Sunday, November 23, 2025

AR-SP42 The American Revolution and the Fate of the World, with Richard Bell

This discussion, primarily an interview with Professor Richard Bell, author of The American Revolution and the Fate of the World, summarizes the book's core argument: that the American Revolution was a World War characterized by global dimensions, multi-theater conflicts, and lasting worldwide consequences.

Key Themes of the Discussion

1. The American Revolution as a World War and Global Conflict

Professor Bell frames the American Revolution as a "World War" or "Seven Years War part two," involving the three great 18th-century powers—Britain, France, and Spain—fighting "hammer and tongs".

The conflict was multi-theater, extending far beyond the 13 colonies:

  • Europe/Mediterranean: Featured the 3.5-year Siege of Gibraltar, the longest siege of the war, where the most troops in any European uniform were massed.
  • Caribbean and Central America: Major theaters where France and Spain sought to gain islands and territory (including Belize, Honduras," or "Seven Years War part two," involving the three great 18th-century powers—Britain, France, and Spain—fighting "hammer and tongs".

The conflict was multi-theater, extending far beyond the 13 colonies:

  • Europe/Mediterranean: Featured the 3.5-year Siege of Gibraltar, the longest siege of the war, where the most troops in any European uniform were massed.
  • Caribbean and Central America: Major theaters where France and Spain sought to gain islands and territory (including Belize, Honduras, and Nicaragua).
  • India: A major theater where Britain, France, and the Kingdom of Mysore contested for supremacy. Naval commanders engaged in five battles within six months.
  • Africa: Included naval skirmishes in places like Cape Town, Cape Verde, and Senegal, and directly led to the foundation of Sierra Leone as a new British colony for resettled people.
  • Australia: The loss of the American colonies as a dumping ground for convicts resulted in the foundation of Australia as a new penal colony (Botany Bay).

2. Reshaping International Alliances

The war created unexpected and "wild" alliances, forcing the Patriots to partner with nations they had previously despised:

  • The Franco-Spanish Coalition: France (joined 1778) and Spain (joined 1779) allied with the American rebels, driven by geopolitical ambition to cause political instability in the British Empire, rather than ideological affinity.
    • France's Role: France, under Count of Vergennes, sought territorial gains in the Caribbean and India, aiming to expand French trading posts and knock down King George to elevate King Louie. While the victory at Saratoga helped, the French had been preparing for over a year by rebuilding ships and recruiting.
    • Spain's Role: Spain, led by King Carlos III, was primarily interested in regaining Florida and, critically, Gibraltar. Ideologically, Spain was hostile to the idea of supporting colonial rebels and therefore allied with France, keeping Spain's hands "clean" from dealing directly with the Continental Congress.
    • Naval Supremacy: The combined French and Spanish fleets were numerically larger than the Royal Navy, forcing Britain to make "impossible naval choices" and divert ships from North America to protect vital holdings like Jamaica. This naval strain was critical to the success at Yorktown.
  • Britain's Isolation: Unlike previous conflicts, Britain failed to secure major allies. King George was left relying on Hessians (hired "renter soldiers") and indigenous allies.
  • Indigenous Actors: Indigenous people were central actors, functioning as sovereign nations making military alliances. Most sided with the King, believing he offered the best chance to hold back the encroachment of Patriot land speculators (like Washington and Jefferson) by upholding the Proclamation Line of 1763.

3. Global Origins and Ripple Effects

The discussion highlighted the complexity and global origins of the war, starting with the Boston Tea Party:

  • The Tea Act: The event originated from Chinese tea leaves, transported by the British East India Company (an "India-based conglomerate"), which sought a British government bailout because it had mismanaged its business and was competing with Dutch tea smugglers.
  • Free Trade vs. Monopoly: The protest became a discourse about "free trade" versus the monopolistic power of the East India Company, which colonists feared was a "stalking horse" for the British government to impose taxes and tariffs.

The war's result also created global consequences:

  • Decolonization: Thomas Jefferson believed the Declaration of Independence was "pregnant with the fate of the world". It inaugurated the genre of declaration making by rebels and separatists worldwide, serving as the "starting gun for decolonization" that eventually replaced the world of empires with sovereign nation-states.
  • Migration and Refugees: The war resulted in significant migration, including Black Loyalists (like Harry Washington, an enslaved man of George Washington who ended up in Sierra Leone) and Native Americans (like Molly Brandt, who ended up a dispossessed refugee in Canada).

In essence, the discussion concludes that viewing the American Revolution narrowly as "crown versus colonists" fails to capture the full, multifaceted, globally sourced, and multi-ethnic nature of this expansive 18th-century conflict.

Q&A: 

The discussion concluded with a series of questions from audience members regarding the global legacy, structure, motivation, and military aspects of the American Revolution.

1. The Global Legacy of the Declaration of Independence (Bob)

Question: Bob asked if the Declaration of Independence was the most significant element of the Revolutionary War in shaping the "fate of the world," particularly because it was adopted by numerous other countries.

Answer: Professor Bell confirmed that the phrase "pregnant with the fate of the world" was used by Thomas Jefferson in 1826 to describe the significance of the Declaration.

  • By 1826, 20 or 30 groups of rebels and separatists, including the Haitians from the French Empire and revolutionaries in South America, had authored their own declarations of independence.
  • These documents were modeled, directly or indirectly, on the American original, inaugurating the "genre of declaration making" by separatists worldwide.
  • This transformation acted as the "starting gun for decolonization" and contributed to the shift from a world of empires to a world of sovereign nation-states.
  • The host added that the Declaration’s influence extended beyond colonialism, spreading the ideal of self-government and elected government, which even influenced non-colonial nations like France.

2. The Use of Individual Characters in Global History (Peter)

Question: Peter asked if telling the global story through a small number of individual characters might skew the overall presentation or give a "skewed sense" of the conflict, as one person may not be fully representative of the facet being examined.

Answer: Professor Bell explained that the book uses a character-centric approach selectively:

  • Out of 14 chapters, only five follow one individual as a primary lens (or "touchstone"). For instance, the Native American chapter uses Molly Brandt as a lens but also discusses other groups, such as the Cherokees and Katabas.
  • The other nine chapters do not follow a single individual.
  • He cited the chapter on the rise of Australia (a consequence of losing the American colonies as a penal dumping ground). The story begins with a jewel thief named William Murray, but because Murray dies early on while guarding British slave forts in West Africa, other touchstones are used to carry the story forward to Lord Sydney’s decision to found Botany Bay.

3. Motivation for Writing a Global History (Peter)

Question: Peter also asked what motivated Professor Bell, as a newcomer to the Revolutionary War field, to undertake the massive effort of synthesizing disparate global scholarship.

Answer: Professor Bell noted that although this was his first book specifically on the Revolution, he had been teaching the subject for 20 years at the University of Maryland.

  • The book was directly prompted by the COVID-19 lockdown period, during which he gave Zoom talks. His British accent led attendees to ask: "what did British people think about the American Revolution?".
  • This curiosity prompted him to research that subject, and subsequent audience questions pushed him to research Ireland, and then India.
  • The book grew out of people "bugging me with questions I didn't know the answer to," and his decision to synthesize the "shelves and shelves" of existing, but often distinct, scholarship to bring these global dimensions to the general public.

4. The Counterfactual Role of the Spanish Navy (Ed)

Question: Ed posed a counterfactual query regarding the Battle of the Chesapeake (Battle of the Capes): Could the French have diverted enough ships to fight off the British fleet and ensure the success at Yorktown if the Spanish Navy had not jumped into the war to provide naval assistance?.

Answer: Professor Bell acknowledged the difficulty of answering a counterfactual question, but confirmed the naval premise:

  • The combined fleets of France and Spain (the second and third largest navies, respectively) numerically overwhelmed the British Royal Navy.
  • This forced Britain to make "impossible naval choices," such as diverting ships globally to defend vital colonies like Jamaica, which was "vastly more important than any American mainland colony" than any American mainland colony.
  • Without the French and Spanish navies' combined ability to overwhelm the Royal Navy globally and locally, the outcome at Yorktown "could have been quite different".
  • He stressed that in the age of sail, what happened at sea was as important as what happened on land, and noted that naval engagements like the Battle of the Capes, the Battle of the Saints, and the "endless rematches" in India were vital parts of the war.

5. Comparative Global Revolutions (Roger)

Question: Roger asked if the American Revolution was the only place and time in the 1770s to bring forth its revolutionary ideals, and if not, where the next such movement might appear.

Answer: Professor Bell quickly pointed to the Haitian Revolution (1791–1804) as an event that commanded the Western world's attention and was "no less significant in global history".

  • Although most of the fighting was confined to the Caribbean, the Haitian Revolution—a slave-led insurrection—was of "seismic global importance" because it directly challenged imperial capitalism.
  • If enslaved people could rise up, throw off an imperial power, and declare themselves statesmen of equal stature, the established order was threatened, leading Western powers (including the United States and Britain) to attempt to suppress it.

* * *

Professor Richard Bell discusses his new book The American Revolution and the Fate of the World.

For a written summary of the discussion, go to https://blog.amrevpodcast.com

To see a list of upcoming Round Table events, where you can participate on Zoom, go to: ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://amrevrt.org/virtual-round-table-events⁠⁠⁠

Order the book on Amazon.

The author has offered to sell a signed copy directly to you if you contact him via Email. His contact information is available here: https://history.umd.edu/directory/richard-bell

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Sunday, November 16, 2025

Episode 370 Vermont Joins the Union

We last looked in on Vermont way back in Episode 177 when the people of Vermont declared themselves a free and independent Republic.  Vermont had never been an independent colony.  Various other colonies claimed all or part of it, but the primary fight was between New Hampshire and New York.  Both colonies sold conflicting land grants in the region, resulting in fights between people who claimed to own the same land.

Vermont Independence

During the colonial era. The Privy Council in London ruled that the region belonged to New York.  The leadership in New York took that to mean that all the land grants made by New Hampshire were null and void and that those holding claims from New Hampshire were simply trespassers. London officials later clarified that, while New York had sovereign control over the land claims, it had to do something to respect the private property claims that had already been made.  New York’s so-called accommodation was to allow New Hampshire claims holders to pay for their land again in New York.  

The landholders, in no mood to pay for their land a second time, opted to resist New York’s efforts to impose its land claim scheme.  These men eventually formed the Green Mountain Boys, which acted as vigilantes, harassing people trying to enforce New York grants as well as law enforcement officers sent out to impose New York’s land rules.  

This was the state of things when the Revolutionary War began.  The New Hampshire faction in the region, the Green Mountain Boys, became active supporters of the patriot cause.  Their early action in seizing Fort Ticonderoga in New York under Ethan Allen, and eventually forming a Continental Regiment under Seth Warner.  By contrast, many of the New Yorkers backed the loyalists and ended up fleeing to Canada.

In 1777, the people in the region decided they would not be part of either New York or New Hampshire.  Instead, they declared their own independence and formed the state of Vermont, using the French name for the Green Mountains that made up much of the region.  

The problem was that New York was not willing to go along with this.  While many New Yorkers had been loyalists, there were a great many patriot New Yorkers who did not want to see the eastern part of their state to break away.  Many of them still had land claims in that area as well.

While Vermont declared itself to be a free and independent state, the Continental Congress refused to recognize them. Representatives from Vermont, which called itself New Connecticut at the time, came to the Congress in Philadelphia in the summer of 1777, seeking recognition and representation.  They used the same arguments outlined in the Declaration of Independence for removing and replacing New York’s control over them. The New York delegation threatened to abandon the Congress and the war effort if the Congress recognized Vermont’s claims.  So for the time being at least, Congress sided with New York, refusing to recognize Vermont.

In 1778, New York governor George Clinton attempted to reassert control over Vermont, offering to confirm private land titles if settlers acknowledged New York’s authority there.  The Vermont settlers, however, had felt so cheated by previous efforts to settle their land claims in New York that they refused any consideration of the offer.

In 1779, New York insisted that Congress adopt a resolution that no new state could be formed out of the land of an existing state without that state’s consent.  This law later made its way into the new US Constitution.  Other states generally took New York’s side.  Many of them were also concerned about having some of their own state land taken away from them.  Also, some states viewed the whole Vermont scheme as an effort by New England to get another delegation and have more power in Congress.  So the people of Vermont found themselves on the outs with Congress. They could not get recognition without New York's permission.

The Cow War

With New York threatening its existence, and with Congress unwilling to support them, the Vermont legislature responded by passing a law formalizing a Vermont militia, complete with a provision to draft soldiers.  The stated purpose of the militia was to defend against possible attacks from Canada.  But the effect of the new law reopened the active violence between Vermont and Canada.

Any draftee who refused to serve could be subject to a fine or prison time.  The state most commonly enforced this by seizing one cow from any militiamen who refused service.  Many of the men in Vermont having their property seized recognized New York’s authority and refused to participate in a militia run by the so-called Vermont Republic. Many of them were members of a militia, but one overseen by New York.

Officials seized several dozen cattle from these pro-New York farmers.  Thee men, under the authority of their New York militia, took up arms and marched north to take back their cows by force.  This began what became known as the Great Cow War.

To support the pro-New York militia, Governor Clinton called out more militia from arnound Albany to support the pro-New York faction in Vermont. Clinton, however, could not commit a very large force to this action. Remember, this was in the middle of the war, when New York was focused on Indian and loyalist incursions from Canada.  

When New York militia entered Vermont, Ethan Allen marched his Vermont militia to the region, where his larger force captured the New York militia.  Because the Yorker militia surrendered without a fight, they were treated leniently.  Those from New York were sent home.  Those who lived in the territory claimed by Vermont eventually had to swear loyalty to Vermont or be expelled from the state.

Governor Clinton complained to Congress about these actions, but Congress was fighting its own war with the British.  It showed no interest in intervening in this local squabble.  Vermont’s actions effectively blunted any pro-New York activity in the state.  But Vermont continued to rile its neighbors.  On sticking point was annexing a bunch of New Hampshire and New York towns on its borders, where the residents asked to join Vermont.

Negotiations with Canada

What would have been even more concerning, but was not publicly known at the time, was that Vermont officials began negotiations with British officials in Canada to form an alliance against the United States.  

In 1779 and 1780, British officials were actively looking for ways to divide the enemy.  This was around the same time they were negotiating to turn General Benedict Arnold.  Vermont was an obvious opportunity.  These people wanted to be independent. The Continental Congress refused to recognize their claims, siding more with their enemy, New York.  Vermont found itself surrounded by hostile neighbors.  At some point, they would likely turn on Vermont and crush its claims to independence.

Lord Germain wrote to Frederick Haldimand, who had succeeded Guy Carlton as Governor of Quebec as well as the North American commander at the time, General General Clinton, the North American military commander at the time.  Beyond a promise of protection, Germain suggested that they offer the Vermont leadership bribes to accept an offer for Vermont to become its own British colony, complete with the protection of the British army.

Virginia loyalist Colonel Beverly Robinson, was working closely with Major John AndrĂ© to turn Benedict Arnold at the time, under Clinton’s authority in New York. Robinson initiated contact with Ethan Allan with the British proposal.  The Robinson proposal came with the implication that the king would be willing to appoint Allen as the Royal Governor of Vermont.

Allen did not reject the offer out of hand.  He recognized Vermont’s precarious position, surrounded by hostile states that refused to recognize the Vermont Republic.  Even if Vermont had to return to colonial status, a good argument could be made that rule under British authority would be better than rule by New York authority.  Allen later claimed that he just played along, thinking that the British proposal could be used to pressure the Continental Congress into recognizing the Vermont Republic. Allen did not respond to Beverly’s proposal.

 Vermont continued to press its case with the Continental Congress, but the Congress kept delaying making any sort of decision.  President of Vermont Thomas Chittenden got frustrated with Congress, saying it had no authority to judge whether or not the Vermont Republic was valid. It was already done.  Vermont would never accept being merged back into New York.  Vermont was only seeking a rightful place with representation in the Continental Congress.  If that was not forthcoming, Vermont reserved the right to negotiate with the British to assure its continued independence from New York.  

Around this same time, in the fall of 1780, Chittenden wrote to Haldimand, offering a truce and a discussion of an exchange of prisoners.  Seeing an opening, Haldimand appointed Justus Sherwood, a loyalist who had lived in Vermont before the war and serving as an officer in the Queen’s Royal Rangers, to negotiate with the Vermont Republic.

Sherwood travelled to Vermont, publicly to discuss a truce and prisoner exchange.  Sherwood, however, also had private discussions with Ethan Allen.  According to Sherwood’s report to Haldimand, Allen was open to the idea, as long as Vermont remained a separate province with its own military command.  He also insisted negotiations must be kept secret, and that negotiations would end if Congress recognized the Vermont Republic.

This was a particularly dangerous time for such discussions since in the midst of them, Arnold’s plot with the British was exposed, and concern over other possible traitors became a prominent concern for the Continental leadership.  Sherwood quickly made his departure from Vermont.  Allen reported the meetings to the Vermont legislature, but this only raised suspicions about him.  Allen angrily resigned his military commission on the spot and stormed out of the meeting.  After that, Allents brother Ira Allen and Joseph Fay were appointed to continue any further negotiations with the British.

With the threat of throwing in with Britain as leverage, Chittenden wrote to the three governors who had land claims on Vermont. Chittenden suggested that keeping an independent Vermont on their side was better than forcing Vermont to ally with the British.  Massachusetts agreed not to make any claims on Vermont territory if Congress took up consideration of Vermont’s application to join the confederation.  New Hampshire did not give a definitive answer, but it appeared it would be willing to support Vermont’s claims, only if Vermont ceded any claims to the annexed territories that had joint the Republic from the east bank of the Connecticut River.

New York was still the biggest opponent.  Governor Clinton showed the Vermont legislature to the legislature and essentially said it was an insult to New York.  The state Senate, however, understood the concern that Vermont might unite with Canada.  It voted to send commissioners to Vermont to at least open negotiations.  The Senate, however, dropped the idea of negotiations after Governor Clinton threatened to dissolve the legislature if it did not drop the idea.

In early 1781, Robinson sent a second letter to Ethan Allen.  Shortly after receiving it, Allen had a discussion with Seth Warner, who expressed the concern that secret negotiations with the enemy was arguably treason.  Allen turned over both letters to the Vermont legislature, noting that he had not responded to either of them.  The legislature sent them to the Continental Congress, which found itself too busy with other things to give it any consideration.

With no action by Congress on recognition, Vermont negotiators met with the British at the Fort at Ile-aux-Noix, in the spring of 1781.  The Vermont delegation refused to put anything in writing.  Ira Alllen told Sherwood that while some Vermont leaders were open to the possibility, the people of Vermont were not.  Without popular support, there was no way this could work.  Allen said that if British incursions into Vermont stopped, they might be able to begin to sway public opinion.  Sherwood’s report after the fact, stated that he thought the Vermont delegation was not serious.  They were just bargaining for time, and that they probably hoped to use the British offer as leverage to get recognition from the Continental Congress. The two sides met several more times over the coming months, with the British threatening to restarting raids into the state unless some progress was made.  

Sherwood was right that Vermont saw these negotiations as leverage with Congress.  In August of 1781, Congress once again took up consideration of Vermont’s application and agreed to allow Vermont’s entry if it gave up its claims on the territories it annexed from New Hampshire.

That fall, an army under General Barry St. Leger moved down to Ticonderoga, with the expectation that the Vermont Assembly would vote on the alliance and would welcome them as liberators.  The British, who were supposed to treat anyone from Vermont as an ally, got into a firefight with some Vermont militia, killing one and taking five others prisoner.  St. Leger wrote a public letter of apology, which inadvertently revealed elements of this very secret and very unpopular deal between Britain and Vermont.

Feeling it was in the driver’s seat, Vermont rejected Congress’ condition that it give up its annexed territories but agreed to continue negotiations over its borders.  The moment seemed to pass though.  The public voted out politicians who were considering the British alliance.  News of the British loss at Yorktown seemed to sour others on the idea of continuing negotiations with Britain.

In 1782, the pro-New York faction in southern Vermont sent a series of petitions to both New York and the Continental Congress, expressing their concerns about the Republic’s negotiations with the British and the fact that they wanted to remain Americans.  At the same time, New York offered to guarantee all land claims in Vermont, without any additional payments or fees, if the territory would just agree to accept New York’s authority.

Governor Clinton continued to add pressure by encouraging Yorkers in Vermont to continue their acts of resistance.  He even appointed New York judges with jurisdiction over cases that arose in Vermont.  Once again, Allen took an army of Vermont militia to the area that was the center of pro-New York activity.  They seized the property and arrested and banished several leaders of the pro-New York faction.  Allen wrote to Haldimand that he planned to do everything in his power to return Vermont to a British province.

Congress reiterated its willingness to recognize Vermont only if it gave up on its annexed territories.  When the war finally came to an end, efforts to resolve the issue also seemed to wane.  The threats from Canada had ended, and New York did not seem to press its claims as hard as it had in the past.  Vermont had no war debts, and actually ran a surplus from all the loyalist property it had seized.  It did not seem in any hurry to join the Confederation and take on the war debt for the entire country, at least not on any terms but its own.

Several Canadian leaders, including the new Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, John Graves Simcoe, tried to use trade agreements to pressure Vermont into returning to British control.  The easiest way to get goods to market was up the river to Quebec.  Britain’s trade restrictions made that uneconomical.  That would change if Vermont became a British province. 

Nothing came of that though.  The British realized that the trade restrictions only kept them more divided.  In 1787, Lord Dorchester (formerly known as Guy Carleton) in Quebec created a free trade zone between Vermont and Quebec on most goods.

The Allen brothers, Ethan, Ira, and Levi, all seemed to warm up to the idea of making Vermont into a British Province.  Levi secured a contract to provide the British navy with masts made from Vermont timber.  Ira worked on plans to dig a canal connecting lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence River to facilitate trade.  Ethan was still writing to Lord Dorchester in 1788 asking for British arms so that Vermont could defend itself if the new United States decided to attack Vermont.

For the longest time, Vermont’s position was that it would only consider being a British Province if Congress denied entry into the US.  By 1789 though, Levi was writing to British officials that he preferred the idea of being a province to US statehood. He also encouraged the Church of England to send a Bishop to Vermont to encourage more Anglican converts.

Statehood

By 1790 though, the US Congress was ready to settle this matter.  It had finally gotten Rhode Island to join the Union, and had gotten other states to cede land for new western states, meaning the Vermont issue could finally be resolved.  A big incentive for many northern states was the Kentucky was probably going to seek admission soon, and so Vermont would provide another northern state for balance.  

Soon after his election, President Washington made clear his wishes that Vermont be admitted as a state.  Alexander Hamilton, a New Yorker, also became a leading advocate.  In the summer of 1789, New York Governor Clinton finally authorized the legislature to appoint commissioners to begin talking about the possibility of ceding Vermont, allowing it to become its own state.

By this time Vermont had its own concerns about joining the Union. Vermont had no war debt, but would be responsible for paying off part of the US war debt.  It was also concerned that New Yorkers with land clams in Vermont could bring those claims in federal court, and possibly win.  It could also lose the free trade agreements that it had in place with Quebec at the time.

After considerable discussions with New York, Vermont agreed to pay $30,000 to cover any possible land claims based on New York grants of land in Vermont.  It also agreed to take on its share of the US war debt.  Vermont also worked out its border disputes conceding the annexed lands that were in New York, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts.

Officials held a statewide convention that met in Bennington in January, 1791 to discuss the concerns over joining the Union.  While many delegates voiced some concerns, the consensus for joining was prety overwhelming.  The delegates voted 105-4 to ratify the US Constitution and join the Union.

President Washington received the news and forwarded it to Congress with the recommendation that Congress admit Vermont.  Since New York had already signed onto the agreement, there was little opposition.  The main arguments in Congress were over how many representatives Vermont would get. They settled on two. Because all the objections with the neighboring states were settled, Congress passed the resolution relatively quickly.  President Washington signed it on February 18, 1791.  The Resolution set admission for March 4.  With that, Vermont became the fourteenth state.

Next week: Federal officials lay out their plans to build a new capital on the bank of the Potomac River.

- - -

Next Episode 371 Planning Washington, DC (coming soon)

Previous Episode 369 First Bank of the United States

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Further Reading

Websites

Vermont’s Admission to the Union “The Vermonter” March 1902: https://books.google.com/books?id=nFMSAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA2-PA101#v=onepage&q&f=false


Graffagnino, J. Kevin “Vermonters Unmasked” Vermont History, Summer, 1989. https://vermonthistory.org/journal/misc/VermontersUnmasked.pdf

Then Again: Defiant ‘Yorkers’ brought to heel during 1783 ‘Cow Wars’ https://vtdigger.org/2020/07/19/then-again-defiant-yorkers-brought-to-heel-during-1783-cow-wars

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Collections of the Vermont Historical Society, Vol. 2 [Haldimand Papers], 1871. 

Allen, Ira The Natural and Political History of the State of Vermont, London: J.W. Myers, 1798.

Bemis, Samuel F. “Relations between the Vermont separatists and Great Britain, 1789-1791American Historical Review, Spring, 1916. 

Dexter, Warren W. and Hanson, Barbara C. Vermont: Wilderness to Statehood, 1748-1791, Rutland: Academy Books, 1989. (borrow only). 

Hall, Henry Ethan Allen: The Robin Hood of Vermont, New York: D. Appleton and Co. 1895. 

Kingsford, William The History of Canada, Vol. 7, Toronto: Roswell & Hutchinson, 1887. 

Van de Water, Frederic F. The Reluctant Republic; Vermont, 1724-1791, New York, The John Day Co. 1941. 

Wilbur, James B. Ira Allen: Founder of Vermont, 1751-1814Vol 1 & Vol. 2, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1928.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Bordewich, Fergus M. The First Congress: How James Madison, George Washington, and a Group of Extraordinary Men Invented the Government, Simon & Schuster, 2016. 

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chernow, Ron Washington, A Life, Penguin Press, 2010. 

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Ellis, Joseph J. Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation, Knopf, 2000.

Ellis, Joseph J. The Quartet: Orchestrating the Second American Revolution 1783-1789, Alfred A. Knopf, 2015. 

Mello, Robert A. Moses Robinson and the Founding of Vermont, Vermont Historical Society, 2014. 

Randall, Willard Sterne Ethan Allen: His Life and Times, W.W. Norton & Co, 2011. 

Sherman, Michael (ed) A More Perfect Union: Vermont Becomes a State, 1777-1816, Vermont Historical Society, 1991 (borrow on archive.org). 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases. 

Sunday, November 9, 2025

ARP369 First Bank of the US

In our last regular episode, we covered some of the final events of the second session of the first Congress and the mid-term elections that were held mostly in the fall of 1790. 

Congress returned for a third session in December of 1790 which met back in Philadelphia.

Coast Guard

Before I get into the third session of Congress, I want to touch on one more event that happened in the second session back in New York.  I discussed in earlier episodes that Congress had created a tariff package to begin raising revenue.  

The problem with import tariffs, as the leaders well knew from the colonial era, was smuggling.  It was pretty easy for merchant vessels to avoid tariffs by offloading goods away from ports and avoiding customs officials.  To enforce tariffs, on the recommendation of Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton, Congress authorized the creation of the Revenue-Marine.  Ten ships would be built to control the coast and enforce federal tariffs.  Two fire New England, two for New York, one for the Delaware Bay, two for the Chesapeake, and two more for the Carolinas and Georgia.

To get Congressional support, Hamilton had each cutter built in the state where it would be used, thus creating local government jobs.  He also had the master of each ship oversee its construction.

These were relatively small ships. Hamilton limited the cost to $1000 each, although several of them exceeded that amount.  They were designed to be fast, with shallow drafts, so that they could chase down ships anywhere along the coast.  Each ship had a crew of ten and a few swivel guns to ensure compliance. 

The US had no navy at the time, and these ships were not designed to confront warships.  These were small coastal enforcement vessels under the authority of the Department of Treasury.  They would take orders from the local customs house.  

The main significance of the Revenue Marine is that they were a forerunner of the US Coast Guard. So the date of its creation: August 4, 1790 is used as the birth date of the US Coast Guard.

Return to Philadelphia

Congress returned for its third session in Philadelphia, in December, 1790.  As I said last week, this was after most states had held elections for the Second Congress, so many of those attending this session were lame ducks, although that term was not in use yet.  About one third of the House members had either retired or lost reelection, but still returned to continue their work in this First Congress.

When the Continental Congress had met in Philadelphia, they met in what we call today Independence Hall. At the time, it was the Pennsylvania State House.  That is, where the state legislature met.  It had also been used by Philadelphia city officials.

Because Pennsylvania was trying to convince the US Congress to remain permanently, they were doing everything they could to encourage Congress to stay and be comfortable in Philadelphia.  The state had just completed a new county courthouse right next to the State House.  They gave this building to Congress, Pennsylvania officials tried to set up the rooms similar to the way they had been in Federal Hall. New chairs and desks were laid out in a similar pattern as they had been in New York.  The Senate was decorated with huge portraits of King Louis of France and his wife, Queen Marie Antoinette. These paintings were gifts from the King and Queen.  

The House took over all of the first floor.  The Senate needed only half of the second floor.  Members of both bodies did not have separate offices. Rather, they had desks on the floor of the House and Senate, which they used to keep their papers.  They generally sat on the floor all day when Congress was in session.  In fact, members were required to remain seated unless speaking.  They could not get up and roam around the floor.

The state legislature would continue to meet in the state house, the main building we call Independence Hall today.  On the other side of the Hall, officials had built another building which would be used by the Mayor of Philadelphia and other city officials as the new city hall.  So federal, state, and local governments all worked together on the same block.  The Supreme Court ended up using City Hall when the Justices met in session.

Not only was Congress moving to Philadelphia, so was most of the new executive branch.  This influx of people led to overcrowding.  Landlords doubled their rental rates, and the city builders went on a housing boom.

Even before Congress arrived, government officials began carting government records and other items from New York to Philadelphia.  The Pennsylvania legislature, still hoping to tempt the government to remain permanently, authorized the construction of a large presidential mansion with a dome on top.  It was built on the western edge of town, on Ninth Street, about three blocks from Congress.  They had gotten as far as setting the cornerstone before the federal government arrived, but the house was not completed for another seven years.  It became less urgent when President Washington made clear that he would not live in the new house.

Instead, the President rented the House owned by Robert Morris.  It was considered the nicest house in the city.  General William Howe had occupied the home during the British army occupation of Philadelphia.  The house was just one block north of Congress.  Morris, perhaps the wealthiest man in America at the time, had purchased it in 1780.  Washington had been a houseguest there during the Constitutional Convention.  Morris offered the house to President Washington.  Morris moved out entirely and took residence in the house next door.  Washington agreed to rent the home.  The State of Pennsylvania ended up paying the rent.

Washington’s personal secretary, Tobias Lear, oversaw the move of all of Washington’s furniture and other items, 58 wagon loads, from New York to Philadelphia, setting up the new presidential residence.  Washington ordered considerable changes made to the house, including tearing down one wall to add large windows.

James Madison, still a bachelor, rented a room in a boarding House two blocks away from the President.  Thomas Jefferson, a widower, also took a small room several blocks away.  He rented a house in Market Street, using the upstairs as his residence.  The ground floor became the offices for the State Department. Alexander Hamilton moved into a house with his wife and children on Walnut Street.  He was only a block from the Treasury department, which continued to expand during the government’s time in Philadelphia.  Secretary of War Henry Knox, who was quite wealthy, rented a larger house for his family.  The War Department took up temporary quarters in several buildings, including a time in Carpenters Hall, where the First Continental Congress had met years earlier.

Pennsylvania leaders were doing everything they could to accommodate the new federal leaders. They hoped that they could convince them to remain in the city after the planned ten year period expired.

First Bank of the US

Meanwhile, Congress returned to work on December 6, 1790, to begin its third session.  Well, it actually had to wait a day before enough members arrived to reach a quorum, but that was better than the weeks that they had to wait to begin the first session back in New York a couple of years earlier.

The biggest item on the agenda became Alexander Hamilton’s proposal to create a national bank. In the 1790s banks were a relatively new concept.  The Bank of England was less than 100 years old.  The first bank in America was Robert Morris’ Bank of North America, established in 1781.  

Banks in this era were not commercial establishments for people to save money, as they are today.  The Bank of England was designed to borrow funds from wealthy investors to finance wars or other major government expenses.  Investors did not make deposits.  Rather, they became shareholders by putting their money into the venture.  Because the banks held a large amount of gold and silver, people would accept banknotes as currency, knowing that they could exchange their notes at any time for that gold or silver.  The bank could issue more paper money, under the hope that not all note holders would try to exchange them for hard currency all at the same time.  This allowed much more money to circulate.

The Bank of England had allowed the government a place to secure money collected from taxes, then borrow much larger sums during wartime to fund the increased costs of the war.  It permitted Britain to sustain wars much longer than other European powers, who had to impose massive taxes during wartime.

The Bank of North America, established by Robert Morris and Alexander Hamilton in 1781 had tried to do the same thing in America to help finance the Revolution.  Bank of North America banknotes held their value, unlike Continental Currency.  

Initially, the Bank of North America held a charter from the Confederation Congress, but took criticism that Congress was overreaching its authority and that the bank gave too much power to a few wealthy men.  To avoid the criticism of Congressional overreach, the bank got a new charter from the State of Pennsylvania.  Even there it had problems as the populist government did not like the power that the bank gave to monied interests in the state.

By this time a second bank had opened in America.  The Bank of New York was established after the war, in 1784.  A group of New York investors saw how profitable the Bank of North America was in Philadelphia and how the bank made it easier to raise investment money for new commercial projects.  Among the original investors in the bank were Alexander Hamilton, and Aaron Burr.

So when it came time to establish a financial system for the new federal government, Hamilton proposed creating a national bank, chartered by Congress.  This bank would be set up in ways similar to earlier banks.  It would acquire capital both from private investors and from government tax collections.  The government could then use much of the money raised to begin paying off its war debt.  The bank would also offer loans to private companies.  It would provide a paper currency to circulate easily while retaining its value.

Hamilton’s Proposal

Hamilton based his proposal for a national bank based on these earlier models.  In his report to Congress, he pointed out that money in the bank would be put to active use in the economy, unlike the traditional pattern of having merchants simply locking up their money in a chest and hiding it away.  This would let other people make use of the money right away, while the owner of the money earned interest.

Another advantage would be that the government could gain access to capital very quickly if the need arose.  It would make it easier for people to pay taxes.  It would improve the credit reputation of the US among both the citizenry and foreign bankers.  It would help to lower interest rates given the ease and availability of money available to borrow.

Hamilton wanted the bank to be a public-private partnership.  The bank would hold specie from both private investors as well as government tax revenues.  He envisioned a capital stock over ten million dollars, offering 25,000 shares in the bank valued at $400 each.  Investors could use public debt, that is those old Continental dollars, to pay for up to three-quarters of the purchase price.  The rest would have to be paid in specie (gold or silver).  Investors would receive interest of 6% per year.  That return would encourage investment. When paying out money, it would be in the form of bank notes, allowing the bank to retain specie to maintain public confidence.

Objections

Hamilton’s proposed bank had its opponents.  Rather quickly Thomas Jefferson and James Madison became the leaders of the opposition. Neither of them were opponents of banking generally. Jefferson had actually been an investor in the Bank of North America.  Madison had expressed some misgivings about the Bank of North America in the Confederation Congress, but ended up voting for it.

Jefferson and Madison had both acquiesced to Hamilton’s debt assumption plan in the earlier session, but both were growing increasingly concerned at just how powerful the federal government was becoming.

The main argument used by the opposition was that the Constitution did not authorize this.  Madison reminded his colleagues that the Constitutional Convention had debated and rejected the idea of giving the federal government the power to grant charters or articles of incorporation.  His view was that if the authorization for such a power was not in the constitution, then the government did not have that power.  Supporters argued that the Constitution’s “necessary and proper” clause granted Congress the power to do anything necessary and proper to carrying out its other duties.  Since Congress had authority to collect taxes, spend money, and pay off its debts, a bank would be a key component of that.

Jefferson also noted that the Tenth Amendment reserved undelegated powers to the states, not the federal government.  But the Tenth Amendment also had not been ratified yet.  The Jefferson-Madison view of interpreting the constitution became known as strict construction.  If a power was not expressly delegated, then the government did not have that power.

Hamilton’s loose construction of the Constitution also set a dangerous precedent.  If Congress could just make any argument for creating a new thing that had not been explicitly authorized by the Constitution, there would be no stopping point.  The government could grow to do just about anything.  Even most federalists who wanted a more powerful federal government after the Confederation, feared the idea of a national government with unlimited authority to do anything.

Beyond this legal argument, there were other reasons for opposing the bank.  The post-war era had been rife with political dissension between farmers and working people against the wealthy merchants and bankers.  This new bank seemed to give special privileges and advantages to a small group of moneyed interests at the expense of everybody else.

In particular, the bank would tend to benefit merchants and businessmen in the cities, at the expense of farmers and others.  The vast majority of the population worked as farmers.  They had come to see banks as their enemy, making this project highly unpopular.  The south especially, where there was very little commercial activity outside of farming was concerned about how much power a bank would move toward northern interests.  Some politicians also feared that establishing this bank in Philadelphia might end up being a reason why the government would not want to relocate to the Potomac after the agreed ten year period in Philadelphia.

Opponents also saw the bank as a source of political corruption. It was the case in Britain that members of Parliament often held stock in the Bank of England, which gave them a self-interests position in supporting anything that benefitted the bank.  It would almost certainly be the case that members of Congress would invest in the bank and have that same conflict of interest.  The idea that the bulk of the nation’s wealth would cause greater wealth to accrue to a small group of wealthy and powerful men, which would disadvantage everyone else.

A bank would also promote speculation.  With so much money to be made through investment, Jefferson warned that people would turn their lives toward speculation rather than being productive workers.  Speculation, unlike labor, had no benefit to the country and was essentially a form of gambling.  It would be destructive of morality.

Debating the Bank

Hamilton had submitted his report in mid-December, 1790, at the beginning of the third session of Congress.  The Senate took up the bill first, proposing a twenty year charter for the bank.  A minority wanted to limit the charter to ten years, but that effort failed.  Relatively quickly, by the end of January, the Senate passed the Bank bill by a vote of ten to six.

The House took up the bill at the beginning of February, when Madison rose to oppose it, raising the issues that I just outlined.  Congress was under a pretty strict deadline.  Since the first Congress had begun on March 4, 1789, the Congress had to wrap up by that date in 1791. Otherwise, members would serve longer than two years, in violation of the Constitution.  At that point, they would have to be replaced by the members who were elected in the most recent elections.

The House debated the bill for just one week.  At the end of the week, they called a vote passing overwhelmingly, by a vote of thirty-nine to twenty.  Congress waited another week before presenting the bill to President Washington.  Both sides used that extra time to draft arguments for their side.  The day before the bill reached Washington’s desk Attorney General Edmund Randolph issued an opinion that the bill was unconstitutional.

The day after Washington received the bill, Jefferson presented his own argument that the Bank was unconstitutional.  Washington, uncertain what we would do, asked Madison to draft a veto message in case he decided to veto the bill. 

Hamilton, raced to complete his own lengthy argument on why the bank was constitutional.  The president had ten days to decide whether to sign or veto.  Hamilton finally submitted his arguments on day eight.  Hamilton essentially argued that the president should defer to the legislature, and that Constitution gave the government power to create entities that were necessary and proper to carrying out their enumerated powers.

The debate over the controversial bill weighed heavily on President Washington.  His thought were not really focused on whether the bank was a good idea.  He was more concerned about whether he would be violating the Constitution by signing it, or being seen as not deferential enough to the legislature by vetoing it.  The bill has passed with nearly two-thirds support in both houses, so an override was quite possible and would be embarrassing.  The bill was also particularly unpopular in his home state of Virginia.

Washington considered his options waiting until the last possible minute, but he ended up accepting Hamilton’s arguments and signing the Bill.  The Bank of the United States would begin operations a few months later.

Next Week: we take a look at the controversy over Vermont joining the Union as the fourteenth state.

- - -

Next Episode 370 Vermont Joins the Union 

Previous Episode 368 The Census of 1790 

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Further Reading

Websites






“Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank, 15 February 1791,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-19-02-0051

“James Madison to George Washington, (draft veto message) 21 February 1791,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-07-02-0232

[A. Hamilton] “Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, [23 February 1791],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-08-02-0060-0003

Hamilton's Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States: 1791 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bank-ah.asp

Dimmitt, Bradley T. Hamilton and the National Bank, East Tennessee State Univ. [Master’s Thesis], 2010 https://dc.etsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3043&context=etd

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia The First Bank Of The United States, 2009. 

Brant, Irving James Madison: Father of the Constitution, 1787-1800. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1950 (borrow only). 

Holdsworth, John Thom The First Bank of the United States, University of Pennsylvania [PhD Thesis] 1915. 

Holdsworth, John & Davis Dewey The First and Second Banks of the United States, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910. 

Lewis, Lawrence A History of the Bank of North America, Philadelphia: J.B Lippincott & Co. 1882. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Bordewich, Fergus M. The First Congress: How James Madison, George Washington, and a Group of Extraordinary Men Invented the Government, Simon & Schuster, 2016. 

Chernow, Ron Alexander Hamilton, Penguin Press, 2004. 

Chernow, Ron Washington, A Life, Penguin Press, 2010. 

Chervinsky, Lindsay M. The Cabinet: George Washington and the Creation of an American Institution, Belknap Press, 2020. 

Cowen, David J. The Origins and Economic Impact of the First Bank of the United States, 1791-1797. Garland Publishing, 2000. 

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Ellis, Joseph J. Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation, Knopf, 2000.

Ellis, Joseph J. The Quartet: Orchestrating the Second American Revolution 1783-1789, Alfred A. Knopf, 2015. 

Evans, Stephen H. The United States Coast Guard, 1790 1915; A Definitive History, US Naval Institute, 1949. 

Ferling, John Jefferson and Hamilton: The Rivalry That Forged a Nation Hardcover, Bloomsbury Press, 2013. 

Hogeland, William Founding Finance: How Debt, Speculation, Foreclosures, Protests, and Crackdowns Made Us a Nation, Univ. of Texas Press, 2014. 

Hogeland, William The Hamilton Scheme: An Epic Tale of Money and Power in the American Founding, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2024. 

Hunger, Harlow Giles Mr. President: George Washington and the Making of the Nation's Highest Office, De Capo Press, 2013. 

Meacham, Jon Thomas Jefferson: The Art of Power, Random House, 2012

Ostrom, Thomas P. The United States Coast Guard, 1790 to the Present, Red Anvil Press, 2004 (borrow on archive.org). 

Randall, Willard Sterne Thomas Jefferson: A Life, Henry Holt and Co. 1993.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.