19th because December 18th had been designated a national Day of Thanksgiving by the Continental Congress to celebrate Gates' victory at Saratoga.

Soldier Morale and Documentation:

  • Despite the miserable conditions, including the lack of food, clothes, and shoes in the cold December weather, the soldiers were ideologically motivated and displayed remarkable resilience. Dr. Albigence Waldo noted a "spirit of elacrity and contentment or even cheerfulness" among the men.
  • The soldiers were fighting for a republic and democracy, striving to establish a system that was "free and fair for all". The Articles of Confederation had been passed in November 1777, and Virginia, the first state to adopt them, did so during the Gulph Mills encampment, around December 15th or 16th.
  • Vance emphasized the importance of documentation found during her research, including a strength return for General Barnum’s division dated December 15th, Gulph Mills, confirming the army's presence. The famous painting, The March to Valley Forge, depicts the march that originated from Gulph Mills.

Continuing Role:

  • Gulph Mills continued to be important after the main army moved, serving as a lookout point where General Sterling and later officers like Aaron Burr commanded a continuous picket post to keep an eye on Philadelphia throughout the Valley Forge encampment.
  • Its strategic high ground was also utilized when General Lafayette retreated there during the Battle of Barren Hill.

- - -

To see a list of upcoming Round Table events, where you can participate on Zoom, go to: ⁠https://amrevrt.org/virtual-round-table-events⁠


To learn more about Author Sheilah Vance, check out her web site: https://sheilahvance.com/about-sheilah-vance

To participate live in future Zoom events, be sure to join as a member on Patreon, or sign up for my mailing list.


Click here to see my Patreon Page
You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option making monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.


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