American Revolution Podcast

Sunday, September 3, 2017

Episode 008: The Surrender of Fort Oswego

When we left off last week, London sent Gen. Loudoun in the summer of 1756 to take command of the North American operation, recalling Gen. Shirley back to Britain to face criminal charges. Due to the strategic mess that everyone had blamed on Shirley, not much of anything got done militarily for the rest of the year. Meanwhile, France had finally declared war on Britain in the spring of 1756 after Britain had been attacking French forts in America for most of 1755. The French had sent Gen. Montcalm to command French forces in North America and coordinate the French military response.

British Plan of Attack Delayed

Prior to the war, the British had built a line of forts from Albany to Lake Ontario. Fort Oswego was the final fort in that chain, sitting on the eastern bank of Lake Ontario, where the Oswego River connects to the Lake.

French and British Forts from the Region (from Wikimedia)

In the last episode, I mentioned the fact that Fort Oswego was not really in much condition to be defensible in 1755. Originally built as a trading post, it just wasn’t designed to support a large force of soldiers. The British would need to make changes if they wanted to use it as a launching point against the French at Fort Niagara.

One of the big problems with the fort was that it sat within range of several hills. An enemy needed only to carry a few cannons to the top of any one of these hills and start lobbing cannonballs into the fort. Given the limitations of 18th Century cannons, holding the high ground in a battle often met that you could hit the enemy but the enemy could not hit you. Therefore exposed hills near any fort always created a danger of the enemy taking the high ground and putting the fort at risk. We saw an example of this back in Episode 5 when the French simply used muskets on hills surrounding Fort Necessity to force Washington’s surrender.

To counter this threat at Fort Oswego, the former Commander, Gen. Shirley had delayed any assault on Niagara in 1755 and instead focused on building a second fort on the hill next to Oswego, called Fort Ontario. At the same time, Shirley attempted to put together a force of 16,000 militia, raised across various colonies for the attack on Niagara. As usual though, the colonies balked at spending money or sending men outside their own colonies. Even so, Shirley worked through the local politics and built up support for the 1756 fighting season. He also planned to use the Regulars who had fled from the Braddock Campaign in 1755 and had been lounging around Philadelphia for a year.

As Shirley planned his campaign during the winter and early spring, he received word that London was replacing him. As I discussed last week, Shirley had lots of enemies on both sides of the Atlantic. His lackluster performance during 1755, convinced officials in London that they should send replacement leaders. London selected Gen. James Abercromby and Gen. Daniel Webb to head up the New York Campaign. They also decided on Gen. Loudoun as the new commander of North American military operations.

A view of Fort Owego from 1727 (from owswego-history.com)

Although Shirley received word of the leadership changes in March, Gen. Loudoun did not arrive in Virginia until July. Even then, he would need more time before he would be ready to mount any sort of offensive. So for most of the spring and summer of 1756, new commanders attempted to plan new strategies or adapt old ones, familiarize themselves with the geography and military resources, and learn how to work with the local colonial political powers to get the support they needed.

Loudoun wanted to focus on taking Fort Carillon at Ticonderoga. In August, he commanded Webb to take several regiments of regulars to Fort Oswego. The regiments had been prepared to move out for over a month, but confusion and delays resulting from the change in leadership delayed their orders. Before the Regulars could reach the Fort, it would be too late.

French Advance

While the British were taking their time getting their act together, the French decided to strike first. Gen. Montcalm had arrived in Canada in May 1756. He was itching to get to work and almost immediately began preparing an expedition against Fort Oswego.

Like his British counterparts, Montcalm was a regular officer who disliked using militia or Indians in battle. Indians tended to be unreliable and were almost useless in the highly disciplined maneuvers needed to besiege a fort. Canadian Gov. Vaudreuil disagreed with Montcalm and strongly encouraged the use of Indian raids to strike fear into the British settlers.

Montcalm had only limited numbers of regulars at his disposal and agreed to use some militia and Indians in his offensive. He set off in late July, 1756 with about 1300 regulars, 1500 militia, and about 250 Indians from various allied tribes. Montcalm planned to use the Indians as guides and to scare the enemy out of the woods and back into the fort, but would use his French regulars for the actual siege.

Abandoning Fort Ontario

The British had little warning of all this. They were on poor terms with the local Oneida tribe, who failed to provide any warning of the French advance. The British also did not seem to do much any scouting of their own any distance from the Fort. As a result, their first notice that their might be a problem was when soldiers at Fort Ontario saw one of their comrades lying nearby, dead and scalped on August 10.

Since Gen. Webb had not yet arrived at Oswego, British Lt. Col. James Mercer remained in command. Mercer sent out a ship to scout along the coast the next day, August 11. The scouts sighted Montcalm’s 3000 troops encamped only about a mile and a half from the fort. Within hours, Indian snipers were firing into Fort Ontario from nearby trees.

A year earlier, Gen. Shirley had agreed with his military experts that Fort Oswego was virtually indefensible. If the enemy placed cannon on either of two hills overlooking the Fort, they could fire directly into the fort. The longer term plan seemed to be to build a new Fort Oswego on one of the hills, but for now that work was incomplete. Gen. Shirley had simply built small outpost fort on top of the other hill in order to prevent the enemy from occupying the high ground. That outpost was Fort Ontario, which was now under attack. Ontario had only a few cannons and a force of about 370 militia, mostly raw recruits with little military experience. The main body of soldiers at Fort Oswego could not come to the defense of Fort Ontario without leaving their own walls and confronting the attackers in the forest.

So instead of serving as protection to Fort Oswego, Fort Ontario had simply become an indefensible smaller outpost that the French would have to capture before beginning their assault on Fort Oswego. The French were able to bring up their artillery to an entrenchment where they could fire point blank into Fort Ontario. Since the assault would simply result in the deaths of everyone in the Fort, with no chance to fight back, Mercer decided to abandon Fort Ontario on Aug. 13, bringing those troops into Fort Oswego.

That, of course, meant that the French now occupied Fort Ontario and the heights around it. All the work building Fort Ontario now meant that it gave the French better walls from which to launch their artillery barrage against Fort Oswego.

Surrender of Fort Oswego

Montcalm had his soldiers move their cannon into Fort Ontario and began firing into Fort Oswego. Oswego’s cannon were all on the wrong side of the fort, since they had planned on using Fort Ontario to protect that side. Now, they had to fire from the far side of Fort Oswego against their own former defenses, without any protective cover for themselves. The 1700 men in Fort Oswego were facing almost certain slaughter from the 3000 man attacking force that was bombarding them.

Surrender of Fort Oswego (from minerdescent.com)

Nevertheless, Mercer was not going to surrender the Fort that easily. An artillery duel continued for several hours until a cannon ball completely beheaded Mercer. At that point the second in command, Lt. Col. John Littlehales decided to ask for terms of surrender.

In 1756, there were no real “rules of war” regarding surrender and prisoners. The first Geneva Convention regarding the protection of prisoners of war would not exist for more than a century. That said, European officers were not savages. They knew that terms given to a surrendering army would affect future decisions to surrender, and would also impact how they would be treated if they were someday found on the losing side of a battle.

If the defenders of a fort had fought a gallant defense, the winner would often accord them the honors of battle. The losing army would be permitted to depart with their arms and supplies, their colors and a single honorary artillery piece. In this case, however, Montcalm decided that the defense was not sufficiently gallant. The fort’s defenses were pathetic and the defense of the main fort really only lasted a few hours. In fact, if the fort had been able to hold out for a few weeks, they might have been relieved by Gen. Webb’s reinforcements.

Montcalm demanded that the garrison of about 1700 surrender as prisoners. He only promised that they would not be killed and would be conducted safely back to Montreal where they could later be exchanged for French prisoners. Seeing the fight as hopeless, Littlehales agreed and surrendered.

Apparently though, the promise of safe conduct as prisoners was even more than Montcalm could deliver. Indians did not fight for the French for pay. Instead, they went to war for the purpose of proving their bravery by taking enemy scalps, and for profit by looting the property of the enemy. Fort Oswego was a trading post and supply depot for the British Army. In addition to cannons and small arms, it had a large supply of food, military supplies and other items of value.

After the surrender, the Indian allies of the French immediately entered the Fort, looted anything of value, and got drunk on the Fort’s supply of rum. They also killed and scalped all of the wounded in the Fort’s hospital. Next, the Indians turned to the disarmed prisoners. They killed several dozen prisoners, which included many civilians, and took many more prisoner, with the intention of taking them home as slaves.

Montcalm was mortified by the actions of his allies. He had given his word of honor to provide safe conduct and could not do so. He eventually put a stop to the slaughter, and agreed to pay a ransom to the Indians to return their prisoners. As a result, his victory ended up costing the French a lot more money than they had planned, and only encouraged Indians to kidnap more prisoners in the future. The incident also reaffirmed Montcalm’s view that Indian allies could often be worse than useless. What incentive did any British force have to surrender if they knew doing so would likely lead to slaughter or slavery?

More Retreat

Upon hearing of the fall of Fort Oswego, Gen. Webb, who had been on his way to relieve the Fort, immediately went on the defensive. He ordered the next fort in line, Fort Bull, to be burned to the ground in order to deny it to the enemy. He then took the time to fell trees on the road as his forces retreated, making the roads impassible to a feared advance of Montcalm. Loudoun later criticized his subordinate for not even trying to determine if the enemy was advancing (they were not) before destroying a fort and running away. That said, the damage was done. British forces were now far removed from Lake Ontario as the fighting season of 1756 neared its end.

So the results for 1756 were even worse than the year before. Not only had the British not gained any ground through offensives, they had lost ground in New York through the loss of several forts. Further, many Iroquois allies and local tribes began to support the French, seeing them as the more effective regional power.

Maryland and Virginia Retreat

With the French now on the offensive, Indian allies of the French continued their raids well into Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, pushing back the borders of British influence..

Maryland refused to deploy any soldiers to the west. It retreated back to Fort Frederick and refused to participate in any military actions beyond that point.

A Maryland Newspaper call to arms in 1756
(from vasitytutors.com)

Virginia, still holding onto dreams of settling the Ohio Valley, made more of an effort. The House of Burgesses appropriated £55,000 and called on Col. Washington to raise a Regiment of 1500 men. Still refusing to pay soldiers a decent wage, the colony had to institute a draft. Conscripts, of course, were not terribly motivated and frequently deserted if given the chance. To make matters worse, the majority of the funds appropriated went to militia in the eastern part of the Colony. Leaders were more concerned about a potential slave uprising affecting their plantations, than about Indian raids affecting the poor settlers to the west. Washington’s western regiment, therefore, never received adequate food, clothing, or arms. Washington’s regiment did engage the Indian raids when possible. But the area was too large to defend effectively. Most Virginians living in the area who could, moved out and headed back east.

In 1757, Washington tried to convince Loudoun to convert his regiment into regulars and give him a commission in the British Army. Had he done so, it might have changed the course of world events. But Loudoun did not have enough confidence in the Virginia militia leader. Instead, he gave Col. John Stanwix, stationed in Pennsylvania, authority over Washington. Stanwix immediately demanded that Washington turn over much of his powder and ammunition for use in Pennsylvania. Between that and his own quartermaster’s embezzlement and the continuing desertions, Washington only faced frustration with the British refusal to reengage in the Ohio Valley. His disappointment at not being permitted to become a British regular would also sit as a deep wound that festered for many years.

Fighting in Pennsylvania

Like its southern neighbors, Pennsylvania was reluctant to spend much of anything on military defense even as the events of 1756 increased their exposure to attack. The Quaker government represented pacifists who held strong religious objections to war. Most of the colony’s money and power was in and around Philadelphia, which did not seem immediately endangered by the attacks. An ongoing fight between the Penn family (the Proprietors of the Colony) and the legislature (run mostly by Quaker leaders and Benjamin Franklin) kept everything in gridlock. The legislature did not want to levy property taxes unless they could also tax the lands controlled by the proprietors. The proprietors held the view that they were the owners of the colony and could not be taxed by those they had allowed to live there. The political wrangling thus led to inaction.

In western Pennsylvania, Indians took advantage of this. Many of the raids were smaller ones against relatively defenseless frontier settlements. In July 1756, the Delaware attacked and destroyed Fort Granville, forcing all colonial forces to retreat back to Carlisle, near modern day Harrisburg. Indian raids continued to probe eastward, with some raids reaching within 70 miles of Philadelphia. The leader of the raid that destroyed Fort Granville was a Delaware Chief named “Captain Jacobs” who had only a few months earlier come to Philadelphia to plead for aid against the French. Receiving none, Jacobs allied himself with the French and became one of the fiercest raiders in Pennsylvania.

If the attacks of the Western Delaware were not bad enough, the Eastern Delaware Indians, who lived just north of Philadelphia, were considering joining their western brothers. The Delaware were still upset about the land grab of the Walking Purchase and other encroachments. With the British on the defensive, the moment seemed opportune to recover much of their lost territory. Western settlers began literally carrying the dead bodies of friends and family killed in Indian raids through the streets of Philadelphia, demanding action.

With the situation becoming desperate, the Pennsylvania legislature finally acted. Benjamin Franklin worked out a compromise to fund a military campaign. The proprietors would make a “donation” of £5000 in lieu of taxes. The legislature would pony up another £55,000 “for the King’s use” to avoid taking responsibility for spending on military. The money was available to the King who would presumably use it to defend the colony militarily, but that was the King, not the Quakers, spending on the military. The Quaker community generally found this distinction morally unacceptable. They excommunicated several members who had supported the compromise plan. In the end, most Quakers generally dropped out of politics altogether. They did not want to participate in the decision to go to war, but also did not seem to want to bear the consequences of refusing to pay for the war either.

The result was men like Franklin and his non-Quaker friends taking control of the legislature and coordinating a military response to the continuing raids. A Pennsylvania raid to avenge Fort Granville attacked a small village called Kittaning where Captain Jacobs and his fellow warriors, along with their wives and children, were all killed. The massacre worsened things by motivating more Delaware to go to war against Pennsylvania, fueled by an increase of arms and ammunition from the capture of Fort Oswego. This only increased the Indian attacks in Pennsylvania throughout the fall of 1756.

Chief Teedyuscung (from wikipedia)

To prevent the Indian violence from spreading even further, Pennsylvania leaders tried to open a diplomatic dialogue with the eastern Delaware. Chief Teedyuscung was motivated to reach an agreement. The continued violence had purged the entire region of Indian traders, on whom the Delaware had become dependent. But for any agreement, Teedyuscung demanded that the parties revisit the Walking Purchase and guarantee a reserve of 2.5 million acres of land for his tribe in the Wyoming Valley, a region of Northeastern Pennsylvania around modern day Scranton. While the negotiations dragged on for months, the initial gifts and progress toward a solution kept most eastern Delaware away from active support of attacks.

In December 1756, Loudoun sent British regulars to Philadelphia to help coordinate military defenses there. Even though the legislature was now on board for defensive action, it refused to provide housing for the soldiers. Loudoun was once again outraged at the treatment the provincials were giving his liberators. The locals, however, not only had more abstract Constitutional concerns, but the very real concern that a smallpox epidemic was spreading through the city. This was not a time to let strangers into your home. Loudoun had to threaten to take homes by force before the Assembly decided to convert a newly built hospital into temporary barracks for the soldiers.

Thus, 1756 came to a close with the British still only seeing continued losses. Neither Parliament nor the colonial assemblies were willing to put up the serious levels of soldiers and money to fight the war properly. The North American Commander, Lord Loudoun grew continually frustrated at the colonies’ refusal to accede to his military demands.

Next week: British setbacks continue with the Fort William Henry Massacre, and Britain decides to make leadership changes once again.

Next Episode 9: Fort William Henry Massacre & Rise of Pitt

Previous Episode 7: Acadia, Lake George, & Loudon's Arrival

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give. Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via Venmo, Zelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)

Click here to see my Patreon Page

You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber. This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges. Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

The Fall of New France, 1755-1760, by Gerald E. Hart, (1888).

The History of Canada, Vol. 3 by William Kingsford (1887).

An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760, Vol 1, Vol. 2, & Vol. 3, by John Knox (1914).

The fall of Oswego (14th August, 1756): a chapter in British history, by W.T. Mercer (1873).

England In The Age Of The American Revolution, by J.B. Namier (1930).

Montcalm and Wolfe, Vol. 1, by Francis Parkman (1885).

Memoir Upon the Late War in North America, Between the French and English, 1755-60, by Pierre Pouchot, Vol. 1, & Vol. 2 (1866).

The Administration of the British Colonies, by Thomas Pownall (1777) (another contemporary account of events).

A review of the military operations in North America : from the commencement of the French hostilities on the frontiers of Virginia in 1753, to the surrender of Oswego, on the 14th of August, 1756, by William Livingston, William Smith, and William Alexander, called Lord Stirling (1757) (This was written by contemporaries living in the colonies as the events transpired).

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Anderson, Fred Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766, Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.

Brumwell, Stephen Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas 1755-1763, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002.

Chartrand, René Montcalm’s Crushing Blow: French and Indian Raids along New York’s Oswego River 1756, Osprey Publishing, 2014.

Fowler, Willam F. Jr. Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763, Walker Books, 2005.

Jennings, Francis Empire Of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America, W.W. Norton & Co. 1988.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, August 27, 2017

Episode 007: Acadia, Lake George, and Loudoun's Arrival

Last week we looked at Gen. Braddock’s advance on Fort Duquesne in what it today western Pennsylvania and the massacre of him and most of his army primarily by Indians and a few Frenchmen. The British retreat, overseen by junior officers like George Washington and Thomas Gage, gave France undisputed control of the Ohio valley. But Fort Duquesne was one of only four goals British military planners had for the summer of 1755 in North America.

Removal of the Acadians

British forces in Acadia (now called Nova Scotia) were having better luck. For years, the French and British had stood eyeball to eyeball in forts across the Missaguash River. The French Fort Beauséjour and the British Fort Lawrence kept each side in check.

Forts Beauséjour and Lawrence (from Wikiwand)

Ever since the British had taken control of the area in 1713, the local French Acadians living under British rule had caused trouble for the army. London had tasked Gen. William Shirley, who was also Governor of Massachusetts, with advancing into Canada and taking as much territory as possible. Gen. Shirley did not share Gen. Braddock’s disdain for militia. Shirley raised about 2000 New England militia to join about 270 British regulars in laying siege to Fort Beauséjour. The French had only 162 French regulars and about 300 militia from the Acadians and the Mi'kmaq Indians to defend the fort..

Given the overwhelming numbers, it took only a few weeks before the French surrendered and withdrew. Once victorious, the British took the highly unusual step of removing the civilian population. British authorities demanded that the local Acadian cease the practice of Catholicism and swear allegiance to King George II. When they locals understandably balked, officials declared them enemies of the State. The government seized all of their lands and possessions and forcibly deported about 5400 Acadians to England or other English colonies. Another 7000-10,000 fled the area for other parts of Canada. Considering the entire French population of Canada was only about 75,000 at this time, this was a massive disruption.

The the area effectively depopulated, thousands of New Englanders moved into the many towns and farms snatching up land at bargain prices. Within a few years, the region went from an almost entirely French Catholic population, to an English Protestant one..

With Gen. Braddock death at the Monongahela, Gen. Shirley assumed overall command of forces in North America. He continued to follow the general plans laid out in London months earlier.

Battle of Lake George

With the 1755 summer fighting season coming to an end, the British had accomplished little outside of Acadia. News of the destruction of Braddock’s army in June still reverberated across the continent. The British naval blockade of the St. Lawrence River had been a failure. The French had sent six battalions of regulars (about 3000 men) to reinforce Quebec and Louisburg. The British captured only two ships containing about 400 of the reinforcements.

William Shirley
(from Wikipedia)

Gen. Shirley still talked about taking Fort Niagara, but had made little progress. Fights over supplies and logistical problems transporting equipment meant that troops only reached the eastern shore of Lake Ontario by September. The old trading post, Fort Oswego, was too small and dilapidated to serve as a base of operations. So, Shirley decided to spend several months building a proper fort and put off the attack on Fort Niagara until the following spring.

Col. William Johnson’s assault of Fort Saint-Frédéric at Crown Point also fell behind schedule. By September, his forces had arrived at the southern tip of Lac St. Sacrement, which he decided to rename Lake George, in honor of the King. There, he built Fort Edward, named in honor of the Edward, Duke of York, one of the King’s grandsons.

While the British colonial troops made their tentative advances, the French planned to counter these moves. Jean Erdman, Baron Dieskau, was among those who had slipped past the British blockade back in June. Dieskau, a German born officer, commanded the French regulars who had been sent to Canada. Also arriving was a new Canadian Governor General, Pierre de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil-Cavagnial, who I’m just going to call "Regaud." The new political and military leaders planned to respond to British advances much more aggressively.

Both men initially thought the defense of Fort Niagara was they key to the theater of operations and placed the bulk of their troops there. However, after realizing that the British did not seem inclined to move on Niagara, and receiving exaggerated reports of movement against Fort Saint-Frédéric, Dieskau took about 3000 men, regulars, militia, and Indians to defend the Fort.

French and British Forts. The battle between Dieskau and
Johnson took place where Fort William Henry would be built
the following year. (from Wikimedia)

When he arrived, he realized that the fort was not in any immediate danger and decided to go on the offensive. Leaving most of the French regulars at the fort, Dieskau took about 1500 troops (200 regulars, 600 Canadian militia, and 700 Indians) to attack Fort Edward. When the Indians seemed reluctant to attack the fort directly, they found a new target, a camp several miles from the fort where Col. Johnson was planning to build a second fort.

Col. Johnson heard that the enemy was near Fort Edward and sent much of his own troops, a force of about 1000 Massachusetts militia and 200 Mohawk allies to attack the French. So at the same time Dieskau was trying to advance on Johnson, Johnson’s troops were also advancing on Dieskau. Although the French had only a small numerical advantage, they were able to ambush the British and force a panicked retreat. The men, however, were able to recover and restore order upon returning to the main camp. This first skirmish became known as “Bloody Morning Scout.”

Col. Johnson, alerted by the sounds of battle, had placed temporary breastworks and cannon to defend the camp. This was enough to stop the Indians who had been chasing down the British retreat. They did not want to rush the cannons. In hopes of shaming the Indians into attack, Dieskau ordered his 200 regulars to charge the cannon. They obeyed, but watching the regulars get cut down en masse by canister shot did not encourage the remaining troops to follow them.

For the rest of the day, the troops fired at each other from a distance with little impact on either side, other than Dieskau suffering a serious but not mortal wound. On the other side, Col. Johnson also suffered a less serious wound.

Wm Johnson Saving Baron
Dieskau (from Wikimedia)

As night began to fall, the French forces began to pull back for a return to Fort Saint-Frédéric. About 400 Indians returned to the site of the original ambush to collect booty, scalps, and prisoners whom they had left tied up there. There, about 200 New Hampshire militia sent from Fort Edward to aid Col Johnson, stumbled across the Indians, resulting in an evening firefight. A few on each side were killed, but the main result was that the Indians decided to kill and scalp all of their prisoners so they could retreat faster without the prisoners.

In the end, the battle was more or less a draw. Both sides lost about 330-340 men (exact numbers are in dispute). The British held the field, which made them the winners. The main result though was that both sides spent the winter building much better forts. The French built Fort Carillon at the north end of Lake George, about 15 miles south of Fort Saint-Frédéric to prevent a spring landing by the British. The British built Fort William Henry on the site of Col. Johnson’s camp to protect against a French landing against Fort Edward. The fort was named after William, Duke of Cumberland, King George’s son, and Henry, duke of Gloucester, another of the King’s grandsons in an apparent attempt to honor as many members of the royal family as possible. Col. Johnson had serious political ambitions. Brown nosing with the royal family never hurt one’s chances for advancement.

The Prime Minister

In the last episode, I introduced Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Duke of Newcastle, who had been Secretary of State and who became Prime Minister in 1754. The notion of Prime Minister was still a relatively new one. When King George I stopped attending ministerial meetings a few decades earlier. The ministers decided they needed to have one person running things or else everything got out of control. There never really was a formal establishment of the job. It really evolved out of necessity and over time. Although the title was sometimes used earlier, historians generally consider Robert Walpole to be the first Prime Minister beginning in the 1720’s. Even then, it was not a formal title, in a nation obsessed with formal titles.

After Walpole left office in 1742. Spencer Compton, Earl of Wilmington, served for just over a year. At 70 years old, he was seen as more of a temporary caretaker. A year later in 1743, Henry Pelham, a protégé of Walpole, landed the role, which he held until his death in 1754. His brother, Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Duke of Newcastle took over as Prime Minister.

So as you can see there was relatively little tradition behind this role. The Prime Minister was not elected but was appointed by the King. OK, technically the King or Queen still appoints Prime Ministers. Today, however, that appointment is largely ceremonial. The leader of the political party what wins a majority gets the appointment. Back in the 1700’s the King may have paid some attention to politics, but in the end appointed whomever he wanted.

Thomas Pelham-Holles,

Duke of Newcastle

(from parliament.uk)

Because Pelham-Holles was the Duke of Newcastle, he was ineligible to sit in the House of Commons. He sat in the House of Lords. Even in the 1700’s, Commons served as the center of political power for the country. The House of Commons drove politics. Pelham-Holles (who I will now go back to calling simply “Newcastle” to make things easier) needed a leader in the House of Commons to get things done.

There were two strong candidates in the House of Commons. William Pitt and Henry Fox. Newcastle did not really like either of them, and they did not like each other much either. Fox was an ally of the Duke of Cumberland, the King’s favored son, and the man who had worked to create the aggressive plan of attack in North America. Newcastle was not happy when Cumberland had replaced his plans for the American assault with a much more ambitious one that, predictably, did not work.

Pitt had spent much of his time in Parliament attacking Newcastle’s policies. Earlier in his career, Newcastle had attempted to bring Pitt into the Ministry, but George II vetoed the idea. Pitt opposed all the military spending on Hanover, and thought British defenses were better spent on a strong Navy. King George, who was also still the Elector of Hanover and considered it home, was not a fan of anyone who did not see Hanover as part of the vital national interest. As a result, Pitt remained out of power criticizing the ministry. Even worse, Pitt became close to George, Prince of Wales (the future King George III). Prince George openly disagreed with many of the policies of King George II (his Grandfather). The Prince of Wales was the heir apparent, as his father Frederick had died in 1751 making him next in line. Despite the rules of primogeniture, it is clear the King would have preferred Frederick’s younger brother William, Duke of Cumberland, rather than Frederick’s eldest son George, to rule after him.

Henry Fox (from .UK National Trust)

In the end, Newcastle grudgingly forged an alliance with Fox, which also meant working closely with Cumberland. Pitt essentially became the voice of opposition in the Commons, even though everyone involved was a Whig.

The next step was deciding what to do with American strategy for the coming year. The hope in 1755 had been to strike quickly and decisively capturing the disputed territory and critical French defenses before the French really could react. All this was being done before there was even a declaration of war. By 1756, with Braddock’s defeat in the Ohio Valley, and with Gen. Shirley and Col. Johnson failing even to make an attack on two of the other three targets for the prior year, the chance for a first strike was gone. The French were understandably outraged at what had happened and would end up formally declaring war in the spring. The French still controlled the Ohio Valley and all the important forts along the New York and New England frontier.

Gen. Shirley

With Gen. Braddock’s death, Gen. Shirley assumed command. Although Shirley was born in England, he had clearly gone native from his many years in the colonies. Shirley, who was also Governor of Massachusetts, had paid New England militia the going rate that they would make as common laborers. This was more money than British regulars made. While it allowed him to fill his regiments with volunteers, it clearly irritated the bean counters back in London.

More importantly, Shirley had tried to avoid two contentious issues that London considered essential to the good order of the empire. One was a royal proclamation that all colonial militia officers would be subordinate to regular army officers. This meant the lowest lieutenant or ensign in the regular army could give orders to Generals and other top commanders in the militia. As you might guess, militia officers took this as a HUGE insult.

Second, enlisted militia were subject to the same rules of discipline that existed for enlisted soldiers in the regular army when acting in conjunction with British forces. Life for enlisted regulars was harsh. Whipping was common for the most minor of offenses. Execution was also commonplace for more significant offenses that would probably be considered minor in civilian life. Shirley knew these rules would be major impediments to obtaining the officers and soldiers he needed for the coming fight.

Col. William Johnson
(from Wikimedia)

Shirley assured provincial leaders that militia units would fight in separate areas from regulars. This ensured that no regular officers of lower rank would be around to give orders to militia commanders. Shirley also promised enlistees that they would be subject only to provincial discipline, not regular army discipline. Since the militia were operating in entirely separate theaters of battle, he interpreted this as not acting “in conjunction” with regular forces and so the rules on regular discipline would not apply.

What Shirley did not fully appreciate was that political backstabbers were active within his own army as much as they were back in London. Col. Johnson was regularly corresponding with officials in London. He took every opportunity to criticize just about everything that Shirley did. Johnson was a political ally of NY Lt. Gov. James De Lancey. Delancey was upset at Shirley’s appointment as a General, which also allowed him to benefit financially from all the military contracts. De Lancey, who wanted those contracts for himself, did not get them and was looking for revenge. His protégé Col. Johnson was in the perfect position to undermine Gen Shirley.

Thomas Pownall
(from Wikimedia)

Another backstabber was Thomas Pownall, who had arrived in the colonies in 1753 and became Lt. Gov. of New Jersey in 1755. He had close friends on both sides of the Atlantic. During the Albany Conference, he had allied himself with Johnson and was now working with him to undercut Shirley with the leaders back in London.

In London, Newcastle only saw that all the aggressive plans for advancement had failed, costs were far over budget, and everyone was telling him that Shirley was a disaster. When Cumberland and Fox brought him a new plan which called for replacing Shirley with an experienced military administrator named John Campbell, the Earl of Loudoun, he agreed with the consensus.

Col. Johnson, who hadn’t been any more successful than Shirley, received a baronetcy, making him Sir William. He also received a prize of £5000 for his heroism at Lake George. His buddy Thomas Pownall landed a new gig as “secretary extraordinary” to the new military commander Loudoun. He had returned to London to complain about Shirley. When Loudoun became Shirley’s replacement, Pownall came back on the same ship with Loudoun.

Loudoun Takes Command

Loudoun arrived in Virginia in the July of 1756 ready to straighten out the mess and save the colonies. About 6000 regular troops would also soon arrive to assist in the new major offensive against the French. In addition to serving as military commander in chief, Loudoun also became the new governor Virginia. Almost immediately, Loudoun heard complaints from all sides about Shirley. He had promoted colonial officers without authorization. He had recruited militia by making promises related to how they would serve, and deployed them without regular army supervision. Many complained about military contracts that benefited his friends and family.

Loudoun quickly went from simply replacing Shirley to sending him back to England to face criminal charges. So Shirley headed back to London, where he spent the next few years trying to justify his positions. When Loudoun’s plans failed miserably the following year, Shirley could basically say I told you so to London officials. The Ministry eventually made him Governor of the Bahamas.

John Campbell. 4th Earl of
Loudoun (from Wikimedia)

For Loudoun, even if Shirley was not a criminal, the new commander decided that British and colonial forces were deployed terribly. Like most British officers, Loudoun took a dim view of Indians or colonial militia as useful soldiers. The notion that provincials could manage an entire offensive without even guidance from regular officers seemed like a terrible idea. The fact that the provincials were occupying a series of forts along the New York frontier just set them up as easy targets for attack.

When Loudoun learned that the militia refused to serve alongside regulars, he angrily summoned the top provincial officers for a conference. Loudoun was a professional officer. He knew how to take orders from superiors and expected nothing less from his subordinates. He had gotten a modification so that senior provincial officers would be treated as “senior captains” meaning they would only have to take orders from regular officers with the rank of Major and higher. The colonial officers were unmoved. They had signed up based on certain conditions, including not having to take orders from regular field officers of lower rank and not being subject to regular army discipline. If Loudoun insisted on changing these conditions, his provincial army would evaporate through resignation of officers and desertion of the enlisted men.

Realizing his impossible position, Loudoun backed down and allowed the provincials to proceed as planned. However, he wrote a series of angry letters back to London describing the unreasonable lack of obedience among the colonists and blaming Shirley for making these deals in the first place.

Loudoun’s frustration was not limited to militia. Colonial governments refused to provide housing for the thousands of regular troops he had brought with him, or provide any other assistance that was not paid for at market rates. Loudoun’s outrage seemed to be that he and his men should be greeted as liberators, there at great expense to protect these colonists from the French and Indians. He did not want to hear arguments about how the English Bill of Rights guaranteed protection from the quartering of troops. Loudoun frequently had to threaten to use military force take control of homes in order to get local governments to act appropriately and provide housing.

Marquis de Montcalm-Gozen
(from Upper Canada History)

None of Loudoun’s views would be seen as inappropriate in London. Gen. Braddock had evinced similar views a year earlier. His quick death was the only thing that prevented Braddock from getting into similar fights with the colonial governors. These leaders were seeing the fundamental schism that would eventually lead to future war and independence. The British government was designed around obedience by those in lower stations to those in clearly defined higher stations. The nearly universal view among the colonists that contractual agreements and basic age old fundamental rights of all people were more important than deference to superiors.

The more fundamental problem was that the change of leadership during the prime summer fighting months of 1756, and the internal squabbling with the colonials had led to almost nothing happening in the fight against the French.

Since France had declared war officially in May 1756, the gloves were off. Both sides did not need to worry about diplomacy any more. That same month, Louis-Joseph, Marquis de Montcalm-Gozen de Saint Veran (we’ll just call him Montcalm) had arrived in Canada with hundreds of French Regulars to command French forces against Britain and her colonies. With the British squabbling, Montcalm was free to take the initiative.

Next week, he will do just that.

Next Episode 8: Surrender of Fort Oswego

Previous Episode 6: British Take Charge: Battle of the Monongahela

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give. Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via Venmo, Zelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)

Click here to see my Patreon Page

Memoir Upon the Late War in North America, Between the French and English, 1755-60, by Pierre Pouchot, Vol. 1, & Vol. 2 (1866).

The Administration of the British Colonies, by Thomas Pownall (1777) (another contemporary account of events).

A review of the military operations in North America : from the commencement of the French hostilities on the frontiers of Virginia in 1753, to the surrender of Oswego, on the 14th of August, 1756, by William Livingston, William Smith, and William Alexander, called Lord Stirling (1757) (This was written by contemporaries living in the colonies as the events transpired).

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Anderson, Fred Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766, Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.

Brumwell, Stephen Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas 1755-1763, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002.

Fowler, Willam F. Jr. Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763, Walker Books, 2005.

Jennings, Francis Empire Of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America, W.W. Norton & Co. 1988.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, August 20, 2017

Episode 006: British Take Charge, Battle of the Monongahela

Last week I talked about Young George Washington’s attempt to push the French out of the Ohio Valley with his Virginia militia. That mission ended with his forces killing French soldiers just sent to talk with him, then his men captured at Fort Necessity. Washington had to sign a document taking responsibility for the assassination of French soldier, giving France a justification to go to war with Britain.

Planning in London:

Thomas Pelham-Holles,
Duke of Newcastle
(from parliament.uk)

As word of the summer of 1754’s disasters in the Ohio Valley reached Britain in September, the government decided to take decisive action. Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Duke of Newcastle, had become Prime Minister following the death of his brother earlier that year. Newcastle was a long time Whig politician who had been Secretary of the Southern Department, which was in charge of colonial affairs in North America. He understood international relations and was a strong proponent of expanding the colonies in North America.

Newcastle believed that France was pretty well blocked in Europe through a series of strategic alliances against them. A swift and decisive action in America to recapture disputed territory should be possible without engulfing Europe in another major war. He worked with William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland and King George II’s son, to develop a plan of attack. Cumberland had a reputation as a hardened soldier who fought aggressively and without mercy. When Cumberland had brutally crushed the Jacobite Uprising in 1745 people started calling him “Butcher Cumberland.”

William Augustus,
Duke of Cumberland
(from thepeerage.com)

Newcastle and Cumberland did not always agree on foreign policy issues, but it would be helpful to the plan if Newcastle could get the Duke to support an aggressive policy that would decisively secure the North American colonies. The King greatly valued his son’s views and relied on him as a military and political adviser. Unfortunately, once Newcastle brought Cumberland onto the team, Cumberland brought in Secretary of War, Henry Fox, who was a political enemy of Newcastle. Cumberland and Fox developed an even more aggressive plan than Newcastle intended. At that point though, Newcastle had no choice but to go along with it.

The team put forth an aggressive four part plan. One Army would advance on the Ohio Valley and take the French forts recently built there, as Washington had tried to do. A second would take out Fort Niagara on Lake Ontario (near Niagara Falls). A third would assault Fort Saint-Frédéric at the tip of Lake Champlain. A fourth attack would take out the French Forts on the isthmus that kept British soldiers in Nova Scotia from encroaching on mainland Canada. Such a plan not only required a significant commitment of money and resources. It required top military leaders to coordinate the assaults.

Gen. Edward Braddock
(from route40.net)

Major General Edward Braddock received command over all British forces in North America. Braddock was a professional officer with a solid reputation. He was the son of a British General of the same name. The younger Braddock joined the army at age 15 and served with distinction as a Lt. Col. in the War of Austrian Succession in the 1740’s. His promotion to Major General came in 1754 along with his command of North American forces.

Braddock had under his command, three regiments in Nova Scotia and seven independent companies stationed in New York and South Carolina. Two more regiments which had been deactivated at the end of King George’s War would be reactivated and draw in recruits. Two more Irish regiments of regulars would travel to Virginia to provide more resources. Braddock would coordinate all four simultaneous assaults using these regulars as well as any militia or Indian warriors he deemed appropriate to supplement his needs.

The colonies would have to foot the bill to pay for all these operations. The Ministry authorized Braddock to compel the colonial governors to provide for a common military fund, as well as provide quarters, supplies, and transport. Governors would help with recruiting for the two local regiments as well as provide militia.

All the major players in the British government formed a consensus that this strategy would fortify British control of North America, force France to deploy more forces to North America, thus weakening French military threats to British allies in continental Europe, and would create a unified organized military authority that could coordinate the resources of all the colonies into a single purpose. It sounded great on paper!

Braddock Organizes for Attack:

In early 1755, Gen. Braddock set sail for America with his two Irish regiments, with the intent of winning several swift and decisive victories with superior numbers of regular troops before the French had a chance to react and reinforce their North American forces.

Albany Congress

While the British attempted to unify efforts against the French in North America, the colonies themselves remained hopelessly divided. Colonial leaders though, attempted to coordinate their own response to the growing threats. In late 1754, seven colonies as well as the Iroquois Confederacy and other key tribes met in Albany NY, at what became known as the Albany Congress to discuss plans for a united front against French encroachment. It seemed few could agree on anything. Pennsylvania and Connecticut fought with each other over the Wyoming Valley, millions of acres in what is today northeastern Pennsylvania. New England colonies refused to be dragged into a scheme that would force them to commit money and resources to protect the New York border from attack. No colonies south of Maryland even bothered to attend. Notably absent Virginia claimed most of this land for themselves, and would be just as opposed to encroachment by Pennsylvania as it would the French.

Albany Congress, by Allyn Cox in US Capitol
(from flickr.com)

Despite the contention, several budding colonial leaders, including Indian trader William Johnson, Massachusetts Governor William Shirley and his protege Thomas Hutchinson, soon to be New Jersey Lt. Gov. Thomas Pownall, Pennsylvania delegate Benjamin Franklin, and New York Lt. Governor James De Lancey were among the delegates who created a Plan of Union. The plan created a single continental government with a head appointed by the King and delegates from every colony. This united body would coordinate military action across all colonies for the common defense.

The proposal met with near universal rejection by every colonial legislature that considered it. None of them wanted to cede power to a central authority. Doing so would mean a loss of political power by the colonial governments and force them to provide men and money to military adventures that did not impact them. Further, many of the colonies still had land disputes with each other, and were in no hurry to create an authority that might deprive them of their claims. The plan went nowhere. The only hope for coordinated action rested with the introduction of a strong and politically astute leader who could force the colonies to unite.

Braddock Frustrated by Local Politics

The man selected to be that leader,, Gen. Braddock, arrived in Virginia in February 1755. As a military leader, Braddock had a reputation as a capable administrator and strict disciplinarian. Throughout the spring, Braddock sent out directives instructing the various colonies as to what money, resources, and provisions they would be required to supply to the general war effort.

Braddock Campaign, 1755 (from fortedwards.org)

At the same time, he began implementing the plan of attack that had been laid out in London. Braddock would personally lead the 41st and 44th Irish regiments, along with Virginia militia, up the same path Col. Washington had taken the prior year. He would take Fort Duquesne and then work his way up the rest of the French forts in the Ohio Valley. Massachusetts Gov. William Shirley received a commission as Major General and became second in command to Braddock in the theater of operations. Shirley would lead the reactivated 50th and 51st regiments, recruited from the colonies against the French fort at Niagara. William Johnson, an Indian trader from western New York would lead a command of Mohawk warriors and other provincial soldiers from New England and New York against Fort Saint-Frédéric. A fourth expedition of New Englanders would assault the French forts in Nova Scotia. Meanwhile, Admiral Edward Boscawen would use the British fleet to prevent the French from bringing in any reinforcements down the St. Lawrence river to any of the French colonies.

Almost all the colonists, including Shirley and Johnson, thought all this was far too unrealistic. The colonies almost uniformly failed to provide the money, men, and material needed for the various military actions. Undeterred, Braddock simply purchased the needed resources on credit and figured he would stick the bill to the colonies later.

As an aside, one of the roadblocks in Virginia toward funding any military campaign was the Pistole Fee Controversy. Essentially Gov. Dinwiddie was trying to extract a fee of one Pistole (less than £1) to sign all land patents. He had the approval of the Board of Trade in London as well as the Virginia Council. The House of Burgesses, balked, issuing a resolution that read in part: Resolved, That whoever shall pay a Pistole, as a fee to the Governor, for the Use of the Seal to Patents for Lands, shall be deemed a Betrayer of the Rights and Privileges of the People. Dinwiddie essentially responded: no fee paid, you get no land patent, meaning no proof of land ownership. The Governor and legislature were stuck in this standoff, which prevented virtually anything else from getting done. Not even paying for the war seemed to break the stalemate. It is just an interesting example of how touchy the colonists could be about virtually any government fee.

Braddock Prepares his Army

Braddock wisely ignored all the petty political squabbling and focused on his military mission. Leading what was considered the main thrust of the operation Braddock began to move his army toward Fort Duquesne. Two colonists who proved valuable to this effort at least, were Benjamin Franklin, who was able to provide much of the supplies needed for the operation. George Washington volunteered to serve as an aide-de-camp to Gen. Braddock. Despite his failures the year earlier, Washington came highly recommended and was clearly familiar with the land from which he had retreated. Washington saw Braddock as a mentor who might assist with his goal of obtaining a commission in the Regular army.

Braddock knew that his professional soldiers would fight much better than the provincials. He also had far more of them than the 150 militiamen that went up against the French in the previous year. Braddock had two full regiments of Irish men, over 1000 professional soldiers. Local recruitment had increased the regimental numbers to around 1500. He also had companies from Virginia and Maryland to provide assistance. In all, Braddock commanded a force of around 2200 men.

Among his officers and men were a great many who would go on to play key military roles in the Revolution. Aside from Washington, the expedition included Lt. Col. Thomas Gage, future British Commander, also future American Generals Charles Lee, Horatio Gates, Hugh Mercer, Daniel Morgan, and Adam Stephen, as well as future frontiersman Daniel Boone.

Missing from his forces were any significant numbers Indian warriors. As he assembled his men at Fort Cumberland, formerly called Wills Creek, Braddock had an opportunity to take on hundreds of warriors into his command. Six different tribal chiefs came to meet with Braddock. One even brought with him detailed plans about the defenses at Fort Duquesne. These tribes were eager to see the French forts removed from the Ohio Valley so that the pro-English could reassert control. Braddock informed them that if the forts were captured, the British would take control of the forts and that much of the land would be used for British colonization.

Not interested in helping the British acquire their land, virtually all of the local tribes walked away. Commenting on Benjamin Franklin’s concerns about the lack of native support, Braddock told him, “Savages may indeed be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia; but upon the king’s regular and disciplined troops, Sir, it is impossible they should make an impression.”

Braddock had some reason for confidence. He heavily outnumbered the French force at Duquesne, which had less than 1000 soldiers, overwhelmingly Canadian militia and not regular troops. The remainder of the roughly 1600 man force were Indians. A few of the Indian warriors were from local tribes, mostly Shawnee. The bulk of the native contingent were from French allied tribes from other parts of Canada: Ottowas, Mississaugas, Wyandots, and Potawatomis. Fort Duquesne itself offered little advantage for such a large battle since the fort could only house about 200 troops.

The Battle of the Monongahela

The French commander, receiving intelligence about the large British force preparing to attack, developed plans to destroy the fort and retreat. Before doing so, however, he thought it was worth an attempt to ambush the British army in the field. He sent a contingent of more than half his force, over 800 men, to attack the advancing British. Only about 100 were French regulars. Another 150 were Canadian militia, with the remainder Indians.

Braddock’s advance slowed to a crawl because of the need to carry so many wagons and heavy artillery through the woods, over mountains, and through swamps. He moved forward with about 1300-1500 of his best soldiers (historians differ on the exact number) with the remaining third of his force lagging behind to deal with the wagons and heavy equipment. This way, he could attack the force with infantry, as soon as possible, but still have artillery for a siege a short time later if needed.

Battle of the Monongahela (from kronoskaf.com)

By July 9, Braddock’s main force arrived about ten miles from Fort Duquesne. Lt. Col. Thomas Gage led an advance guard of about 300 infantry to protect about 250 men who were cutting trees and creating a road for the main column. Around 1:00 PM the two sides made contact. The ensuing battle is one that historians often use to point the stupidity of European tactics of war in the American wilderness.

The Indians allied with the French immediately scattered behind trees and other cover, taking shots at the British who remained shoulder to shoulder in lines as they fired into forests where they rarely even saw a target. The result was a one-sided slaughter. The Indians picked off most of the officers and killed large numbers of troops. Gen. Braddock was able to rally the troops for a time, but after he was shot in the lung, the British lines began to break.

Military Tactics

This might be a good time to ask the question, why on earth did anyone think it was a good military tactic to stand out in the open, shoulder to shoulder, and make one’s self an easy target? Part of the reason was motivation. European soldiers were often uninterested in the outcome of a war. It mostly just determine which ruler would be exploiting them next. Left to their own devices, they had every incentive to flee the battlefield at the earliest opportunity. Maintaining lines prevented most of them from running.

The lines also made sense given the weapons of the day. Muskets were terribly inaccurate. The only chance of hitting anyone was to have everyone shoot at once from a concentrated point and hope that some of the balls would make it to the enemy. If the enemy kept lines, it meant none of them could get behind you either. Whichever side broke its lines and ran first would likely be the ones decimated by the charge of the victorious lines chasing them down.

One might also ask why muskets were so terribly inaccurate. Much more accurate rifles had been around for over 200 years, but were almost never used in battle. The reason was that loading a rifle was much more difficult and time consuming. The ammunition literally had to be hammered down the barrel of the rifle since the ball had to be the same size as the barrel. As a result, it could take several minutes to load one shot. By contrast, a musket could be loaded and fired about three times per minute. The time it would take to reload a rifle was more that it would take the enemy to run 100 yards across the field and bayonet you. Also after a few shots, a residue would build up in rifle barrels, making them impossible to load again until cleaned. It was not until the mid-1800’s that balls were developed that could expand on firing, thus making loading a rifle just as fast as a musket. So in the 1700’s, rifles made sense for hunting, but not combat.

Heavy British Casualties

Back to the battle: it seems that many of the Indians had hunting rifles. This allowed them to take out the officers and pick off others from a greater distance. Since they could disperse and take cover, there was nowhere for the British to charge.

The Wounding of Gen. Braddock by Robert Griffing (from lordnelsons.com)

After Braddock died, British lines, which had already taken heavy casualties, began to fall back. The Indians then charged with knives and tomahawks, causing the British to break their lines and run for their lives. Washington tried to coordinate the retreat. By all accounts, he behaved gallantly. He had several horses shot out from under him, and later discovered four different bullets had clipped his uniform, though none actually hit his body. The men spent two days falling back to reach the rear guard of 800 soldiers handling the wagons and equipment. They decided to destroy what they could not carry quickly and spent the next five days making their way back to Fort Cumberland.

Of the 1300 or so British who engaged in battle, records show 456 killed and 422 wounded. Out of 86 officers, 63 were killed or wounded. Many of those killed likely survived the initial battle but were killed as the victorious Indians took scalps and killed any wounded who could not be taken as slaves. By contrast, the French and Indians only suffered 30 killed and 57 wounded.

Ironically, after the battle, the British had their best opportunity to take Fort Duquesne. Once the Indians had secured scalps, prisoners, and captured equipment, they decided they were done and went home. Fort Duquesne’s defenses were reduced to a few hundred men, mostly Canadian militia. This was exactly why professional officers did not like to rely on Indians.

The British still had over 1300 troops. Had they not destroyed their canon and fled, but instead advanced on the Fort after regrouping, they probably could have easily won. But they did not know the Indians had left. They had lost their commander, and the men were probably too terrified to return. The result was a humiliating loss for the British

Retreat

The surviving British regulars fled back to Philadelphia. There, they demanded to be put up in “winter quarters” despite the fact that it was July. They had decided they were done for the season. Most of the militia deserted as well. Only a few hundred men remained at Fort Cumberland. Local Indians in the Ohio valley had no choice but to throw in their lot with the French. Indian war parties continue to raid any British farms or settlements anywhere west of the Alleghenies, as far down as the Shenandoah Valley. There was no force available to stop them. Any British colonists not killed, got the message and moved back east. The French now decisively controlled the Ohio Valley.

Next Week: We’ll take a look at some of the other military engagements of 1755, and then get the British Plan B after losing the fight for the Ohio Valley.

- - -

Next Episode 7: Acadia, Lake George, & Loudon's Arrival

Previous Episode 5: Jumonville & Fort Necessity

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give. Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

You may also donate via Venmo, Zelle, or popmoney (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)

Click here to see my Patreon Page

An alternative to Patreon is SubscribeStar. For anyone who has problems with Patreon, you can get the same benefits by subscribing at SubscribeStar.

Click here to go to my SubscribeStar Page

Visit the American Revolution Podcast (https://amrev.podbean.com).

Further Reading

Websites

Thomas Pelham-Holles, the Duke of Newcastle, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Pelham-Holles-1st-duke-of-Newcastle

William Augustus, the Duke of Cumberland, http://www.unofficialroyalty.com/prince-william-augustus-duke-of-cumberland

Jacobite Rising, 1745: https://britishheritage.com/jacobite-rebellion-1745

Henry Fox, http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1754-1790/member/fox-henry-1705-74

Fort Niagara: https://www.oldfortniagara.org/history

Fort Saint-Frédéric: http://www.fortwiki.com/Fort_St._Frederic

Gen. Edward Braddock: http://www.encyclopedia.com/people/history/us-history-biographies/edward-braddock

Proceedings of the Albany Conference: http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-05-02-0096

Albany Plan of Union: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1750-1775/albany-plan

William Johnson: https://www.varsitytutors.com/earlyamerica/early-america-review/volume-1/sir-william-johnson-indian-superintendent-colonial

Gov. William Shirley: http://www.celebrateboston.com/biography/governor/william-shirley.htm

Thomas Hutchinson: http://www.americanrevolution.com/biographies/colonials/thomas_hutchinson

James De Lancey: http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/legal-history-eras-01/history-era-01-delancey.html

Thomas Pownall: http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1754-1790/member/pownall-thomas-1722-1805

Adm. Edward Boscawen: http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/boscawen_edward_3E.html

The First "No Taxation Without Representation Crisis,, by Bob Rupert (Pistole Fee Controversy) Journal of the American Revolution (2016):
https://allthingsliberty.com/2016/03/the-first-no-taxation-without-representation-crisis

Gen. Charles Lee: http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1117.html

Gen. Horatio Gates: http://www.revolutionary-war.net/horatio-gates.html

Gen. Hugh Mercer: http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/hugh-mercer

Gen. Adam Stephen: http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/adam-stephen

Daniel Boone: http://www.notablebiographies.com/Be-Br/Boone-Daniel.html

Fort Cumberland: http://www.fortedwards.org/braddock/sites/cbe.htm

Fort Duquesne http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/fort-duquesne

Battle of the Monongahela: http://www.britishbattles.com/french-indian-war/battle-of-monongahela-1755-braddocks-defeat

Free eBooks:
(links to archive.org unless otherwise noted)

The Ohio Company of Virginia and the westward movement, 1748-1792,by Kenneth P. Bailey (1939).

The Hero of the Monongahela; Historical Sketch, by Monongahéla de Beaujeu (1913) (short discussion from the French perspective).

Washington's expeditions (1753-1754) and Braddock's expedition (1755), by James Hadden, (1910).

The History of Canada, Vol. 3 by William Kingsford, (1887).

A review of the military operations in North America : from the commencement of the French hostilities on the frontiers of Virginia in 1753, to the surrender of Oswego, on the 14th of August, 1756, by William Livingston, William Smith, and William Alexander, called Lord Stirling (1757) (This was written by contemporaries living in the colonies as the events transpired).

History of Cumberland, by William Harrison Lowdermilk (1878).

England In The Age Of The American Revolution, by J.B. Namier (1930).

Memoir Upon the Late War in North America, Between the French and English, 1755-60, by Pierre Pouchot, Vol. 1, & Vol. 2 (1866).

The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne, in 1755 Under Major-General Edward Braddock, by Winthrop Sargent (1855).

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Anderson, Fred Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766, Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.

Brumwell, Stephen Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the Americas 1755-1763, by Stephen Brumwell Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002.

Fowler, Willam F. Jr. Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763, Walker Books, 2005.

Jennings, Francis Empire Of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America, W.W. Norton & Co. 1988.

Preston, David Braddock's Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution, Oxford Univ. Press, 2015.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.