Showing posts with label History Revolutionary War Podcast. Show all posts
Showing posts with label History Revolutionary War Podcast. Show all posts

Sunday, April 28, 2019

Episode 094 War at Sea, Battle of Turtle Gut Inlet




When we last left the Continental Navy in Episode 84, Commander Esek Hopkins had completed the fleet’s raid on the Bahamas.  After returning, it found itself bottled up in Narragansett Bay in Rhode Island.  The British Navy kept the fleet from leaving.

Meanwhile, Hopkins had to deal with a host of criticism.  He could not afford to pay his crew.  Congress was upset because he ignored orders, going to the Bahamas instead of destroying the British Fleet off the Virginia and Carolina coasts.  He also ignored instructions to go destroy the British fleet in Nova Scotia.  That fact that those orders were insanely unrealistic even with a navy twice its size did not seem to enter into the debate.

Most of Hopkins’ crew abandoned him to go work on privateers.  That was where the action was, and where a sailor could make far higher pay and get a larger percentage of any prizes.  By the summer of 1776, Hopkins had ships he could not man, and criticisms he could not answer to anyone’s satisfaction. As a result, he did almost nothing.

Privateers

In truth, privateers were the real naval force for the Continentals for the duration of the war.  On a privateer, a crew divided up the full value of any captured ship and cargo.  Navy crews only received one-third of the value of merchant ships, and one-half the value of warships.  Further the Navy often did not have the money to pay even that reduced value.  Some privateers earned more than $1000 on a single voyage, at a time when a private in the Continental Army earned $6/month.

The British also did not treat privateers differently than navy sailors.  Under the law, privateers could be hanged as pirates, but I guess sailors could have been hanged as traitors. In practice, when the British captured sailors or privateers, they generally treated them as prisoners of war.

On April 3 1776, the Continental Congress formally approved privateering and granting letters of marque to privateer ships.  Essentially this granted ship owners and crew free passage to a friendly port where a prize court in cities like New Providence, Philadelphia, or Baltimore could award the capture and allow them to sell their prize, usually at auction.  Of course, large numbers of privateers had been operating for over a year, either with the authorization of a particular colony, or just acting on their own authority.

American Privateer Jack Attacking a British Navy Brig
(From American War for Independence at Sea)
Continental privateers had to submit a bond to Congress, of between $10,000 and $20,000 depending on the size of the ship.  The bond required that they operate under certain rules, such as targeting only British ships, not looting the private belongings of prisoners, not killing or torturing prisoners, and returning all captured ships to a prize court for formal judgment that the capture was valid and to assess the value of the prize.

But compared to a navy, privateering just worked better.  New England especially was full of trained ship’s crews and merchant vessels.  Most of these vessels regularly travelled in dangerous waters before the war, and had carried some weaponry to fend off pirates.  It often only took adding a few extra guns to make the ship into a formidable attack vehicle.  Congress did not have to put out any money for ships or crew, the ships and crew aboard privateers got paid better and more regularly, and they performed the necessary function of capturing British ships and supplies, making life more difficult for the British and providing much needed supplies for the patriot cause.

In an earlier episode, I mentioned the capture of the Nancy in 1775, which provided the Continental Army with much needed munitions for the Siege of Boston.

By one count, over the course of the entire war, the Continental Navy had a total of 64 ships in operation, which captured 196 enemy vessels.  Privateers deployed 1697 ships, capturing 2283 enemy vessels.  Privateers captured the bulk of the 16,000 British who were taken prisoner at sea, compared to about 15,000 prisoners captured by the Continental Army over the course of the war.

Privateers did not limit themselves to the North American coast.  They operated throughout the West Indies, capturing British merchant ships trading with their own island colonies.  Privateers even patrolled the coast of Europe and England itself, occasionally picking off isolated ships that they could rush back to America.

Privateers often acted alone or in small groups.  There were no large squadrons of them and they could not attack the largest warships or fleets.  But privateers were so numerous that they continually harassed supply ships and smaller navy patrol ships.  This also made it difficult for the British to use their smaller ships to patrol the coast and stop smugglers. It allowed private shipping to import roughly 2 million pounds of gunpowder or saltpeter (an essential component of gunpowder) into North America.  Absent this effort, Washington would have been reduced to the use of spears or bows and arrows.

Shipping brought in all sorts of other military supplies and necessities critical to the prosecution of the war.  European powers, notably the French, Dutch, and Spanish, were willing to sell supplies to the Americans on the sly, but they were not willing to ship it to America.  Doing so would be an act of war against Britain.  But they would ship to their colonies in the West Indies and allow private American vessels carry the much-needed supplies to America.  The work of privateers in this effort was absolutely essential to the final American victory.

Washington’s Navy

Washington had also authorized the use of private ships to attack the enemy during late 1775 and 1776.  These were not authorized by Congress nor any other legitimate authority.  It was also before Congress had authorized any navy. Since many of the ships were manned by Continental soldiers, it may not be fair to characterize them as privateers, but they largely acted independently and worked to harass British shipping in New England.

When he first took control of the army, he rejected any proposals to mount any challenge to the British Navy.  Washington bought into the reputation that the British Navy held undisputed dominance of the high seas.  If large countries like France could not even challenge the British Navy, what hope did a few colonial merchant ships converted for war have?

Some of his officers though, had captained ships.  They knew that although they could not dominate the seas, they could easily pick off isolated transport ships, and even challenge some of smaller patrol ships.  Even if they could not control the Atlantic, they could make Britain’s control much more difficult.
John Glover (from Wikimedia)

One of the biggest army advocates for a navy was Colonel John Glover, commander of the 14th Regiment from Marblehead, Massachusetts.  Glover’s Regiment would play a key role in helping Washington to cross key waterways during critical battles of the war.  But in 1775, they were just another regiment surrounding Boston.  Washington, however, noted that Glover kept his regiment in exceptional order and discipline.

Before the war, Glover had owned and captained ships that traded with Europe and the West Indies.  Many of his soldiers had been sailors who followed their captain to war shortly after Lexington.  By fall 1775, Glover had convinced Washington to give it a try, and even leased the army one of his own ships, the Hannah, with his son Lt. John Glover, Jr. serving as first officer Washington eventually approved the leasing and use of eight converted schooners to harass the navy around Boston and attack any isolated ships they could find.

In the six months before the Siege of Boston ended, Washington’s Navy had captured a total of 55 ships, the Nancy captured by the Lee, being the most valuable.  Despite successes, Washington’s ships sometimes captured ships belonging to patriots.  Some the ships captured mistakenly.  Others they recaptured, meaning they were American ships that the British had captured, then recaptured by the Americans.  In both cases, the crew received no prize money.  In one case of recapture, the disappointed crew of the Hannah mutinied.  Washington had to put down the mutiny and punishing most of the crew with lashes.

This was still months before Congress even knew about Washington’s Navy, and before it had authorized any Navy of its own.  When a Congressional delegation visited that fall, Washington discussed the problems of running both and army and navy.  The delegation agreed that Massachusetts should handle the court hearings for awarding prizes.  It also motivated the Continental Congress to create its own Navy.  That eventually led to the formal navy led by Esek Hopkins.

Washington’s navy never joined Hopkins’ navy.  Washington’s ships continued to operate under Washington’s command.

Massachusetts Bay

After Washington moved his army to New York, part of his informal Navy a continued to patrol around Boston.  Although the British had abandoned Boston in March, the Navy left a few ships around Massachusetts Bay, mostly to make sure British transports did not try to land there by mistake and get captured.

On May 17, the HMS Hope, a British supply ship filled with gunpowder and entrenching tools, attempted to sail into Boston Harbor, apparently still unaware of the evacuation.  The Franklin, a small six gun vessel from Washington’s Navy, discovered the ship before the British Navy did.  The Franklin’s captain, James Mugford sailed up and captured the Hope before they knew what was happening.  Captain Mugford then sailed his prize, five times the size of his own ship, into Boston.  This was the biggest prize for the patriots except for the Nancy a year earlier.

The British were pretty upset that this little privateer had captured a ship right under their nose.  When the Franklin and an even smaller ship, the Lady Washington sailed out of Boston two days later, the British sent 12 or 13 small ships containing a total of around 200 sailors and marines.  They hoped to board both ships and capture the crews.

The Lexington (from Wikimedia)
The British approached, pretending to be patriots, but fooling no one.  Both patriot ships began firing on the attackers.  The Franklin successfully fended off the boarding parties after intense hand to hand combat.  Captain Mugford received fatal wound from a lance as he attempted to chop off the hands of boarders with his sword.  Some accounts say the Franklin ran aground. The crew had to escape to land and form a line of battle to fight off the attackers.

Privateers were a major problem for the British, but privateers also often lost battles with British ships.  For example, a privateer named the Yankee Hero tangled with the HMS Melford (sometimes spelled Millford).  The Yankee Hero had been headed down the New England coast with only a partial crew, hoping to hire more sailors in Boston.  On June 7, 1776, the Melford spotted her and sailed to intercept.  The two ships engaged in a two hour gun battle before the Yankee Hero finally surrendered.  That meant the British took the ship as a prize and made prisoners of the crew.  Imprisonment often meant months or even years on a prison ship, usually ending in a slow death from starvation or disease.  Alternatively, crew members sometimes agreed to serve the British Navy to avoid that terrible fate.

John Barry

Privateers and Washington’s informal navy were not the only patriot resources at sea.  Although Hopkins and most of the Continental Navy were stuck in Rhode Island, several of Hopkins’ officers still actively engaged the enemy.  One of his captains, John Barry, commanded the Lexington.  Around this same time John Paul Jones received a commission as Captain of the Providence.  But the Providence was stuck in Rhode Island, so Jones’ story does not get interesting until much later.  For now, I want to take a look at Barry.

John Barry (from Wikimedia)
John Barry had been born in Ireland to a poor farmer who was kicked off his land while Barry was still a child.  He went to sea as a young boy, taking a job as a cabin boy.  Barry eventually moved to America, where he began work as an officer on merchant vessels between Philadelphia and the West Indies.  After a few years, he would captain merchant vessels as he developed a good reputation for running merchant ships.

Barry probably adopted Philadelphia as his home, because it was one of the few places in the British Empire where he could practice his Catholic faith openly.  At the outbreak of war, Barry was captaining the largest merchant vessels for prominent Philadelphia merchant Robert Morris.  In late 1775, when the Continental Congress created the new Continental Navy, Morris, then a delegate from Pennsylvania, helped Barry get a commission.  Barry accompanied Hopkins on his mission to the Bahamas, and acquitted himself well.

While Hopkins was stuck in Narragansett Bay, Barry kept the Lexington out at sea.  On April 7, 1776, the Lexington encountered the British sloop Edward.  After a lengthy sea battle, the Edward struck her colors and surrendered.  His capture of this war ship helped establish Barry as one of the early naval war heroes.  Barry sent the Edward and several other captured supply ships to Philadelphia during the spring and summer.

His success also drew the attention of British Navy.  In May two British ships, the  HMS Roebuck and Liverpool, chased the Lexington.  The ships engaged in a running duel lasting all day.  In the end, Barry gave them the slip and returned to Philadelphia.

Philadelphia Naval Defenses

Philadelphia, the largest city in the colonies, remained relatively impervious to attack by the British Navy.  Unlike the other major colonial seaports, Philadelphia was not on the coast.  A ship had to access it by sailing miles up the Delaware River.

The patriots had set up a series of alarm posts along the river, most of which had row galleys armed with cannon.  These proved surprisingly effective.  On a river, sailing maneuverability is limited.  These large rowboats could move in any direction to attack a ship.  Although they usually had only one cannon and could not easily sink a larger sloop, many of them used together could harass and attack any ship that tried to get up the river.

That is exactly what happened when Captain Barry escaped up river to avoid the Roebuck and Liverpool.  The two ships attempted to follow the Lexington up the Delaware River.  A smaller patriot ship, the Wasp, and 13 row galleys attacked the two British warships several miles down river from Philadelphia.  The two sides engaged in a four hour firefight, during which time the Roebuck ran aground.  The patriots did not have enough men or guns to take the ship.  The two British vessels remained overnight until the tide lifted the Roebuck off the sand bar.  They retreated back down to a point where the river widened greatly, giving them much better maneuverability.

After that encounter, the British did not attempt to move up the river again.  Instead, they remained down near the bay where they could intercept any traffic trying to enter or leave the river.

Battle of Turtle Gut Inlet

In June, just such a merchant vessel attempted to get past the British blockade.  The Nancy had made a run down to St. Croix and St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands.  She was loaded with gunpowder, and weaponry purchased in the French colonies, as well as rum and sugar.  By way of explanation, this Nancy was a completely different ship from the Nancy captured in New England several months earlier.  This ship was built in Wilmington Delaware in 1775.

Turtle Gut Inlet on NJ Coast (from Wikimedia)
Two British vessels, the Kingfisher and Orpheus, spotted the Nancy on June 28 and began a chase.  Unable to get past the British, the Nancy moved north, up along the New Jersey coast.  Around dusk, a fog settled in and the two British ships lost sight of their target.  The Nancy sailed into Turtle Gut Inlet.  This was a small waterway between two islands that today make up the Wildwood Beaches along the New Jersey shore.  In the early 20th century, engineers filled in this inlet to make Wildwood one long island instead of two smaller islands.  But in 1776, the Nancy could move into this inlet between the two islands.

Eager to protect his cargo, the captain of the Nancy, Hugh Montgomery, began unloading the ship, carrying the cargo to shore in small rowboats.  The crew made little progress getting the cargo off the ship overnight.  In the morning, the British ships spotted the Nancy again and moved in for another attack.

Also that morning, Captain Barry, aboard the Lexington, along with the Wasp and the Reprisal arrived on the scene to assist the Nancy.  Even so, the two British ships were much larger and had more guns than the three Continental ships.  They would not be chased off.  The British Navy could probably win a protracted battle.

Instead, the Continental ships harassed and distracted the British, while sending several of their longboats to help the Nancy’s crew unload the ship.  The Americans could not keep up the fight for very long.  The firefight resulted in one American sailor killed and another wounded before the Nancy decided to abandon its efforts to save the cargo.  It had removed about two-thirds of the cargo before abandoning the ship.

Rather than let it fall into the hands of the enemy though, Captain Montgomery laid a long fuse down to the ship’s hold, still carrying a great deal of gunpowder.  They could not keep it, but they also would not let it fall into enemy hands.

Seeing the Americans abandon ship, the Kingfisher sent a prize crew aboard the Nancy.  The British were aboard when the fuse finally hit the powder magazine causing a huge explosion.  A count of body parts after the fact, led to an estimate of 30 or 40 British officers and crew killed by the explosion.

Although the Americans lost their ship, the battle was widely considered an American victory.  The Continental Navy fought a successful holding action against larger British warships and saved much of the cargo. It enhanced Barry’s reputation and that of the new Navy generally.

Next Week: the Continentals surrender Canada following the Battle of Three Rivers.

- - -

Next Episode 95: The Battle of Trois-Rivières (Three Rivers)

Previous Episode 93: The Dave Mathews Band Breaks Up



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Further Reading

Resources to learn more about today’s topic.

Websites:

American War of Independence at Sea: http://www.awiatsea.com/Index.html

Privateers and Mariners in the American Revolution: http://www.usmm.org/revolution.html

Privateers of the Revolution: http://www.massar.org/privateers-of-the-revolution

The Whale-Boat Men of Long Island Sound, by Jackson Kuhl, Journal of the American Revolution (2013) https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/11/whale-boat-men-long-island-sound

Overlooked Hero: General John Glover, by Michael Schellhammer, Journal of the American Revolution (2013): https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/07/overlooked-hero-general-john-glover

The Yankee Hero: http://www.awiatsea.com/Privateers/Y/Yankee%20Hero%20Massachusetts%20Brig%20%5BThomas%20Tracy%5D.html

Origins of Washington’s Fleet: http://www.awiatsea.com/Narrative/Origins%20of%20Washington's%20Fleet.html

Commodore Barry: http://www.ushistory.org/people/commodorebarry.htm

John Barry: True Father of the American Navy, by Jodie Gilmore (2010):
https://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/4774-john-barry-true-father-of-the-american-navy

Naval Engagements 1775-1783 https://www.myrevolutionarywar.com/battles/1775-1783-naval

Rolling on the River: Delaware in the American Revolution, by Kim Burdick (2017):
https://allthingsliberty.com/2017/01/rolling-river-delaware-american-revolution

The Battle of Turtle Gut Inlet https://cresthistory.org/turtlegut.php

Turtle Gut Inlet: http://www.revolutionarywarnewjersey.com/new_jersey_revolutionary_war_sites/towns/wildwood_crest_nj_revolutionary_war_sites.htm

Turtle Gut Park,NJ: http://www.revolutionarywarnewjersey.com/new_jersey_revolutionary_war_sites /towns/wildwood_crest_nj_revolutionary_war_sites.htm


Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Journal of the Continental Congress, Vol. 4, Jan-June, 1776 Govt. Printing Office, 1904.

Naval Documents of the American Revolution (Vols. 1-9) (from ANRS at ibiblio.org).

Griffin, Martin The Story of Commodore John Barry, Philadelphia, 1908.

Howe, Octavius T. Beverly Privateers in the American Revolution, The Univ. Press, 1922.

Maclay, Edgar Stanton A History of American Privateers, D. Appleton & Co. 1899.

Meany, William Commodore John Barry, the Father of the American Navy, Harper and Brothers, 1911.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)

Beeman, Richard R. Our Lives, Our Fortunes and Our Sacred Honor: The Forging of American Independence, 1774-1776, New York: Basic Books, 2013.

McGrath, Tim Give Me a Fast Ship: The Continental Navy and America's Revolution at Sea, Caliber, 2014.

Nelson, James George Washington’s Secret Navy, McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Patton, Robert H. Patriot Pirates: The Privateer War for Freedom and Fortune in the American Revolution, Pantheon, 2008 (book recommendation of the week).

Shomette, Donald G. Privateers of the Revolution: War on the New Jersey Coast, 1775-1783, Schiffer Publishing, 2016.

Willis, Sam The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of the American Revolution, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016.


Sunday, February 17, 2019

Episode 084: The Continental Navy Raids the Bahamas




The Continental Congress had authorized a Continental Navy back in October of 1775, as I discussed back in Episode 75.  A real navy, though was more of a dream than a reality.  Aside from the ships that Arnold had captured on Lake Champlain, and a handful of ships George Washington had purchased or rented, which remained under army control, the Continental Congress had no ships.  Several colonies had launched their own ships, mostly to attack and capture merchant ships supplying the regulars.  Many privateers were raiding British ships as well.  This was actually quite helpful in capturing supplies and denying them to the British Army.  But none of this was under the command of Congress, and no colony nor privateer had anything that could go up against a British naval fleet or even one of its larger ships of the line.

That did not seem to discourage anyone.  Congress decided to start building a navy and wanted to put it to use as soon as possible.  Congressional delegate Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island sat on the Naval Committee.  When it came time to select a fleet commander, Stephen thought is brother Esek Hopkins would be the best man for the job.

Esek Hopkins

On December 22, 1775, Congress appointed Esek Hopkins Commander in Chief of the Continental Navy.  Now I don’t know about you, but when I think Revolutionary war navy, I think John Paul Jones or John Barry.  Esek Hopkins is almost a non-entity in any book about the Revolution.  But he commanded the navy for over two years, and was the only man ever named Commander in Chief of the navy during the war.

Hopkins was born and raised in Rhode Island.  His great grandfather, Thomas Hopkins, had been one of the founding members of the Rhode Island colony.  Like many Rhode Islanders at the time, Esek lived most of his life at sea.  He captained a fleet of merchant ships and lived a pretty comfortable life as a merchant trader.  His life got even more comfortable when he married the daughter of another wealthy Rhode Island merchant.

Esek Hopkins (from Wikimedia)
During the French and Indian War, Hopkins captained a privateer ship, capturing numerous French and Spanish ships as prizes.  The fact that they were not actually at war with Spain at the time did not seem to bother anyone but the Spanish.  Hopkins grew even wealthier from all the prize money.

During the 1760’s Hopkins was elected to several minor posts in Rhode Island, though he seemed to resign them all after short periods, presumably because he returned to sea. His involvement in government probably came about more by the fact that his brother, Stephen Hopkins, was Governor of Rhode Island for much of the 1750’s and 60’s.

By the early 1770’s Esek was in his 50’s and ready to spend more time at home.  He served in he colonial assembly and clearly sided with the patriots as the split with Britain grew.  In 1772, his son was a leader in the force that sank the British ship Gaspee that I discussed way back in Episode 36.

Following the battle of Lexington, Rhode Island put itself on a war footing.  Hopkins serving in the colonial legislature at the time, helped with the development of colonial defenses and in October 1775, took a position as General in the Rhode Island Army.

During this time, he arranged a settlement with the captain of the British Navy ship Rose to provide the British ships with food in exchange for them not destroying the town of Newport.  He also began seizing the property and estates of several prominent Tories in the colony, turning over the confiscated property to the colonial government to help pay for the war effort.

Two months after becoming a general, Hopkins received Congress’ request in December 1775 that he become Commander and Chief of the new Continental Navy.  Some people refer to him as Commodore, others as Admiral, but whatever title you use, he was the head guy in charge of the navy, just as Washington was in charge of the army.  Despite the fact that he had only two months experience as an army officer, and zero experience in any navy, Hopkins accepted and prepared to travel to Philadelphia to assume his new command.

Launching a Navy

Now the term “navy” might be a bit much for what Commodore Hopkins commanded.  Individual colonies did not want to give up the ships they had outfitted to defend their own coastlines and harass British shipping.  Privateers were in no hurry to join a navy where they would have to take orders from someone else, and not be allowed to keep as much prize money as they currently enjoyed.

The Columbus (from Wikimedia)
So Congress spent much of the winter of 1775-76 purchasing merchant vessels and outfitting them as best they could to serve as combat vessels.  Congress had authorized building more ships, but they were nowhere near ready in early 1776 when Commodore Hopkins received his first orders to set sail.  His fleet consisted of eight ships.  The largest, the Columbus with 36 guns.  The next largest, the flagship Alfred had 24 guns, followed by the 16 gun Cabot , the 14 gun Andria Doria, and the 12 gun Providence.  The three smallest ships, the ten gun Hornet and the Wasp and Fly with 8 guns each were named after insects, supposedly because they were so small they could only serve to be a nuisance to the enemy in battle.  By comparison, a British ship of the line had at least 60 guns, and there were at least 130 ships of the line in the British Navy at the time.

The fleet left Philadelphia in February 1776.  If you have been paying attention, you may recall that British General Clinton was headed south at the same time.  Clinton had a contingent of British ships to meet up with General Cornwallis and another fleet.  The combined fleet planned to capture the Carolinas and restore Tory control of those colonies.  You may also recall that Lord Dunmore in Virginia had burned Norfolk in January and remained with another British fleet controlling the Chesapeake bay and operating out of Portsmouth, Virginia.

The Mosquito and Fly (from Navy History & Heritage)
Any of these fleets were more than a match for the 8 ships and 130 Marines commanded by Hopkins.  Dunmore had at least six naval vessels, most of which were much larger than anything the Continentals had, and also had at least 400 Marines.  Clinton and Cornwallis’ fleets consisted of dozens of ships and thousands of soldiers.  In just about any confrontation, the best case scenario for the Continental Navy would be to run away successfully and not be sunk or captured.

Despite the odds, Congress instructed Hopkins to go forth and take out the British navy.  His first mission was to take his fleet to the Chesapeake Bay and take out the naval fleet there.  After winning that fight, he should proceed immediately to the Carolinas to take out the huge fleet of the coast, which was probably 20 times the size of his fleet.  After defeating them, Hopkins was to proceed north and take out the fleet in Narragansett Bay in Rhode Island.  They even authorized him to break up his fleet of eight ships and send them to different locations in order to cover more territory.  While they were at it, I’m not sure why they didn’t just order him to sail over to London and capture the King.  The orders were so out of touch with reality, that Hopkins must have shaken his head in disbelief.

The instructions included a statement:

Notwithstanding these particular orders, which it is hoped you will be able to execute, if bad wind or stormy weather, or any other unforeseen accident or disaster disable you to do so, you are then to follow such courses as your best judgment shall suggest to you as most useful to the American cause and to distress the enemy by all means in your power.

Gadsden Flag (from Wikimedia)
Congress’ Marine Committee wrote these orders on January 5, so Hopkins must have had time to confer with the committee before setting sail in late February.  If he thought the orders were unrealistic, you would think he’d confer with them and get some changes to his instructions.  But there does not appear to be any evidence that he did so.

On February 17, Hopkins took his fleet out of Philadelphia and out toward the open seas.  Departure had been delayed a few weeks because the Delaware river was still frozen and the fleet could not get out.  As the ships set sail Hopkins instructed Lt. John Paul Jones to hoist the new flag, a yellow flag with a rattlesnake on it, and the phrase, “Don’t Tread on Me.”

South Carolina Delegate Christopher Gadsden had taken a copy of the flag home to South Carolina.  That was how the fleet and the defenders of Charleston Harbor would recognize each other as friends if the fleet made it there.  The flag is often known as the Gadsden Flag.

To the Bahamas

Apparently Hopkins had no intention of obeying his orders.  Some historians have indicated that perhaps he had secret orders, or made the decision once at sea given weather conditions and the position of the enemy.  But the facts don’t seem to bear out these theories.  Before leaving port, Hopkins issued orders to each captain that if they became separated from the fleet, that they should rendezvous at a small island called Abacco in the Bahamas, which seems really out of the way, like over 700 miles, for raids on the Chesapeake or the Carolinas.

Battle of Nassau (from Wikimedia)
Within two days, two of the fleet's smallest ships, the Hornet and the Fly got separated from the fleet.  Actually, it turned out that they crashed into each other and had to return to shore for repairs.  Hopkins took the remainder of the fleet straight to Abacco, where they arrived on March 1.  There, the marines captured some small local boats and used them to make their way inconspicuously toward Nassau, on the island of New Providence.  Nassau, then as now was the capital of the Bahamas.  Two forts defended the town but no garrison of regulars.  Defense relied on militia.  Since Nassau had been settled years earlier by many New Englanders, they were sympathetic to the patriot cause.

At the site of 200 Continental Marines invading the city on March 2, the Bahama militia fired off a few shots and then almost immediately fled the smaller Fort Montague and took up defenses in the larger Fort Nassau.  That evening, Hopkins issued a public letter to the people of Nassau saying they were only there to collect stores from the forts belonging to the British government.  If the people put up no resistance, he would not burn the town nor loot any private property.  The locals apparently took up the deal.  The next morning, when the marines marched to the fort, the militia left, and the Governor turned over the keys to the fort.

The navy collected a large cache of military supplies, including 88 cannon, nearly 10,000 cannonballs, and 23 barrels of gunpowder.  It was so much stuff, that it took nearly two weeks to load it onto ships.  Part of the delay was the fact the the sailors and marines had also captured a large cache of rum and proceeded to get drunk for several days.  Even with that delay, they loaded everything onto their ships.

Map of New Providence (from Naval History & Heritage)
They even had to commandeer another local ship to carry it all home.  True to his promise not to take private property, Hopkins later returned the ship to its owners and paid for its use.  Unfortunately for the patriots, they missed out on what they needed most.  The Governor had removed about 150 barrels of gunpowder from Fort Nassau before the marines entered.  He secreted the barrels onto a civilian sloop which sailed away with the valuable cargo.

The Continental Navy also took the governor and a few other top leaders as prisoners of war and brought them back to North America.  While they were loading supplies, the Fly, one of the two ships that had gotten lost as they left Philadelphia, finally arrived.  The Captain reported that it had been able to catch up after making minor repairs.  The other ship the Hornet, had suffered greater damage and remained in port in South Carolina.

On March 18, the seven ships of the fleet, along with the borrowed merchant vessel set sail for Providence, Rhode Island.  There, they could offload the military supplies so that they could travel by wagon to General Washington in Cambridge.  They did not know it, but by the time they left the Bahamas, Washington had already broken the siege and the British had evacuated the city.

Battle At Sea (Block Island)

On the way back, on April 4, as the fleet passed the coast of Long Island New York, they encountered a British Navy ship, the Hawk, a small six gun tender ship which surrendered easily.  The next day, they encountered another ship, the Bolton with eight guns, and captured it as well.  The day after that, they sighted a larger ship the 20 gun Glasgow, along with a smaller tender ship.  The ships opened fire on each other, leading to a battle that lasted several hours.  The captain of the Glasgow, realizing he was outnumbered and outgunned, eventually made a run for it and escaped capture, leaving only the smaller tender ship as a prize.

The patriots took several casualties.  Captain Hopkins of the Cabot, Commodore Hopkins’ son, was seriously wounded, along with seven others on his ship.  Four men on the Cabot died in battle.  The Cabot, which had been the first ship in the assault, took the brunt of the casualties.  Overall the fleet suffered 10 killed and 14 wounded, with only one killed and three wounded on the Glasgow.

After this, the fleet continued on to Rhode Island where they offloaded their captured goods and Commodore Hopkins had the chance to send a report to Congress.

Investigations and Courts Martial

Initially, Hopkins received congratulations for his successful mission and enjoyed celebrations for the raid on the Bahamas.  But within days, the praise began to turn to criticism.  Why hadn’t the fleet been able to capture the Glasgow? It was a single 20 gun ship going up against seven vessels.

Now in all fairness, the Glasgow was a fast new well designed ship of war.  It was not a converted merchant vessel.  It also had a highly experienced crew going up against a patriot fleet that had never fought a sea battle before.  Just based on lack of experience, I have to give the patriots a break on letting this one escape.

The Alfred (from Museum of US Navy)
Others were not as forgiving though.  Two Captains, Whipple of the Columbus and Hazard of the Providence were accused of being insufficiently aggressive during the fighting, leading to courts martial of both men.  Amazingly, Whipple sat on the panel that court martialed Hazard, and Hazard sat on the panel that court martialed Whipple.  The courts acquitted Whipple but relieved Hazard of his command, leading to the promotion of now Captain John Paul Jones.

Next, Hopkins had to deal with his sailors.  Typically upon returning from a mission a crew would be paid.  But as usual, Congress was short on cash and making excuses.  Over 200 crewmen had to leave for medical care, smallpox among other things, ravaging the crew.  Hopkins could not recruit a new crew as any able sailor was making far more money aboard a privateer, plus he had a better chance of actually getting paid what he was promised.  So Hopkins could not set sail again as he could not recruit sailors for his fleet.

By May, Hopkins learned that many in Congress were upset by the fact that he had refused to follow orders and had not bothered to do anything about the British fleets in the Chesapeake and off the Carolina coast.  Southern delegates were already predisposed not to like a New England commander.  Ignoring the military needs of the southern States to bring back a bunch of arms to New England, and disregarding orders in the process, did not endear him to the southerners.

Congress wanted Hopkins to set sail again, to attack the British in the Chesapeake and also to raid Halifax.  But with Hopkins unable to raise a crew for his fleet, he could not comply with the orders.  The Continental Congress did not want excuses, it wanted results.  They soon called him back to Philadelphia for hearings related to Hopkins’ refusal to follow orders when he raided the Bahamas, and his failure to capture the Glasgow despite having a much larger fleet.

Many hoped the hearings would end in Hopkins being dismissed.  However, his supporters among New England delegations helped prevent dismissal.  Congress did censure him though, before returning him to command of the fleet, now based in Rhode Island.  I can’t image the censure did much for his morale, and it certainly left a mark on his reputation that weakened his command authority.

Conclusion

Hopkins would remain in command of the Navy until 1778.  I’ll discuss the reasons he left in a later episode.  But following his initial raid on the Bahamas, Hopkins accomplished very little.  He could never recruit enough sailors to man all of his ships.  He could not get the undivided support of Congress.  The British Navy now focused on keeping his ships locked up in Narragansett Bay.  There would not be any more major naval actions over the next few years.  Individual vessels would still harass the British, but they were really doing nothing more than what the privateers were already doing.

For those of you hoping for lots more stories of naval exploits, sorry, you’ll have to wait for the next war.

- - -

Next Episode 85: Dorchester Heights

Previous Episode 83: Continental Congress Winter 1776



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Further Reading

Websites 

Rhode Island’s Esek Hopkins – Rodney Dangerfield of the American Revolution: http://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/rhode-islands-esek-hopkins-rodney-dangerfield-of-the-american-revolution

Letter from Committee of Congress to Commodore Hopkins, Jan. 18, 1776:
http://amarch.lib.niu.edu/islandora/object/niu-amarch%3A101440

New Providence Expedition: http://www.awiatsea.com/Narrative/New%20Providence%20Expedition.html

Revolutionary War, Battle of Nassau: http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/the-nassau-raid-americas-first-jointspecial-operation

Battle off Block Island http://www.awiatsea.com/Narrative/Battle%20of%20Block%20Island.html

Proceedings of a Court-Martial on John Hazard, Commander of the sloop Providence, May 8, 1776: http://amarch.lib.niu.edu/islandora/object/niu-amarch%3A99526

Proceedings of Court-Martial on Abraham Whipple, Commander of the Columbus, May 6, 1776: http://amarch.lib.niu.edu/islandora/object/niu-amarch%3A90046


Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Journals of Congress, Vol 1, (contains minutes of First Continental Congress and first year of the Second Continental Congress.

Beck, Alverda (ed) The Letter Book of Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Navy, 1775-1777, Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society, 1932.

Field, Edward Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Navy During the American Revolution, 1775 to 1778, Providence: Preston and Rounds Co., 1898.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 4, Vol 4, Washington, 1837.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)

Beeman, Richard R. Our Lives, Our Fortunes and Our Sacred Honor: The Forging of American Independence, 1774-1776, New York: Basic Books, 2013.

McGrath, Tim Give Me a Fast Ship: The Continental Navy and America's Revolution at Sea, Caliber, 2014.

Nelson, James George Washington’s Secret Navy, McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Willis, Sam The Struggle for Sea Power: A Naval History of the American Revolution, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2016.