American Revolution Podcast

Sunday, November 3, 2019

Episode 121: Iron Works Hill

When we last left the Continental Army, Washington was probably at the lowest point in his life. His attempts even to put up a decent defense against the British invasion of New York had failed completely. By December 1776, his army had retreated across New Jersey and into Pennsylvania. The only reason the British stopped their advance was that the British Commander Howe decided to call off any further campaigning and to put his armies into winter quarters.

Continental Army on the Ropes

The British controlled all of the area around New York, took all of New Jersey, and had moved unopposed into Rhode Island. General William Howe wrote self-congratulatory letters back to London saying that his forces had accomplished everything they had planned for the year.

Of course, that was not completely true. The British had originally planned to move up the Hudson River through New York and meet up with the British forces under General Guy Carleton in Canada. Carleton was to have moved down the Hudson River, thus cutting off New England from the rest of the colonies. That did not happen, mostly because Continental General Benedict Arnold had forced Carleton to delay his advance. Carleton needed to build his navy on Lake Champlain to defeat Arnold at Valcour Island (see Episode 110). The delay in doing that forced Carleton to delay an invasion of New York until the following spring.

Joseph Reed

So while General Arnold had delayed British plans, General Washington had not stopped Howe from doing anything. Everyone seemed to come to the conclusion that General Washington just wasn’t up to the task of taking on the full British Army.

Thousands of Continental soldiers now sat in prison ships in New York Harbor, dying from disease and starvation. Thousands more deserted the Continental Army, with little desire to join their comrades on the prison ships once the final surrender came. By some estimates, Washington’s Army had dwindled to as little as 3000 men by the time his army crossed the Delaware River into Pennsylvania. New York and New Jersey militia did not march with the army. Pennsylvania militia had not yet arrived. General Charles Lee still had several thousand continental soldiers in northern New Jersey and refused Washington’s increasingly desperate requests that he join him in Pennsylvania. After Lee’s capture, General John Sullivan still needed time to move his Continentals in north Jersey to meet up with Washington just outside of Philadelphia. Likewise General Horatio Gates was marching with reinforcements from Fort Ticonderoga, but was still on the march and had not yet reached Washington.

Many in Congress had lost faith in Washington as well. They had talked of turning over command to General Lee. The British leadership seemed to hold the same opinion. When they captured General Lee on December 13, they saw it as a more important victory than the capture of 3000 Continental soldiers at Fort Washington. Lee was the only general they seemed to respect. Fortunately for the patriots, the capture put off talk of replacing Washington for a time. It also ensured that Lee’s army would finally join with Washington in Pennsylvania.

Washington even had to be doubting himself by this time. By the end of December, most of the remaining Continental enlistments would expire. His army would almost certainly choose to go home as had earlier enlistments. Washington sent many of his officers home to recruit a new army. But no one seemed interested to sign on to what looked like a losing cause. Thomas Paine did his part by publishing the Crisis, which I covered last week. However, there was no good evidence that would do any good before the end of the year, if at all.

Looting and Pillaging

Despite bleak prospects, there was still reason to oppose the British occupation. In earlier episodes, I’ve alluded to the problems of looting and pillaging. Remember that British regulars were dirt poor. Their pay was eight pence per day. That’s roughly $10 per day when converted to inflation adjusted dollars. By the time all the deductions were made for food, uniforms, and a host of other expenses, soldiers were lucky to receive maybe one fourth of that. Their Hessian allies were paid even less. These were men living at bare subsistence, often without enough clothes to keep warm or enough food to stop feeling hungry. When they came across abandoned homes or other property, they would help themselves to whatever they could, unless officers prevented it. In that case, they had to do it on the sly. Obtaining alcohol or any small valuables that could be sold later were prime targets. But really just about anything they could carry would go.

Hessian Jagers occupied New Jersey
(from British Battles)

At times looting was part of a war strategy. Some officers thought that the rebels should suffer after having rejected the King’s protection. However, General Howe’s offer of pardon and amnesty was supposed to protect those who had signed oaths of allegiance. The soldiers were not particularly careful to make that distinction. Many New Jersey Tories who had welcomed the regulars as liberators, soon found their homes and personal items ravaged.

Not all of the pillaging was for personal gain either. Rampaging soldiers often burned homes and simply destroyed property that they could not take with them. They argued that civilians claiming loyalty were all rebels and would turn back to rebellion as soon as the soldiers moved on.

Rapes were another serious problem. There were thousands of reported rapes of all sorts, from girls as young as ten to women in their seventies. Married women and children were gang raped in front of their husbands, fathers, and brothers. These were brutal acts of violence were often compounded with beatings threats of murder, and actual murder.

Many of the British officers put blame for these abuses on the Hessian soldiers. British regulars did engage in such abuses too. Whether Hessians were more to blame is questionable since British officers had an incentive to blame their allies. If the abuses were committed by their own troops, that reflected poorly on the officers. If committed by Hessian soldiers, the blame fell primarily on Hessian officers.

Whatever the percentage of blame, it is clear that Hessians engaged in some great share of the pillaging, looting and raping across New Jersey. As I said, Hessians were paid even less than British Regulars. Most enlisted men had come from families in abject poverty back in the German States and who had virtually no rights at all. Seeing colonists who enjoyed comparative wealth and freedom and who still dared to commit treason against their king made many Hessians justify their ill treatment as just punishment.

Had the invaders limited their assaults to patriot households, that might not have been so bad for British policy. But many loyalists quickly fell victim to military abuses: theft, destruction of property, assaults, and even murder. Many who had spoken for the loyalist cause as the way to protect law and order now had reason to question their views. Many were experiencing a tyranny that made many question their loyalties to the King. The soldiers they once hailed as liberators had become their abusers.

Occupation of South Jersey

British officers did make some attempts to reign in soldier abuses, but the leadership did not seem terribly concerned about it. Military victories would convince the citizenry to end the rebellion. Once they returned to keeping the King’s peace, the military occupation could end and the abuses would also go away.

Initially the plan seemed to work. General Howe’s amnesty proclamation motivated thousands across New York and New Jersey to swear allegiance to the King in return for a full pardon. The British set out a series of outposts across New Jersey where subjects could see that they were in charge. With any luck the Continental Army would dissolve over the winter and Howe could extend his amnesty across the continent without having to butcher thousands more on both sides.

Map of regional forces during Mount Holly Raid

Before Howe returned to New York for the winter, he personally surveyed and posted his army along the Delaware River, making sure the Americans would not attempt to cross back into New Jersey.

He left General James Grant in overall command of the region. For those of you keeping track of such things, we first met General Grant in Episode 12, when he was a mere major captured near Fort Duquesne near the end of the French and Indian war, and again in Episode 15 when as a Lieutenant Colonel, he attacked the Cherokee at the Battle of Etchoe in South Carolina. After the French and Indian war, Grant served as Governor of East Florida for a time, then returned home to be elected to Parliament. There, he was one of the toughest talking members against the brewing rebellion. Grant said the patriots would never stand up to military action and that he could march across the entire continent with 5000 regulars.

When war broke out, he received a commission as full colonel and traveled with General Howe to Boston in 1775. After Howe replaced General Thomas Gage as overall commander of North America, Grant received a promotion to brigadier general. His leadership during the battle of Brooklyn had led to yet another promotion to major general.

Despite his rise in rank, Grant did not seem to have the respect of his officers and men. Like General Howe, he seemed more interested in personal comforts than in the success or even the safety of the men under his command. Grant set up his headquarters in Brunswick, NJ, closer to New York than to the outposts he commanded along the Delaware River.

The ranking officer actually present at the outposts was Hessian Colonel Carl Von Donop. General Howe ordered Von Donop with a force of about 2000 Hessians to occupy Bordentown, NJ, a small town just a few miles south of Trenton along the Delaware River. At the time, Bordentown had only a couple of dozen houses, nowhere near enough buildings to house 2000 Hessians for the winter. Also as it bordered the Delaware River, the Hessians attracted artillery fire from ships and Continentals on the other side of the river. Von Donop had to move inland and scatter his forces in farm houses around the countryside.

Some estimates say Von Donop had about 3000 men. However, this may include the division deployed to Von Donop’s south. Howe directed, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Stirling, an officer commanding the 42nd Regiment, known as the Black Watch, as well as a battalion of Hessians. Stirling’s men would occupy Burlington, NJ about 10 miles southeast of Bordentown. Again, Burlington was not large enough to house even this smaller force and suffered enemy artillery fire from the river. Stirling also deployed his forces a few miles south of Burlington, further inland, scattering them among several farmhouses and barns in the area.

Carl Von Donop
(from Historica)

To Colonel Von Donop’s north Colonel Johann Rall commanded about 1400 Hessians at Trenton. Rall held an independent command and did not report to Von Donop, but instead reported directly to General Grant. At least Trenton, with about 100 buildings, was large enough to accommodate most of Rall’s soldiers, even if they did have to pack themselves into pretty tight quarters.

To support these front line outposts, General Howe established a supply depot at Princeton, further inland and about 13 miles north of Trenton. There, General Alexander Leslie commanded another brigade of British infantry. For those paying attention, this is the same Colonel Leslie who led a raid on Salem back in 1775 before Lexington and Concord, see Episode 46. In early 1776 he received a promotion to brigadier general.

The British deployment was not particularly defensible. These were thousands of soldiers spread over lightly populated countryside, with no forts or other particularly defensible positions. Their focus was more on pacifying the region, hunting down small groups of rebels or bandits and making sure everyone knew they occupied New Jersey. No one expected the crippled Continental Army to attempt any sort of large attack. If an attack came, the forces were a few hours march away. Any of the outposts should be able to hold out until relief could arrive.

While many in New Jersey had accepted the British occupation and sought amnesty. There remained a hard core of militia who continued to harass the British at every opportunity. These were not conventional soldiers. They were essentially civilians with guns. They could not take on the British army, or even the outposts that were set up. They could, however, shoot British messengers that traveled between units, or attack supply trains providing food and supplies to the outposts. If the British sent out companies of soldiers to track down the guerrillas, they would find only civilians who had hidden their guns and now claimed to be loyal subjects who knew nothing about the attacks in the area. The British knew they were in hostile territory, but were frustrated that they could not get the enemy to stand and fight on a battlefield.

Iron Works Hill

Across the river in Pennsylvania, General Washington had to decide if there was anything he could do before his Army evaporated at the end of the year, just a few weeks away. If fearful New Jersey civilians could see that they were not completely abandoned by the Continental Army, they might begin to rally around the American cause once again. He also did not want to let the enemy get comfortable settling into winter quarters. Anything they could do to harass and annoy the enemy had to continue.

On December 17, Washington ordered Colonel Samuel Griffin from Virginia to cross over into New Jersey. Griffin commanded a force of about 600 men, a few Virginia artillerymen with small field cannon, along with mostly Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia. The force made its way to Mount Holly New Jersey, where they set up a defensive position at the top of a small hill near the local iron works.

Mount Holly was close to the southernmost British outpost commanded by Colonel Stirling. However, Stirling did not receive word of the American incursion into New Jersey, or if he did, he simply reported it to Colonel Von Donop and did not deploy any of his soldiers. In Bordentown, Von Donop received word of the American presence. Some accounts indicate that his soldiers encountered rebels attempting to steal cattle. They informed the British that more than 1000 rebels had encamped near Mount Holly.

Von Donop and Griffin had met on the field of battle once before. Both men had led their battalions into battle at Harlem Heights, where Griffin was wounded. It is not clear, however, that either man knew much about the other, or their opponent in the previous encounter.

Samuel Griffin
(from Wikimedia)

Von Donop moved nearly all of the 3000 soldiers under his command to confront the enemy. On December 21, the patriots encountered a small British force holding Petticoat Bridge, over Assiscunk Creek. Outnumbered, the British outpost fell back to the north to meet up with Von Donop’s 3000 man force.

The following day, the main body of Hessians recaptured the bridge. A brief skirmish took place, with a few casualties on each side. The Americans fell back to Mount Holly.

That same day, Washington’s aide, Colonel Joseph Reed, rode into New Jersey to find Colonel Griffin. He asked Griffin to keep the Hessians engaged in order to distract them as Washington prepared to cross the Delaware and attack further north. Reed was pleased to find that Griffin had already engaged the enemy and was keeping them occupied.

It is not clear if Washington had sent Griffin into New Jersey with the intent of creating a distraction away from his newly formed plan to attack the Trenton garrison. There are no written instructions to that effect. Washington may have simply sent Griffin more to get a better idea of the locations and numbers of British forces in the area. The decision to use Griffin to distract and divide the enemy probably came later, hence Reed’s visit on the 22nd. Reed himself called the engagement at Mount Holly accidental but with a “happy effect.” Reed sent a messenger back to Washington, letting him know the enemy was scattered and divided making an immediate attack advisable. Reed suggested either supporting Griffin or making a separate attack while Von Donop’s forces were so far from Trenton.

A day later, December 23, the Hessian force under Von Donop moved into Mount Holly. The two sides engaged in a firefight lasting at least several hours, and involving the use of field cannon. The Hessians eventually forced the smaller American battalion to fall back to their defensive position on Iron Works Hill.

The two sides continued in an exchange of fire, but the Hessians did not attempt to take the hill. The American force was entrenched on the hill and had its own field cannons to deter any assault. The Americans were outnumbered and that evening the Americans retreated to Moorestown, leaving Mt. Holly to the Hessians.

By some accounts, there were up to 100 casualties on both sides combined. That seems exaggerated though. Most accounts indicate only two or three killed on each side and maybe a dozen wounded.

Colonel Von Donop and his army occupied Mount Holly. The Hessians looted houses, apparently found a fair amount of alcohol and got drunk. With the patriot army having withdrawn and most of the local population having fled town, Von Donop decided not to pursue the enemy any further for the moment. Instead, he allowed his troops to enjoy the town.

Though most of the locals fled, there is a story of one young widow who remained in town and entertained Von Donop. Some historians have speculated that this widow might have been Betsy Ross, though I could find no solid evidence to support the theory. Whoever she was, the widow apparently caused Von Donop to want to remain in town for a few days. Another Hessian officer noted that Von Donop had a weakness for the ladies and was smitten by this young beautiful widow. With the patriot force still in the area, and finding reasonably comfortable accommodations at Mount Holly, Von Donop and his men spent Christmas in the town.

Von Donop’s decision to remain in Mount Holly meant that Colonel Rall and the Hessian force in Trenton were isolated and at least a day’s march away from Von Donop’s larger force of Hessians.

- - -

Next Episode 122 Washington Crosses the Delaware

Previous Episode 120 The American Crisis

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Further Reading

Websites

The Skirmish at Petticoat Bridge, by Norm Goos and Earl Cain: http://www.thehistorygirl.com/2014/12/the-skirmish-at-petticoat-bridge.html

Battle of Iron Works Hill https://revolutionarywar.us/year-1776/battle-iron-works-hill

Battle of Iron Works Hill: http://www.revwartalk.com/Battles-1776/12-22-1776-battles-battle-of-iron-works-hill-in-mount-holly-new-jersey-new-jersey-campaign.html

Iron Works Hill Revolutionary War Sites in Mount Holly, NJ
https://www.revolutionarywarnewjersey.com/new_jersey_revolutionary_war_sites/towns/mount_holly_nj_revolutionary_war_sites.htm

Iron Works Hill: https://bclhnsassoc.org/battle-of-iron-works-hill

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

The Detail and Conduct of the American War, under Generals Gage, Howe, Burgoyne, and Vice Admiral Lord Howe, (original reports and letters) The Royal Exchange, 1780.

Carrington, Henry Battles of the American Revolution, 1775-1781, A.S. Barnes & Co. 1876.

Collins, Varnum L. A Brief Narrative of the Ravages of the British and Hessians at Princeton in 1776-1777; a contemporary account of the battles of Trenton and Princeton, Princeton University Library, 1906.

Drake, Samuel A. The Campaign of Trenton 1776-77, Lee and Shepard, 1899.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 5, Vol 3, Washington: St. Claire Clarke, 1837.

Johnston, Henry The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn, Long Island Historical Society, 1878.

Martin, Joseph Plumb The Adventures of a Revolutionary Soldier, 1830 (This is a copy of the original print, but in poor quality. You can borrow a better quality copy or listen to a free audio copy of the book) or see below in "books worth buying" section.

Reed, William B. (ed) Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed, Vol. 1, Lindsay and Blakiston, 1847.

Ross, Charles Derek (ed) Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, Vol. 1 J. Murray, 1859.

Stryker, William Battles Of Trenton And Princeton, Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, 1898.

Stryker, William The Continental Army at the Crossing of the Delaware River on Christmas night of 1776, J.L. Murphy Publishing Co. 1896.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Atkinson, Richard The British Are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777, Henry Holt & Co. 2019

Bill, Alfred Hoyt The Campaign of Princeton 1776-1777, Princeton Univ. Press, 1948.

Dwyer, William The Day Is Ours: How a Ragged Rebel Army Stood the Storm and Saved the Revolution, Viking, 1983.

Fischer, David Hackett Washington’s Crossing, Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975.

Ketchum, Richard The Winter Soldiers, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973.

Kidder, William L. Ten Crucial Days: Washington's Vision for Victory Unfolds, Knox Press, 2019.

Lefkowitz, Arthur S. The Long Retreat, The Calamitous American Defense of New Jersey 1776, Upland Press, 1998.

Maloy, Mark Victory or Death: The Battles of Trenton and Princeton, December 25, 1776 - January 3, 1777, Savas Beatie, 2018.

McCullough, David 1776, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Schecter, Barnet The Battle for New York, New York: Walker Publishing, 2002.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, October 27, 2019

Episode 120: The American Crisis

Last week I covered a few side events in Rhode Island and Canada that took place in late 1776. But we all know the main event was along the Delaware River. Over the last few weeks, I addressed the British push to take New Jersey and the Continental retreat to Pennsylvania. Continental soldiers were leaving in droves as their enlistments ended, or just plain deserting. General Washington had another very large enlistment expiration at the end of December, leaving him with little more than a few regiments to command. Very few soldiers saw any chance of victory and were eager to go home.

One of the soldiers retreating with the Continentals was Thomas Paine. The author of Common Sense had enlisted in the Pennsylvania militia sometime after writing his famous pamphlet. He ended up in Fort Lee where he volunteered to serve as General Nathanael Greene’s aide-de-camp. Paine marched with the rest of the army from Fort Lee as the British under Cornwallis pursued them.

According to legend, Paine marched with the army during the day and penned The American Crisis, No. 1, during the evenings as the army marched from Newark to the Delaware River. It is hard to imagine, though, having much time to do anything during the march. Perhaps he had time to scratch out a few notes. There is no good record as to exactly how much of The Crisis he wrote during the march. Years later, Paine said that he wrote The Crisis in Philadelphia after his arrival in the city on December 8th.

The purpose of Paine’s essay was not to inspire the troops. It was an attempt to rally the public to the cause and encourage more men to enlist. Although it is a bit lengthy for this podcast, I’m going to read it in full since it is such a powerful work.

THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph. What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly: it is dearness only that gives every thing its value. Heaven knows how to put a proper price upon its goods; and it would be strange indeed if so celestial an article as FREEDOM should not be highly rated. Britain, with an army to enforce her tyranny, has declared that she has a right (not only to TAX) but "to BIND us in ALL CASES WHATSOEVER," and if being bound in that manner, is not slavery, then is there not such a thing as slavery upon earth. Even the expression is impious; for so unlimited a power can belong only to God.

Printing from "American Crisis"
(from Wikimedia)

Whether the independence of the continent was declared too soon, or delayed too long, I will not now enter into as an argument; my own simple opinion is, that had it been eight months earlier, it would have been much better. We did not make a proper use of last winter, neither could we, while we were in a dependent state. However, the fault, if it were one, was all our own*;

* The present winter is worth an age, if rightly employed; but, if lost or neglected, the whole continent will partake of the evil; and there is no punishment that man does not deserve, be he who, or what, or where he will, that may be the means of sacrificing a season so precious and useful.we have none to blame but ourselves. But no great deal is lost yet. All that Howe has been doing for this month past, is rather a ravage than a conquest, which the spirit of the Jerseys, a year ago, would have quickly repulsed, and which time and a little resolution will soon recover.

I have as little superstition in me as any man living, but my secret opinion has ever been, and still is, that God Almighty will not give up a people to military destruction, or leave them unsupportedly to perish, who have so earnestly and so repeatedly sought to avoid the calamities of war, by every decent method which wisdom could invent. Neither have I so much of the infidel in me, as to suppose that He has relinquished the government of the world, and given us up to the care of devils; and as I do not, I cannot see on what grounds the king of Britain can look up to heaven for help against us: a common murderer, a highwayman, or a house-breaker, has as good a pretence as he.

'Tis surprising to see how rapidly a panic will sometimes run through a country. All nations and ages have been subject to them. Britain has trembled like an ague at the report of a French fleet of flat-bottomed boats; and in the fourteenth [fifteenth] century the whole English army, after ravaging the kingdom of France, was driven back like men petrified with fear; and this brave exploit was performed by a few broken forces collected and headed by a woman, Joan of Arc. Would that heaven might inspire some Jersey maid to spirit up her countrymen, and save her fair fellow sufferers from ravage and ravishment! Yet panics, in some cases, have their uses; they produce as much good as hurt. Their duration is always short; the mind soon grows through them, and acquires a firmer habit than before. But their peculiar advantage is, that they are the touchstones of sincerity and hypocrisy, and bring things and men to light, which might otherwise have lain forever undiscovered. In fact, they have the same effect on secret traitors, which an imaginary apparition would have upon a private murderer. They sift out the hidden thoughts of man, and hold them up in public to the world. Many a disguised Tory has lately shown his head, that shall penitentially solemnize with curses the day on which Howe arrived upon the Delaware.

As I was with the troops at Fort Lee, and marched with them to the edge of Pennsylvania, I am well acquainted with many circumstances, which those who live at a distance know but little or nothing of. Our situation there was exceedingly cramped, the place being a narrow neck of land between the North River and the Hackensack. Our force was inconsiderable, being not one-fourth so great as Howe could bring against us. We had no army at hand to have relieved the garrison, had we shut ourselves up and stood on our defence. Our ammunition, light artillery, and the best part of our stores, had been removed, on the apprehension that Howe would endeavor to penetrate the Jerseys, in which case Fort Lee could be of no use to us; for it must occur to every thinking man, whether in the army or not, that these kind of field forts are only for temporary purposes, and last in use no longer than the enemy directs his force against the particular object which such forts are raised to defend. Such was our situation and condition at Fort Lee on the morning of the 20th of November, when an officer arrived with information that the enemy with 200 boats had landed about seven miles above; Major General [Nathanael] Green, who commanded the garrison, immediately ordered them under arms, and sent express to General Washington at the town of Hackensack, distant by the way of the ferry = six miles. Our first object was to secure the bridge over the Hackensack, which laid up the river between the enemy and us, about six miles from us, and three from them. General Washington arrived in about three-quarters of an hour, and marched at the head of the troops towards the bridge, which place I expected we should have a brush for; however, they did not choose to dispute it with us, and the greatest part of our troops went over the bridge, the rest over the ferry, except some which passed at a mill on a small creek, between the bridge and the ferry, and made their way through some marshy grounds up to the town of Hackensack, and there passed the river. We brought off as much baggage as the wagons could contain, the rest was lost. The simple object was to bring off the garrison, and march them on till they could be strengthened by the Jersey or Pennsylvania militia, so as to be enabled to make a stand. We staid four days at Newark, collected our out-posts with some of the Jersey militia, and marched out twice to meet the enemy, on being informed that they were advancing, though our numbers were greatly inferior to theirs. Howe, in my little opinion, committed a great error in generalship in not throwing a body of forces off from Staten Island through Amboy, by which means he might have seized all our stores at Brunswick, and intercepted our march into Pennsylvania; but if we believe the power of hell to be limited, we must likewise believe that their agents are under some providential control.

I shall not now attempt to give all the particulars of our retreat to the Delaware; suffice it for the present to say, that both officers and men, though greatly harassed and fatigued, frequently without rest, covering, or provision, the inevitable consequences of a long retreat, bore it with a manly and martial spirit. All their wishes centred in one, which was, that the country would turn out and help them to drive the enemy back. Voltaire has remarked that King William never appeared to full advantage but in difficulties and in action; the same remark may be made on General Washington, for the character fits him. There is a natural firmness in some minds which cannot be unlocked by trifles, but which, when unlocked, discovers a cabinet of fortitude; and I reckon it among those kind of public blessings, which we do not immediately see, that God hath blessed him with uninterrupted health, and given him a mind that can even flourish upon care.

I shall conclude this paper with some miscellaneous remarks on the state of our affairs; and shall begin with asking the following question, Why is it that the enemy have left the New England provinces, and made these middle ones the seat of war? The answer is easy: New England is not infested with Tories, and we are. I have been tender in raising the cry against these men, and used numberless arguments to show them their danger, but it will not do to sacrifice a world either to their folly or their baseness. The period is now arrived, in which either they or we must change our sentiments, or one or both must fall. And what is a Tory? Good God! what is he? I should not be afraid to go with a hundred Whigs against a thousand Tories, were they to attempt to get into arms. Every Tory is a coward; for servile, slavish, self-interested fear is the foundation of Toryism; and a man under such influence, though he may be cruel, never can be brave.

But, before the line of irrecoverable separation be drawn between us, let us reason the matter together: Your conduct is an invitation to the enemy, yet not one in a thousand of you has heart enough to join him. Howe is as much deceived by you as the American cause is injured by you. He expects you will all take up arms, and flock to his standard, with muskets on your shoulders. Your opinions are of no use to him, unless you support him personally, for 'tis soldiers, and not Tories, that he wants.

I once felt all that kind of anger, which a man ought to feel, against the mean principles that are held by the Tories: a noted one, who kept a tavern at Amboy, was standing at his door, with as pretty a child in his hand, about eight or nine years old, as I ever saw, and after speaking his mind as freely as he thought was prudent, finished with this unfatherly expression, "Well! give me peace in my day." Not a man lives on the continent but fully believes that a separation must some time or other finally take place, and a generous parent should have said, "If there must be trouble, let it be in my day, that my child may have peace;" and this single reflection, well applied, is sufficient to awaken every man to duty. Not a place upon earth might be so happy as America. Her situation is remote from all the wrangling world, and she has nothing to do but to trade with them. A man can distinguish himself between temper and principle, and I am as confident, as I am that God governs the world, that America will never be happy till she gets clear of foreign dominion. Wars, without ceasing, will break out till that period arrives, and the continent must in the end be conqueror; for though the flame of liberty may sometimes cease to shine, the coal can never expire.

Thomas Paine (from Wikimedia)

America did not, nor does not want force; but she wanted a proper application of that force. Wisdom is not the purchase of a day, and it is no wonder that we should err at the first setting off. From an excess of tenderness, we were unwilling to raise an army, and trusted our cause to the temporary defence of a well-meaning militia. A summer's experience has now taught us better; yet with those troops, while they were collected, we were able to set bounds to the progress of the enemy, and, thank God! they are again assembling. I always considered militia as the best troops in the world for a sudden exertion, but they will not do for a long campaign. Howe, it is probable, will make an attempt on this city [Philadelphia]; should he fail on this side the Delaware, he is ruined. If he succeeds, our cause is not ruined. He stakes all on his side against a part on ours; admitting he succeeds, the consequence will be, that armies from both ends of the continent will march to assist their suffering friends in the middle states; for he cannot go everywhere, it is impossible. I consider Howe as the greatest enemy the Tories have; he is bringing a war into their country, which, had it not been for him and partly for themselves, they had been clear of. Should he now be expelled, I wish with all the devotion of a Christian, that the names of Whig and Tory may never more be mentioned; but should the Tories give him encouragement to come, or assistance if he come, I as sincerely wish that our next year's arms may expel them from the continent, and the Congress appropriate their possessions to the relief of those who have suffered in well-doing. A single successful battle next year will settle the whole. America could carry on a two years' war by the confiscation of the property of disaffected persons, and be made happy by their expulsion. Say not that this is revenge, call it rather the soft resentment of a suffering people, who, having no object in view but the good of all, have staked their own all upon a seemingly doubtful event. Yet it is folly to argue against determined hardness; eloquence may strike the ear, and the language of sorrow draw forth the tear of compassion, but nothing can reach the heart that is steeled with prejudice.

Quitting this class of men, I turn with the warm ardor of a friend to those who have nobly stood, and are yet determined to stand the matter out: I call not upon a few, but upon all: not on this state or that state, but on every state: up and help us; lay your shoulders to the wheel; better have too much force than too little, when so great an object is at stake. Let it be told to the future world, that in the depth of winter, when nothing but hope and virtue could survive, that the city and the country, alarmed at one common danger, came forth to meet and to repulse it. Say not that thousands are gone, turn out your tens of thousands; throw not the burden of the day upon Providence, but "show your faith by your works," that God may bless you. It matters not where you live, or what rank of life you hold, the evil or the blessing will reach you all. The far and the near, the home counties and the back, the rich and the poor, will suffer or rejoice alike. The heart that feels not now is dead; the blood of his children will curse his cowardice, who shrinks back at a time when a little might have saved the whole, and made them happy. I love the man that can smile in trouble, that can gather strength from distress, and grow brave by reflection. 'Tis the business of little minds to shrink; but he whose heart is firm, and whose conscience approves his conduct, will pursue his principles unto death. My own line of reasoning is to myself as straight and clear as a ray of light. Not all the treasures of the world, so far as I believe, could have induced me to support an offensive war, for I think it murder; but if a thief breaks into my house, burns and destroys my property, and kills or threatens to kill me, or those that are in it, and to "bind me in all cases whatsoever" to his absolute will, am I to suffer it? What signifies it to me, whether he who does it is a king or a common man; my countryman or not my countryman; whether it be done by an individual villain, or an army of them? If we reason to the root of things we shall find no difference; neither can any just cause be assigned why we should punish in the one case and pardon in the other. Let them call me rebel and welcome, I feel no concern from it; but I should suffer the misery of devils, were I to make a whore of my soul by swearing allegiance to one whose character is that of a sottish, stupid, stubborn, worthless, brutish man. I conceive likewise a horrid idea in receiving mercy from a being, who at the last day shall be shrieking to the rocks and mountains to cover him, and fleeing with terror from the orphan, the widow, and the slain of America.

There are cases which cannot be overdone by language, and this is one. There are persons, too, who see not the full extent of the evil which threatens them; they solace themselves with hopes that the enemy, if he succeed, will be merciful. It is the madness of folly, to expect mercy from those who have refused to do justice; and even mercy, where conquest is the object, is only a trick of war; the cunning of the fox is as murderous as the violence of the wolf, and we ought to guard equally against both. Howe's first object is, partly by threats and partly by promises, to terrify or seduce the people to deliver up their arms and receive mercy. The ministry recommended the same plan to Gage, and this is what the tories call making their peace, "a peace which passeth all understanding" indeed! A peace which would be the immediate forerunner of a worse ruin than any we have yet thought of. Ye men of Pennsylvania, do reason upon these things! Were the back counties to give up their arms, they would fall an easy prey to the Indians, who are all armed: this perhaps is what some Tories would not be sorry for. Were the home counties to deliver up their arms, they would be exposed to the resentment of the back counties who would then have it in their power to chastise their defection at pleasure. And were any one state to give up its arms, that state must be garrisoned by all Howe's army of Britons and Hessians to preserve it from the anger of the rest. Mutual fear is the principal link in the chain of mutual love, and woe be to that state that breaks the compact. Howe is mercifully inviting you to barbarous destruction, and men must be either rogues or fools that will not see it. I dwell not upon the vapors of imagination; I bring reason to your ears, and, in language as plain as A, B, C, hold up truth to your eyes.

I thank God, that I fear not. I see no real cause for fear. I know our situation well, and can see the way out of it. While our army was collected, Howe dared not risk a battle; and it is no credit to him that he decamped from the White Plains, and waited a mean opportunity to ravage the defenceless Jerseys; but it is great credit to us, that, with a handful of men, we sustained an orderly retreat for near an hundred miles, brought off our ammunition, all our field pieces, the greatest part of our stores, and had four rivers to pass. None can say that our retreat was precipitate, for we were near three weeks in performing it, that the country might have time to come in. Twice we marched back to meet the enemy, and remained out till dark. The sign of fear was not seen in our camp, and had not some of the cowardly and disaffected inhabitants spread false alarms through the country, the Jerseys had never been ravaged. Once more we are again collected and collecting; our new army at both ends of the continent is recruiting fast, and we shall be able to open the next campaign with sixty thousand men, well armed and clothed. This is our situation, and who will may know it. By perseverance and fortitude we have the prospect of a glorious issue; by cowardice and submission, the sad choice of a variety of evils—a ravaged country—a depopulated city—habitations without safety, and slavery without hope—our homes turned into barracks and bawdy-houses for Hessians, and a future race to provide for, whose fathers we shall doubt of. Look on this picture and weep over it! and if there yet remains one thoughtless wretch who believes it not, let him suffer it unlamented.

Thus ended the Crisis.

These powerful word began to spread across North American in late December 1776. Historians also don’t agree on the day it was published. Most say December 19, but it may have been as late as December 23. Popular legend says he published it in the Pennsylvania Journal and that Washington had it read to his army just before they crossed the Delaware to attack the Hessians. But again, there is no contemporary evidence that Washington did this. Paine’s first printing came as an independent pamphlet. The Pennsylvania Journal had ceased publishing entirely in early December because of the expected British invasion of Philadelphia. It did not resume publishing until mid-January.

Another paper, the Pennsylvania Packet reprinted the first half a few days after Christmas. It did not publish the second half until January. That said, it is quite possible that copies of the original American Crisis pamphlet reached the Continental Army a few days before the crossing and that many soldiers either read it or had it read to them.

Whatever the details of its release, Paine’s Crisis called on the nation to rally against the British Army. Next week, we will cover the beginning of the country’s counterattack.

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Next Episode 121 Battle of Iron Works Hill

Previous Episode 119: Fort Cumberland (Nova Scotia) and Newport, RI

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Further Reading

Websites

The American Crisis series (full texts): http://www.ushistory.org/paine/crisis

The American Crisis Before Crossing the Delaware, by Jett Conner, Journal of the American Revolution 2015: https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/02/american-crisis-before-crossing-the-delaware

A Brief Publication History of the “Times That Try Men’s Souls,” by Jett Conner, Journal of the American Revolution 2016:
https://allthingsliberty.com/2016/01/a-brief-publication-history-of-the-times-that-try-mens-souls

How Thomas Paine's Other Pamphlet Saved the Revolution: https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/how-thomas-paines-other-pamphlet-saved-the-revolution

Biography of Thomas Paine: http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/biographies/thomas-paine

Thomas Paine: https://www.biography.com/scholar/thomas-paine

The Writings of Thomas Paine: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/31270/31270-h/31270-h.htm

Thomas Paine, works: https://oll.libertyfund.org/people/thomas-paine

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Clarke, Harry Hayden Thomas Paine, American Book Company, 1944.

Conway, Moncure The Life of Thomas Paine, Vol 1 and Vol. 2, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1908.

Conway, Moncure (ed) The Writings of Thomas Paine, Vol. 1 1774-1779, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1906.

Drake, Samuel A. The Campaign of Trenton 1776-77, Lee and Shepard, 1899.

Foner, Phillip (ed) The Complete Works of Thomas Paine, Citidel Press, 1945.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Atkinson, Richard The British Are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777, Henry Holt & Co. 2019

Dwyer, William The Day Is Ours: How a Ragged Rebel Army Stood the Storm and Saved the Revolution, Viking, 1983.

Fischer, David Hackett Washington’s Crossing, Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975.

Foner, Eric Tom Paine and Revolutionary America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1976

Foner, Eric Thomas Paine: Collected Writings: Common Sense / The Crisis / Rights of Man / The Age of Reason / Pamphlets, Articles, and Letters, Library of America, 1995 (book recommendation of the week).

Kaye, Harvey J. Thomas Paine and the Promise of America: A History & Biography, New York: Hill and Wang, 2006.

Kean, John Tom Paine: A Political Life, London: Bloomsbury, 1995

Lefkowitz, Arthur S. The Long Retreat, The Calamitous American Defense of New Jersey 1776, Upland Press, 1998.

Nelson, Craig Thomas Paine: Enlightenment, Revolution, and the Birth of Modern Nations, New York: Viking, 2006.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, October 20, 2019

Episode 119: Fort Cumberland (Nova Scotia) & Newport RI

In late 1776, British war plans seemed to be going reasonably well for the British. In Canada, General Carleton had destroyed General Arnold’s fleet on Lake Champlain, and opened up the path for a spring invasion from the north. General Howe had pushed General Washington out of New York and New Jersey and into Pennsylvania. The patriot cause seemed to be in trouble.

Fort Cumberland

Despite being on the ropes, many Patriots were still looking to take the fight to the British. Some still wanted to go on the offensive. A revolution is not controlled by a single authority. In many places, locals will take the initiative.

Back in March 1776, General Howe had evacuated Boston and moved his forces up to Halifax Nova Scotia before beginning the summer campaign in New York. After Howe’s army left Halifax for New York, there were few British soldiers left in the area. Recall that back at the beginning of the French and Indian war, Britain had removed most of the local French Acadians from the region and forced them to return to France. See, Episode 007. Thousands of colonists from New England moved into the area to take the farmland that the French Canadians had been forced to abandon. During the French and Indian war, it seemed like a good idea for Britain to populate the area with British colonists. But by 1776, those same New Englanders were at war with Britain. The New Englanders who had settled in Halifax shared the same political views as their friends and family in Massachusetts.

Model of Ft Cumberland, Nova Scotia (from Johnwood1946)

Among those settlers was Jonathan Eddy. He had served as a New England militia officer fighting in Halifax during the French and Indian War. When hostilities ended in 1760, Eddy took advantage of the cheap land, and moved his family to Halifax. There, he settled into life as a farmer and an elected member of the local assembly. In 1775, the Assembly expelled Eddy for non-attendance, though the real reason was probably more for his involvement in revolutionary activities.

In February 1776, Eddy traveled to Cambridge to convince General Washington to send a contingent to Halifax to take control of the region. At the time, Washington was still besieging Boston and preparing his own offensive there. He did not want to deploy resources to begin another campaign. Eddy then traveled to Philadelphia to get the support of the Continental Congress for a campaign to take Halifax. Congress also rejected his proposals. Finally, he returned to Massachusetts to get the Provincial Congress to assist with his plans. Massachusetts refused to provide him with troops, but promised to provide arms and ammunition if he could raise enough men to attempt a takeover of Nova Scotia.

As I said,by the end of March, General Howe had moved the bulk of his army from Boston to Halifax. But everyone expected it would be leaving soon. Eddy spent most of the summer, attempting to raise a regiment. Despite aggressive recruiting among small villages in northern New England, Eddy could not raise even 100 men. Most men who wanted to fight for the patriot cause, had already left for Boston where they were fighting in the Continental Army.

Undeterred, Eddy took his small force back to Nova Scotia, where he was able to recruit more locals and a few Indians, bringing his force to around 180.

After Howe had departed for New York, there were few British soldiers in the region. Eddy’s force targeted Fort Cumberland, which fell under the Command of British Lt. Col. Joseph Gorham. Like Eddy, Gorham had served as an officer during the French and Indian war, and had settled in Halifax. He received an appointment as Deputy Agent for Indian Affairs. At the same time Eddy tried to recruit a patriot corps, Gorham attempted to recruit a loyalist corps. He also toured much of New England, mostly before the fighting at Lexington and Concord, to put together a fighting force to support the King. Gorham did not have much luck with recruitment either. He ended up with a total command of about 190 men.

Jonathan Eddy

In the summer of 1776, after Howe’s forces left, Gorham took command of Fort Cumberland. This was former French Fort Beauséjour, which sat on the isthmus between Nova Scotia and mainland Canada. The fort was far from a priority for British, leaving Gorham’s militia with little supplies or anything else to build up the fort’s defenses. Still Gorham and his men used equipment leftover from the French and Indian War, repaired the walls, and made the fort relatively defensible.

In early November, Eddy’s forces moved into the area. He recruited more locals, including several members of local tribes as well as some French speaking Acadians who remained in the area. The force captured a small contingent of Loyalist militia under Captain Walker. The patriots also captured a small sloop under Gorham’s command, the Polly along with its crew. Eddy’s forces then began to lay siege to Fort Cumberland. By some accounts, Eddy’s forces had grown to over 500 men, though this seems exaggerated. Gorham had less than 200 in his garrison. Eddy had already taken about 60 men prisoner. However, Eddy had no cannons to use against the fort, while Gorham had three mounted cannons to put into use against the attackers.

On November 10, Eddy sent a letter to Gorham, calling for his surrender. In response, Gorham suggested that Eddy surrender. Two days later, Eddy attempted a night attack against the fort, hoping that surprise and confusion would allow his men to get inside the fort and take the garrison. Gorham’s men, however, repulsed the attack.

Joseph Gorham at Fort Cumberland (from Wikimedia)

Following that failure, the soldiers serving under Eddy began to question his leadership. A council of officers voted to remove Eddy from leadership. Remember these were all local civilians acting as militia, with no professional officers or men around. A little over a week later, the new leadership council ordered another attack on November 22 and again on November 23. They burned a few outbuildings but failed to capture the fort itself.

On November 27, a British relief force arrived aboard the ship Vulture. The ship carried 200 reinforcements, mostly Royal Marines under the command of Major Thomas Batt. Two days later, Batt led a counterattack on the patriot lines outside the fort. The British killed or wounded an unknown number of patriots while taking five casualties, two dead and three wounded, themselves.

The patriot forces scattered. Most of the men simply left the fight and went home. The British spent the next few days trying to chase down patriots, but with little luck. They scoured the countryside and captured a few suspected rebels. They also burned farms of those suspected of participating in the attack on the fort or other supporters of the rebellion.

The locals protested the destruction of property. Colonel Gorham offered a full pardon to anyone who surrendered and agreed to take an oath of allegiance, with the exception of Eddy and a few other leaders. This upset Major Batt, who charged Gorham with neglect of duty. Gorham later received exoneration of the charges. The pardon seemed to return the area to loyal obedience and ended the patriot movement there. Eddy, and a few others unwilling to submit, left for Massachusetts.

The battle at Fort Cumberland, also sometimes called Eddy’s Rebellion, ended up being a relatively minor affair involving mostly militia. While some historians argue that a patriot victory there might have brought Nova Scotia over to the patriot side and made it the 14th State, it seems unlikely that the patriots would have been able to hold the territory against an almost certain British counterattack from Halifax. In any event, the British, despite a victory, did not consider it terribly significant.

Occupation of Newport

All of this fighting in Halifax was happening while the British under General William Howe were pushing the Continental Army out of New York and across New Jersey, still moving slowly toward Philadelphia. As I said, General Howe had joined General Cornwallis in New Jersey, slowly pushing Washington’s army into Pennsylvania.

Newport Map, 1777 (from Boston Rare Maps)

Howe had left General Clinton back in New York. Clinton spent most of his days, I imagine, banging his head on his desk out of frustration. Since the first British troops landed in New York earlier that summer, Clinton had proposed one plan after another to encircle, entrap, and destroy the Continental Army. His commander, General Howe, continually rejected his advice, preferring to push the Americans back slowly, and always offering them an avenue of retreat.

As I mentioned a couple of weeks ago, during the New York campaign, Howe and Clinton’s relationship, which had never been particularly good, grew even more strained. Clinton attempted to push beyond Howe’s orders on several occasions only to receive a reprimand from the commander. During the battle of White Plains, a frustrated Clinton spoke openly of his frustration about serving under Howe to Cornwallis. When Cornwallis passed along these comments to Howe, the commander decided to leave Clinton completely out of any combat plans under his command.

As the British and Hessians pushed the Continental Army across New Jersey, Clinton once again proposed taking a fleet up the Delaware while another army pushed Washington back to the river. Washington’s army would be trapped and forced to surrender. But Howe once again said no, and allowed Clinton’s subordinate, Cornwallis, to lead the British Army attacking Washington in New Jersey.

Still, Howe needed to give Clinton something to do other than sitting in New York writing letters to London about how badly Howe was performing. Howe deployed Clinton to capture Rhode Island, or in particular the island and harbor areas around Newport. General Howe’s brother, Admiral Howe needed a winter port for the Royal Navy. The fresh water areas around New York might freeze up for the winter, thus trapping the navy and possibly damaging the ships. The salt water port at Newport, Rhode Island would be a much safer nearby location to host the Royal Navy for the winter. Newport would also once again give the British a toe hold in New England and would also serve as a good post to block New England privateers from coming and going. Newport was thought to have one of the largest percentages of loyalist populations in New England, thus minimizing the dangers from local militia.

Clinton received a force of about six or seven thousand regulars and Hessians and took General Lord Percy as his second in command. Some sources say the force was larger, but that may have been counting the thousands of sailors aboard ships carrying the army to Rhode Island. Howe had originally promised Clinton a force of 10,000 soldiers, but reduced that number shortly before Clinton set sail.

A fleet of 83 ships under the command of Commodore Peter Parker carried Clinton and his forces troops from New York to Rhode Island. You may recall that Parker had carried Clinton to the Carolinas where they faced the embarrassing loss at Fort Sullivan in Charleston Harbor. See, Episode 96. Clinton certainly had not forgotten about it. He took this opportunity to bicker with Parker again over the incident. He demanded that Parker take the blame for the failure at Charleston and clear the cloud over Clinton’s good name. Parker was pretty conciliatory and wanted to put the issue behind them. But making a fuss about it now only made the situation between the two commanders worse.

Even so, the landing at Newport on December 8, 1776 turned out to be a nonevent. There were no Continental soldiers prepared to oppose the landing. Washington’s army was in New Jersey, fleeing toward Philadelphia. Charles Lee’s army was in southern New York, but seemed more interested in what was happening in New Jersey than attempting to oppose the British in Rhode Island. Before the British fleet arrived, the local patriot militia had abandoned the defensive works along the shore and had already removed their cannons.

Sir Henry Clinton, 1777
(from Wikimedia)

Most patriot civilians in the area simply left town before the British arrived. A prewar population of about 9000 had fallen to under 5000. Clinton found the much reduced population remaining behind to be loyalists or Quakers who were willing to submit to British rule. The British force landed unopposed. There were a few patriot militia in the area, who the British easily captured or dispersed.

For the last year, Clinton had constantly recommended to General Howe that he should use forces to envelope the enemy and surround them so that the British could capture the enemy. Instead, Howe just pushed the enemy further back, allowing them an avenue of retreat. Now, Clinton in his first independent command, did exactly the same as Howe. He landed his forces at Newport and simply allowed the enemy militia to flee. Clinton was not interested in taking prisoners. He simply wanted to take Newport as ordered and move on to other things.

The Continental Navy was still hanging around Rhode Island at this time. Most of it remained bottled up near Providence. It did not confront the British or attempt to oppose the landing. In fact, after a British ship, the HMS Diamond, ran aground in January 1777, the Continentals were still unable to capture or destroy it. After the better part of a day, the tide came in and the British sailed on their way. Shortly after that incident, Congress suspended Commodore Esek Hopkins from command of the Continental Navy. The navy remained a nonentity of little concern to the British.

General Clinton was wary about spreading his forces to thinly. He did not attempt to occupy the whole colony but kept his forces in and around Newport. Clinton’s goal was not to occupy large portions of New England. It was to secure a good salt water port for the navy to use over the winter. From there, the Navy could protect its occupation of New York as well as harass patriot shipping all along the New England coast. It also proved once again that the British could take control of any town they wished. The Continental army or militia was not going to stop them. Receiving word of Washington’s attack on Trenton, reinforced Clinton's view that he should not spread his troops too thinly, where small outposts would be vulnerable to a similar attack.

New England militia mobilized about 6000 soldiers in the area around Rhode Island to oppose any attempts to move inland. General Howe, instead of providing reinforcements for an offensive, recalled many of the soldiers under Clinton’s command, for use in New Jersey. As a result the British occupation would remain strictly on the defensive.

Clinton Goes Home

In January, 1777, Clinton turned over command to Lord Percy and returned home to Britain. Clinton was frustrated at not getting any real command opportunity and still felt the need to clear his name over the failure to take Charleston. He also wanted to express his frustration over Howe’s go-slow strategy and refusal to take any advice that might result in the capture and destruction of the Continental Army. Further, Clinton felt slighted by the fact that General John Burgoyne, a more junior general, had been given an independent command in Canada.

Clinton had planned to resign his commission once he returned. As we’ll see in future episodes, the King would not accept his resignation and still had other plans for him. But for the winter of 1777, once Newport was secure, Clinton hopped on a ship and went home to England, expecting that would be the end of his military career.

Percy Goes Home

After Clinton’s departure, General Lord Percy took command for a few months. Then, he too decided to return to London. Percy, who had saved the British during the retreat from Concord, and had led divisions in the Battle of Long Island and the assault on Fort Washington, had also regularly clashed with General Howe. He had proven himself a highly capable officer on the battlefield, and also had the respect of the officers and men who had served under him.

Lord Percy (from Wikimedia)

Like Clinton, Percy felt he was being banished to Rhode Island where nothing interesting was likely to happen. Adding to his frustration at being removed from the main action, Percy felt Howe was questioning his abilities as a general. Howe, who was not exactly known for his aggressive strategy, wrote several letters to Percy over the winter, criticizing him for being too cautious in capturing territory in Rhode Island.

Since Percy had followed orders, and since Howe’s attempts in New Jersey to occupy more territory that winter had ended in disaster, it’s hard to say or certain why Howe was so critical. It appears that Howe saw Percy as a Clinton ally and therefore a political threat to Howe’s leadership. By putting Percy in a theater where he would not see much action, and then generally criticizing his failure to impress, Howe seemed to be trying to diminish Percy’s reputation among leaders back in London.

Officials in London seemed perfectly happy with Percy. They even promoted him to Lieutenant General. Despite the promotion, Percy decided to return home in the spring of 1777 and resign his commission. Unlike Clinton, the King accepted Percy’s resignation, ending his military career. General Richard Prescott assumed command of the British forces in Rhode Island. I’ll have more to say about Prescott in a future episode.

Percy seemed content to retire and live out his life in wealth and comfort. He divorced his wife, who had been cheating on him while he was away. He then remarried. He had nine children with his new wife. In 1786 his father died. Percy inherited the family estates and the title of Duke of Northumberland.

Ironically, Americans probably remember Percy’s illegitimate half brother, James Smithson, better than Percy. Many years after Percy’s death, Smithson, who never visited America, left a large bequest in his will which formed the foundation of the Smithsonian Institute in Washington DC.

Next week: Thomas Paine will attempt to reinvigorate the Army with his publication of The American Crisis.

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Next Episode 120: The American Crisis

Previous Episode 118 British Capture Stockton and Lee

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