Sunday, February 16, 2025

ARP343 Shays' Rebellion


Last week we looked at the severe economic crisis caused by the post war economic depression.  Money shortages and the demands to repay war debts were making life difficult for almost everyone.

Massachusetts Money Problems

With the Revolutionary war at an end, Massachusetts was dealing with the problems on peace.  The economy was in a post-war depression that pitted the merchant creditors, who mostly live in or around Boston, against the debtor farmers in the western part of the state.

Fight during Shays Rebellion
Part of the economic problem was an inability to engage in much of the pre-war trade.  Merchants were able to import British goods, but could not export most of their products to Britain or its colonies.  British merchants, which had trouble collecting on old debts, insisted on cash payments, leading to a drain on what little gold and silver remained in the state.

In the western part of the state, farming was the prime economic engine.  While the farms were rather productive, no one had any money to buy any of the farm products.  Most exchanges were done through barter.  Many farmers had borrowed in order to increase production during the war.  It was part of the effort to feed the army.  With the war over and demand for crops down, prices plummeted.

Many farmers who had returned from the war had been issued paper money or certificates, which were not worth anything close to face value.  Most of them sold their paper at 10 to 15 percent of face value.

By the middle of the 1780’s a financial crisis was developing.  Eastern merchants were getting squeezed for cash by British merchants.  They were unable to sell most of their goods outside of Massachusetts.  Merchants began to put the squeeze on farmers for repayment of debts, in cash, so that the merchants could pay their debts to suppliers in London.

On top of that, state debt was about 15x the size of the debt before the war, at about £1.5 million, at a time when the states annual tax receipts were about £60,000.

John Hancock had served as governor of Massachusetts since the adoption of the state constitution in 1780.  He won reelection overwhelmingly each year.

Open Protest

Political protests, of course, were nothing new in Massachusetts. The patriot leaders had been protest leaders themselves before the war.  

Even before the war ended, western farmers began protesting economic conditions.  Minister Samuel Ely led a revolt in Hampshire county.  In 1782, shortly after Massachusetts passed the Tender Act, requiring all taxes  be paid in cash, farmers found themselves unable to pay.  Much like protesters had done during the colonial era, Ely led a mob that shut down the county courts, preventing them from seizing properties or jailing debtors.

Ely had been an itinerant preacher during the war.  He roamed around Connecticut, Massachusetts,and Vermont.  While he did not formally join the army, he served as a volunteer at the battle of Bennington.  He became an early leader of the protest movement in western Massachusetts, where he called for the overthrow of the Massachusetts Constitution.

After Ely’s mob shut down the courts, authorities arrested him and brought him to Springfield for trial.  A court fined him £50 and sentenced him to six months in jail.  About fifty local militia men formed up, marched on the jail, and forced Ely’s release.  Ely fled to the wilderness in Vermont, where he evaded capture.

Ely soon got involved in land disputes in Vermont, getting himself arrested there, charged with being a “pernicious and seditious man” who was disturbing the peace.  Vermont had its own problems, still fighting to be an independent state.  It did not want to involve itself in Massachusetts’ tax fights.  Officials banished Ely and turned him over to authorities in Massachusetts.  He ended in Castle William in Boston Harbor, where his friends could not conduct another jailbreak.  

Realizing Ely represented a political movement, politicians did not want to make him a martyr. After he requested clemency, citing the conditions of his imprisonment, the legislature voted to have him released on bond. More than 500 farmers had engaged in the illegal actions.  Only three were arrested and those were soon released.

The Ely revolt in 1782 brought attention to the plight of western farmers.  Despite this, many believed this sort of lawlessness needed to be treated as a criminal matter.  The law and order crowd would not tolerate disruption of the courts and legal process.  Even Samuel Adams, who had led mobs in the colonial era, made a distinction between the colonial protests which he led, and protests against a democratically elected government with laws made by representatives of the people, including himself.

Adams, along with former Continental General Artemas Ward, travelled to western Massachusetts in the summer of 1783 to meet with local officials.  They heard complaints about high taxes and the money shortages that threatened farmers’ property.  

The state government eventually reduced taxes by deferring the repayment of some state debt.  Governor John Hancock also pushed for the creation of more paper money, which increased the money supply, but also led to inflation.

Hancock v. Adams

As I discussed last week, the debtor farmers loved inflation since it made it easier to repay their debts.  The merchants in the east, however, objected to policies that allowed repayment of debts in depreciated currency.

Hancock had served as governor of the state since the implementation of the Constitution in 1780.  He was elected with over 90% of the vote, and re-elected each year with overwhelming numbers.  Hancock did have his detractors though.  Among them was Samuel Adams.

Hancock and Adams had worked well together before and during much of the war.  Adams had been happy to use Hancock’s money for the movement and allow Hancock to serve in high ceremonial positions.  However, when Adams expected to be elected governor in 1780, and the people chose Hancock instead, the two men became more adversarial.  Hancock wanted to be loved by all, and refused to take any controversial positions that might hurt him with the voters. By contrast, Adams wanted to take action to pay down the state war debts and to crack down on protesters like Ely who threatened the state’s law and order.

Adams and Hancock also had different visions for the state.  Adams had a rather puritanical view of society.  He believed that people should live simply and frugally.  He opposed the payment of pensions to Continental officers and the creation of the Society of the Cincinnati as these would create a privileged class within the republic  Adams blamed the economic problem, not on an unfair economic system that imposed high taxes on farms and restricted the money supply, but rather on “the habits of luxury contracted  in the late war, from the vast quantity of goods imported” as well as “receiving and giving unlimited credit.”  For Adams, reforming economic and tax policies was not the answer.  People had to “lay aside the destructive fashions and expensive superfluities of the day; be sober, temperate, and industrious.”

Despite the fact that Hancock was a rich merchant, he refused to support the political demands of the merchant class, and Adams.  The merchants wanted to pay down state debt.  Many of them held that state debt and would get paid when the state collected the money.  They also greatly opposed paper money policies that meant they would be repaid with depreciated money.  

Adams backed the merchants.  Hancock backed the farmers. Another issue that divided the men was a new social club in Boston that allowed card playing and dancing in the evening.  Adams saw this as part of the moral collapse of society, while Hancock seemed to enjoy such distractions.

James Bowdoin

One of the leading merchants that allied himself with Adams’ harsher economic policies was James Bowdoin.  Bowdoin had been a prominent official in the colonial era, even sitting on the Governor's Council before that became controversial.  He eventually got kicked off the Council for his support of the patriot cause.  Bowdoin had been named a delegate to the First Continental Congress, but declined the appointment citing the poor health of both his wife and himself.  For a time, early in the war, he served as president of the executive council of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, and later as President of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention. 

In 1780, Bowdoin ran against Hancock for governor.  He lost in a landslide.  This trouncing was repeated for several more elections. Hancock always won in a landslide with Bowdoin failing to get even 10% of the vote in any election. Hancock’s support dwindled with each election, but remained strong.  His weakest showing in 1784 still gave him over two-thirds of the popular vote.

Congress’ Requisition Act of 1785, which we discussed last week, made the fight between the merchants and farmers even more contentious.  The only way the state could meet the demands, was by greatly increasing taxes on its citizens.  Feeling the pressure, Hancock offered to resign.  By some accounts, this was a political ploy, expecting most of the establishment to beg him to stay in office.  When that did not happen, Hancock did resign, citing health problems.

Lieutenant Governor Thomas Cushing took up the role and ran in the 1786 elections.  Cushing generally supported Hancock’s positions, but lacked any real political charisma.  He had only become lieutenant governor in 1780 after Bowdoin and James Warren both rejected the position.

With Hancock off the ticket, Bowdoin made another real effort to win election as governor.  Samuel Adams backed Bowdoin.  Former Continental General Benjamin Lincoln also allowed himself to be put forward as a candidate.

Bowdoin received the most votes with about 44%.  Since no candidate received a majority, the legislature made the choice, selecting Bowdoin.

With Adams’ support, Governor Bowdoin put in place a number of policies that the eastern establishment had been demanding for years.  He raised taxes in order to pay off debt, and also increased enforcement for the collection of back taxes.  He refused to loosen the money supply to help anyone pay these taxes.

The result was that many farmers, even those with extremely productive farms, faced the possibility that their land could be seized for non-payment of taxes or other debts.  The farmers themselves faced the possibility of debtors' prison.

Taxes in 1786 were more than ten times what they were before the Revolutionary War began.  Poll taxes required everyone to pay the same amount.  So a wealthy merchant like John Hancock owed the same $1.75 that was also paid by a laborer earning 20 or 30 cents a day.  In addition, property taxes were based on acres of land, not the land’s value.  Western farmers often had large farms with land that was not particularly valuable as it was not suited for farming.  Their tax burden was a far larger portion of the value of their land than someone who owned a smaller but more valuable property in the east.

In some towns, the number of lawsuits for debt collection quadrupled during this time.  The number of men in debtor’s prison increased tenfold.  In Worcester, for example, debtors made up more than three-quarters of all prisoners.

Rebellion

The western farmers sent petitions and demanded relief to these policies.  They needed a fairer tax system and the issuance of more paper money..  After the legislature adjourned in July without taking action on these petitions, the petitioners turned into protesters.

On August 29, 1786, a group of protestors prevented the Northampton County Court from sitting.  The protesters called themselves Regulators, a reference to the Regulator movement of North Carolina, where western farmers had fought against unfair eastern tax policies in that state in the 1760s.

A week later, on September 5, similar protests shut down the courts in Worcester.  Officials attempted to call out the local militia to restore order and open the courts, but the militia failed to turn out.  Most of the militia were either sympathetic to the cause of the protesters, or were themselves protesters.

Daniel Shays

As the protesters organized themselves, many leaders, often militia officers, commanded the men and kept the protests organized.  Over time, Daniel Shays emerged as the leader of the movement. 

Shays had been born in Massachusetts to Irish immigrants.  He was a militia sergeant before the war.  His war service began on the day of Lexington and Concord.  Although he did not see combat personally that day, his company joined the siege of Boston.  He saw action at Bunker Hill and was soon commissioned a lieutenant for his actions on that day.  In 1776, joined the Continental Army and served in the New York campaign.  By 1777 he was serving as a captain in a Massachusetts regiment.  He served at Saratoga under General Benjamin Lincoln.  In 1779 he participated in the much celebrated raid on Stoney Point under Anthony Wayne.  In 1780. Shays served under the Marquis de Lafayette, and helped fend off a British landing in New Jersey.  It was around this time that Lafayette honored Shays with a sword.  Later that year Captain Shays was one of the officers assigned to guard Major John Andre after Arnold’s betrayal.  All of this is to say that Shays had a long and honorable record during the war.

Almost two weeks after Andre’s execution, Shays resigned his commission and returned home.  Like most Continental officers, Shays had not been paid during most of his service and was broke.  In 1777, he was forced to sell a farm in New Hampshire.  Shortly before his resignation, He also sold the sword that Lafayette had given him, a very controversial act among his fellow officers. 

After he returned home to Pelham, Massachusetts, in October, 1780, he was hit with a lawsuit for unpaid debts.  He was forced to sell more land to repay his debts.   

Despite his money problems, Shays was a prominent member of the community and well respected for his military service.  He sat on the local committee of safety. When the 1786 mass meeting decided to shut down the Northampton Courts, Shays accepted appointment to a committee to raise and equip a force of regulators.  His bearing and experience as an officer made him a natural leader.  By some accounts, Shays sent men to request that Ethan Allen take command of the rebellion, but Allen refused.

Although most people on both sides saw Shays as the leader, he himself rejected that title.  Shays was reluctantly drawn into the fight but did command those who joined to serve under him.  When the courts tried to resume business at the end of September, Shays led men again to keep the Northampton courts closed.

Response

This time, officials were prepared for the protests. William Shepard was also a veteran of the Continental Army.  By this time (1786) he was serving in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and as a general in the state militia.  Shepard took 300 friendly militia to the courthouse in Springfield.  When others arrived to shut down the courts, they found themselves pretty evenly matched.  While the protestors demonstrated, they did not attempt to seize the building.  Even so, the judges adjourned without hearing any cases.

After this incident, Shepard was able to recruit more militia and moved to the Springfield Armory as a defensive position.

The government in Boston condemned these attacks on law and order.  Governor Bowdoin called on the legislature to "vindicate the insulted dignity of government." Samuel Adams claimed that the British were behind these plots and were inciting treason.  Even though these tactics were very similar to those Adams had used against the British years earlier, Adams believed this case was different. Such protests, in his view, were appropriate against a colonial government appointed by outsiders.  But going against the elected government of the people was deserving of the death penalty.  Adams helped push through a new Riot Act, and a resolution to suspend habeas corpus so that authorities could more easily take on the rebellion.  

Governor Bowdoin did not have enough money to call out a full militia army.  He also could not call on the Continental Army since there no longer was one.  Even so, the government issued arrest warrants for leaders, and managed to capture a few of them in November.

In January, 1787, Governor Bowdoin suggested raising a privately financed army.  Eastern merchants who supported the effort to collect on the debts owed to them were happy to pay.  Bowdoin raised over £6,000 from 125 wealthy merchants. With the money the government raised an army of 3000 men from the eastern part of the state.

While Shays and the other leaders had organized their forces, they needed more weapons to contest the new army being brought against them.  The only source of such weapons in the area was the Springfield Armory, where Congress had stored weapons from the Revolutionary war.  As I mentioned, the pro-government militia under Shepard had already taken possession of the armory and now had a force of about 1200 men.

Three different groups of rebels agreed to attack the armory on January 25.  One of the groups later sent a note saying they could not make it.  The second leader, Eli Parsons, got the note and paused his attack.  But Shays did not get the notice and marched his column toward the armory.

Shapard first attempted to discourage the attackers by firing over their heads.  When that did not work, he ordered cannons to fire grapeshot into the advancing line.  With that, the attack collapsed and the attackers fled.  

General Benjamin Lincoln had taken command of the 3000 man militia army that was tasked with crushing the rebellion.  Shays sent a messenger to his old commander, requesting a short truce until the legislature could act on their petition.  Instead, Lincoln took his army on a night march that raided Shays’ camp on February 4, and scattered the rebels.  Some were captured, but many escaped.  Shays managed to make his way to Vermont where he remained in hiding.

Lincoln’s militia army returned home.  After that, there was one final raid in late February in Sheffield Massachusetts.  Local militia put down the raid, but at a loss of one man killed on each side, and dozens wounded.

Aftermath

With the rebellion at an end, Gov. Bowdoin remained vengeful.  He offered a reward for the capture of Shays and got the legislature to pass the Disqualification Act that prevented any of the rebels from running for office.

Despite those efforts, anger at state policies caused Bowdoin to be thrown out of office in the next state elections two months later.  John Hancock returned as governor.  He cut taxes and placed a moratorium on debts.  This seemed to calm the crisis.

Two rebel leaders, John Bly and Charles Rose, were hanged in December.  Shays remained in hiding in Vermont until he received a pardon in 1788.

Next week, we’ll return to the Continental Congress, as it attempts to solve many of the country’s economic problems with passage of the Northwest Ordinance.

- - -

Next Episode 344 Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (coming soon)

Previous Episode 342 Paper Money Riot

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Further Reading

Websites

The Requisition of 1785 and Shays’s Rebellion, 1786–1787 https://digfir-published.macmillanusa.com/tap6e/tap6e_ch8_19.html

Shays’ Rebellion: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/shays-rebellion

The Events and Impact of Shays’s Rebellion: https://csac.history.wisc.edu/document-collections/confederation-period/shays-rebellion

Griffiths, Bruce D. “Samuel Adams and John Hancock: The Relationship that Determined the Formation of America” University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Masters Thesis, 2018. https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=etd

Vaughan, Alden T. “The ‘Horrid and Unnatural Rebellion’ of Daniel Shays” American Heritage: June 1966, vol. XVII, no. 4. https://www.americanheritage.com/horrid-and-unnatural-rebellion-daniel-shays

“Shays’s Rebellion.” The American Historical Review, vol. 36, no. 4, 1931, pp. 776–78. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1838006

“Documents Relating to the Shays Rebellion, 1787.” The American Historical Review, vol. 2, no. 4, 1897, pp. 693–99. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1833986

Feer, Robert A. “Shays’s Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 3, 1969, pp. 388–410. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/363616.

Moody, Robert E. “Samuel Ely: Forerunner of Shays.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, 1932, pp. 105–34. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/359493

Parker, Rachel R. “Shays’ Rebellion: An Episode in American State-Making.” Sociological Perspectives, vol. 34, no. 1, 1991, pp. 95–113. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1389145

Pencak, William. “Samuel Adams and Shays’s Rebellion.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 1, 1989, pp. 63–74. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/366210

Pressman, Richard S. “Class Positioning and Shays’ Rebellion: Resolving the Contradictions of ‘The Contrast.’” Early American Literature, vol. 21, no. 2, 1986, pp. 87–102. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25056617

Smith, Jonathan. “The Depression of 1785 and Daniel Shays’ Rebellion.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, 1948, pp. 77–94. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1920948

Warren, Joseph Parker. “The Confederation and the Shays Rebellion.” The American Historical Review, vol. 11, no. 1, 1905, pp. 42–67. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1832364

A sermon, preached in Lenox in the county of Berkshire, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, December 6, 1787; at the execution of John Bly and Charles Rose: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=evans;cc=evans;rgn=main;view=text;idno=N16785.0001.001

Video: Daniel Bullen: Shay's Honorable Rebellion, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zIcyDT1aqik

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Holland, J. G. History of Western Massachusetts, Springfield: S. Bowles and Co. 1855. 

Noble, John A Few Notes on the Shays Rebellion, Worcester, MA: C. Hamilton, 1903. 

Rivers, George R. R. Captain Shays, a populist of 1786, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1897. 

Vaughan, Alden T. “The ‘Horrid and Unnatural Rebellion’ of Daniel Shays” American Heritage: June 1966, vol. XVII, no. 4, p. 50-53 (borrow only).

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Bullen, Daniel Daniel Shays's Honorable Rebellion: An American Story, Westholme Publishing, 2021.  

Condon, Sean Shays's Rebellion: Authority and Distress in Post-Revolutionary America, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2015. 

Richards, Leonard L. Shays's Rebellion: The American Revolution's Final Battle, Univ. of Pa. Press, 2002. 

Szatmary, David P. Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection, Univ. of Mass Press, 1980. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

 

Sunday, February 9, 2025

ARP342 Paper Money Riots


Last week we discussed the efforts by several national leaders to address the ongoing economic crisis caused by trade and commerce issues.  This week, I want to take a closer look at some of the problems that people were actually facing.

Paper Money

Money in the 18th century typically consisted of specie.  That is a precious metal such as gold or silver, or copper, which could hold its value simply based on the fact that there was a limited supply of it.  During the colonial era, Britain’s economic system encouraged the extraction of specie from the colonies back to Britain.  As a result, money shortages were a common problem.

Rhode Island Ten Shilling Note, 1786
The colonial solution to this was to issue paper money.  These were essentially notes that carried with them some promise that they could eventually be exchanged for certain other items, such as specie, or other items of value.  For example, in Virginia some notes were tied to the value of tobacco.  In many cases, the notes were never exchanged but simply traded like regular money.  Governments would often accept this paper money for payment of taxes as a way to remove it from circulation.

The obvious problem with paper money was that the holder could never be 100% certain that it could be exchanged as promised for something with real value.  These were essentially IOU notes that were only as good as the word, and the economic viability, of whoever was issuing the notes.  Notes from the Bank of England retained their value because people had faith that the bank would exchange the notes and was in no danger of bankruptcy.

Many colonies had issued notes at various times.  Problems arose when people were not confident of full repayment.  Notes would then trade at a discount.  For example, if there was a 50/50 chance of repayment, someone might accept the notes at fifty cents on the dollar.  So if you wanted to buy something for a shilling, you might have to pay for it with a two shilling note.  This was known as a discount rate.  The discount rates of notes went up and down all the time, and even might vary from vendor to vendor.  You would have to negotiate the value of your money.  

During the colonial era, this often became an issue when colonists tried to pay debts to merchants in Britain with colonial notes.  Merchants wanted to be paid in pounds sterling and did not want to have to deal with these weird colonial notes.  They brought their complaints to the government, which often restricted the ability of colonial governments to issue paper money.

During the revolutionary war, the Continental Congress, and the states, were free of any such restrictions from London.  They freely issued paper money to fund the war and other government expenses.  Since there was no guarantee that they would win the war, or that they would pay off these notes even if they did win, the notes almost immediately began trading at a deep discount, which got even worse as the governments printed even more money.  Officials sometimes tried to force merchants to accept the paper at face value, and also often accepted it at face value for payment of taxes.

These mandates often led merchants to ruin.  Let’s say you owed someone £100.  If you could go out and buy £100 worth of notes for £1 then pay off your debt with them, you came out ahead. The poor creditor who lent you  £100 worth of real money essentially lost 99% of it.  This led to the obvious result that no one wanted to lend money or credit of any kind.  Merchants who were forced to sell their goods and accept paper at face value simply stopped selling their goods.  During the war, this was treated as being unpatriotic and against the war effort, but patriotism was not a good enough reason for merchants to allow themselves to go bankrupt.

Some of the notes issued during the war operated more like war bonds.  In an effort to get people to accept them, some notes would come with a date certain when they could be exchanged for specie, and some even offered interest on the money.  Even with these though, their value depended on how much you trusted the issuer to keep its promise.

When the war ended, the army was largely paid off with paper.  Soldiers needed money right away so they often spent their paper money at deep discounts, perhaps getting only ten cents on the dollar, or even less.  The bulk of these notes ended up in the hands of speculators.  These were men who thought they had a pretty good idea of their chances of being able to redeem these notes. Some speculators were government officials themselves who would have a say in how and when these notes would get redeemed.

This situation deeply divided people in many states.  For the merchants, they had taken great risk by buying up the notes offering at least some money to people who would otherwise have nothing.  Their willingness to accept this risk meant that they should be rewarded by having the government pay off its notes to them in full as had been promised when it issued the notes.

For the farmers, many of whom had gone to war for years, receiving almost none of their promised pay and having given up years of labor on their farms when they could have been building up their own wealth, the idea that they should have to hand over everything they owned in order to pay off already wealthy merchants seemed to be the height of injustice.  Many farmers had borrowed money during the war to produce food for the army.  When the war ended and the army stopped buying food, they had trouble selling their crops, while the lenders wanted those loans paid off.

For most farmers, the solution was to have the government issue more paper money.  This would allow them to pay off their debts and taxes in depreciated currency, much like the currency they had been receiving for their labor for years.  Merchants obviously opposed this idea since they wanted to get paid with real money and stop carrying all these notes of dubious and speculative value.

Requisition Act of 1785

The post-war recession and money shortages were causing problems everywhere.  To make matters worse, Congress passed the Requisition Act of 1785.  During the war, and desperate for cash, Congress had been borrowing money wherever it could find any.  Much of it came from European governments and banks, who wanted to be paid back.  Defaulting on such loans could result in loss of trade or seizure of property. In some cases during this time period, default by a government could result in war.

While things had not reached that state yet, Congress was obligated to make payments.  Its hope to sell some western lands was still several years away.  It attempted to set up federal tariffs, but the states refused to approve this plan. The only revenue source it had was to requisition money from the states.  Congress had been trying to do this for years, with limited success.  In 1784, the state requisitions totaled about $750,000.  In 1785, this amount quadrupled to $3 million.  About 30% of the money was needed to run the government.  Another 30% was required for repayments to foreign lenders.  This portion had to be paid in specie.  The other 40% would go to repay Americans who held government bonds.  Much of these bonds were interest payments on Commutation certificates, those papers issued to officers at the end of the war in exchange for having to give up their promised pensions.

Up until this time, many states had been paying interest on commutation certificates issued by Congress directly to the certificate holders in their states, and deducting that amount from what they paid to Congress in the Requisition.  The 1785 Requisition explicitly banned this practice.

The Requisition was like throwing gasoline on an economic fire.  The economic burden divided Americans, and resulted in a variety of responses.  New Jersey responded with a “I got your requisition right here” and refused any payment.  Connecticut similarly refused payment.  Congress could not force the issue.  After all, it had no courts, no police, no army.

In other states, where influential merchants held a great deal of bonds that were due to be repaid through these taxes, support for paying the requisition was much stronger.  Funds would have to be raised through higher taxes.  This made the already almost-bankrupt farmers even madder, but the merchants who would be paid through this scheme saw it as a necessary step to repay debts.

Rhode Island Response

The case of Rhode Island is a good example of the problem.  The state debt from the war was massive.  Interest payments alone were over £10,000 per year.  By comparison, the entire government budget before the war was only about £2000.  The state had no western lands to sell and largely had to rely on taxes to repay both state debts and Congress’ requisitions.

The majority of the Rhode Island government was controlled by supporters of the merchants who had speculated heavily on notes and wanted to see these repaid in full.  It had approved an impost in 1783, which made all imports much more expensive for its citizens.  It even agreed to send two delegates to the Annapolis convention that I discussed last week, but the delegates did not arrive until after the convention had ended.

Like everyone else, Rhode Island was suffering from the post-war depression.  The economic demands on the state divided them into two parties, the merchants who wanted full debt repayment using specie, and indebted farmers who wanted to get out of debt by having the state issue heavily devalued paper money.

Beginning in 1784, town meetings began sending petitions to the legislature, demanding the issuance of more paper money.  The merchant controlled Assembly rejected these demands.  In 1786, they responded to petitions by calling for all town meetings across the state to send their views on the issue.  Ninety percent of the meetings responded with a demand for more paper money.  The pro-merchant legislators were shocked by this outcome and, in March, 1786 still overwhelmingly rejected a plan to issue more paper.

The next month, Rhode Island held its annual elections.  The pro-paper voters tossed out most of the legislature and replaced them with officials willing to carry out their demands.  When the new Assembly met in May, it suspended the last tax collection and authorized the emission of £100,000 of paper money.  The money would flood into the economy through loans given to land owners.  The law further mandated that the paper was legal tender.  The state set up a system where if you owed someone money, you could just leave the money with the court.  If the creditor refused to accept it, the government would keep the money and consider the debt paid.  This forced creditors to accept the money.  Later, the legislature added a £100 fine for refusal to accept the paper.  That was roughly two years wages for the typical laborer.  Multiple violations could result in a creditor losing the right to vote.  It also created a special court to rule on paper money issues, with no jury and no appeal.

Despite these efforts, merchants did everything they could to avoid having debts repaid in paper that they knew would trade at depreciated levels.  Congress refused to accept the paper money for payment of its requisition.

At one point with merchants threatening to abandon the state entirely, the government considered a plan to take over most private businesses: ships, warehouses, waves, shipyards, etc. and run it on its own.  It also considered requiring an oath to support paper money.  Refusal could result in a loss of voting rights or the right to run for office.  One newspaper reported a proposed bill that would simply cancel all debts and redistribute all wealth equally among the people, with the process taking place every 13 years.  While that did not happen, the legislature did force the repayment of one-fourth of all state debt with paper money.

The indebted farmers were happy with the plan and overwhelmingly reelected the legislators the following year.  The plan managed to greatly reduce both state debt and private debt at the expense of wealthy merchants who most people didn’t like anyway. Over time, however, the paper money began to drag down the economy as merchants left the state or found ways to avoid the paper.  In 1789, the legal tender mandate was dropped and the paper money traded at a depreciated rate of about seven cents on the dollar.

Exeter Riot

Several neighboring states looked at Rhode Island’s solution with great interest.  Wealthy merchants realized they could be effectively stripped of their property if a majority of voters decided to do so.  By contrast indebted New England farmers thought this was a great solution to correct massive problems and inequalities that prevented them from making a living as productive farmers.  

No other state was as extreme as Rhode Island.  North Carolina also issued a currency that quickly depreciated.  New Jersey and Georgia also issued paper which saw substantial, but not crazy levels of depreciation.

New York, Pennsylvania and South Carolina issued paper currencies that depreciated a little, but largely worked.  They were largely used to provide loans to cash strapped farmers.  New York and Pennsylvania even used their money to buy Continental securities held by their citizens, thus making those states creditors of Congress.  

The divisions between creditors and debtors were still very real, and getting worse with the continuing economic hardships.  In New Hampshire, the dispute nearly led to civil war.  As in other states, farmers, feeling the pinch, first tried to address the issue at town meetings and through petitions to the legislature.  In many cases, debtors were recently returned veterans who found themselves being thrown into debtor’s prison for debts they or their family had incurred while in the army.  As early as 1782, armed rioters in the town of Keene shut down a courthouse to prevent the court from hearing detb cases.  The state’s attorney general rode to the scene personally.  The AG at the time was former Continental General John Sullivan, who had left the army in 1780.  He served a few years in Congress, but returned to New Hampshire in 1781, shortly after having to take a personal loan from the French Ambassador to cover his own debts.

Sullivan showed up at the Keen riots in 1782 wearing his Continental Army uniform.  Many of the rioters were former soldiers who had served under him.  He was able to use their respect for him to get the protesters to disperse.  The following day, he personally handled all the debt cases before the court, agreeing to continue any case where both parties were not ready to proceed.  

That resolved the immediate crisis, but the larger problem only grew.  Debts forced many farmers to sell their farms.  Many also faced debtor’s prison.  While they sent multiple petitions for relief, primarily in the form of requesting more paper money, the legislature, controlled by the supporters of merchant creditors, ignored the petitions.

In September, the legislature was meeting in Exeter locals in nearby Kingston hatched plan to march on the legislature and force them to pass a bill for paper money.  The men, former war veterans, formed a column of 200 and marched to Exeter. There, they surrounded the building where the legislature normally met.  On this day, however, a judge was holding court there.  So when the men surrounded the building the court simply ignored them and continued with its business.  Eventually, the protesters discover the legislature was meeting in a nearby church.  As they marched over, they were confronted by a growing mob of locals who sought to defend the legislature.

The men managed to surround the church and refused to let anyone in or out.  Once again former General Sullivan, by this time President of New Hampshire, came out to engage the protesters.  While he was in negotiations, the locals, militiamen themselves, formed up their own military column.  They managed to convey the false idea that they were bringing artillery, which caused the protesters to withdraw, but only across the river, where they set up camp.

Using the respite, Sullivan sent out messengers to call out militia in other towns in the area.  By the next morning, about 2000 militia marched to Exeter, then surrounded the protesters’ camp.  A few shots were fired, but it appears no one was killed or seriously injured. 

The three leaders of the protest were indicted on charges of treason.  However, they were immediately pardoned.  Several militia officers who had participated were stripped of their commissions.

The militia sent a request for towns to vote on the issue of paper money.  Perhaps after seeing the chaos such policies were creating in Rhode Island, the majority voted against paper money.  Sullivan banned the use of conventions to petition the legislature, and sought authority to call out the militia when needed.

While the crisis in New Hampshire ended without bloodshed, that would not be the case in Massachusetts.

Next week: we will take a look at the situation in Massachusetts, where Daniel Shays starts a rebellion.

- - -

Next Episode 343 Shays' Rebellion (coming soon)

Previous Episode 341 Annapolis Convention

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

 Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast

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Further Reading

Websites

The Requisition of 1785 and Shays’s Rebellion, 1786–1787 https://digfir-published.macmillanusa.com/tap6e/tap6e_ch8_19.html

Introduction to Ratification in Rhode Island https://csac.history.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/281/2023/12/DC9-13-00-01_R.I.-Essay.pdf

Gross, Robert A. “A Yankee Rebellion? The Regulators, New England, and the New Nation.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 82, no. 1, 2009, pp. 112–35. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20474709

The Paper Money Craze of 1786: https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/archives/1886/09/58-347/131865758.pdf

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Belknap, Jeremy The History of New Hampshire. Dover: S.C. Stevens and Ela & Wadleigh.

Bell, Charles H. History of the Town of Exeter, New Hampshire. Boston: J.E. Farwell & Co. 1888. 

McClintock, John Norris History of New Hampshire, Boston: B.B. Russell, 1888. 

Sanborn, Franklin B. New Hampshire: An Epitome of Popular Government. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1904. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Conley, Patrick T. First in War, Last in Peace : Rhode Island and the Constitution, 1786-1790, Rhode Island Bicentennial Association, 1986 (borrow on archive.org).

Holton, Woody Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution, Hill and Wang, 2007. 

Stephens, Karl F. Neither the Charm Nor the Luck: Major-General John Sullivan, Outskirts Press, 2009 (borrow on archive.org).

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, February 2, 2025

ARP341 Annapolis Convention


For years following the end of the war, national leaders were growing increasingly frustrated with the states running themselves increasingly separately, and with a Confederation Congress that did not have any power to regulate or enforce much of anything.

The Congress proved to be barely functional during the war, when the need to remain united against the British army focused the attention of delegates.  In peacetime, without that enemy army to goad them along, states became even less willing to cooperate.  Regional interests began to open more divisions between states.  Those who dreamed of a truly United States grew frustrated.  Some people believed that there was no way to keep this large number of people together without the unifying force of a king.

Commerce and Trade Problems

Back in Episode 337 we discussed the Mount Vernon Conference, where George Washington was trying to establish an interstate agreement to form a company that would create a commercial route to the west via the Potomac River.  His frustrations in getting this done led him and others to consider a new conference that would look at proposals to strengthen interstate cooperation on issues of trade and commerce.

Initially this new convention was meant to be a continuation of the Mount Vernon Conference, where George Washington had invited delegates from Maryland and Virginia to discuss agreements on how to develop trade along the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay. The limited goal in this case was the Potomac River project to form a western trade route from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ohio River.  

Many, however, wanted to address the broader issue of commerce that was creating growing conflict.  There were many other examples of states creating policies that put more economic burden on their neighbors.

James Madison, who had worked closely with Washington on the Potomac project, noted that Connecticut and New Hampshire were being forced to pay fees to Rhode Island, New York and Massachusetts for goods that passed through those states.  New Jersey similarly found itself dependent on imports that were using the ports of New York and Philadelphia and that those states were setting up rules for their own economic advantage.  These conflicts could eventually lead to economic retaliation, or even civil war between the states.  The only way to prevent this, Madison believed, was through strong national action to create a uniform and agreed set of rules.

Internal trade, however, was just one headache for leaders. The inability to establish trade deals with most of the major European powers, especially Britain, was holding back the economies of most states.  The inability to trade with British colonies in the West Indies was destroying many local merchant-based economies.  Many leaders like Madison believed that, just as with the war, the states had to present a unified front in foreign trade, or rivals would play them off against each other. 

The situation was made even worse by the need to pay down war debt.  Remember all that money that Congress borrowed during the war and needed to pay it back someday? Well, “someday” had arrived.  Bonds were coming due and creditors, both at home and abroad were demanding repayment in full with interest.

Many states hoped to repay debts through the collection of duties.  For example, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania imposed import duties to be collected at their ports to raise money.  But since merchants could simply import the goods to neighboring states, and then smuggle the goods overland, it was pretty easy to evade these duties.  To get 100% cooperation of all states on customs duties, there had to be a national system that everyone followed.

Beyond that, Congress needed authority to enforce its repayment quotas on the states.  It also needed to have a system of enforcement to prevent smuggling, including a court system that was not tied to any particular state.  All of this required more national power and authority.  

Proposing a Convention

In the fall of 1785, months after the disastrous Mount Vernon Conference, John Tyler offered a resolution in the Virginia Assembly that appointed a committee that included James Madison to meet with commissioners that would be appointed by any other states in the Union.  These men would review the current trade situation among the state, and consider a uniform system of regulations to handle commerce.  Their report would then be presented to Congress for final approval and implementation.

James Madison was the man behind this initiative, but he had Tyler (who by the way was the father of future President John Tyler) make the resolution because Tyler was a prominent politician in Virginia who had never served in Congress.  He was not seen as a nationalist.  No one suspected he would be interested in implementing major changes to federal power over the states.  

They might have suspected that if a nationalist like Madison had made the proposal himself.  Instead, the proposal just looked like a regular committee of investigation that could look into trade and come back with a report.  

Even so, some might have had an inkling.  This was a conference of states, organized outside the Confederation Congress.  The whole point of Congress was it was designed to be a seat for considering interstate issues.  So why not simply have Virginia’s delegates to Congress  propose changes in Congress that would make it more effective?

The main reason was that the nationalists saw that as impossible.  Confederation rules requiring supermajorities, and in some cases unanimous votes, made it impossible to enact any real change.  Further, term limit rules meant that some of the most effective leaders in the country were ineligible to serve in Congress.  By 1786 the body was mostly made up of second rate actors who were less capable of leadership and brokering national deals.

Madison had larger plans, but wanted to present this meeting as a simple chance to review and discuss trade and commerce issues.  He wrote to James Monroe that he secretly harbored more ambitious plans that he dared not announce publicly; "The expedient is no doubt liable to objections and will probably miscarry. I think however it is better than nothing and, as a recommendation of additional powers to Congress is within the purview of the commission it may possibly lead to better consequences than at first occur.”

Despite Madison’s caution, the proposal sat before the Assembly for three months, until the end of the legislative session in January, 1786.  On the final day of the session, supporters pushed through the resolution.  In the end, it went through with relatively little opposition.

After the bill passed and all the legislators went home, Virginia invited all the states in the union to attend this look at trade rules so that they could write a report on the matter.  So while this went well beyond the creation of the Potomac Company to establish a trade route to the western territories, it was also not really seen as an attempt to replace the Confederation Congress.

A few months after the resolution went through, Madison wrote to Monroe again, informing him that the meeting would take place in Annapolis in September.  Since Annapolis was not a major port city, it was seen as a relatively neutral meeting place to discuss trade issues. Madison confided in his friend that he hoped this would be part of a larger effort to make major changes to the Congress.  Madison viewed the Convention as an experiment, to see if this might be an effective way to push through more extensive changes.  At the time, Monroe was serving as a delegate in the Confederation Congress, but shared Madison’s frustrations with that body.

Even after the Convention plans were in place, commerce became even more of a mess.  Connecticut, hoping to undercut Boston, as the primary port in the region, declared its ports free from import duties, thus hoping to attract more commerce from Massachusetts to Connecticut.  New Jersey did the same thing against New York and Delaware did the same thing to undercut the port at Philadelphia. 

The result was even less import duties being collected, and a growing inability to make payments on war debt.  States were competing against each other in a race to the bottom. Under the rules of the Confederation Congress, a unanimous vote by all states would be required to create a uniform system of duties.  That was never going to happen.

The Meeting

The Annapolis Convention delegates had planned to meet at the Statehouse, since the state legislature was not in session at the time.  Only five states ended up sending delegates to Annapolis: New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia.   

You might notice that one of the states that did not send delegates was the host state of Maryland.  The state that hosted the convention did not vote to appoint any commissioners. Maryland had agreed to host the Convention when they thought it was a meeting of a few states to discuss the Potomac Company issues.  When they learned that Virginia had changed this to a convention of all the states to discuss much broader issues, the Maryland Senate refused to appoint any delegates.  They argued that a meeting of all the states outside of the Confederation Congress, might give offense to Congress, and could create concern and confusion as to who was really in charge, both among US citizens and foreign powers.

Similarly, Connecticut, South Carolina and Georgia did not appoint anyone.  New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and North Carolina appointed delegates, but none of those delegates arrived in Annapolis in time to participate in the Convention.

The official title of the Convention was Meeting of Commissioners to Remedy Defects of the Federal Government.  The title itself generated concern that this Convention might be focused on more than simple trade and commerce issues.  Many states opposed to such changes felt it better not to participate at all.

James Madison arrived in Annapolis on Monday September 4, 1786, the day the Convention was scheduled to begin.  At that time he arrived, only two other delegates were already there.  They killed time at Mann’s Tavern, which offered room and board, waiting for more delegates to arrive.  By Friday, a few more had arrived but nowhere near enough to do any business.

The men spend their days drinking and exchanging ideas on how to improve the union between the states.  All of the delegates who did make the trip were in agreement that this discussion should go well beyond trade and commerce.  Rather, it needed to address some pretty fundamental problems with the Articles of Confederation themselves.

By Monday, September 11, there were twelve delegates representing five states who showed up for the Convention.  Most of these men were radical nationalists who all supported a much stronger central government.  They all realized that most of the country did not accept this position, but they were pleased to find others at Annapolis who agreed on their goals.  This was a great opportunity for members of this side of the debate to discuss strategy.

Some states had appointed delegates to the convention who were not nationalists.  But the state-rights delegates did not bother to make the trip. Those who had traveled to the Convention constituted a group of men who were all strongly in favor of a much more powerful and effective federal government. 

Most of those present were relatively young.  The average age of the group was forty.  Madison was only thirty-five at the time.  New York delegate Alexander Hamilton was only twenty-nine.

Another person who notably was not at the Convention was George Washington.  This was not out of any opposition or disinterest in the movement. Virginia had not added him to the delegation. That's the way Washington wanted it. Washington knew that he was far and away the only nationally known figure.  Although he had begun this series of events with his efforts to form the Potomac Company, resulting in this convention, he knew that his presence at the convention would only raise its profile and increase the opposition to doing anything.  Besides, Washington considered himself retired at this point.  He could provide advice as an elder statesman, but had no plans to get involved in politics again.

Report

After giving up on getting a quorum, the delegates present decided they should at least write up a report.  Even writing a report created several problems.  Different states had given different instructions as to what the delegates could even consider.  A large portion of the country was highly skeptical and suspicious of efforts to cede more power to a central government.  Any report would have to give them an opportunity to address more issues, without raising the concerns of those who did not want a new convention of radicals giving a central government more power.

The delegates selected John Dickinson of Delaware as chairman of the convention. In his mid-fifties, Dickinson was one of the older delegates.  He had a reputation as being a conservative or moderate.  Most of us may remember Dickinson as the man who hesitated to support the Declaration of Independence in 1776.  

Because of his moderation, the radical Pennsylvania government pushed him out of power for several years.  Dickinson had returned to the Continental Congress as a delegate from Delaware.  Since he owned properties in both Pennsylvania and Delaware, he could represent either one.  Late in the war, he served as President of Delaware.  Following the end of his term, Dickinson found that politics in Pennsylvania once again favored his more moderate views.  He ended up serving as President of Pennsylvania for three years, covering the end of the Revolutionary War and the first years of peace.  Dickinson was in favor of a stronger central government and was generally in line with the other nationalists.  However, public perception of Dickinson was as a capable moderate leader without a strong agenda for radical change.  He was the perfect face for this more radical group.

The delegates put together a committee to draft a public report. Edmund Randolph, who was the Attorney General of Virginia, headed the committee.  Alexander Hamilton was not even on the committee, but somehow managed to take over the work anyway.  According to one source, Hamilton’s first draft “set forth very elaborately and undisguisedly the grave condition of the country and the imperative necessity for a powerful government.”  Madison and Randolph made suggestions to make the report’s language much milder.

The delegates decided that they really needed a new convention that would take a comprehensive look at the Articles of Confederation and suggest an entirely new approach. The delegates at Annapolis had neither the authority nor the numbers even to propose such a plan. They also knew that expressing their views directly would quickly raise national opposition to any such plan.  The idea was to write a report that would give delegates to the next convention more authority to address a range of issues without actually saying that.

The final report simply laid out the facts that, while a majority of nine states had agreed to attend the convention, only five had shown up.  This meant they could not really do much without a quorum, but it also showed that a majority of states recognized the need for such action.

Next, the report looked at the varying instructions that each state had given its delegates. Most of the instructions asked the delegates to consider a uniform system of commerce and regulations.  Some states then said the report should be returned to state officials. Other instructions said the report should go to the Confederation Congress.  

The authors of the report, however, seized on the instructions given to the New Jersey delegation, which were  “to consider how far an uniform system in their commercial regulations and other important matters, might be necessary to the common interest and permanent harmony of the several States,”  The four key words in those instructions were “and other important matters.”  This essentially gave the delegates authority to discuss anything.  Opponents probably would have simply considered those words a throw away line so that the state did not inadvertently prevent discussion of some related issue they had not considered.  But the report emphasized the importance of giving greater latitude to delegates to have a more open ended discussion on any issue of national importance.

The report then suggested that, hey, this is not our idea.  It was New Jersey’s idea.  Regulating trade is such an important topic that touches on so many issues.  We should allow delegates at a new convention next year to investigate and discuss a plan for fixing a wider range of defects in the current Articles of Confederation.  These matters are serious and have been part of the public discussion for some time, so we won’t even attempt to enumerate them here.

Instead, we suggest that a new convention be held in Philadelphia, beginning in May of the following year to take up a discussion of these concerns and focus on the current situation of the United States.

The report ended with the delegates noting that they had no real authorization by their states to make this suggestion.  Rather, the report should be sent back to each state where it could be considered as a suggestion to the state legislatures about what they should do next.   

Aftermath

The delegates completed the report on Thursday, September 14, having met for four days.  Each delegation agreed to carry a copy of the report back to their state legislature.  Dickinson would take a copy to the Confederation Congress, which was meeting in New York.  Three months later, Congress approved a resolution endorsing the call for a convention to meet in Philadelphia in May, 1787.

The week after the Annapolis Convention concluded its work, the Maryland Journal printed a public notice of the Convention.  The Journal noted: "Should this Address have its Effect, we may hope to see the Federal Union of these States established upon Principles, which will secure the Dignity, Harmony and Felicity of these confederated Republics; and not only rescue them from their present Difficulties, but from that insolent Hauteur and contemptuous Neglect, which they have experienced as a Nation."

Next week: We'll take a look at the continued economic breakdown of the states threatens to break into political violence.

- - -

Next Episode 342 Paper Money Riots (coming soon)

Previous Episode 340 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

 Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast

 Join the Facebook group, American Revolution Podcast 

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American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account. You may also donate via Venmo (@Michael-Troy-20) or Zelle (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)


Click here to see my Patreon Page
You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option making monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

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Further Reading

Websites

Annapolis Convention: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/annapolis-convention

“Annapolis Convention. Address of the Annapolis Convention, [14 September 1786],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-03-02-0556

“From James Madison to James Monroe, 22 January 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0250

“From James Madison to James Monroe, 14 March 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0265

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Brant, Irving James Madison, the Nationalist 1780-1787, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1948. 

Morse, John T. The life of Alexander Hamilton, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1876. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Morris, Richard B. Witnesses at the Creation: Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and the Constitution, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1996 (borrow on archive.org).

Williams, Tony. America’s Beginnings: The Dramatic Events That Shaped a Nation’s Character. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010 (borrow on archive.org).

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.