Sunday, February 15, 2026

ARP377 Washington’s First Veto

Last week we covered the US Army’s first major military loss when the Indians in the Northwest territory soundly defeated the army under General Arthur St. Clair.  Today we will cover Congress’ response to that loss, and other legislation from 1792.

Military Appropriations

The defeat reinforced President Washington’s view that the nation needed a larger standing army.  Many members of Congress still believed that a standing army in peacetime violated a fundamental tenet of the Revolution.  A professional military that was large enough to compel the citizenry to comply, not out of voluntary acceptance, but fear of military reprisal was the tyranny that they had just shed under British rule.

First US Penny 1792

Washington and others calling for a larger army understood that concern, but also recognized that there were very real military threats, from both Indian tribes and foreign nations, that required substantial numbers of professionally trained soldiers to defend the new country.  

The other big issue was cost.  The country would be digging its way out of debt for decades because of the cost of the Continental Army during the war.  The cost of a large peacetime army could cause that national debt to increase, no decrease.

Up until the time of the Battle of the Wabash in 1791, the US Army had never exceeded 1000 soldiers.  In 1790 Congress had authorized raising a force of 1273, mostly to deal with Indians in the Ohio territory.  Low pay and poor conditions had prevented reaching those enlistment goals.  By the time General St. Clair went off to fight the total number of American regulars was only about 800 officers and men.

Following the loss on the Wabash, Congress was finally willing to approve a much larger army.  Fortunately, they had some of the top talent in the administration to advise them.  President Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox had both played key roles in organizing the Continental Army.  Congress also sought the advice of former Inspector General Friedrich von Steuben, who was by this time living on a large estate in upstate New York, granted to him for his services during the war.

After taking their advice, Congress adopted a plan to create the Legion of the United States.  This would total over 5000 officers and men. The legion would be divided into four independent sub-legions that would normally operate independently.  Each sub-legion would have a troop of dragoons, a company of artillery, two regiments of infantry and one regiment of riflemen.  The total cost of maintaining this army would be about $1 million per year.

President Washington also appointed a new commander of the army Major General "Mad" Anthony Wayne had been one of Washington’s top generals during the war.  He was known for tough discipline and aggressive action.

Although he was a Pennsylvania native, Wayne had moved from Georgia after the war.  He had received a large land grant in appreciation for his work during the southern campaign.  In 1791, the Georgia voters sent Wayne to Philadelphia as their representative in Congress.  Washington had approached Wayne for a leadership role in the army as early as 1789, but Wayne was not interested.

However, by 1792, Wayne was struggling with his finances, and was facing accusations of election fraud for his election to the House of Representatives.  By this time, Wayne put all of that behind him by accepting Washington’s appointment as commander of the US Army.  

Wayne was in no hurry to rush into another battle.  He set up a training ground on the banks of the Ohio River, just north of Pittsburgh.  He spent months training and recruiting new recruits, who had enlisted for three years.  He did not want to go into battle until his army was ready.

Militia Act

If the establishment of a large standing army had been controversial, Congress also tackled even more contentious issues in the Militia Act.  Congress had been debating an act to regulate state militias since Congress had first met in 1789.  The members kept tabling the matter because no one could agree on the Federal Government’s role in state militias.

State and local militias were considered the backbone of America’s fighting force.  Given the relatively small size of the professional army, the country needed to have a well armed and well trained militia to step up in times of war or national emergency.

Many state officials, however, were skeptical of the idea that the federal government should control the militia.  Many were still fearful that the federal government might become tyrannical, and it would be up to the state militias to challenge that tyranny.

During the Constitutional Convention, delegates had debated these issues.  Foremost in their minds, however, was Shays Rebellion in Massachusetts, and the inability of both the state and the Confederation Congress to control that rebellion.  In response, delegates gave congress the authority 

To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; [and] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

The new militia act was designed to fill in the details for that Congressional authorization.  Congress’ Militia Act, passed on May 2, 1792, explicitly gave the president the power to call out the state militia doing any invasion or the imminent danger of invasion by any foreign nation or Indian tribe.  It also gave the president authority to call out the militia if an insurgency grew so large that it could not be handled by regular judicial proceedings.  Any militia member’s refusal to follow the orders of the president could result in a court martial and a fine of up to a year’s pay.

A week later, on May 8, Congress passed a second militia act.  It required all able-bodied white men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to be enrolled in a militia.  All militia members were required to buy their own musket or rifle, ammunition, and equipment to keep on hand at all times.  The law exempted certain professions from militia duty, including most federal officials, sailors, ferry operators.  It also allowed states to create their own exemptions.

The state exemptions were particularly contentious.  Congress debated whether to grant exemptions for religious reasons.  Some states with many Quakers or other peace-oriented religions, strongly supported this exemption.  Madison strongly advocated for a conscientious objector provision, but could not get it passed.  Other members believed such a provision would create a loophole that would allow anyone who just wished to avoid service to claim an exemption.  There were also arguments from manufacturers that militia duty would disrupt the productivity of apprentices. In the end, by allowing each state to adopt whatever exemptions it wanted, they sidestepped these contentious arguments and left it to state leaders to resolve on a state by state basis..  

There was also some debate about whether a president might abuse the power to call up the militia to put down a rebellion.  While no one expected President Washington to abuse the power, the same might not be said for future presidents. The result was a requirement that a federal judge had to affirm the need to call out the militia.

Congress also ended up limiting the power of the militia for three years.  That would force them to reconsider whether this power was being used properly after some time had passed.

The law also defined carefully how a chain of command would work, with the President as commander in chief.  It also limited militia service to a maximum of three months in a year.

Because the most controversial matters regarding conscientious objections were avoided in the final bill, both militia acts passed Congress pretty convincingly.  President Washington signed them into law.

Tariff Act

I covered the Militia Act first because it led directly from our last episode’s events regarding the war with the Indians in the Ohio territory.  But Congress was actively engaged in a number of other important laws at the same time.  It passed the tariff Act in March, about two months before the Militia Act.

Congress had already begun authorizing tariffs in 1789. It was one of the first things that Congress did since it needed to start collecting money. The 1792 Act took tariffs in a new direction and brought more controversy. 

The basis for the new tariffs came from Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures, released in late 1791.  Hamilton proposed increasing tariffs for the purpose of making it more expensive for consumers to import manufactured goods from abroad.  This would allow local manufacturers, primarily based in New England and the mid-Atlantic states to become more competitive.

Back during the colonial era, the colonies were not permitted to engage in manufacturing.  Britain wanted the colonies to focus on producing raw materials for British manufacturers.  The independent US saw manufacturing grow at a phenomenal rate.  Hamilton saw manufacturing as the key to making the United States into an independent world power, with less dependence on Europe.

To this end, Hamilton’s report recommended higher tariffs on imported goods.  It also recommended reducing tariffs on certain raw materials, and even subsidies for certain industries.  Many import duties were increased by about two percent.  Certain items, including cotton, hemp, and iron, had massive duties in order to encourage domestic production

This plan also had its opponents.  Merchants and shipowners, who thought they had fought a revolution to prevent officials from sticking them with tariffs to benefit certain groups over others, greatly opposed this plan.  Opponents noted that the Constitution only allowed tariffs for raising revenue, not for the influencing of manufacturing.  The distinction between regulatory and revenue tariffs had also been a hot button issue during the Revolutionary War.

Southern colonies balked at the idea of having to pay more for their imported goods in an effort to benefit moneyed interests in the north. Jefferson viewed America as an agricultural utopia, and that encouraging greater manufacturing and industry would destroy that.  Southern leaders like Madison favored free trade.  They did not want Hamilton using the government to benefit his rich supporters in northern cities.  Rather, southern farmers should be permitted to buy from whatever source they wished.  They saw Hamilton’s efforts as a form of corruption, using the government to enrich friends and the expense of everyone else.

Despite this strong opposition, the tariff act passed much along the lines that Hamilton had recommended.  President Washington signed it into law.

Coinage Act 

Congress also passed the Coinage Act in April. The Constitution required that the federal government established a mint for coining money.  Washington had badgered Congress for several years to get this done.  Finally, in 1792, Congress put it in place.  The Coinage Act established the US Mint in Philadelphia.  It authorized the creation of copper pennies and half-pennies, silver half-dimes, dimes, quarters, half-dollars and dollars, and gold pieces worth $2.50, $5, and $10.

The law went into great detail about the design and metal quality of the coins that I won’t get into here.  I will say that Madison and Jefferson objected to Hamilton’s formula because Jefferson wanted the silver dollar to be exactly one ounce.  While this was not a major public issue, the fact that Jefferson’s view beat Hamilton’s was one that greatly annoyed Hamilton.  On thing that particularly galled Hamilton, Madison, who tended to serve as Washington's ghost writer on major speeches, attempted to put his own preferred wording of the metal content issue the President’s state of the Union address on this matter to be partisan intrigue.  Hamilton later pointed this out and the President changed the wording to appear neutral on the matter.

The more public issue was the design.  Hamilton wanted George Washington to appear on the coins, much like European coins included the images of the current monarch.  Hamilton and other Federalists believed this would instill patriotism. The Republicans objected.  They did not want the President to appear as a king and instead proposed more abstract symbols of liberty to appear on all the coins.

Washington stayed far away from this debate.  Once again though, the Republicans prevailed.  The Coinage Act specified the use of abstract imagery rather than that of any actual person.

Finally, Hamilton suffered a third blow in the passage of this act.  It would seem logical that the mint would fall under the authority of the Treasury Department.  Hamilton, however, had a great deal of responsibilities on his plate at this time.  Jefferson had already held himself out as an expert on coinage, based on his tours of France’s mint.  Washington ended up giving the responsibility for regulating and managing the mint to the Secretary of State.

Because the mint was a very specific facility, it became the first building built from scratch for the federal government.  President Washington appointed Pennsylvania Treasurer David Rittenhouse to be the first director of the mint.  Supposedly, Rittenhouse hand pressed the first half-dimes a few months later.  He got his silver for these coins directly from President Washington, who donated his silverware for the experiment.  It would not be until 1793 that the first mass produced coins, pennies would be distributed to the public.

More Assumption of Debt

During the 1792 term, Hamilton also pushed for greater federal assumption of state debts from the war.  The first assumption bill, which had been part of the whole compromise to move the capital to Washington, DC, had left out many debts particularly in Massachusetts and South Carolina.  

Some opponents argued that many states were abusing the assumption to get hundreds of thousands of more dollars than they actually deserved.  To them, this was waste, fraud, and abuse.  Later the government would appoint a commission to look into the matter.  The commission found that many states, in fact, got more money than they should have. 

Hamilton was not particularly concerned about the details.  His focus was to have the nation’s entire financial system focused on the federal government, rather than the states, so that investors could get paid.

Related to all of this, Hamilton also pushed for a sinking fund to be adopted.  This was a common financial strategy used in Britain.  It ensured that certain tax revenues were dedicated to the reduction of debt and could not be used for other purposes.

Part of the act passed by Congress that year was the establishment of more sources of revenue to pay down the debt.  An important one was a tax on whiskey.

Hamilton’s main focus was on investor confidence.  He did not want US debt to be sold at a discount in the market.  During several financial crises in 1791 and 1792, Hamilton had the Bank of the United States and the Bank of New York buy up securities to ensure they remained near par value.  His goal was investor confidence so that foreign investors would invest in lower interest loans.  

Opponents, however, saw it as a strategy to enrich Hamilton’s favored investor class, giving them healthy returns with no real risk.  Once again, Hamilton got congress to pass the laws, but opponents like Madison continued to grow angrier.  They saw the abuse and speculation among eastern investors that ended up harming many working people.

Apportionment Act

One of the biggest debates that year was over apportionment.  Following the 1790 Census, Congress had to reapportion seats in the House of Representatives.  Members of Congress had to determine how many representatives each state would get. 

The Constitution required no more than one representative for every 30,000 people, except that every state would have at least one representative.  You’d think this would be a simple math problem.  But there was more than one way to do the math and certain states got advantages depending on what model was used. 

Congress, using a formula that Hamilton had recommended, took the total population of the US (counting slaves as three-fifths of a person) and divided it by 30,000.  This gave them a House of 120 representatives.  Of course, some states had a fraction of a representative, so the states with the largest fraction got an extra representative.

As it turned out, most of those fractional bonus representatives went to northern states that were more heavily federalist.  As a result, the southern states, which also tended to be dominated by Democratic-Republicans, objected to this formula.

Since the Federalists were in the majority, Congress passed the law using their formula and sent it to President Washington.  The President found himself in a bind.  He did not like controversial partisan decisions.  Signing the bill would anger many southerners, particularly Virginians.  Vetoing the bill might make him look provincial and supporting the position of his home state.

Washington asked for comments from his cabinet.  Not surprisingly, Hamilton and Knox, both northerners, said he should sign the bill.  Congress acted reasonably in this matter and the President should defer to Congress.  Jefferson and Randolph, who were both from Virginia, both argued for a veto.  They argued that the formula for apportionment should simply apply the ratio of 30,000 to 1 to each state population and give the state that number of representatives.  There should be no bonus representative for any fraction that was higher based on the total national population.

In the end, Washington decided to veto the bill.  He stuck to a more basic constitutional arguments.  The Constitution said there should be no more than one representative for every 30,000 people.  Under the Federalists’ formula, some states had more than that.  One state had a representative for every 28,000 people, for example.

Washington vetoed the bill on April 5, 1792.  He sent it back with two objections.  The President noted that the Constitution required that representatives be apportioned based on the population of each state, not the national population.  It also required no more than one representative for every 30,000 voters and that this bill violated that in some states.

After Congress failed to override the veto, it ended up using the other formula, and changing the distribution to one representative for every 33,000 people.  In other words, the formula that the Democratic-Republicans like Jefferson and Madison wanted prevailed.  This reduced the size of Congress from 120 members to 105 members, still much larger than the first congress, but not as large as some had hoped.

In the end, no state got more votes since Congress was 15 members smaller.  The changed formula only affected two states. Delaware lost one representative and Virginia gained one using the Jefferson formula rather than the Hamilton formula.

Next week, the American flag gets a 15th star and a 15th stripe as Kentucky joins the Union.

 - -

Next Episode 378 Kentucky Joins the Union (coming soon)

Previous Episode 376 Battle of the Wabash

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Further Reading

Websites

Militia Act of 1792 https://www.mountvernon.org/education/primary-source-collections/primary-source-collections/article/militia-act-of-1792

The First Congressional Investigation: St. Clair's Military Disaster of 1791: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA517709.pdf

Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures Dec. 5, 1791: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-10-02-0001-0007

Coinage Act of April 2, 1792 https://www.usmint.gov/learn/history/historical-documents/coinage-act-of-april-2-1792

The 1790 Census and the First Veto: https://prologue.blogs.archives.gov/2022/04/04/the-1790-census-and-the-first-veto

Balinski, M. L., and H. P. Young. “The Jefferson Method of Apportionment.” SIAM Review, vol. 20, no. 2, 1978, pp. 278–84. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2029901.

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Brant, Irving James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1950 (borrow only). 

Maas, John Defending a New Nation, 1783-1811, Center of Military History, 2013. 

Malone, Dumas Jefferson and the Rights of Man, Little Brown and Co. 1951.  (borrow only)

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton: Portrait in Paradox, Harper & Brothers, 1959. 

Preston, John H. A Gentleman Rebel: Mad Anthony Wayne, Garden City Publishing Co., 1930. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chernow, Ron Washington, A Life, Penguin Press, 2010. 

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. The Cabinet: George Washington and the Creation of an American Institution, Belknap Press, 2020. 

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Ellis, Joseph J. His Excellency. George Washington, Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. 

Ellis, Joseph J. Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation, Knopf, 2000.

Ferling, John Jefferson and Hamilton: The Rivalry That Forged a Nation Hardcover, Bloomsbury Press, 2013. 

Heidler, David S. & Jeanne T. Washington's Circle: The Creation of the President, Random House, 2015. 

Hunger, Harlow Giles Mr. President: George Washington and the Making of the Nation's Highest Office, De Capo Press, 2013. 

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012.

Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton and the Growth of the New Nation (or Portrait in Paradox), Harper & Brothers, 1959 (Borrow on archive.org

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

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Sunday, February 1, 2026

AR-SP46 Carl Borick The Revolution in South Carolina

Carl Borick, Director of the University of Charleston Museum in South Carolina joined us for a discussion of South Carolina's role in the Revolutionary War.

We covered the British attack on Fort Sullivan in 1776, Charleston's stand of in 1779, the British Siege of Charleston in 1780, and the events following the Siege.  

The Charleston Museum has a special exhibit called Ringleaders of Rebellion: Charleston in Revolt, 1775-1783.  You can get more details here: https://www.charlestonmuseum.org/exhibits/upcoming/68/ringleaders-of-rebellion

Mr. Borick also has thee books about the War: 


To see upcoming roundtable events, or listen to past recordings, go to AmRevRT.org

To participate live in future Zoom events, be sure to join as a member on Patreon, or sign up for my mailing list,


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Sunday, January 25, 2026

ARP376 Battle of Wabash

In late 1791, the US Army faced its first real challenge in battle.  The stakes were whether the Ohio  Territory would become part of the United States, or remain Indian territory.

Ohio in 1790

The Ohio territory was seen as the future of the United States.  Congress was counting on land sales there to help finance the federal government, and to begin paying off war debts.  The Northwest Ordinance had divided up the land and outlined how it would be auctioned and sold to settlers moving into the territory.  Virginia had already begun settling veterans on land north of the Ohio River.  The Ohio Company had established Marietta in 1788 and began selling land and settling the territory.

Arthur St. Clair had been appointed as Governor of the Northwest Territory.  To the extent the US had any army at all, almost all of it was located in Marietta with the purpose of making sure settlement proceeded as planned and for purposes of Indian pacification.  As I mentioned back in Episode 359, Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar remained in command of the US Army.

Battle of Wabash

Back in Episode 336, we covered how the US had entered into a series of treaties in 1785 giving it the legal possession of most of the Ohio Territory.  Many of the Indians who lived there, however, did not recognize the validity of those treaties, and were determined to keep the Americans from settling on their side of the Ohio River.

One of the leaders of this resistance was the Miami war chief MihÅ¡ihkinaahkwa, also known as Little Turtle.  We first discussed Little Turtle back in Episode 271, when he intercepted a force of French soldiers that were trying to advance through his territory toward Detroit in 1780.

His warriors massacred the soldiers, prisoners were tortured, mutilated, and burned alive, with a a few released so they could tell the story.  The purpose of this treat was a warning to stay out of Miami territory.  Little Turtle received some British support in his efforts to keep the Americans out of his territory.

With the arrival of US settlements at the end of the War, Little Turtle joined the Northwestern Confederacy, an alliance with other tribes including the Shawnee and Delaware, as well as the Iroquois under Joseph Brant.

Native warriors regularly conducted raids on settlements, killing settlers, burning their farms, and often kidnapping their children.  They did not restrict their raids to the Ohio territory.  Many raids crossed into Virginia and Pennsylvania.

Harmar Expedition

Harmar, by this time a general by brevet, and his officers regularly met with tribal leaders in hopes of establishing diplomatic understandings or trade agreements.  The army did not report engaging in any attacks on Indians.  In fact, Harmar had orders from the Secretary of War not to engage in any offensive operations.  The US wanted to avoid provoking a war.

Josiah Harmar
Frontier communities were largely responsible for their own protection.  They formed militias which were not afraid to engage with native tribes when they thought it was necessary.  But the growing presence of more and more settlers on what the Indians still regarded as their lands led to increased Indian attacks.  Territorial governor Arthur St. Clair reported that the Indians had killed, wounded or captured over 1500 men women and children since the end of the Revolutionary War.  St. Clair warned that if the government failed to act, the settlers would take increasingly aggressive actions on their own.  The Indians were also getting supplies and support from the British outpost still occupying Detroit.

US Officials determined that some of the most aggressive raids were coming from the Miami and neighboring tribes along the Wabash River, which mostly runs through what is today the State of Indiana.

Officials in Philadelphia, including President Washington and Secretary of War Henry Knox, concluded that the army needed to engage in a sudden stroke with a large force to “chastize” the hostile tribes for their continued attacks.  This expedition would be similar to the Sullivan Expedition in New York during the Revolutionary War.  The army would march in force, burning crops and villages. Their ultimate target would be the confluence of the St. Mary's and St. Joseph Rivers, called Kekionga, near modern day Fort Wayne, and where a concentration of Native warriors were gathering.

The US Army, however, did not have nearly enough soldiers for such a mission.  Although Congress had recently authorized recruitment of nearly 1300 officers and men, the current US Army was probably closer to 500.  Many of these were spread out across outposts that could not simply be abandoned.  General Harmar was able to assemble about 320 officers and men for his expeditionary force.  He augmented this force by calling out the militia in Kentucky and western Pennsylvania.

Harmar Campaign
This raised over 1100 men, bringing the total to nearly 1500.  Harmar complained about the condition of the militia.  Many of those who turned out were hired substitutes.  Many were boys or old men.  The majority had not come with guns.  

The main army assembled primarily at Fort Washington, modern day Cincinnati, and marched into Indian territory in September.  A second smaller group of several hundred marched east from Vincennes.

Much of this area was wilderness, requiring the army to cut its own roads.  Progress was slow, often only a few miles per day.  Cold weather, disease, and insufficient rations soon began to take its toll.  Many militiamen, including at times entire units, tried to desert.

The force that marched east from Vincennes, never made it to their goal.  The group consisted of only about 50 regulars and over 250 militia.  Given the hardships of the march and a lack of food, the militia mutinied and abandoned the mission.  They ended up burning one small village and returning to Vincennes.

This second force from Vincennes, however, had been providing a distraction for the Indians, making it difficult for them to concentrate on Harmar’s main force.  As Harmar’s army advanced through the wilderness, they encountered little resistance.  Natives were well aware of the approaching army and fled their homes.  As a result, Harmar divided his forces so they could cover more ground, burning more villages and crops.

Battle of Kekionga

By October 17, the army reached Kekionga.  Harmar deployed Colonel John Hardin with about 300 men, mostly Kentucky militia, to take out a village several miles away, the home of Little Turtle.  Instead, they walked into an ambush set by Little Turtle.  The surprised militia panicked and ran away.  Many threw down their arms and fled without firing a shot.

Little Turtle
The result was a slaughter, about 100 men were killed, about one-third of the total force.  The US army commander with the force, Captain Armstrong reported hiding in a swamp that night, listening to the Indians celebrating their victory over the corpses of their vanquished.

Back at the main camp, Warriors began harassing the soldiers.  The Indians, who probably numbered over 1000, and could probably have taken the force, did not attack directly.

The army burned the village and destroyed an estimated 300 homes and 20,000 bushels of corn.  Unable to get the Indians into a decisive battle, the army began to withdraw.

A couple of days later, Colonel Hardin took another 400 men and returned to the village, hoping to catch the Indians by surprise and exact some revenge for the ambush he suffered earlier.  Little Turtle set up another ambush and attacked. This force of mostly regulars suffered about 80 killed.  The battle was a fierce one with a number of Indians killed as well, although exact numbers are unknown.  The brigade withdrew and the Indians did not pursue.

On November 3, Harmar’s army returned to Fort Washington, having lost a total of 183 men.  Harmar reported that the mission was a success.  They had burned a number of towns and set up a string of outposts in Indian territory.  As for the casualties, Harmar blamed the militia, referring to their "ignorance, imbecility, insubordination and want of equipment"

Despite the rosy picture Harmar tried to paint, the consensus was that the mission was a failure. A court of inquiry cleared Harmar of any wrongdoing, and blamed the militia for the shortcomings of the campaign.  Despite being cleared, public opinion, including civilian leadership, were highly critical.  Many feared that the inconclusive attack would serve as a provocation and result in more attacks on settlements. 

This fear proved correct.  Native raids on towns in Ohio picked up over the winter and into the spring of 1791. Many Americans believed that the army had abandoned the region.  This resulted in more squatters moving into the territory as well.  Government officials needed to act decisively or the plans for the Northwest Territory would fail.

A New Army

Washington removed Harmar from command, reactivated the territorial Governor, Arthur St. Clair as a major general, and put him in command of the Army.  St. Clair, of course, had been a  major general during most of the Revolutionary War.  While returning to active service, St. Clair retained his position as territorial governor.  Washington also appointed an experienced second in command. Richard Butler had served as a colonel during the war, operating as a regimental commander in the Saratoga Campaign, later he transferred to Valley Forge, fighting at Monmouth and Yorktown. Washington personally recognized his abilities and gave him a brevet to brigadier general before the Revolution had ended.

Arthur St. Clair
After the war, Butler became a large land owner in Western Pennsylvania, and also served as a state judge in Pittsburgh, as well as a member of the state’s General Assembly.  Butler returned to full service as a full brigadier.

Knox requested that Congress authorize an expansion of the army to 3000.  The final law passed by Congress in March 1791 authorized a second regiment of 912 men, 2000 short term enlistments, and to call out the militia for six months.  

Another, former Continental General, Charles Scott, also took command of a militia army from Kentucky.  Scott’s first experience fighting Indians had been in the Braddock Campaign of 1755.  After the war, Scott had moved into the Kentucky territory to take his share of veteran’s land.  Two of his adult sons were killed by Indians, one of them in Harmar’s expedition.

The goal of this overwhelming force was to impress on the Indians and others, the power of the US Army and the futility of resistance. The goal, once again, was to burn Indian villages, and focus on the target at the center of the Wabash territory, controlled primarily by the Miami Indians who had defeated Harmar. 

There was some opposition.  Thomas Jefferson feared that the action would create a permanent need for a larger standing army and would increase the national debt. In an effort to resolve the issue, Washington agreed to send an emissary, the Chief Cornplanter of the Iroquois, along with Colonel Thomas Procter who had been a Continental officer who fought in the Sullivan expedition against the Iroquois.  The goal was to convince the western tribes to accept peace or else, as Knox put it, they would “send forth such number of warriors as would drive you entirely of the country” resulting in “absolute destruction to you, your women, and your children.”

In the end, Cornplanter refused to go, and Procter needed help getting across Lake Erie, which British officials refused to allow.  There were a few other half-hearted attempts to make diplomatic overtures, but none of these had any impact.  The consensus was that they needed to display overwhelming force before the Indians would come to heel.

The initial plan had been to organize the military campaign in the spring, and for the expedition to embark in July.  St. Clair had returned to Philadelphia for consultations and left for the west a few weeks after Congress passed the law authorizing the larger army in March, 1791.  St. Clair, however, was sick with gout and found it hard to travel.  He did not reach Fort Washington until mid-May.  When he got there, he found only about 150 regulars present and fit for duty.  

St. Clair’s first action was to deploy 500 of the mounted Kentucky militia to attack and distract the Indians from his primary target.  The commander of this secondary force was former Continental Colonel James Wilkinson.  You may recall Wilkinson from the Revolution, when he was an aide to General Horatio Gates.  Wilkinson had to resign in 1778 for his role in the Conway Cabal.  He later served nearly two years as the Continental Army’s Clothier General, but resigned from that position as well, generally considered a failure.

After the War, Wilkinson moved to the Kentucky territory, where he was a leader in the effort to separate Kentucky from Virginia.  He strongly opposed the ratification of the Constitution and was much more interested in an independent State of Kentucky.  What most people did not know at the time was that after Virginia ratified the Constitution, Wilkinson traveled to meet with the Spanish Governor in New Orleans.  His aim was to make a deal that would make Kentucky part of the Spanish Empire, and for this service he would receive a grant of 60,000 acres.  While Spain was not fully ready to put such an ambitious plan into effect, they did begin providing funds to Wilkinson for him to act as a Spanish agent.

For now though, Wilkinson’s interest aligned with the United States.  He wanted to stop the Indian raids on Kentucky.  Wilkinson and the Kentucky militia rode out in May toward the Wabash Valley.  At first he marched north toward Kekionga, but that was a feint.  He then rode his army west attacking villages further south along the Wabash River.

His attack on one village surprised the residence.  His soldiers managed to kill six men, two women, and one child.  He also captured 38 prisoners among those captured was Little Turtles daughter and grandchild.  He continued his rampage on a series of towns through August, burning homes and destroying crops.  After deciding his work was done, Wilkinson and his militia returned to their homes in Kentucky.

St. Clair's Camp Nov 4, 1791
Wilkinson’s raids were supposed to be a distraction while St. Clair’s main force made its attack. But the main army waited at Fort Washington.  It was not until September that General Butler arrived with the additional regulars.  The army set out in September, again moving slow as they cut their way through the wilderness.  To speed up the process Butler abandoned St. Clair’s orders to cut two parallel lines for the army, and instead focused on just one.  When St. Clair rejoined the army a few days later, he reprimanded Butler for violating orders. The result was a rift between the first and second in command of the army. The two men refused to speak to one another for the remainder of the campaign.

By October 12, the army reached Fort Jefferson, one of the outposts established by the Harmar Expedition.  This was less than half the distance of their 150 mile march to Kekionga.  By that time, frost was killing the forage and a lack of supplies was causing food shortages for the army.  St. Clair’s gout got so bad he could no longer ride a horse.  He continued in a litter carried between two horses.  After 60 of the Kentucky militia still with the main force deserted, St. Clair had to send about 300 soldiers to go after them.  St. Clair feared the deserters might capture the food supply wagons that they so desperately needed.

St. Clair had left Fort Washington with over 2400 men.  By the end of October, he had only less than 2000. After deploying a regiment to go after the deserters, he had at most 1700 men in the main body, although some estimates say this was as few as 1400.  There were also several hundred camp followers, women and children who were related to the soldiers.

The Battle

On November 3, the army reached the Wabash River and established a camp.  They had seen no organized enemy and did not bother to set up any real defenses.  

There was, however, a large force of Indians in the region.  The Wilkinson Expedition a few months earlier had motivated the tribes to form an army of their own.  Led by Little Turtle and the Shawnee Chief Blue Jacket, the Indian army consisted of between 1100 and 1400 warriors.

At around dawn the following morning, the Indians attacked the camp.  The surprise attack was devastating.  Most of the militia fled immediately.  Reports say that many of them simply dropped their guns and ran without firing a shot.

Richard Butler
Those who remained, including most of the regulars, were surrounded.  The Indian warriors overran the American artillery and killed the soldiers manning those guns.  The infantry fought mostly in hand to hand combat with bayonets.  St. Clair led a bayonet charge and had two horses shot out from under him during the battle. Although he had several bullet holes in his uniform, he managed to survive unscathed.  General Butler was shot twice.  He retired to his tent, where he died.

Some of the female camp followers took up arms and fought with the army.  Some of these women were killed in battle as well.  

The battle raged for about four hours.  Eventually, St. Clair ordered a breakout charge, leaving behind the wounded and their supplies.  Those who survived the charge and escaped returned to Fort Jefferson.  Any wounded left behind were killed and scalped.  The Indians did not pursue the retreating column for very long.  The Indians realized they were missing out on the spoils left in camp and returned to claim their share.

Aftermath

Although records differ, there were probably somewhere between 600 and 800 soldiers killed, and another 300 wounded.  As I said, those wounded who did not escape were killed.  So the wounded who did escape were able to run or ride a horse. US Army casualties were about two-thirds those involved in the battle.  Total losses cut the entire size of the US Army in half.

The Indians captured six cannons, 1200 muskets and ammunition, hundreds of horses, and wagons full of other supplies.  Indian casualties seem to have been rather light.  Little Turtle reported 21 killed and 40 wounded.

The American battlefield deaths were worse than any American battle during the Revolutionary war.  Many of the wounded were brought back to Fort Jefferson where they received inadequate medical care.  Most of them died there.

The entire campaign was an utter defeat.

Next week: we will look at the government’s response to this defeat, including some legislation that is still part of the government today.

- - -

Next Episode 377 Washington's First Veto

Previous Episode 375 Ratifying the Bill of Rights 

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

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Further Reading

Websites

Battle of Kekionga: https://archfw.org/heritage-trail/kekionga/the-battle-of-kekionga

A Narrative of Harmar’s Defeat: October 22nd, 1790 https://fortwaynehistory.com/2021/12/a-narrative-of-harmars-defeat-october-22nd-1790

Warner, Michael S. “General Josiah Harmar’s Campaign Reconsidered: How the Americans Lost the Battle of Kekionga.” Indiana Magazine of History, vol. 83, no. 1, 1987, pp. 43–64. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27791042.

St. Clair's Campaign of 1791: A Defeat in the Wilderness That Helped Forge Today's U.S. Army: https://www.army.mil/article/65594/st_clairs_campaign_of_1791_a_defeat_in_the_wilderness_that_helped_forge_todays_u_s_army

Eid, Leroy V. “American Indian Military Leadership: St. Clair’s 1791 Defeat.” The Journal of Military History, vol. 57, no. 1, 1993, pp. 71–88. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2944223

Nelson, Paul David. “General Charles Scott, the Kentucky Mounted Volunteers, and the Northwest Indian Wars, 1784-1794.” Journal of the Early Republic, vol. 6, no. 3, 1986, pp. 219–51. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/3122915.

Lt. Col. Josiah Harmar: https://pasocietyofthecincinnati.org/gallery_post/lt-col-josiah-harmar

General Richard Butler: https://www.butlerhistory.com/richardbutler

The Battle of the Wabash: The Forgotten Disaster of the Indian Wars https://armyhistory.org/the-battle-of-the-wabash-the-forgotten-disaster-of-the-indian-wars

Fort statue honors Indian war survivor: https://dailystandard.com/archive/2009-04-17/stories/8528/fort-statue-honors-indian-war-survivor

Congress’ First Investigation, St. Clair’s defeat: https://sitemap.carllevincenter.org/congress-first-investigation-general-st-clairs-defeat

The First Congressional Investigation: St. Clair's Military Disaster of 1791: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA517709.pdf

VIDEO: St. Clair’s Defeat: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hDoLu_97IoE

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

General Harmar’s Campaign, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1954. 

Little Turtle, Chief of the Miami, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1954. 

Scott’s Wabash Expedition, 1791, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1953 (borrow only). 

St. Clair’s Defeat, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1954. 

Jarrold, Rachel Marian Arthur St. Clair: Governor of the Northwest Territory 1787-1802, Univ. of Illinois [Master’s thesis], 1909. 

Matthaidess III, Maj. Edwin D. “Our Loss Was Heavy”: Brigadier General Josiah Harmar’s Kekionga Campaign of 1790. Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015 (from Defence Technical Information Center).  

Potterf, Rex M. Little Turtle : 1752-1812, Allen County-Fort Wayne Historical Society, 1960. 

Smith, William Henry The St. Clair PapersVol. 1 & Vol. 2, Cincinnati: Clarke, 1882. 

Young, Calvin M. Little Turtle (Me-she-kin-no-quah): The Great Chief of the Miami Indian Nation, Public Library of Fort Wayne and Allen County, 1917 (1956 reprint). 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Calloway, Colin G. The Victory with No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First American Army, Oxford Univ. Press, 2014. 

Carter, Harvey L. The Life and Times of Little Turtle: First Sagamore of the Wabash, Univ. of Ill. Press, 1986. 

Gaff, Alan D. Field of Corpses: Arthur St. Clair and the Death of an American Army, Knox Press, 2025. 

Locke, Steven P. War Along the Wabash: The Ohio Indian Confederacy's Destruction of the US Army, 1792, Casemate, 2023. 

Schoenfield, Rick M. The Soldiers Fell Like Autumn Leaves: The Battle of the Wabash, Westholme Publishing, 2024. 

Winkler, John F. Wabash 1791: St Clair’s Defeat, Osprey Publishing, 2011.  

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, January 18, 2026

ARP375 Ratifying the Bill of Rights

We last left the Bill of Rights back in Episode 362 when Congress approved twelve amendments to the Constitution and sent them off to the states for ratification.  Most of the amendments were pretty uncontroversial.  They simply restated the rights for which Americans had fought the Revolutionary War and which most states had already adopted in one form or another at the state level.

Federalists, like James Madison, had never really objected to a bill of rights.  They mostly saw it as unnecessary since the federal government was one of limited enumerated powers, and the federal government was not given the power to violate any of those rights.  When state debates over ratification of the original Constitution raised the issue of a lack of a bill of rights, federalists like Madison did not want to delay ratification over the issue, but promised to add a bill of rights as soon as the new government was established.  True to his word, Madison drafted and put through the amendments in the first few months of the first Congress in 1789.  

Concerns over Amendments

The next step was to have three-quarters of the states ratify those amendments.  At the time, there were eleven states, so nine of them would have to approve the amendments.  Congress had approved the proposed amendments just before it left for the end of its first session at the end of September, 1789. President Washington transmitted the proposed amendments to the states on October 2.

Patrick Henry
In addition to the ten amendments that we know today as the Bill of Rights, there were a total of twelve proposed amendments.  What we call the First Amendment today, regarding freedom of speech and religion, was actually the third amendment.

The first proposed amendment decreed that the House of Representatives would have one representative for every 30,000 people.  As the population of the US increased, the Congress would set the size of the House so that it contained at least 200 members but no more than one representative for every 50,000 people.  This amendment addressed the concern that had come up at some ratification conventions, that Congress had too much authority to set the size of the House of Representatives to whatever it wanted.

The second proposed amendment ordered that Congress could not alter the compensation of members of the House or Senate until an election had intervened.  This addressed the fear that elected officials could get into office, give themselves massive raises, and collect that money before the voters could get rid of them.  Under this amendment, Congress would have to propose a raise, then wait for an election before that raise would take effect.

When the state began considering the amendments, the first two hit some opposition.  The first amendment, which I’m going to call the apportionment amendment, had been added to assure anti-federalist skeptics that voters could have a pretty close relationship with their representative because representation would be to a relatively small group.  If a representative had only 30,000 constituents, and the average household was about six people, that meant there were only about 5000 heads of households per representative.

Opponents argued that the amendment would make the House too large.  The House of Representatives had opened with only 59 representatives.  The idea of a House with more than 200 members would make deliberation impossible.  It would simply be a large mass of people who assembled for votes but who could not work to develop good legislation.  Others argued that a large House would allow men of inferior abilities to win office.  Rather than appealing to a larger body of voters, they would just have to convince a few friends and neighbors to get elected.  Smaller states knew that their guaranteed one seat in the House would see its voting power diluted as larger states got more representatives.  There was also the concern over cost.  Having a larger Congress meant more tax dollars to pay all of those representatives.

The second proposed amendment, which required an election before a change in Congressional pay could take effect, also had its opposition.  The main argument against what I’m going to call the pay amendment, was that the amendment would make Congressional pay more of a political issue.  It would mean that many members of Congress would want to keep pay much lower in order to ingratiate themselves with the voters.  This would mean that only men of independent wealth would be able to afford to serve in Congress and would result in the interests of poorer working people being diminished.  Opponents argued that voters already had the ability to let their views be known about congressional pay without drawing it out as a higher profile issue.

There were also concerns about the other amendments.  The protections of free speech might encourage licentiousness.  The restriction on cruel and unusual punishments also took some criticism from those who thought criminals deserved what they got, and that this restriction might prevent that.  

But the free speech provision, along with the other rights, had largely come from the English Bill of Rights and were well established in British common law.  The main one that was not, was the Establishment clause, preventing the federal government from establishing a state religion.  But that only applied to the federal governments.  States were still free to establish whatever religions they wanted.  

States Consider Ratification

Washington sent copies of the proposed amendments to the states in October, 1789.  Less than two months later, on November 20th, the first state voted on them.  The New Jersey Assembly took up the proposal and with relatively little debate voted to ratify eleven of the twelve amendments.  The state rejected only the pay amendment. A month after that, Maryland took up consideration and ratified all twelve amendments.

North Carolina had refused to ratify the original constitution, in part because it lacked a bill of rights.  When the second North Carolina Convention ratified the Constitution in November, the ink was barely dry on that work before the North Carolina legislature considered and ratified all twelve amendments in December.  It became the third state to ratify the Bill of Rights, even before the US Congress had officially received word that the state had ratified the Constitution and joined the union.  South Carolina followed suit a few weeks later, also ratifying all twelve amendments.

Also in January, New Hampshire signed on, approving all the amendments except for the pay amendment.  Delaware approved all accept the apportionment amendment.  Delaware, of course, was a small state and had only one representative and was unlikely to get another under any measure, so this amendment only gave more power to other states.  

So, within three months of the proposal, six states had voted on the amendments and had either voted to adopt at least eleven of them.  But as we saw with the Constitution, the earliest states were the easiest.

New York continued the process, approving eleven amendments and rejecting the pay amendment in February.  Pennsylvania took up the amendment in March.  They were the first to approve only ten amendments.  They rejected both the apportionment and the pay amendment.

So, by then, the states were just one more state away from ratifying at least ten of the amendments.  In May of 1790, Rhode Island finally joined the union and ratified eleven of the amendments, rejecting the pay amendment.  But Rhode Island’s entry into the Union also brought the total number of states to thirteen, meaning that ten states would have to ratify rather than only nine to get the necessary three-fourths vote required.  That was it.  For another year and a half, no other states took up the ratification.

In November, 1791, Vermont joined the Union and ratified both the Constitution and all twelve amendments.  But Vermont’s entry brought the total number of states to fourteen, meaning the required three-fourths rose to eleven states.

Virginia Ratification

One important holdout was Virginia.  As I said, Madison had never really thought that a bill of rights was important as he deemed it unnecessary.  But to make his constituents happy, he had drafted them and pushed through Congress. Two years after the fact though, Virginia still refused to vote on them.

Virginia had been reluctant to ratify the Constitution at all because it lacked a bill of rights.  George Mason had refused to sign on at the Constitutional Convention based on that lack of a bill of rights.  Now state leaders were refusing to approve the bill of rights that they had been demanding.

The reason for the reluctance was that many anti-federalist leaders thought that the amendments did not go far enough.  They called it a “tub to the whale.”  That is a 19th century saying that probably needs an explanation.  Obviously a tub of water does little for a whale.  By providing a tub to the whale, opponents thought that the proposed amendments were offering a phony and insufficient solution to the very real problem of a dangerously powerful federal government.

Patrick Henry remained an outspoken foe of the new government and had still not given up his dream of holding a second constitutional convention to rewrite some major flaws that he sawn in the first one.  Henry believed that if the people ratified the Bill of Rights, it would quash all the political energy toward demanding that second convention.

To people like Henry, the Bill of Rights as proposed was simply a restatement of pretty non-controversial personal liberties.  It completely ignored Virginia’s concerns that the federal government had too much power of taxation and the regulation of commerce.  These had to be addressed now, or the moment would pass.

The Virginia House of Delegates took up the debate over the Bill of Rights only weeks after receiving them in 1789.  Henry, by this time no longer governor but still a member of the legislature, spoke against ratification.  

It soon became clear that Virginia’s House was willing to ratify the amendments, but the state Senate was not.  Senators not only objected to the apportionment and pay amendments, but also to what we today call the First, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.  Their issue was that the wording of these amendments was not as nearly as strong as the proposals they had sent to Congress along with their ratification of the original Constitution.  They wanted the language to be stronger.  

The problem, of course, was that a ratifying vote was simply an up or down vote.  They had no authority to reword the proposals.  In the midst of this debate, Henry simply left Richmond and went home.  He did not announce his reasons, but it was generally believed that he had become frustrated that the legislature was unwilling to fight for stronger language.  

After Henry left Richmond and went home, the legislature voted on a motion to demand that Congress propose new amendments that used the stronger language that Virginia had used in the proposals it had sent from the Constitutional ratifying convention.  The vote on this motion was a tie.  The Speaker voted against it, thus causing the motion to fail.  Henry’s presence would have allowed it to pass.

Even so, the legislature also failed to ratify the amendments.  Opponents were successful in getting the legislature to defer the matter to their next session.  When the next session came, the legislature did not take up the matter again, but rather dealt with other matters.  Finally, in the fall of 1791, the Virginia legislature took up the debate again.

By this time it was clear that there was not going to be a second constitutional convention and that the US Congress was not going to reconsider the wording of its amendments.  The choice was to have this bill of rights, or none at all.

Having accepted that fact, the Virginia House of Delegates approved all twelve amendments, nearly unanimously on December 5, 1791.  Ten days later, the Senate also ratified all the amendments. This gave the federal government the eleven state ratifications it needed to put into effect the ten amendments that we know as the Bill of Rights.

Other States

Even with the announcement of the ratification of the ten amendments, there were still three states that had not acted.  The pay amendment, which had fallen five votes short so far, seemed pretty much dead.  The apportionment amendment, which was only two votes away from success, still had a chance of ratification.

Connecticut had considered the amendments in late 1789 shortly after they received the proposals from Congress.  The Connecticut House approved eleven of the twelve amendments, rejecting only the pay amendment.  The Governor and Senate, supported all twelve.  Because the two bodies did not agree, and refused to compromise, the Senate voted to delay action until the following spring.  

The legislators took up the question again in May 1790, the house only voted to approve ten amendments while the Senate still wanted all twelve.  Once again, they agreed to postpone a final decision until 1791.  After Virginia ratified the amendments, making the ten part of the Constitution, Connecticut gave up all further consideration and never bothered to make a final determination.

Georgia had been one of the states that demanded a bill of rights when it ratified the original Constitution.  But when it came to ratify a bill of rights, Georgia did not act.  During the debate in Congress, Georgia Congressman James Jackson argued that the amendments were unnecessary since the constitution had limited enumerated powers and those powers already denied the federal government any authority to infringe on individual rights.  He thought the proposed amendments as a mere restatement of rights would not lead to any actual security. These views seem to be shared by the Georgia legislature, which never took up debate on the amendments.

Massachusetts debated the amendments, but also never came to a final conclusion.  In early 1790 when the state legislature came into session, Governor John Hancock encouraged the legislature to ratify the amendments.  A month later, the state senate agreed to approve ten of the amendments, rejecting the apportionment and pay amendments.  The house also rejected the apportionment and pay amendments. 

This rejection of the apportionment amendment is particularly surprising since Massachusetts had demanded that such an amendment be added when it ratified the original constitution.  Two years later, the legislature rejected the idea.

The two bodies were not in agreement though, because the House also raised concerns about the twelfth proposed amendment, what eventually became the tenth amendment.  This is the one that explicitly reserves unenumerated powers to the states or to the people.  Several members raised concerns about the wording, so the House only approved nine amendments, while the Senate approved ten.

Because of this dispute, even though both houses agreed to nine of the amendments, they did not pass a formal bill and notify the federal government of their ratification.  As a result of not completing the process, Massachusetts support for the bill of rights was never finalized.  When Jefferson announced ratification of the ten amendments, Massachusetts legislators dropped the matter completely.  They considered further debate was irrelevant.

Implementation

At the end of December, 1791,  President Washington received word that Virginia had become the eleventh state to vote in favor of ratification.  That meant that three-fourths of the states had ratified ten of the twelve amendments.  They were now part of the Constitution.

A few months later, Secretary of State Jefferson sent announcements to the governors, burying the announcement in a list of other matters.

I have the honor to send you herein enclosed, two copies duly authenticated, of an Act concerning certain fisheries of the United States, and for the regulation and government of the fishermen employed therein; also of an Act to establish the post office and post roads within the United States; also the ratifications by three fourths of the Legislatures of the Several States, of certain articles in addition and amendment of the Constitution of the United States, proposed by Congress to the said Legislatures.

Jefferson’s announcement, almost in passing along with other legislation, gives an indication about how much of a non-event ratification was considered at the time.  Supporters of the bill of rights mostly thought of them as an irrelevant restatement of obvious rights.  Opponents generally agreed with that, but wanted stronger protections that would actually mean something.  Most leaders considered the whole effort as a sop to voters that basically said, yes, we support individual rights and here is a list of some which we like. The actual defense of these liberties would still require that the people and their representatives live up to them.

Next week, the new US army faces its first significant battle, which takes place in Ohio.

- - -

Next Episode 376 Battle of Wabash

Previous Episode 374 Haitian Revolution Begins

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

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Further Reading

Websites

The Bill of Rights: A Transcription https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript

The Original 12 Amendments? https://archivesfoundation.org/newsletter/10-bor-facts

James Madison's Failed Amendments https://teachinghistory.org/history-content/ask-a-historian/21861

What about the Two Amendments and Three States that Got Away? https://teachingamericanhistory.org/resource/themes/amendments-and-states-that-got-away

When Connecticut Ratified the Bill of Rights in 1939 https://yankeeinstitute.org/2025/03/07/when-connecticut-ratified-the-bill-of-rights-in-1939


Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Brant, Irving James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1950 (borrow only). 

Conley, Patrick T. and John Kaminski (eds) The Bill of Rights and the States, Madison, WI: Madison House Publishers, 1992 (borrow only).

Deegan, Paul J. The fights over rights: ratification, the Bill of Rights, Abdo & Daughters, 1987 (borrow only).  

Dudley, William The Bill of Rights: Opposing Viewpoints, San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1994 (borrow only). 

Rutland, Robert The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776-1791, Northeastern Univ. Press, 1955 (borrow only). 

Schwartz, Bernard Roots of the Bill of Rights, Vol. 5. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971 (borrow only). 

Schwartz, Bernard The Great Rights of Mankind: A History of the American Bill of Rights, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977 (borrow only) 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

The Bill of Rights: With Writings that Formed its Foundation, Applewood Books, 2008. 

Congress Creates the Bill of Rights: The Complete Proceedings, The National Archives, 2023. 

Bordewich, Fergus M. The First Congress: How James Madison, George Washington, and a Group of Extraordinary Men Invented the Government, Simon & Schuster, 2016. 

Godwin, Robert A. From Parchment to Power: How James Madison Used the Bill of Rights to Save the Constitution, AEI Press, 1997. 

Labunski, Richard James Madison and the Struggle for the Bill of Rights, Oxford Univ. Press, 2006. 

Levy, Leonard W. Origins of the Bill of Rights, Yale Univ. Press, 1999. 

Smith, Craig To Form a More Perfect Union: The Ratification of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, 1787-1791, Univ. Press of America, 1993. 

Veit, Helen E. (et. al) (eds) Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1991. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.