Sunday, August 23, 2020

ARP163 Germantown

Two weeks ago, General Howe entered Philadelphia, capping a months-long campaign that began in New York, then down to Maryland, then the overland march to Philadelphia.  Howe had out-maneuvered Washington's army and taken the city without any real last stand after defeating the Continentals at Brandywine.

Last week, we caught up on what was going on with Burgoyne’s army in New York as General Howe made his way from Maryland to Philadelphia. Today we are going back to the Philadelphia area to see Washington’s response to Howe’s capture of the city.  Although the British general had reached his goal, he had left General Burgoyne swinging in the wind without any support in upstate New York.  Of greater concern to General Howe was the fact that he had not opened up the Delaware River, meaning his invading army could not link up with the navy and reconnect to the outside supply lines.  

Occupation of Philadelphia

General Howe left the bulk of his army in Germantown.  Today Germantown is part of Philadelphia.  However, in 1777, when the northern border of Philadelphia was Vine Street in what is today center city, Germantown was still several miles north of the city.  

Continentals surround the Chew House at
Germantown (from British Battles)
As you might discern from its name, it was settled by immigrants from the Palatine region, in what is today southwestern Germany.  By 1777 the Germans had lived in the area for several generations but still spoke the German language rather than English.  Most of the German people who came to Pennsylvania were members of pacifist groups who had fled the nearly continual state of warfare that defined much of Europe at this time.  They felt no affinity with the militaristic Hessians who fought with the British.  At the same time, as pacifists, most did not join the armed opposition of the patriot movement either.  Some had fled the area in advance of the army’s occupation.  However, many more stayed put and tried to make the best of life under military occupation.

General Howe went with General Cornwallis to Philadelphia with about half of the army.  Howe would occupied a house on Market Street, which had once been the residence of Lieutenant Governor Richard Penn.  Most recently Pennsylvania General John Cadwalader had lived there before fleeing the British occupation of the city.  Howe also maintained a headquarters at the home of James Logan, about a mile south of Germantown.

Howe’s first order of business was to open up the Delaware River so that he could reconnect with the British Navy and the outside world.  He had to deploy a brigade of 3000 soldiers to march back to Head of Elk, Maryland and escort more supplies back to Philadelphia overland because the patriots still controlled the Delaware River.  He also had to prepare for an attack by the Continentals, most likely from the north.

In Philadelphia, Howe made every attempt to prevent looting or plundering by British soldiers.  He still wanted to win over the locals and be accepted as a liberator, not a conqueror.  Howe needed to establish local support so that he could move the regular army on to other cities at some point.

American Plan of Attack

Almost as soon as Howe marched into Philadelphia, Washington was planning to attack.  On September, 26, the same day Howe marched into Philadelphia, Washington moved his Continentals to Pennybacker’s Mill, today called Schwenksville, just over twenty miles from Germantown.  There, he consolidated his forces, reporting on the 28th that he had 8000 Continentals and another 3000 militia at his camp.  The next day, the Continentals marched about five miles closer to the enemy camp and a few days later moved about three miles closer, putting them about sixteen miles away from each other.

Map of Germantown attack (from Wikimedia)
Washington’s intelligence indicated that less than half of the British Army was camped at Germantown.  Actually, it was considerably more, but Washington’s total force still slightly outnumbered the roughly 9000 enemy soldiers camped at Germantown.  The British had laid out their camp in a line forming east to west.  On the east, or British right flank, camped battalions commanded by Generals James Grant and Edward Mathew.  On the left flank were battalions under the command of Generals Grey, Agnew, Stirn, and Knyphausen’s Hessians.  The line extended all the way to the Schuylkill River where Hessian jaegers held the left flank.  

Washington, as he liked to do, developed a rather complex plan of attack, dividing his forces into four separate columns, each approaching the enemy from a different direction.  General John Sullivan, who was still awaiting court martial for his actions on Long Island and at Brandywine, commanded the first column, supported by Anthony Wayne’s brigade, at least those who had survived the Paoli Massacre.  Lord Stirling and General Maxwell would follow Sullivan’s column as a reserve force.  

Nathanael Greene commanded the second column, which was the largest battalion, containing about two-thirds of the Continental Army.  His force would attack the British right flank commanded by Generals Grant and Matthews.  A third column made up of Maryland and New Jersey militia under the command of General William Smallwood, who had lost half of his command to desertion and failed to engage the enemy at the Paoli Massacre, would march to the east and attempt to move around to the rear of the British right flank.  A fourth column commanded by General John Armstrong would march to the west to try to move behind the British left flank.

Washington ordered all four columns to engage in a night march so that all would be in position for an attack beginning at 5:00 AM on the morning of October 4.  From there, the forces would converge from different positions on the British camp with a bayonet charge.

William Smallwood

Before I get to the battle, I want to give a quick background on two new generals.  I mentioned William Smallwood a few weeks ago during the Paoli Massacre.  Smallwood came from a prosperous Maryland family which owned a plantation.  As a boy, his family sent him to England for his education where he attended Eaton, where he may have been a classmate of Barry St. Leger.  

William Smallwood
(from Wikimedia)
Smallwood returned home to run the family plantation.  He also served in the Maryland Assembly, like his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather before him.  Coming from a family of wealth and status within the colony, Smallwood also served in the colonial militia. During the French and Indian War served as an officer on several campaigns.  

In 1775 Smallwood attended the Maryland Convention and was an early advocate of armed resistance to British policies.  When Maryland sent soldiers, Smallwood was among the first to go to New York as a colonel.  He served on Long Island and was wounded at the Battle of White Plains in 1776.

He returned home to recuperate and did not rejoin the army for some time.  During his convalescence, Congress promoted him to general.  When the British landed at Head of Elk, Maryland in August 1777.  Smallwood decided it was time to get back into the fight and raised a regiment of 2000 Maryland militia.  These were the troops that scattered when the British attacked General Wayne’s Continentals at Paoli.  He recovered about half of his army that had not run home and joined Washington’s Continentals for the continuing fight.

Washington ordered Smallwood to take his division on the far American left, to go around the British right flank and attack their rear.

John Armstrong

The other division commander that I have not mentioned yet was General John Armstrong.  Born in Ireland, Armstrong was educated as a civil engineer.  He came to Pennsylvania in 1740 as a surveyor for the Penn family.  One of the areas he surveyed became the new town of Carlisle, Pennsylvania.  He liked the area so much that he settled there and started a family.

John Armstrong, Sr.
(from Founder of Day)
During the French and Indian War, Armstrong served as a colonel in the Pennsylvania militia.  He led 2700 militia soldiers during the Forbes expedition to recapture Fort Duquesne, today Pittsburgh, from the French.  During this expedition, he served alongside fellow militia colonel George Washington.

By 1775, Armstrong was a brigadier general in the Pennsylvania militia and an outspoken patriot.  When Pennsylvania joined the fight in early 1776, Armstrong received a commission as brigadier general in the Continental Army.  He put his engineering experience to work, setting up the defenses at Charleston, South Carolina prior to the British attack on Fort Sullivan. 

Armstrong resigned his Continental commission less than a year after he received it to become a major general in command of the Pennsylvania state militia.  He commanded the left flank of the American line at Brandywine.  Since the British attacked the right flank, he did not see much action that day, but had to retreat with the rest of the army after the American right flank collapsed.  At Germantown, Washington gave Armstrong command of the division on the American right flank with orders to get behind the enemy flank and attack.

Battle Begins

That night, the troops struggled to get into position over dark and unfamiliar terrain. The first Americans to make contact with the enemy were from the head of Sullivan’s column, led by French General Thomas Conway.  The Americans began a firefight with British pickets,who had time to fire a signal gun and warn the British army of the American attack.  Colonel Thomas Musgrave of the 40th Regiment of Regulars commanded the defense against Conway’s attack.  Both sides poured in reinforcements.  Anthony Wayne’s continentals reportedly fought viciously and shouted “remember Paoli” as they ruthlessly cut down the enemy, even men trying to surrender.

General Howe personally rushed toward the sound of the gunfire confronting his retreating soldiers.  He ordered the men to form and told them it was only a scouting party.  About that time, an American cannon hit the tree under which Howe was sitting atop his horse, making clear that this was no scouting party.

Chew House

At sunrise, a dense fog remained over the battlefield, preventing both sides from determining where anyone was and leading to confusion.  As Musgrave’s regulars fell back against the much larger attacking force, he ordered his six companies to take shelter inside a large stone house owned by Pennsylvania Chief Justice Benjamin Chew. As the rest of the British line retreated, the British inside the Chew House became isolated.  

Initially, several of Washington’s officers proposed leaving one regiment to keep the defenders of the Chew House from moving and continuing on with the attack. General Henry Knox, however, objected.  He thought it an error to leave a force in their rear.  He proposed taking the house before moving on.  Washington agreed. 

Americans storm the Chew House
(from Fandom)
The Americans sent an officer under a flag of truce to demand surrender. The British defenders fired on the officer and killed him.  Next, Knox brought up several field cannons that could smash the doors and windows, but could not penetrate the thick stone walls of the house.  The Americans charged the house, but were shot down.  The few who made it inside were quickly cut down by the defenders.  During the assault’s Washington’s aide, Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, the son of Continental Congress delegate Henry Laurens, was wounded. Another officer, John Marshall, the future Chief Justice, who had received a minor wound at Brandywine, received a more serious one in the assault on the Chew House.

The attempt to take the house went on for over an hour.  More American regiments, drawn by the sound of gunfire marched toward the house.  General Adam Stephen, who was the advance of General Greene’s main column, marched his battalion over as well.  General Greene’s main column of Continentals was behind schedule and had not yet reached the battlefield.

General Wayne had advanced beyond the Chew House, but hearing the firefight continuing there, believed that Sullivan must be having trouble and returned to assist.  In the fog, Stephen’s regiment and Wayne’s regiment saw each other and thought that they must be the enemy.  Both fired on each other and caused both brigades to flee in panic.

As Sullivan’s division continued its frustratingly ineffective assault on the Chew House, British Generals Grey and Grant led their regulars to attack Sullivan on both his right and left flanks.  Most of Sullivan’s continentals feared they were being surrounded in the fog.  They panicked and fled the battlefield.

Greene Attack

When Greene’s force finally arrived, it struck the British right and forced back the defenders.  The Americans soon found themselves in the British camp as the regulars retreated in the face of superior numbers.  Greene’s men had smashed the British right flank with fair success.  But with Sullivan’s division already dispersed, the British who had deployed there, now turned on General Greene’s flank.

Some of Greene’s force had fallen out of formation as soldiers took an opportunity to loot the enemy camp.  When the British counter-attacked, the men were not in their lines and ended up fleeing the field.

One of Greene’s divisions, led by Pennsylvania General Peter Muhlenberg pushed deep into British lines, only to find himself cut off from the rest of his own army.  His division had to fight its way back through the British lines to join the rest of the Continental Army.  One of Muhlenberg’s regiments, the 9th Virginia, found itself isolated and surrounded by the British counter-attack, forcing the entire 400 man regiment to surrender.  The remaining bulk of Green’s force retreated to safety.

Retreat

Colonel Pulaski, who now commanded a cavalry regiment, was being held in the rear.  When the British attacked, his men fled on their horses, riding right into Greene’s retreating infantry.  The infantry thought the cavalry were British soldiers and scattered.  Greene struggled to restore order as the men retreated. 
 
British at Germantown (from MoAR)
By this time, British General Cornwallis had brought up fresh battalions of regulars from Philadelphia.  Cornwallis pursued the retreating Americans for eight miles, but then gave up his pursuit.  The retreating Americans marched a full 24 miles back to Pennybacker’s Mill, where they had camped two days earlier.  Most of the army between the march to Germantown, and the retreat, marched over 40 miles that day and night, in addition to fighting a pitched battle.

Many of the men had not slept for nearly two days, having marched the previous night to get into position for the attack.  To give an example of how tired they were.  There is a story of General Muhlenberg during the retreat.  He tried to get his horse to jump a fence, but the horse refused.  As Muhlenberg paused for a few minutes while some soldiers broke down the fence to let him pass, Muhlenberg fell asleep in his saddle.  He awoke a minute later when a bullet whistled past his ear and he heard the screams of the enemy charging his position.

Over the course of the battle, General Stephen was found at one point nearly passed out on the battlefield.  He was accused of drunkenness and ultimately lost his command as a result.  He would face a court martial and be cashiered a short time later.  He probably had been drinking, but perhaps not to excess.  His condition was likely more one of exhaustion.  Also during the retreat, General Conway was found asleep in a barn.  General Pulaski also got caught napping in a farmhouse as the army retreated.

Francis Nash

During the retreat, Continental General Francis Nash used his reserve force as a rear guard against the advancing British.  Nash, who was from North Carolina, had only received promotion to brigadier general a few months earlier.   He had a long history of supporting the patriot cause.  He had fought at the Battle of Alamance back in 1771 and had served as an officer in North Carolina at the Battle of Moore’s Creek Bridge and was present the attack at Fort Sullivan.

After his promotion to general in February 1777, Nash remained in the south, trying to recruit more volunteers.  However, when the more senior general from North Carolina, James Moore fell ill and died in April, Nash took command of the North Carolina regiments fighting with Washington.  He had commanded those regiments at Brandywine, and had been held in reserve at Germantown.

During the Continental retreat, Nash advanced his division to buy time for the rest of the retreating army.  In his attempt to slow the British advance, a British cannonball struck Nash in the hip while riding his horse. The same ball killed his aide, Major James Witherspoon, the son of a signer of the Declaration.  Nash was carried from the field, but died from his wounds a few days later.

The British also lost a general that day.  About that same time, as Cornwallis’ divisions pushed on the American retreat, an American sniper shot British General James Agnew, who fell from his horse and died.

I’ve talked about the two main divisions, but remember General Washington had also sent two other divisions, one to march around the British left and the other around the British right in order to attack from behind.   General Armstrong’s Pennsylvania militia, assigned to attack the British left, ran into a group of Hessian jaegers near Wissahickon Creek.   The Hessians pulled back across the bridge. Instead of charging them, the militia just brought up their cannons and fired from a distance.  When the Hessians charged back across the bridge, the militia pulled back and retreated from the battle.

General Smallwood’s Maryland and New Jersey militia had been assigned to attack from behind the British right.  They had the longest march of all the divisions, and took so long to march into position that the battle was over before they arrived. Smallwood joined the Continental retreat without engaging the enemy.

Aftermath

The British suffered about 70 killed and 450 wounded.  The Americans lost about 150 killed, over 500 wounded and nearly 450 captured, mostly from the 9th Virginia.

The attack at Germantown showed that the Americans were still ready to fight after the loss of Philadelphia, but accomplished little else.  The Continental Army pulled back about a day’s march from the British encampment at Germantown.  Washington established a headquarters at Whitemarsh, while his army nursed its wounds and planned what to do next.  They would remain there until December, when they moved into winter quarters at Valley Forge.

Assault on Chew House (from British Battles)
The British remained in possession of Philadelphia and Germantown for the next few weeks.  General Howe then abandoned Germantown, pulling all of his forces into entrenchments closer to Philadelphia.  There, the British and Hessians settled into their winter quarters.

Many military analysts say the battle of Germantown very easily could have been an American victory had Washington not got hung up at the Chew House, and instead had taken most of Sullivan’s division forward to meet up with Greene’s division.  Many also blame the bad luck of fog causing confusion on the battlefield.  Others would argue that drawing up such a complex plan of attack that required far too much coordinated action without communication was doomed to fail.  I think much of this comes with the benefit of hindsight.  The Continentals did not get the victory for which they had hoped, but also were able to retreat with most of their army intact and prepare to fight another day.

Next week, British General Clinton in New York City ventures north to see if he can help Burgoyne’s Northern Army, by this time in serious trouble.

- - -

Next Episode 164 Forts Clinton and Montgomery 



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Further Reading

Websites

John Adams Diary: “1777 Septr. 21. Sunday.,”  https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/01-02-02-0007-0003-0006




Fyers, Evan W. H. “GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HOWE'S OPERATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1777. The Battle on the Brandywine Creek—11 September—and the Action at Germantown—4 October.” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 8, no. 34, 1929, pp. 228–241. www.jstor.org/stable/44232285

Lambdin, Alfred C. “Battle of Germantown.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 1, no. 4, 1877, pp. 368–403. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20084306

Tompkins, Hamilton B. “Contemporary Account of the Battle of Germantown.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 11, no. 3, 1887, pp. 330–332. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20083215

“Battle of Germantown from a British Account.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 11, no. 1, 1887, pp. 112–114. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20083188

Von Muenchausen, Friedrich Ernst. “Notes on the Battle of Germantown.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 23, no. 4, 1899, pp. 483–487. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20085880

Murphy, Orville T. “The Battle of Germantown and the Franco-American Alliance of 1778.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 82, no. 1, 1958, pp. 55–64. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20089039

“A Partial List of Pennsylvania Troops Killed, Wounded, and Captured at the Battle of Germantown, October 4, 1777.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 40, no. 2, 1916, pp. 241–243. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20086266

Darlington, William M. “Major-General John Armstrong.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 1, no. 2, 1877, pp. 183–187. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20084279

Lapp, Derrick E. “The Death of Lt. Michael Grosh: The Maryland Militia at Germantown” Journal of the American Revolution, February 11, 2020. 

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Pennypacker, Samuel W. Anthony Wayne, J.B. Lippincott company, 1908.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965 (borrow only).
 
Trussell, John B. B. Jr. The Battle of Germantown, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1974.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*


Drury, Bob & Clavin, Tom Valley Forge, Simon & Schuster, 2018.


McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign, Vol. 2, Stackpole Books, 2007.



Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Pioneer Press, 1980 (orig. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003


Ward, Christopher The War of the Revolution, Macmillan, 1952.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, August 16, 2020

ARP162 Raid on Fort Ticonderoga

Last week I talked about the battle of Freeman’s Farm, where the Americans fought General Burgoyne’s army to a draw in upstate New York.  The British were struggling to advance, but their real problem was a lack of good supply lines.

General Horatio Gates had taken command of the northern army, replacing General Philip Schuyler in late August.  He had lobbied for the command in Philadelphia for months before the loss of Ticonderoga convinced Congress that it was time for a new leader.  Once in command, Gates traveled to Albany and contacted General Lincoln and General Stark who were still in what is today Vermont and asked them uh, so what do you guys think we should do?

Fort Ticonderoga (from Wikimedia)

Lincoln and Stark developed a plan to harass Burgoyne’s rear and disrupt his supply lines from Canada.  As I mentioned in an earlier episode, Lincoln originally wanted Stark’s militia army to join up with the Continentals further south.  Stark’s refusal meant that his men were in place to contest the battle of Bennington.  Rather than continue to fight with Stark, Lincoln got on board with the idea of keeping these local militia separate and tried to find another use for them.

In September, before the battle of Freeman’s Farm, Lincoln came up with a plan to create more havoc behind British lines.  General Burgoyne’s forces had captured Fort Ticonderoga in July.  After that, they had then sailed down Lake Champlain to Skenesboro, marched through the forest to force the Americans out of Fort Ann and Fort Edward, and by mid September had crossed the Hudson river and were marching south toward Albany.

General Burgoyne had asked General Carlton in Canada to deploy some of his forces to garrison Fort Ticonderoga.  Carleton pointed out that Ticonderoga was in New York, not Canada, and that it was Burgoyne’s problem, not his.  In fact, Lord Germain had given precise orders on what regiments were to go to New York under Burgoyne and which would remain in Canada under Carlton.  The general would not deviate from those instructions.  So Burgoyne left one regiment of British regulars and one regiment of German Brunswickers to garrison the fort and hold Mount Independence, or what the British still called Rattlesnake Hill. 

Rather than continue to try to maintain a supply line from Skenesborough through the forest to the Hudson River, the British reverted to their original plan to move supplies down Lake George to Fort George.  From there, an existing road allowed easier transport to the army that was now moving down the Hudson River.

The American General Lincoln planned to disrupt the British supply lines by deploying militia against the British outposts that were relatively small and isolated.  Lincoln had accumulated about 2500 soldiers ready for duty.  From this force, he developed a plan to deploy 500 soldiers each under three different commanders.  One division would take and hold Skenesborough.  Another would assault Mount Independence.  It was hoped that these two divisions would distract the British as a third group assaulted Fort Ticonderoga.

John Brown

To lead the assault on the Fort, General Lincoln turned to Colonel John Brown.  Colonel Brown is an interesting character who deserves a little background.  We have already crossed paths with Colonel Brown several times in our story already.

Brown was born in Massachusetts in 1744, no relationship to the famous abolitionist of the same name, He attended Yale College and studied law in Rhode Island under his brother in law, Oliver Arnold, uncle of Benedict Arnold.  He then moved to upstate New York where he took a position as the king’s attorney, essentially what we would call today a government prosecutor.  Shortly before the war began, he moved to Pittsfield in western Massachusetts and won election to the colonial legislature.

Benedict Arnold
(from Wikimedia)
Brown was active in committees of correspondence before the war and even when on a mission to Quebec to see if there was any interest in getting them involved in the revolution.  Brown found the Quebecois unreceptive, but did note that Fort Ticonderoga in early 1775 was a valuable prize that the British had left relatively unguarded.

When fighting broke out at Lexington and Concord, Brown worked with Samuel Parsons to assemble a raiding party to capture Fort Ticonderoga.  As a member of the Pittsfield militia, Brown met with the local militia commander James Easton to combine their forces with the Green Mountain Boys under Ethan Allen to take the fort.  As they were preparing to do so, Colonel Benedict Arnold showed up and tried to take command.  Brown, along with Easton, Allen, and just about everyone else, seemed to take an immediate dislike to Arnold and were among his first haters.  

After they captured the Fort, Brown was given the honor of delivering the news to Congress. His refusal to acknowledge Arnold’s role in his message to Congress put him on Arnold’s personal enemies list.  Brown took a commission as major in the Continental Army and spent the rest of 1775 under the command of General Richard Montgomery, first scouting enemy positions in Canada and also engaging in several skirmishes with the enemy. 

In late 1775, Colonel Arnold made his famous wilderness march to Quebec that I discussed back in Episode 76.  Arnold and Brown, once again, had to work with each other.  During the New Year’s Eve attack on Quebec, Brown was given command of the attack on the main gates, which was designed to divert attention as Mongomery and Arnold launched the real attack on the other side of the city. 

During the retreat, Arnold accused Brown of stealing property from captured British officers.  Brown demanded a court martial to clear his name, but never got one.  Brown, in turn, brought thirteen charges against Arnold, which likewise were never brought to a hearing.  After Arnold’s success and Valcour Bay in late 1776, Arnold’s reputation nationally had made him a hero once again.  A frustrated Brown published his pamphlet where he famously wrote of Arnold "Money is this man's God, and to get enough of it he would sacrifice his country."  

There is a story that shortly after that, Arnold threatened to attack Brown if he ever saw him.  Brown got word of this and went to a dinner party that Arnold was attending and confronted him.  At the party, Brown got right in Arnold’s face and called him a scoundrel, the same sort of language that had led to the MacIntosh-Burnett duel in Georgia.  Arnold, however, did not take the bait, and simply ignored Brown.

Congress promoted Arnold to brigadier general in early 1777, and swept away Brown’s charges without a hearing.   Brown, by this time a Lieutenant Colonel, resigned his commission and returned to Pittsfield.  It is not certain why Brown resigned.  It seems likely that his resignation was related to Congress’ decision to promote Arnold and dismiss Brown’s charges against the new general. Whatever the reason, by spring 1777, Brown was back to practicing law in Pittsfield, Massachusetts.

Whatever ill-will Brown harbored, over the military politics, when Burgoyne invaded New York in the summer of 1777, Brown as a Massachusetts militia colonel, made his services available to General Lincoln.

The Mission

General Lincoln tasked Colonel Brown with the attack on Fort Ticonderoga.  On September 13, 1777 Brown departed Pawlet, Vermont with 500 hand-picked men.  Among his men were portions of the Seth Warner’s regiment, the former Green Mountain Boys who had taken Fort Ticonderoga with Brown over two years prior.

Benjamin Lincoln
(from Wikimedia)
Colonel Johnson led another 500 militia for the assault on Mount Independence.  One source for the account identifies him as Colonel Thomas Johnson of the Vermont militia.  Another source identifies him as Colonel Samuel Johnson of the Massachusetts militia.  Since General Lincoln’s account only calls him Colonel Johnson, I’m not sure I have a definitive answer as to who this guy was.  But a guy named Colonel Johnson led the attack on Mount Independence.  

Colonel Benjamin Ruggles Woodbridge of the Massachusetts militia led another 500 men to secure Skenesborough.  After the three colonels departed with their troops, General Lincoln personally took another 600 soldiers on September 17, leaving only about 400 in Pawlet.  Lincoln set out to join up with Colonel Woodbridge near Skenesborough.

The mission required speed.  The men left behind tents and any other heavy baggage.  They carried what food and ammunition they could use, with only a little extra carried in the saddlebags of some of the cavalry that went with them.

Once all the men were in the field, General Lincoln received orders from General Gates to recall all of the soldiers and move south to meet up with the main army, which was about to fight the battle of Freeman’s Farm that I discussed last week.  Lincoln turned around and began to head back to Pawlet.  He also dispatched messengers to the three divisions to do the same.  However, they did not get these messages in time.

Raid on Ticonderoga

Brown marched his men south, crossing Lake Champlain at a narrow area, then marching north to Ticonderoga.  According to Brown’s report.  The men marched all night, launching a dawn attack on the morning of September 18th.  Other reports indicate they were in the area for at least two days observing the British garrison.  It is likely that Brown, a former scout himself, did at least send an advance team to get intelligence on the British defenses before his attack.

Brown deployed Captain Ebenezer Allen and a group of twenty rangers to retake Mount Defiance.  That is where the British had famously deployed cannons to force the American abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga.  The Rangers used knives and tomahawks to kill or capture the enemy company, most of whom were asleep on the mountaintop.  His men retook the mountain without a shot fired and without raising any alarm.

There were nearly 1000 British and German defenders at the fort.  Brown was attacking with only 500 men.  So even ignoring the fort walls and artillery, the British had a numerical advantage.  Brown, however, had surprise on his side.  Nearly half of the garrison was outside the fort walls, not expecting any sort of attack.  When the Americans approached, the pickets mistook them for returning Canadian militia.  The Americans captured the guards without a shot fired.  

The Americans rounded up over 300 prisoners as the stunned garrison could not react to the attack before the Americans had them.  Most of the prisoners were taken at the Lake George landing where the British maintained a fleet of batteaux and small ships for transporting men and supplies.  

The British did manage to close the doors of the fort and keep the attackers at bay from behind the fort walls.  Colonel Brown sent an officer to demand the fort’s surrender.  The commander Brigadier General Henry Watson Powell refused to surrender.  I think his response was something like this.  Actually, Powell responded much more professionally, and not nearly as funny saying: "The Garrison invested to my charge, I shall defend to the last."

The Americans fired on the fort with some of the field cannons they had captured, but did not have nearly enough firepower to knock down any walls.  Even if they did, they did not have the overwhelming numbers to storm the defensive artillery and take the fort from the garrison.  With enemy forces still occupying artillery on top of Mount Independence, even taking the fort could lead to the attackers putting themselves in a vulnerable position. Brown had orders from Lincoln only to harass and not to attempt to recapture the fort unless an easy opportunity presented itself.  

Instead, Brown’s attackers satisfied themselves by destroying or carrying away everything around the fort, all the outbuildings, ships, food, supplies, and prisoners.  The men ran off all the horses and cattle, denying transport and provisions to the enemy.  British General Powell could only watch with frustration from behind the fort walls.

In addition to taking over 300 enemy prisoners, the Americans also recaptured more than 100 American prisoners held by the British, most of whom were being held after their capture at the Battle of Hubbardton.  Brown reported he had two or three men killed during the attack and less than five wounded.  The British also suffered two or three dead and a few wounded.

Across the river, Colonel Johnson’s attack on Mount Independence did not catch the defenders by surprise.  The German defenders were ready for him and Johnson opted to call off the attack.  Brown’s force remained in the area for four days before they withdrew.  Brown turned over most of his prisoners to Colonel Johnson, who marched the unlucky British and German soldiers back to Pawlet.

Diamond Island

After he had completed his work at the fort, Brown boarded a fleet of captured ships and sailed south down Lake George.  He hoped to seize a British supply depot on Diamond Island.  Brown’s men left late in the day on September 22.  Although the island was only 25 miles away, poor weather and adverse winds prevented them from reaching the island the next day.  

Brown had with him several suspected loyalists who his men had collected during the raid.  Several of these men were held aboard ship.  However, one officer allowed a loyalist parole to sail his own ship behind the fleet.  This man made his escape on the night of September 23, and sailed to shore.  He walked down to the bank across from Diamond Island.  There, he shouted until he got the attention of guards on the island and was transported across.  He warned the garrison commander, Captain Thomas Aubrey, of the imminent attack.  

When Brown’s fleet arrived the next morning, the 24th, the two or three companies of German and British soldiers were ready to contest the attack.  They had canons and were in position behind entrenchments.

Thomas Aubrey
(from 47th Regiment)
Brown fired on the defenders from his small ships, which had mounted cannons of their own. He attempted to find a place to land his troops where they would not be under enemy fire, but found the defenders had covered the whole island.  After a brief firefight, it became clear that he could not mount a successful attack against the defenders.  Brown reported two men mortally wounded and a few more with lesser wounds.

Brown also reported that there were about 300 defenders at Diamond Island, although 100-150 seems to be a more probable number.  He reported another 40 men still at a garrison at Fort George further to the south.

Brown then sailed away, found a landing point, burned his ships and all the supplies that the men could not carry, and marched to overland to Skenesborough.  The original plan had been to meet up with Colonel Woodbridge and five hundred reinforcements there. However, General Lincoln had already recalled Woodbridge back to Pawlet.  The Americans had expected to encounter more enemy soldiers in the area.  Instead, General Burgoyne had ordered almost all units to join his main army, leaving almost no one in his rear.  Brown was able to return to Pawlet and rejoin Lincoln's main army.

Aftermath

John Brown’s raids on Ticonderoga and Diamond Island did not get much attention at the time since the much larger armies under General Gates and General Burgoyne were already engaged further to the south.

However, the raids ensured that Burgoyne’s army was cut off from any supplies, not only from Canada, but even from the stores he had left at Fort Ticonderoga.  Many regiments had left much of their baggage at Diamond Island so that they would not have to carry it on their march.  Even though the American raids did not capture the island, the British were afraid to transport anything from there, fearing additional raids on transports.

Such fears were well-founded. After Colonel Brown rejoined General Lincoln at Pawlet, Lincoln redeployed him with several hundred men to patrol the area between Fort Edward and Fort George and to attack any enemy parties on the move that he could find.  Meanwhile, General Lincoln took the bulk of his army south to join up with General Gates and the main Continental army near Saratoga.  On September 29th Lincoln took command of the right wing of Gates’ army and prepared for Burgoyne’s attack.  

General Stark also moved south, although he still refused to put himself and his militia under Gates’ command.  He continued to operate as an independent entity.  He and Gates did communicate regularly.  Stark’s militia continued to be an obstruction to any attempt Burgoyne might make to retreat north, or make a move east toward New England in order to get away from Gates’ Continentals.

Brown sent a report to General Gates indicating that he believed that Burgoyne’s army only had enough food for the next four weeks, and was cut off from any more supplies.  This may have encouraged Gates in his belief that all he had to do was keep the British contained until the army ran out of food.  Burgoyne would either have to surrender or make a desperate attack against the American entrenchments.

In Canada, General Carlton was alerted to the new danger against Fort Ticonderoga.  He finally relented and sent several regiments of regulars to reinforce the fort’s garrison.  Also by this time, Barry St. Leger’s army, which had retreated from Fort Stanwix and had returned to Canada, was making its way south toward Ticonderoga in an effort to join up with General Burgoyne’s army. His forces finally arrived at the fort on September 27, a few days after Brown had completed his raid.  

St. Leger, however, was reluctant to continue his journey to link up with Burgoyne.  He was concerned that Fort Ticonderoga would fall under attack again.  There was also the danger that his army would suffer an ambush in an area that a week or two earlier the British had considered perfectly secure.  As a result, Burgoyne would find himself without St. Leger’s reinforcements as he prepared to make his final stand.

Brown’s raid proved a great success in helping to isolate General Burgoyne’s army and keep critical supplies from reaching his men at this critical time.

Next week, while Burgoyne and Gates take a pause before their final showdown, we head south again as General Washington threatens General Howe’s control of Philadelphia with his attack at Germantown.

- - -

Next Episode 163 Battle of Germantown 

Previous Episode 161 Battle of Freeman's Farm 


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American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

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Further Reading

Websites


Mounted Soldiers in John Brown’s Raid: 

Hoyte, Edward A. “The Pawlet Expedition, September 1777” Vermont History, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 2007): 69–100. https://vermonthistory.org/journal/75/10_Hoyt.pdf

Nelson, Peter. “The Battle of Diamond Island” The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association, vol. 3, no. 1, 1922, pp. 36–53. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43564559

Ventner, Bruce, “The Forgotten Battle of Diamond Island on Lake George” Adirondack Almanack, June 17, 2015:

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Anbury, Thomas Travel through Various Parts of North America, Vol. 1, William Lane, 1789.


Oxford Univ. Press, 1963.

Brandow, John H. The story of old Saratoga; the Burgoyne campaign, to which is added New York's share in the revolution, Brandow Printing, 1919.

Clay, Steven E. Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 June to 8 November 1777, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2018 (US Army Website):.

DeCosta, B. F. The fight at Diamond Island, Lake George, New York, J. Sabin & Sons, 1872.

Eelking, Max von, (translated by Stone, William L.) Memoirs of Major General Riedesel, Vol. 1, J. Munsell, 1868.

Hadden, James Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1884.

Howe, Archibald Murray, Colonel John Brown of Pittsfield Massachusetts, Boston: W. B. Clarke company, 1908.


Nickerson, Hoffman The Turning Point of the Revolution; or, Burgoyne in America, (Houghton-Mifflin Co. 1928 (Hathitrust.org). 

Peck, John Mason Lives of Daniel Boone and Benjamin Lincoln, Boston: C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1847.


Roof, Garret L. Colonel John Brown: his services in the Revolutionary War, Battle of Stone Arabia, Utica, NY: Ellis H. Roberts & Co. 1884.

Smith, Joseph E.A. The History of Pittsfield, (Berkshire County,) Massachusetts, Boston: Lea and Shepard, 1869.


Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Furneaux, Rupert The Battle of Saratoga, Stein and Day 1971.

Ketchum, Richard M. Saratoga, Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War, Henry Holt & Co, 1997.


* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, August 9, 2020

ARP161 Freeman’s Farm (1st Saratoga)

Last week, we ended a series of episodes as General Howe made his long slow sailing voyage from New York to Maryland, then marched his army up to capture Philadelphia. 

Burgoyne Trudges South

While all that was happening, General Burgoyne was marching his northern army from Canada down through upstate New York, with the hope of taking Albany, and eventually linking up with British forces in New York City.  We last left General Burgoyne in Episode 155 as his army suffered a loss at Bennington, in an attempt to capture food and supplies.

Despite that loss, Burgoyne’s main army had reached the Hudson River and planned to march downstream to Albany.  His hope to recruit an army of Tories in upstate New York had proven to be a joke.  Almost all of his loyalist soldiers were men who had already fled New York to Canada and had joined at the outset of the expedition.  Promises of locals in New York who would flock to the King’s banner, had proven empty.

Freeman's Farm (from British Battles)
Burgoyne found his supply lines from Canada too long and attenuated to do much good.  He was frustrated that no British relief force seemed to be on its way from New York City.  After receiving word that General St. Leger’s force had given up on capturing Fort Stanwix and was returning to Canada, Burgoyne lost his only other prospect of reinforcements.  Burgoyne’s situation was becoming more threatened each day.  His army was shrinking, while his opponents were growing.  His men were isolated and largely cut off from additional food and supplies.  At the outset of this campaign, Burgoyne had hoped for more soldiers, better support from Canada, and most importantly a British army marching northward from New York City.

In letters back to London, Burgoyne discussed the option of pulling back to Fort Edward, reestablishing supply lines with Canada and awaiting more reinforcements.  But getting bogged down and refusing to advance was exactly what he had accused his predecessors of doing in order to get this command.  Burgoyne believed his orders were to push forward and take Albany.  He planned to do just that.

Burgoyne ordered the bulk of his small reserves, still at Fort Ticonderoga, to march south and join up with his main army.  He would not rely on maintaining lines back to Canada, but would live off the land. He determined that his army would cross the Hudson River and march down the west bank to Albany.  Crossing the Hudson so far upstream would prevent any problems trying to cross closer to Albany where they might have to do it in the face of the enemy.  But crossing where they did also made it nearly impossible to retreat back to Ticonderoga if they ran into problems.  Burgoyne was committing himself to complete victory or defeat, no option for backing down.

Schuyler Relieved

The Americans, having succeeded in killing or capturing over 1000 of the enemy at Bennington, continued to harass them whenever possible.  They drove off cattle and burned fields of grain and orchards.  They tore up bridges and felled hundreds of trees across roads, all to slow the British advance and deny them the supplies needed to maintain the army.

British March (from Wikimedia)

If time was on the side of the Contientals, it was not on the side of their commander.  Before word of the victory at Bennington or Fort Stanwix reached Congress, the delegates in Philadelphia concluded that the loss of Fort Ticonderoga in July was simply unacceptable.  Congress voted for the removal of General Philip Schuyler from command.  New England delegates especially had never really liked or trusted the New York general.  The loss of Ticonderoga under his command, was the final straw.  New Englanders had captured this fort a few years earlier, only to see it turned over to a New York commander.  That commander’s loss of the fort was unacceptable.  Congress ordered both General Schuyler and General St. Clair to report to Philadelphia for an inquiry into their activities.  The order came, despite the fact that both generals were actively engaged in the ongoing campaign to halt General Burgoyne’s army.

At first, Congress wrote to General Washington and asked him to pick a successor to the northern army.  Congress’ obvious choice was General Horatio Gates, who Washington, by this time, had great reason to distrust.  Washington knew that recommending Gates would be putting someone in charge who he really did not respect.  Picking someone else who did not have the experience in New York and at a time when Washington needed those generals to stop General Howe from capturing Philadelphia, would also be a problem.  Washington would have preferred to keep Schuyler in command.  He could not say that without appearing to thumb his nose at Congress.  So, Washington punted.  He simply informed Congress that if they were going to replace General Schuyler, that they should name the replacement.

Congress then selected General Gates to assume command.  Gates found out about the orders almost immediately.  At the time when almost all the officers in the Continental Army were in the field, either opposing Burgoyne’s advance on Albany or Howe’s advance on Philadelphia, Gates was in Philadelphia complaining about their leadership and lobbying for a new job.  After learning of his commission and knowing that the situation was desperate, Gates took a leisurely two weeks to travel up to New York and take command on August 19, 1777. 

 Gen. Horatio Gates
(from Wikimedia)
General Schuyler, who had received his orders to stand down and return to Philadelphia, felt obliged to remain in command until his successor arrived.  Schuyler then spent the next few days trying to brief Gates on the status of both his and the enemy forces and the strategies in place, but Gates seemed entirely uninterested in anything Schuyler had to say.  Instead, Gates held a large council of war for all Continental offices, as well as Albany militia commanders, but did not invite Schuyler.  Taking the hint, Schuyler finally packed up and left for Philadelphia.

Gates also received reinforcements of about 8000 men.  These included new recruits from New England, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.  Washington sent some of his own forces, including his highly valued riflemen commanded by Colonel Daniel Morgan.  General Benedict Arnold was marching his 1200 Continentals back from their victory at Fort Stanwix.  By early September, Gates commanded an army of over 10,000 soldiers, finally outnumbering Burgoyne's army.

Gates determined that he should pick out the best defensive ground in the region between Burgoyne and Albany and await the British there.  At first, he gathered his army at a place called Stillwater.  Then, after consulting with the locals, moved his army about three miles further north to Bemis Heights.  There, he relied on Polish Colonel Tadeusz KoÅ›ciuszko to build the defenses.

Tadeusz Kościuszko

KoÅ›ciuszko is an interesting figure himself.  He had grown up as a member of minor nobility in Poland.  During the 1760’s he worked as a military instructor for the Corps of Cadets in Poland. When the country descended into civil war, his family sided with the rebels against the King.   Rather than pick a side, KoÅ›ciuszko fled the country.  He settled in Paris.  As a foreigner, he could not attend the military academy there.  Instead, he enrolled in Paris’ Royal Academy of Painting and Sculpture.  At the same time, he audited lectures at the Military Academy and made use of the military libraries in Paris.  If you think about it, this was absurd.  It was a security risk for a foreigner to receive grades and a degree from the military academy, but officials had no problems with him sitting in on the classes and learning everything the instructor had to say.  But, that’s government bureaucracy I guess.

Tadeusz Kościuszko
(from Wikimedia)
After the partition of Poland in 1772, KoÅ›ciuszko returned home to find his family broke from the war. He attempted to elope with the daughter of the local governor, but the Governor’s soldiers caught the young couple and beat him severely.  He returned to Paris, alone and out of money.

KoÅ›ciuszko’s education in the French enlightenment, and his experience with petty aristocrats, left him with a fairly hostile view toward tyrannical leaders and a fan of liberation movements.  When KoÅ›ciuszko heard about the war in America, he volunteered and traveled to Philadelphia. 

At first, he worked as a civilian consultant for some of the defenses along the Delaware River, then received a commission as colonel of engineers and a transfer to Fort Ticonderoga. There, he had worked with General Gates for a time before Gates left for Philadelphia.  KoÅ›ciuszko had been a part of the retreat from Ticonderoga and remained with the northern army.  On Gates’ return as commander of the northern army, he relied on KoÅ›ciuszko to oversee the construction of defensive works to oppose Burgoyne.

Benedict Arnold

Also joining Gates at Bemis Heights was General Benedict Arnold, fresh from his victory at Fort Stanwix.  Arnold’s role in capturing Fort Ticonderoga back in 1775 and his success in preventing the British from capturing the fort in 1776 with his improvised navy, among other accomplishments, gave Arnold a fair amount of command credibility.  He was now a major general, but still frustrated that he was more junior to Major General Lincoln who had been commissioned before him.

Arnold and Gates had gotten along well in earlier years when both men were in upstate New York together.  Gates knew of Arnold’s record and his abilities and gave him command of the left wing of the army.

Richard Varick
(from Wikimedia)
However, when General Schuyler left for Philadelphia, Arnold took two of Schuyler’s staff officers onto his own command, Richard Varick and Henry Brockholst Livingston.  Gates’ aide, Colonel James Wilkinson, who you may recall from Episode 118 was mixed up the conspiracy between General Gates and Lee to bring down General Washington, was by this time an old hand at internal petty politics within the army.  Wilkinson pointed out to Gates that Arnold’s decision to take two of Schuyler’s aides onto his staff meant that Arnold might not be particularly loyal to Gates.  He showed Gates letters from both men where they badmouthed Gates’ actions in the past.

Gates hinted to Arnold that he wanted the two men removed from Arnold’s staff.  Arnold, however, refused to take the hint and kept the officers where they were.  A few days later, in what Arnold took to be a petty reprisal, Wilkinson issued orders to move several regiments from Arnold’s command on the left wing to Glover’s command on the right wing.  Arnold lost his temper and wrote an angry letter to Gates. In response, Gates said it was just an oversight that would be countermanded, but it never was. 

The disagreement over staffing grew into a full-blown dispute between the two generals that would never heal.  Gates saw Arnold as part of Team Schuyler and potentially disloyal to him. Arnold saw Gates as a petty officer putting internal politics above the war effort. I don’t think either man was wrong in their assessment of the other.  The relationship between Gates and Arnold would never again be a good one.

Bemis Heights Defenses

On the morning of September 19th, American pickets noted the advance of the British Army toward Bemis Heights.  General Gates was happy to sit behind his defenses and to let the British try to force him out. 

Troop Deployments (from Wikimedia)

General Arnold disagreed.  Arnold feared that the British would send a force against the American right wing to distract the army.  Then, it would send a flanking force through the woods to move on the left flank. Once in the fields, the British could bring up their cannons and roll the American left, pushing everyone to retreat toward the Hudson river.  Sentries detecting movement in the woods confirmed that this was likely what would happen.  Gates seemed to think, bring it on. The British can try to charge up hills against a dug in enemy.  They will take an obscene number of casualties if they do.  He did not seem concerned that British artillery might devastate those defenses or that similar flanking maneuvers on Long Island or most recently at Brandywine had led to embarrassing losses for the Continentals.  His brilliant leadership would lead to a different result.

Arnold, supported by Colonel Morgan, had a different idea.  They wanted to advance the left wing of the army and hit the British in the woods before they could form up in the fields near the heights.  A fight in the forest was not a strength for either British regulars or Hessians.  Most of the Indian scouts had abandoned the British after the loss at Bennington, putting the British at a real disadvantage in that type of warfare.

After considerable badgering and argument, Gates split the difference.  He retained the Continental right wing, under the command of General Benjamin Lincoln, and supported by Generals Glover, Nixon and Patterson.  These armies would hold Bemis Heights against a potential attack.  General Arnold supported by Generals Poor and Learned, and Colonel Morgan could advance into the woods on the American left and engage the enemy there.  If they failed, they could retreat back to the heights and participate in the final defense.

Battle of Freeman’s Farm

The British attack came pretty much as the Americans expected.  General Burgoyne deployed his Germans under the command of General Riedesel down the trail along the Hudson River to attack the American right.  This group also took the bulk of the army’s artillery.  In the center, General Burgoyne rode with division commander General James Hamilton and four regiments supported by artillery.  Against the American left, Burgoyne deployed General Simon Fraser and his regulars, along with a couple of German regiments and the small remainder of Indians and loyalists that remained with the army.

American Assault Freeman's Farm
(from British Battles)
The Germans on the American right found it tough going as the column marched down the river road.  The Americans had burned several bridges across streams and felled numerous trees across the road.  The soldiers struggled to remove the impediments to make it into position by 2:00 PM.  Similarly General Fraser on the American left had to march nearly two miles further west to move around a deep ravine.

On the American left, General Arnold advanced with his division, with Colonel Morgan’s riflemen in the front.  The advancing British ran into Morgan’s riflemen at a small cabin on Freeman’s farm.  Freeman had been a local farmer who had long since fled to Canada due to his Tory sentiments.

There, Morgan’s riflemen startled the British advance skirmishers and forced them to retreat. Morgan’s men charged after the retreating skirmishers, only to run into the entire British center.  The Americans fell under cannon fire and quickly retreated back into the woods.  Both sides took devastating losses.  Morgan’s riflemen picked off the officers from the skirmishing companies before taking heavy casualties themselves from the British cannons.  Many of the British skirmishers took friendly fire as they retreated back to the main British lines. General Arnold rode through the front lines, encouraging his men to advance.  The fighting lasted about 45 minutes until both sides pulled back to assess the damages.

The lull lasted about two hours until shortly before 4:00 PM, both sides reengaged with the fiercest fighting of the day.  The American riflemen picked off artillery officers and crews, allowing the Continentals to capture several cannon.  Hamilton sent in British regular reinforcements to retake the cannons and turn them against the Continentals once again.  General Burgoyne also appeared near the front to encourage the men.  He got within range of Morgan’s riflemen, but they mistakenly picked off a captain that Burgoyne was conferring with.  The captain had a fancier saddle that caused the sniper to mistake him for the general.

Freeman's Farm (from British Battles)
Despite the fierce fighting, General Gates held back the American right at the Heights, not wanting to commit all of his forces to the fighting in case another attack came on the right.  Similarly, Burgoyne held back most of Fraser’s force on the American left in case the Americans tried a flanking attack from that side.  As a result, the Continental forces under Arnold and the British under Hamilton bore the bulk of the intense fighting.

At one point, the Americans almost forced the British center to buckle, but Major General Phillips personally rode in with four cannons to hold the Americans at bay while the British line could regroup.

By late afternoon Burgoyne ordered General Riedesel to secure the baggage and lead his soldiers against the right of Arnold’s advancing Continentals.  This was a risky move since it left the British baggage, and a portion of its artillery, relatively unguarded.  General Gates could have swooped down and captured all of it.  Gates, however, remained secure in his entrenchments, unwilling to venture out.

Benedict Arnold
(from Wikimedia)
Riedesel advanced with several hundred soldiers and two cannons to find the Continentals close to overrunning Hamilton’s center.  Riedesel ordered a charge and pushed back the startled Continentals.  This attack near the end of the day secured British possession of the field.  Only sunset and darkness finally put an end to the intense fighting, as the Americans drew back to their lines.

General Arnold was, in fact, fighting two battles at once.  One with the British, the other with General Gates.  Over the course of the battle, Gates had refused to comply with Arnold’s increasingly desperate calls for reinforcements.  At one point, Gates even sent orders for Arnold to send back a regiment to protect Gates’ headquarters.

In frustration, Arnold finally rode back to headquarters himself to make his demands in person.  Gates finally relented and sent off a brigade under the command of General Ebenezer Learned.  Gates, however, refused to allow Arnold to return to the battle and kept him in camp.  Learned’s reinforcements got lost in the woods and missed most of the battle.

At one point, after receiving concerning reports about the course of the battle, Arnold had enough and galloped off on his horse determined to enter the action.  Gates ordered his aide, Wilkinson, to chase after Arnold and bring him back.  Arnold reluctantly obeyed the direct order to return.  Thus Arnold missed the end of the battle.

Aftermath

At the end of the day, the British held the field, so Burgoyne declared victory in his letters to London.  However, the British had taken nearly 600 casualties that they could ill-afford.  The Americans had lost about half that number.  Although the British held the field of battle around Freeman’s farm, they had not even reached the main American lines still several miles away at Bemis Heights. Even most British officers conceded that the Americans had fought well and held their own against the regulars.

That night, the wolves came down from the hills to feed on the dead and dying as each side considered their next moves.  Many of Burgoyne’s officers wanted to advance again the next morning in hopes of catching the Americans still in disarray.  Burgoyne, however, decided against it.  The men were too exhausted.  He did consider another offensive on the 21st.  However, before dawn, he received a letter from General Henry Clinton in New York City.  Clinton's letter said that he would attempt an attack on some American forts in the lower Hudson valley in order to distract the Americans.  Burgoyne took this as hope that perhaps he might get some support from New York City after all.  He knew London had planned to send reinforcements to New York City and that their arrival might encourage Clinton to go on the offensive.

Burgoyne opted to halt his offensive and await more information on a possible relief column. For the next couple of weeks, both sides nursed their wounds, buried their dead, and planned their next steps.

Next week, during this pause, the Americans strike at Burgoyne’s rear, including a raid on Fort Ticonderoga.

- - -

Next Episode 162 Raid on Fort Ticonderoga 

Previous  Episode 160 Paoli Massacre & Fall of Philadelphia

Click here to donate
American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.

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You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.




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Further Reading

Websites

Horatio Gates: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/horatio-gates

Tadeusz Kościuszko: https://www.battlefields.org/learn/biographies/tadeusz-kosciuszko

Battle of Freeman’s Farm: https://www.britishbattles.com/war-of-the-revolution-1775-to-1783/battle-of-freemans-farm

The Battle of Saratoga (First)/ Freeman’s Farm: https://revolutionarywar.us/year-1777/first-battle-saratoga

Halsey, Francis Whiting. “GENERAL SCHUYLER'S PART IN THE BURGOYNE CAMPAIGN.” Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, vol. 12, 1913, pp. 109–118. www.jstor.org/stable/42890006

Brandow, John. H. “GUIDE TO THE SARATOGA BATTLEFIELD.” Proceedings of the New York State Historical Association, vol. 12, 1913, pp. 315–320. www.jstor.org/stable/42890016

Strach, Stephen G. “A MEMOIR OF THE EXPLOITS OF CAPTAIN ALEXANDER FRASER AND HIS COMPANY OF BRITISH MARKSMEN 1776-1777 (Continued).” Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, vol. 63, no. 255, 1985, pp. 164–179, www.jstor.org/stable/44229658

Hargreaves, Reginald “Burgoyne and America's Destiny” American Heritage Magazine, Volume 7, Issue 4, June 1956: https://www.americanheritage.com/burgoyne-and-americas-destiny

Lynch, Wayne “Debating Arnold’s Role at Freeman’s Farm” Journal of the American Revolution, September 12, 2013: https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/09/debating-arnolds-role-freemans-farm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Anbury, Thomas Travel through Various Parts of North America, Vol. 1, William Lane, 1789.

Baster, James (ed) The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1887.

Bird, Harrison March To Saratoga General Burgoyne And The American Campaign 1777,
Oxford Univ. Press, 1963

Brandow, John H. The story of old Saratoga; the Burgoyne campaign, to which is added New York's share in the revolution, Brandow Printing, 1919.

Clay, Steven E. Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 June to 8 November 1777, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2018 (US Army Website):.

Eelking, Max von, (translated by Stone, William L.) Memoirs of Major General Riedesel, Vol. 1, J. Munsell, 1868.

Hadden, James Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1884.

Hudleston, Francis J. Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne : misadventures of an English general in the Revolution, Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1927.

Luzader, John Decision on the Hudson, National Park Service, 1975.

Moore, Howard P. A Life of General John Stark of New Hampshire, New York self-published, 1949.

Riedesel, Friederike Charlotte Luise, Freifrau von Letters and journals relating to the war of the American Revolution, and the capture of the German troops at Saratoga, Joel Munsell, 1867.

Stone, William Leete, The Campaign of Lieut. Gen. John Burgoyne  and the expedition of Lieut. Col. Barry St. Leger, Albany, NY: Joel Munsell, 1877.

Walworth, Ellen H. Battles of Saratoga, 1777; the Saratoga Monument Association, 1856-1891, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1891.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Furneaux, Rupert The Battle of Saratoga, Stein and Day 1971.

Gabriel, Michael P. The Battle of Bennington: Soldiers & Civilians, History Press, 2012.

Ketchum, Richard M. Saratoga, Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War, Henry Holt & Co, 1997.

Logusz, Michael O. With Musket and Tomahawk, The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777, Casemate Publishing, 2010

Luzader, John F. Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, Casemate Publishers, 2008

Mintz, Max M. The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates, Yale Univ. Press, 1990.

Philbrick, Nathaniel Valiant Ambition: George Washington, Benedict Arnold, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Viking, 2016.


Snow, Dean 1777: Tipping Point at Saratoga, Oxford Univ. Press, 2016.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.