American Revolution Podcast

Sunday, September 8, 2019

Episode 113: Fall of Fort Washington

In last week’s episode, we saw General Washington pull the Continental Army out of White Plains New York and cross the Hudson River into New Jersey. British General William Howe pursued a policy of slow but deliberate overwhelming force. He never gave Washington an opportunity to strike at any extended vulnerability, but his glacial pace also met he never could capture the Continental Army or force any sort of determinative battle.

The Continental Army still had one outpost on Manhattan. That was Fort Washington. The Americans had built Fort Washington in order to prevent the Royal Navy from sailing up the Hudson. It sat along the river on the New York side, with Fort Lee (formerly Fort Constitution) on the New Jersey side. Any British ship passing up the river would be subject to an artillery assault from both sides.

The experience over the summer showed that the forts never accomplished their purpose. With a good tailwind, the British Navy could sail right past both forts, suffering only minor damage. Admiral Richard Howe regularly sent ships upriver for little purpose other than proving he could.

The Defenders

By November 1776, with all of the rest of the Continental forces out of Manhattan, Fort Washington sat as the last local bastion of defence on the island against the British Army. General Howe was ready to move into winter quarters, but not before he dealt with this last holdout. The Americans had spent a year and a half building up the defenses at Fort Washington. They had increased the size of the garrison to about 3000 defenders. The fort had plenty of cannon, soldiers, and food to withstand a siege of several months. In fact, the fort was far too small for all the men. Most were deployed outside the fort.

Battle of Fort Washington (from Wikimedia)

Washington had to worry about the main army that he was taking into New Jersey. He wanted to stay between the British and Philadelphia, figuring they might move on the seat of Congress if given the opportunity. He divided his force, giving a portion to General Charles Lee to take north, further upriver into the Hudson Valley. Lee’s forces would prevent any British attempt to move toward Albany and perhaps making a coordinated attack on Fort Ticonderoga in cooperation with General Carleton’s forces in Canada. Washington left General Nathanael Greene with a separate command of Forts Washington and Lee.

On November 8, Washington wrote a letter to Greene, saying that the fort was useless at keeping British ships from moving up and down the river, that it seemed in imminent danger of attack, and that it was probably not worth risking the men and supplies there. They should evacuate across the river to New Jersey. Washington, though, left the final decision up to Greene, who was on the scene and had a better idea what was going on.

Up until this time, General Greene had no actual battlefield experience. He had arrived in Cambridge for the Siege of Boston a few weeks after Lexington and Concord. He was back in Rhode Island during the battle of Bunker Hill. Washington ordered him to be ready for an invasion from the north of Boston during the Battle of Dorchester Heights, an invasion that never happened. When Greene move with the army to New York, he had been in command of the forces on Long Island, but became deathly sick a few weeks before the battle and had to sit that one out too. His rise to general seemed to be based primarily on the fact that Congress wanted someone from Rhode Island and that he had kept a fairly well disciplined camp at the Siege of Boston. He would prove his value as a general later. But at Fort Washington, Greene was not only his name, it also described his battlefield experience.

Greene ignored Washington’s advice to abandon the fort. Even though a British siege would probably prevail, Greene hoped to make the British pay for the real estate with their lives, perhaps another Bunker Hill. He expected that when things got too hot, his men could escape across the Hudson River to New Jersey.

Greene did not command Fort Washington personally. Greene set up his command across the river at Fort Lee in New Jersey. Instead, he left that honor to Colonel Robert Magaw of Pennsylvania. Magaw was an Irish immigrant who had worked as a lawyer in western Pennsylvania before the war began. He was an ardent patriot who supported the cause in Pennsylvania politics, part of the radical patriots of western Pennsylvania who were challenging the more conservative leaders in Philadelphia. He also became an Associator after Lexington and Concord.

Other than a few years of participation in a local militia, Magaw had no real military experience before marching up to Cambridge in 1775. He was part of Thompson’s Regiment of riflemen, among the first Pennsylvanians to join the New England Army at Cambridge, serving as a major. When he remained with the Continental Army at the end of 1775 as most of the army was going home, he received a promotion to colonel. After the army moved to New York Colonel Magraw commanded the 5th Pennsylvania Battalion and took direct command at Fort Washington, under the direction of General Greene.

Despite Washington’s misgivings, his officers at the scene thought the fort could withstand a lengthy siege. If it seemed their defenses would fail, they expected to be able to retreat across the Hudson to New Jersey. Green did not even think there would be a siege. He expected the British to go into winter quarters, tackling the fort the following spring.

British Surround the Fort

General Howe, however, had no plans to end the campaign just yet. It was already November. As expected, he did not want to maintain a siege over the winter. He was looking to wrap up the fighting season. Before ending the season though, he thought he could clear the last American rebels off of Manhattan. The bulk of the Continental army had already fled the area. Howe had almost all of the forces under his command available to take the fort.

Howe ordered the newly arrived Hessian General Wilhelm Knyphausen to take up a position just north of the fort with two columns comprising over 4000 Hessian soldiers. Wilhelm, baron von Knyphausen was the second in command of the Hessian force. He was an experienced officer who has served Frederick the Great in his Prussian Army.

British General Lord Percy, who had saved the British expedition to Concord, and who had most recently distinguished himself in the invasions on Long Island, had already taken a position to the south of the Fort with between four and five thousand British and Hessian soldiers. From there Percy, monitored the Americans during the weeks when the main British Army was gently nudging the Americans out of Harlem Heights and White Plains.

Battle Map, Fort Washington (from Wikimedia)

Admiral Richard Howe brought several ships of the line up river to fire on the fort from the west. The Admiral even came ashore to work with General Percy in the assault from the south.

General Howe took up a position with his main army directly to the east of the fort. He and General Lord Cornwallis and General Edward Mathew led over 4000 regulars, including 800 Highlanders of the Black Watch, in a direct assault from the east. In total, General Howe had about 13,000 British and Hessian soldiers ready to take the 3000 defenders. Not all of these soldiers would be engaged in battle. About 5000 ended up being held in reserve.

Howe had a pretty good idea of the fort’s defenses. A few weeks earlier, Magaw’s adjutant, William Demont deserted his post and entered the British lines. He brought with him sketches of the fort’s defenses, and intelligence about a garrison that was deeply divided. He noted that the fort had no internal water source, but had to carry water up from the river. There were also no barracks or protected ammunition bunkers in the fort. The outer defenses leading up to the fort were rather weak. There were miles of defenses around the fort that had far less soldiers than needed to defend them. Many weak spots in the line would allow the British to push back the defenders to the fort itself. From there, the British could bring up cannon to nearly point blank range. They could knock down the walls and also lob shells into the fort.

On November 10, Washington arrived on the scene from the New Jersey side. From there, he hoped to evaluate personally whether to abandon Fort Washington prior to any attack. Washington discussed the matter with his officers, but hesitated to make any final decision on the matter. By November 12, Howe had his force in place. His men then sat for several days, giving the Americans an opportunity to retreat at night across the river.

On November 15, British Lieutenant Colonel James Patterson approached the fort under a flag of truce. His message ordered the immediate surrender of the fort, and said that if such surrender did not happen in the next two hours, everyone in the fort would be put to the sword, no surrender. It was a bit of bluster that the Americans did not believe. They knew General Howe would never permit such a massacre. Magaw rejected the demand and sent Patterson back to his lines. He also sent word of the surrender demand back to General Greene.

Washington had left Fort Lee to find more comfortable quarters for himself at Hackensack. He still did not expect the British to launch an attack. At Fort Lee, Green received news of the surrender demand and forwarded the news to General Washington in Hackensack. He told Washington he left standing orders with Magaw to defend the fort until receiving further orders. Green then went across the river to Fort Washington, along with General Israel Putnam to discuss the situation with Magaw. As I said, like Greene, Magaw was not an experienced officer. He was confident that he could hold out against the British for at least a month and was in no mood to surrender or retreat.

That evening, after dark, Greene and Putnam returned back across the river. As they made their way, they encountered General Washington in a boat headed toward them in mid-river. Washington had received Greene’s message and rushed to get to Fort Washington himself. The generals conferred on their boats, mid-river. They told Washington that Magaw remained confident and prepared to defend the fort. Greene and Putnam had approved his defensive plan and convinced Washington that he should wait until morning before doing anything further. The three generals returned to New Jersey.

General Howe had given the Americans days to retreat. Delivering terms on the morning of the 15th turned out to be his final warning. He gave the Americans an opportunity to pull off another night escape that night. This time though, the Americans were going to stand and fight.

The Battle of Fort Washington

Near dawn on the morning of November 16, Hessian forces from the North began storming the outer trenches. At the same time, Percy’s forces, a mix of Hessian and British forces from the south began storming the outer trenches on the south side. Howe’s artillery bombarded the fort from the east. The speed of the attack seemed to surprise the Americans, who began retreating back into the fort.

Wm Von Knyphausen
(from Wikimedia)

Then, almost as suddenly as the attack began, it stopped. General Howe sent orders to both Knyphausen and Percy to halt their attacks and pull back. Howe’s main infantry under Generals Mathew and Cornwallis did not get across the Harlem River in time and was not ready.

Both Knyphausen and Percy’s attacking forces later grumbled that they had been succeeding before being ordered to stop and suffered far more casualties when they resumed the attack later that morning, after the Americans were ready for them.

When the attacks started that morning, General Washington, along with Generals Greene, Putnam, and Mercer crossed over the river and took a position of observation at a house on a hill a few miles from the fort. The British kept getting closer to their position until the generals urged Washington to leave or be captured. Greene even offered to stay behind and monitor things but insisted that Washington leave. Finally Washington agreed they all should leave. The group left only 15 minutes before the enemy took the hill. Had Washington been a bit slower or the British a bit faster, one squad might have captured almost all of the top leadership of the Continental army.

At around 11 AM the main British force under Cornwallis and Mathews finally got into position and the advance resumed on all fronts. Knyphausen’s Hessians to the north had a particularly difficult time trudging through swamps, then having to climb up a rocky cliff area where several soldiers fell to their deaths. All the while, they came under fire from American cannons and riflemen. One of the artillerists that day was John Corbin, who was killed in the British assault. The only reason I mention his name as one of hundreds of otherwise anonymous casualties of this battle is that his wife Margaret was with him on the field dressed as a man and assisting him with the cannon. When he died, Margaret Corbin took his position on the cannon and continued loading and firing. Soon, she also took a hit and had to leave the field, another rare example of women fighting in combat during this war.

Margaret Corbin in battle (from Rev War Journal)

After a couple of hours, the American riflemen had to retreat. Sustained fire had fouled their barrels. They could not continue to fire until they cleaned their weapons. So, they retreated back to the fort. Many other defenders acquitted themselves well. But the overwhelming number of attackers eventually forced the defenders to withdraw.

Inside the fort itself, Colonel Magaw’s overcrowded garrison was pinned down by a steady and massive artillery bombardment. He received a message from Washington urging him to hold out until dark. A short time later, Magaw learned that the Hessians had reached the fort walls and were demanding that he surrender or they would kill everyone in the fort. Magaw tried to delay, requesting four hours to respond but was given only 30 minutes. This time, Magaw saw that his defenses would not hold and agreed to surrender.

Few men were able to escape. A handful swam across the Hudson River, but most had to lay down their arms and surrender. By 4PM the battle was over and prisoners were being marched out of fort under guard. The victors re-branded Fort Washington as Fort Knyphausen. They would hold the fort for the next seven years.

Aftermath

The British recorded losses of 128 killed wounded or missing, while the Hessians lost 326. There is some evidence that Hessians killed some prisoners, particularly riflemen, after surrender, out of anger and frustration from their losses. The terms of surrender promised that the garrison would be permitted to keep their personal baggage. Yet, as the British and Hessians marched their prisoners out of the fort, they stripped them of all valuables, including even some clothing. Hessians literally cut the backpacks off of prisoners and they marched, and did not hesitate to kick and beat the prisoners. The victors shouted that they were traitors and should all be killed where they stood. Among the prisoners, the British found a few deserters who had joined the Continental Army. These former regulars were sentenced to death.

Some desperately searched to find George Washington among the prisoners, disappointed to learn that he and the other generals were safely across the river in New Jersey. Washington watched the surrender through a telescope, something that he later described as giving him great mortification.

The Americans suffered only 59 killed and 96 wounded. But the real loss was the capture of the fort and its garrison. The British took 230 officers and 2600 soldiers as prisoners. Most of these men would have been better off being killed in battle. Many wounded would die in the next days or weeks as they went untreated, were denied food and water, and kept in terrible conditions.

Even those who had survived the battle without injury faced horrific conditions. They would spend the next several years in warehouses or aboard prison ships in New York Harbor in the care of Joshua Loring. As you may recall, Loring was the husband of General Howe’s mistress. As a reward for his compliance and discretion, Howe gave him charge of prisoners of war. Loring made a small fortune embezzling money for the food and care of the prisoners, allowing most of them to starve to death or die from disease brought on by hunger or other horrific conditions. By one estimate more than two-thirds of the prisoners captured that day would die within the next 18 months.

Officers tended to do a little better. While some were treated roughly in the weeks after the capture, most were eventually allowed to live on parole either on Long Island or in New York City. They could arrange for their own quarters, on the promise that they would not try to escape or take up arms until exchanged. Colonel Magaw ended up living at the home of Rugert Van Brunt in Gravesend, Long Island. He would be held as a prisoner on parole for nearly four years. However, it ended up being not so bad for him. While a prisoner, he married Van Brunt’s daughter Marrieta. In late 1780, he was finally exchanged. The couple returned to Magraw’s home in Carlisle, PA. His neighbors hailed him as a returning hero and elected him to the Pennsylvania legislature.

The Fort itself, along with all of its cannon, ammunition, equipment, and food fell into British hands, leaving the Continental Army without those desperately needed goods. On the other hand, the Continental Army also had 3000 less mouths to feed. The fall of Fort Washington would be the greatest loss of soldiers for the Continental Army until near the end of the war.

The staggering loss caused Congress and many Americans, not to mention other officers, to question not only General Greene’s judgment, but also General Washington’s. His decision to divide his forces in the face of the enemy, and leave the garrison at Fort Washington to be a sitting duck led many to doubt his judgment. Washington was too indecisive. Perhaps it was time to consider a replacement.

Next week: The British cross the Hudson and take Fort Lee in New Jersey.

- - -

Next Episode 114: Escape from Fort Lee

Previous Episode 112: Battle of White Plains

Click here to donate

American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give. Make a one time donation through my PayPal account.
Thanks,
Mike Troy

Click here to see my Patreon Page

Sunday, September 1, 2019

Episode 112: Battle of White Plains

When we last left General Washington, he was holding firm at Harlem Heights on Manhattan Island. Having created a series of defensive lines, he waited patiently for British General Howe’s frontal attack. Washington expected that in such an attack he would inflict large numbers of casualties on the British, even if he had to give up the field.

The problem for Washington was that, since Bunker Hill, General Howe was not stupid enough to attempt a frontal assault against an entrenched enemy. Washington had given Howe several opportunities for such an attack, but Howe refused to take the bait.

Hessian Soldiers (from Land of the Brave)

In holding this ground, Washington did not consider the danger to his army. Holding an entrenched area on Manhattan Island, meant that the British could easily sail north of Washington’s position, land a force and effectively surround the Continental Army. Fortunately for the Continentals, Howe ignored General Clinton’s advice to do just that: land a force to the north, capture King’s Bridge and cut off Washington’s army from any line of retreat.

Instead, after meeting resistance at Harlem Heights, on September 16, 1776, Howe did what he usually did: set up camp, entrench his troops in defensive lines and sit around for weeks doing nothing.

It appears that Howe was waiting to hear from Canada. He knew Generals Carleton and Burgoyne planned to invade Lake Champlain and make his way down toward Albany. From there, that 10,000 man northern army would be in Washington’s rear while Howe still sat in front of Washington’s lines. The Continentals would have no choice but to see the hopelessness of their cause. They would surrender and allow the Howe brothers to work out generous peace terms with the King, all without having a major battle that could kill thousands.

As we learned last week, however, the Canadian commander, General Carleton, could be just as conservative as Howe. After the battle of Valcour Island and destroying Arnold’s fleet on Lake Champlain, Carleton decided that late October was too late in the year to begin his invasion of New York. He pulled his forces back to Canada and waited for spring.

Landing at Throg’s Neck

With nothing happening to the north, Howe finally concluded that he needed to do something about Washington’s Army. He still rejected Clinton’s plans to land a large army behind the enemy and trap them. Instead, he permitted Clinton to perform another water landing a few miles up the East River at Throg’s Neck, often mistakenly called Frog’s Neck in many of the contemporary reports.

Throg’s Neck was a peninsula on the East River a few miles north of Kip’s Bay and just on the northern side of the Harlem River. It was not far north enough for the British to get around Washington’s rear and cut off his army from retreat. It was about due east of Washington’s headquarters at Harlem Heights. By marching west, the British would threaten Washington’s position, but still give him time to retreat further north.

British Transports on East River (from Wikimedia)

In the early morning hours of October 12, Clinton’s army of 4000 returned to Kip’s Bay and boarded a fleet of navy warships and transport vessels. The fleet got underway shortly after dawn moving up the East River toward Throg’s Neck. A heavy fog set in over the river, making the journey extremely dangerous. The fleet of 80 ships had to pass through an already dangerous part of the river known as Hell Gate, full of rocks and whirlpools that could damage a ship even in good weather. Admiral Richard Howe personally commanded the expedition and somehow guided the fleet to its destination. Only one small ship, carrying three cannon and a few men wrecked and sank. That the bulk of the fleet made it through the treacherous waters in such bad weather is a testament both to the skill of Admiral Howe’s navy and probably also to some good luck. British reports indicate they encountered “feeble resistance” upon landing. But there were probably not more than a few lookouts in the area.

The real problems for the British started after the landing. Throg’s Neck was an island at high tide. Even at low tide, the only way to cross from the neck onto the mainland was across a bridge. The Continental General Heath had removed the bridge planks days earlier, just in case the British decided to land there.

On the other side of the bridge, twenty-five Continental riflemen harassed the British and prevented them from attempting to cross and repair the bridge. The British advance force instead threw up a defensive barrier and returned fire. Another Continental guard blocked a marshy ford where the British might be able to pass. Thus, because of the landing point, less than 100 Americans could block the advance of Clinton’s 4000 man army. A member of the NY Provincial Congress noted later, “had [the British] pushed their imaginations to discover the worst place [to land] they could not have succeeded better than they have done.”

Rather than attempt to push through or return to the ships to move up river, the British did what they did best, sit and wait. They spent several more days camping on Throg’s Neck and awaiting further supplies. Meanwhile Washington deployed more reinforcements to prevent the British from getting off the neck. Over the next few days, about 1800 Americans moved into the area to contest any British advance.

Lee Returns

About the same time Washington was preparing to contest the British attack at Throg’s Neck, General Charles Lee returned from the South. Lee was probably at the height of his popularity following his victory at Fort Sullivan in South Carolina. As I discussed in an earlier episode, Colonel Moultrie defeated the British at Fort Sullivan only by ignoring Lee’s advice to retreat and give up the Fort before the British even attacked. Still, Lee was the commander on the scene and received the credit for the only clear American victory in a major battle against regulars so far.

Charles Lee
(from Wikimedia)

Washington assigned Lee to command the left flank of the Continental forces, which included the area along the East River that appeared to be where the British were launching their attack. Lee, an experienced British officer took one look at the map and essentially told Washington and his generals: Are you guys crazy? The only reason the British had not landed north of you and trapped your entire army yet is that they seem to be bigger idiots than you. We need to retreat across Kingsbridge right away. We need to move further north so that we don’t fall into a British trap.

The next day, in response to Lee’s advice, Washington held a council of war with his top generals. They agreed to abandon Harlem Heights and move across the Harlem River to White Plains. There, the mountains provided a natural defensive area. It also served as a Continental supply depot for materials shipped to the army from New England. Days later Colonel Joseph Reed credited Lee’s wakeup call for saving the army from certain destruction. On the other side, General Henry Clinton agreed that the precipitous retreat, combined with the British delay at Throg’s Neck saved the Continental Army.

Landing at Pelham Bay

After the Continentals began their retreat to White Plains, General Howe finally conceded what everyone else had realized for days: his landing at Throg’s Neck was a huge mistake. He ordered Clinton and his 4000 soldiers back into their 80 ships and moved further upriver.

The Continentals were on the move, but the lack of horses and wagons slowed that move. The British might still beat the Americans to White Plains and take control of the hills before the Americans could entrench themselves. The British chose to land at Pelham Bay, but before they left Throg’s Neck, several deserters slipped into the American lines and informed the Continentals of Howe’s new plans.

Pelham Bay (from Journal of Am. Rev.)

To oppose Howe, Lee deployed what amounted to about two regiments under the command of Colonel John Glover, the same mariner who had ferried Washington’s Army from Long Island to New York for the successful retreat from the battle of Brooklyn. Now he had a chance to prove himself on land. In the early morning hours of October 18, Glover saw Howe’s fleet landing at Pelham Bay. The British apparently began the landing before dawn and all 4000 were ashore before the Americans could engage them.

As Glover advanced his men to engage the enemy, he encountered an advance enemy company of about 30 soldiers. Glover deployed 40 men to engage the force while he deployed his defensive lines behind the fighting. Glover made use of the stone walls dividing farm pastures that fell at intervals along either side of the road leading inland.

The Continentals deployed behind the walls. As the British forced the American advance guard to retreat, they pushed forward expecting a rout. When the British hit the first stone wall, the Americans stood up and fired a volley at close range, forcing the British to stagger back. The two sides exchanged volleys as the British brought up their cannons. The Americans, greatly outnumbered, fell back in good order as the next line of Americans lay behind the next stone wall ready to repeat the process.

Eventually, the armies reached a creek which Glover had set as his final line of defense. He had pulled up the bridge crossing the creek and deployed his full force of over 700 men along the creek to prevent the enemy from crossing. Glover also had a few cannon to back up his infantry. The British failed to cross the creek but continued to exchange artillery fire until nightfall. Under the cover of darkness, Glover’s brigade slipped away and marched the three miles to join up with the main Continental force.

The battle at Pelham’s Bay led to few American casualties, eight killed and thirteen wounded. The number of British casualties is a matter of dispute. In his official report, Clinton reported only three dead and twenty wounded. But Clinton only reported British casualties, not the Hessian ones. The Hessians made up about 3000 of the 4000 man force that engaged in battle, and were involved in some of the heaviest fighting. Estimates range from 200 to 1000 dead and wounded among the Hessians. While I suspect the lower range of that estimate is closer to the truth, it was still a lopsided battle and a dearly bought victory for the British and Hessians. Outnumbered by about 5 to 1, the Americans never expected to hold the field. The battle provided the Continental army with a successful delaying action, keeping the British from attacking the main Continental column all day. This gave Washington the valuable time he needed to move the Continental Army out of danger.

White Plains

Rather than moving directly on Washington’s retreating column, the following day Howe ordered the army to move north to New Rochelle. There, the army waited another three days until 8000 Hessians who had just made the Atlantic crossing could come up from Staten Island to join the forces pursuing Washington. The Hessians came under the command of General Wilhelm Von Knyphausen.

Both sides continued to trudge north slowly. The Continentals were so slow because they lacked the horses and wagons to pull their artillery and baggage. The British and Hessians just seemed to move at a leisurely pace, stopping for a few days here and there in various towns along the way.

As Washington struggled to get his army over the Harlem River at King's Bridge, he sent Colonel Rufus Putnam to search out the British Army’s position. I’m not sure why he sent his Chief Engineer on such a mission, especially when he had officers who were much more familiar with the local area than the Colonel from Massachusetts. But Putnam set out on his own to find the enemy. He learned from local militia that Howe’s forces were only about nine miles down the road from White Plains. If General Howe had occupied the heights first and linked up with brother, Admiral Howe on the Hudson river, Washington’s army would have been cut off from any line of retreat. Putnam rushed back to Washington’s camp and got Washington to push forward on a night march to take White Plains first.

British Grenadiers (from Britanica)

General Howe, though, was still waiting for the Hessians. Putnam discovered the British position on October 19, but Howe did not begin to move until October 22. When the British did finally move, they marched another few miles up the road from New Rochelle to Mamaroneck and paused there for another four days. By the time the British and Hessians finally started moving again, the Continental Army had had almost a week to occupy and entrench its defenses at White Plains, making a direct assault inadvisable.

Washington had positioned the Continental lines between the Bronx river on his right, and a smaller creek and marshy area to the left, making a British flanking attack on his lines more difficult.

While the 14,000 British and Hessian force could have taken the Continentals, Howe feared another Bunker Hill level of casualties. Howe’s second in command, Clinton, who had been urging faster movement all along, also agreed that a direct assault at this point would be a mistake.

Instead, the Howe stopped again and waited for a better opportunity to engage the Continentals. General Clinton led the British contingent and Knyphausen led the Hessians. The combined force moved to occupy the high ground Chatterton Hill. It was across the Bronx River, but would give the British the high ground overlooking the Continental right flank. From there, the British could use artillery to drive the Americans from the field. On October 28, they attempted to occupy Chatterton Hill.

As soon as Washington learned the British were crossing the Bronx River, he realized Chatterton Hill was the obvious goal, and sent General Alexander McDougal, who you may recall from many episodes back had been one of the Sons of Liberty troublemakers in New York City, to support the few militia units already on the Hill. Other deployed officers included Major Benjamin Tallmadge, who will become more important in future episodes, and Captain Alexander Hamilton’s artillery. This force would try to deny the hill to the enemy.

Battle of White Plains (from Wordpress)

The Continentals first deployed a few companies as a delaying action to slow the British and Hessians from crossing the Bronx River and approaching the hill. This gave McDougal time to get his soldiers on Chatterton Hill. The Hessians led a few tentative assaults on the hill but were driven back each time. The British eventually decided they needed to launch an all out coordinated assault on the hill using 4000 troops.

They organized the attack with three prongs, Colonel Johann Rahl would lead a charge up the hill on the American right. Another Hessian, Colonel Carl Von Donop, led a second charge against the center, and British General Alexander Leslie would lead British regulars against the American left flank. Colonel Johan Rahl’s assault ended up scattering the militia on the American right flank. Rahl had newly arrived in America with the Hessian reinforcements. A few months later, he would find himself in charge of the Trenton outpost during Christmas.

After Rahl scattered the militia, he was able to push into the American Center on Chatterton Hill. The Americans did not panic this time. Colonel John Haslet’s Delaware Regiment, which had been one of the few to stand and fight at the battle of Long Island, stood and fought again on Chatterton Hill, providing covering fire for the rest of the Americans to retreat. Haslet’s regiment then maintained its own orderly retreat off the hill, giving way to the superior British and Hessian assaults while keeping their lines in good order.

John Haslet (from
Revolutionary War Journal)

The fighting on Chatterton Hill cost the British and Hessians about 200 casualties, while the Americans lost about 175. Since this was just part of the overall battle of White Plains, casualty estimates are not very precise, but basically it was close to a draw in terms of casualties. The British took the hill giving them the victory. They then entrenched themselves and prepared for a final assault on the main American lines.

But Howe still was not interested in an aggressive attack. After capturing Chatterton Hill, the two armies spent the rest of the day mostly lobbing artillery shells at each other without much impact. With British artillery now able to destroy the Continental right flank, the British could have launched a final assault and crushed the Continental line.

Instead, Howe did what he normally did, gave Washington a chance to realize that his position was untenable and that he should retreat from the field. Howe reinforced his position on Chatterton Hill, and maintained his lines directly facing the American main lines, but did not advance. The two armies faced each other for two more days as the Americans awaited the final assault that never came.

On October 30, General Lord Percy arrived from New York City with seven more regiments of Hessians. Even with additional forces, the British did not attack. According to Howe, he had planned to attack on the 31st, but did not do so because of a terrible rain storm. Washington finally decided that the Continental Army should retreat north. On November 1, before dawn, the Continentals began to pull out and march north. The continuing rain gave cover to the retreat. Howe did not bother to pursue or harass the retreating Continental Army.

At first, the Continentals moved about five miles north to North Castle Heights, where they would be in a better position to resist a British attack. But the British never bothered to pursue them. Howe remained in camp for several more days, finally abandoning White Plains and returning south. Washington, realizing he would not have to occupy the favorable ground for a battle, continued his retreat to the north. At Peekskill, he took his army across the Hudson River into New Jersey.

With Washington’s retreat, the only Continental occupation on Manhattan Island remained the stronghold at Fort Washington.

Next Week: General Howe will turn his attention to the capture of Fort Washington, making his control of Manhattan complete.

- - -

Next Episode 113: Fall of Fort Washington (Available September 8, 2019).

Previous Episode 111: Retreat from Lake Champlain

Click here to donate

Click here to see my Patreon Page

Ross, David "The Hessian Jagerkorps in New York and Pennsylvania, 1776-1777" Journal of the American Revolution, May 14, 2015 https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/05/the-hessian-jagerkorps-in-new-york-and-pennsylvania-1776-1777

Schenawolf, Harry "Battle of Mamaroneck, New York – 'A Pretty Affair' in the American Revolutionary War" Revolutionary War Journal March 5, 2013:
http://www.revolutionarywarjournal.com/battle-of-mamaroneck

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

The Detail and Conduct of the American War, under Generals Gage, Howe, Burgoyne, and Vice Admiral Lord Howe, (original reports and letters) The Royal Exchange, 1780.

Carrington, Henry Battles of the American Revolution, 1775-1781, A.S. Barnes & Co. 1876.

Babcock, James, Memoir of Captain Nathan Hale, Hale Memorial Assoc. 1844.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 5, Vol 3, Washington: St. Claire Clarke, 1837.

Johnston, Henry The Campaign of 1776 Around New York and Brooklyn, Long Island Historical Society, 1878.

Martin, Joseph Plumb The Adventures of a Revolutionary Soldier, 1830 (This is a copy of the original print, but in poor quality. You can borrow a better quality copy or listen to a free audio copy of the book) or see below in "books worth buying" section.

Reed, William Life and correspondence of Joseph Reed, military secretary of Washington, at Cambridge, Vol. 1, Lindsay and Blakiston, 1847.

Reed, Henry Sparks, Jared (ed) The Library of American Biography, Vol. 8: The Lives of Charles Lee and Joseph Reed, Little & Brown,1834.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Atkinson, Richard The British Are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777, Henry Holt & Co. 2019

Daughan, George C. Revolution on the Hudson: New York City and the Hudson River Valley in the American War of Independence, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 2016.

Ellis, Joseph Revolutionary Summer: The Birth of American Independence, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1975.

Martin, Joseph Plumb A Narrative of a Revolutionary Soldier, Signet Classics, 2010 (original 1830) (book recommendation of the week).

McCullough, David 1776, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005.

Schecter, Barnet The Battle for New York, New York: Walker Publishing, 2002.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, August 25, 2019

Episode 111: Retreat from Lake Champlain

Last week, we left General Benedict Arnold’s fleet bottled up in Valcour Bay. The Americans had done great damage despite being no match for the British in numbers of ships, guns, or men. They had fought the fleet to a draw that day. But the Americans could not count on that luck to continue. While General Carlton had used up the entire summer building his fleet, he did so in order to make it virtually impossible for any American fleet to defeat him. Despite British shortcomings that day, their preparations in building such an overwhelming fleet met that he would inevitably win the battle and control the lake.

After dark on October 11, 1776, British General Guy Carlton, aboard the flagship Maria sent his first reports of the battle back to Quebec, to be forwarded to London. Carlton ignored his own apparent missteps: not knowing where the enemy was despite intelligence warning they were in the area, not distributing any plan of attack to his captains, spreading out his fleet along the lake so that they were not prepared for battle when they encountered the enemy, and allowing his flagship to stay out of the battle. Instead, he simply reported that he had bottled up the enemy in Valcour Bay, making an escape impossible. Despite the fact that the day went according to Arnold’s plans and not Carlton’s, the British commander was confident that the next day would be the end of the American fleet.

The British had lost on ship, the Carleton, but only about 40 of 2500 men in the fleet killed or wounded. He had sufficient reserves to re-arm his smaller gunboats and would have his entire fleet in place the following morning to resume the attack. Carlton planned either to accept the surrender of Arnold’s fleet, or destroy it in the morning,

This was not an unreasonable expectation. The Continentals had lost the Royal Savage, lighting up the night as it burned down to its water line. All of their other ships had taken damage. Overall the Americans had lost about 60 of the 500 men killed or wounded aboard all the ships.

Many had lost their officers to Indian sharpshooters or lucky cannonballs. Most were taking on water, some at alarming rates. The sailing vessels had their sails and rigging damaged, thus impeding speed in any escape attempt. As usual, the Continentals were also low on ammunition. During the battle that day, they had used up about 75% of their ammunition. They could not keep up the same rate of fire for another day. Meanwhile, the British had moved up their larger ships that had sat out the fighting on the first day. On the second day, they were prepared to direct even more firepower with larger guns on the small American fleet.

The Plan

Despite all this, Arnold was in a good mood. He praised the work of his officers and men that day and congratulated them on holding back the superior British fleet. His praise included Captain David Hawley, of the Royal Savage, who had made his way from his sunken ship back to the fleet. Arnold gave Hawley the command of the Washington, whose captain was too wounded to command the following day.

The Liberty (from JAR)

The Americans had inflicted a great deal of damage on the British despite having a crew about one-fifth the size of the enemy, half the number of ships, fewer and smaller cannons, and sailors with almost no combat experience, many without much experience at sea.

Yet even with their good work that day, they remained trapped in Valcour Bay. The British fleet blocked passage to the south, rocks and debris blocked escape to the north, and hundreds of Indians along the shore prevented any escape overland. While Carleton anticipated his final victory over the American fleet, Arnold revealed his escape plan to his officers.

General Carleton had organized his fleet at the mouth of the Bay, the only realistic escape route for the Americans. When Arnold met with his officers on the night of October 11, 1776, he needed a plan to get his men, and hopefully his ships, past the British fleet to sail back to Fort Ticonderoga where the main force of Continentals prepared to meet the British..

The Slip

General Arnold was nothing if not daring. He informed his officers that they would sail their ships right through the British fleet that night. Arnold ordered the captain of each ship to tie a lantern made out of tin, so that it only emitted a small sliver of light, which would shine on a line of chalk drawn onto the stern of each boat. The lit chalk line could only be seen for about 50 feet by someone directly behind the boat. This would serve as a guide for each boat to follow the one in front of it, as they passed through the enemy fleet.

It certainly was a risky scheme, but amazingly, it worked. That evening, after dark, the American ships moved slowly through the enemy lines. The sailing vessels had only one small sail up, so that they would drift slowly through the fleet. The row gallies would use muffled oars so that the enemy could not hear them.

By some accounts, they passed so close to the British flag ship Maria that sailors reported hearing the officers laughing in their cabin as they discussed plans for the following day. The weather apparently cooperated by providing a fog that made it difficult to see much of anything in the dark. If any British were aware of another ship drifting nearby, they must have assumed it was one of their own fleet. There is no evidence that any British watchman challenged any of the American ships. Later, other officers critical of Carlton, blamed Arnold’s escape on Carleton's orders to pull back several ships away from the mouth of the bay, giving the Americans the space they needed to pass through.

The Chase

At dawn on October 12, the British were amazed to find the American fleet had vanished. Carleton first assumed that the Americans had escaped to the north, going through the difficult waters at the northern tip of Valcour Island. He immediately ordered his fleet to move north to intercept the Americans before they could attack any targets in the British rear. Carleton was so stunned and moved so quickly, that he forgot to give any orders to the soldiers he had put ashore that night in the expectation of boarding the American fleet in the morning.

Although the Americans were only a few miles to the south, a morning fog prevented British lookouts from discovering their position. It took Carleton until about noon that day to realize he was moving in the wrong direction. By mid-day, the fog had lifted. British lookouts spotted sails miles to the south on the lake and moving further south. By the time Carleton got his fleet turned around, he only made it back as far as Valcour Island by nightfall. He ended up spending a second night in almost the same spot as the previous night.

Lake Champlain region (from Wikimedia)

Arnold, however, was not in the clear yet. While Carleton was sailing north in search of Arnold’s fleet, the Americans had to spend most of October 12, repairing their ships to the point where they could remain afloat and on the move. Arnold scuttled three of his mostly badly damaged gondolas, the Providence, New York, and New Jersey. He sent his fastest ship, the Liberty down the lake as fast as it could go. It would deliver dispatches to Crown Point and Ticonderoga that the British fleet was on its way and could not be stopped. He also begged for any reinforcements that the forts could send. The Liberty also carried the wounded away from the battle.

Late on the day of October 12, after spending the previous day in battle, the previous night escaping through the British fleet, that day repairing ships, Arnold planned for yet another sleepless night sailing his fleet further south on another dangerous nighttime naval movement to escape the British. This time, nature was not on his side. Unfavorable winds, tired rowers, and damaged ships still taking on water allowed the fleet to sail only 12 miles that night. The following morning, the weather cleared and the British had the American fleet still in view.

Arnold’s men were still sailing against a southerly wind, meaning they made little progress. Meanwhile, the British caught a northerly wind and were sailing speedily toward the American fleet. Arnold knew it would only be a matter of hours before the British caught up with his fleet. He ordered his five fastest ships to speed ahead and attempt to make their escape. Arnold would stay behind aboard the Congress which would remain with the badly damaged Washington and four smaller gunboats to engage the enemy and slow their progress.

End of the Line

When the British got within five miles of his fleet, the American fleet finally picked up the northern wind that had been giving the advantage to the British all morning. But even with a favorable wind, their tattered sails prevented them from moving as fast as the British. Eventually, the British Inflexible caught up with the Washington, which had been taking on water and moving much slower than the other ships.

After receiving only a few shots, the Captain Hawley struck his colors and surrendered. Only 16 men from the crew escaped in small boat while the rest of the crew of 122 surrendered. Hawley had always been at a disadvantage with his heavily damaged ship. On top of that, the Inflexible’s guns had a much longer range and could fire on the Washington without getting in range of the Washington’s guns. Even so, Captain Hawley, who had commanded the Royal Savage two days earlier, had the distinction of surrendering two ships without firing a shot.

With the Washington out of the fight, the British could focus all their attention on Arnold’s Congress and the four smaller gunships. While making repairs on the 12th, Arnold had prepared for this possibility. He had mounted his largest cannons on the rear of each ship so that they could fire on the enemy as it gained on them.

Arnold also reached his location of choice for battle, a narrow area known as Split Rock, that provided the greatest difficulty to the British to maneuver their ships. Arnold’s diminished fleet continued its running firefight with the British for nearly five hours. Arnold personally aimed cannon out of the windows of his cabin in the stern of the Congress. His small fleet continued to use its rear cannons effectively to smash at the British ships. The British, of course, returned fire and inflicted more casualties and damage on the Americans.

By late afternoon, the seven large British warships had surrounded what remained of the American fleet and continued to blast away at them more effectively with broadsides. Twenty seven of Arnold’s remaining seventy officers and crew were killed or seriously wounded. Not only were Arnold’s remaining ships badly damaged, they were almost entirely out of ammunition.

Arnold's Fleet at Buttonmould Bay (from HistoryNet)

But General Arnold was not a surrender kind of guy. He still had one more card to play. Arnold had carefully mapped out Lake Champlain during the year that he controlled it. He knew that nearby Buttonmould Bay was deep enough for his small ships, but too shallow for the larger British warships to follow. Arnold steered his fleet into Buttonmould Bay and grounded his ships along the shore, grounding his ship the Congress last. He ordered the ships not to strike their colors but to set them on fire with the flags still flying. He would not surrender his ships, but he surely would deny them to the enemy.

Arnold ordered his marines to take positions along the shore and fire at British longboats attempting to board his grounded ships. Then, another event happened that would haunt Arnold’s reputation. Arnold had ordered the wounded removed from the ships and for the crew to blow up the ships in order to deny them to the enemy. In the confusion a Lieutenant Goldsmith, suffering from a serious leg wound, got left aboard one of the ships. Just before the ship exploded, he called out for help. No one, however, was willing to risk their life to reboard the ship. As it exploded both Americans and British watched Goldsmith’s body get blown into the air and fall to earth dead.

Both British officers and some of Arnold’s enemies within the Continental Army, circulated the story that Arnold had ordered the ships blown up with the wounded still aboard. Of course, Arnold had ordered no such thing. When he found out what had happened, he threatened to run through the crewman who had been tasked with helping Goldsmith off the ship. The only thing that may have stopped Arnold from going through with his threat was a British artillery assault on his position, which forced everyone to scatter.

Aided by locals and taking a little known trail, Arnold and his men spent a third sleepless night carrying their wounded in slings made out of the remnants of ship sails twenty miles back to Crown Point. They successfully avoided the Indian patrols looking for them and arrived at Crown Point early on October 14th, only hours ahead of the first British landing parties.

Arnold still could not rest. He ordered all buildings burned along with any supplies they could not carry, in order to deny Crown Point to the enemy. From there, his men continued on foot to Fort Ticonderoga. While some of Carleton's forces arrived that same day, Carlton himself apparently spent several days on the lake, not arriving at Crown Point until October 20, nearly a week after Arnold had come and gone. British troops occupied the ruins, sleeping in tents as an early snow covered them.

Carlton Withdraws

For the next two weeks, Arnold and the Continentals prepared for the British assault on Fort Ticonderoga. The small force waited for the attack to come, and waited, and then waited some more. Finally, after sending reconnaissance to Crown Point, Arnold discovered the British had left.

Carlton had remained at Crown Point until November 1, trying to decide on his next steps. Although he had destroyed Arnold’s fleet, and still had his own fleet in relatively good shape, the winter weather convinced him it was the wrong time to attack Fort Ticonderoga. The fort’s defenses would almost certainly require a lengthy siege. If the fleet remained in open water when it froze, the British would be trapped there. Even though they controlled the lake, supplying a siege force from their main base in Canada over the winter, across a frozen lake, would be extremely difficult. Having cleared the American fleet from Lake Champlain, Carlton could easily sail back in the spring and begin his siege then. So the 1776 fighting season ended with the Americans having lost control of Lake Champlain, but still in control of Fort Ticonderoga.

Aftermath

Many historians have credited Arnold’s loss at Valcour Bay as a success. He prevented the British from moving down the Hudson River that year as planned, connecting up with the main force in New York, and cutting off New England from the rest of the colonies. It is true that the British failed in that goal, but the fighting at Valcour Bay really did not contribute much to the British failure. Had Arnold scuttled his fleet at the first sign of British movement, it probably would have only allowed them to arrive at Ticonderoga a few days sooner.

Benedict Arnold

Rather than the fight itself, it was Arnold’s efforts in building his fleet on Lake Champlain in the first place that made the difference. The mere existence of his fleet forced Carlton to spend all summer building an even bigger fleet. That was the delay that prevented Carlton from making any further progress that year.

Most of Carlton’s officers seemed to support his decision to return to Canada for the winter. Leaving his army exposed in New York surrounding Fort Ticonderoga would have left many dead from exposure if nothing else. But the retreat back to Canada did not go over well in London. Lord Germain was deeply disappointed in Carlton’s lack of progress, and would eventually push aside Carlton for command of the following year’s offensive. It did not help that over the winter, General Burgoyne returned to London and told everyone who would listen that Carleton was far too cautious and timid. If he had simply let Burgoyne attack when he wanted, this whole campaign would have been long over.

Similarly, Arnold received mixed reviews for his efforts. Most top officers admired Arnold’s ability to take the fight against a superior force and for his ability to keep the British in Canada from moving down into New York that year. Similarly, Arnold’s popularity among the people seemed secure as one of the few fighting generals who fought gallantly.

But many in the Continental Congress were less impressed. The politicians were hearing stories from all the junior officers who hated Arnold and who said everything they could to detract from his efforts. While Arnold had spent the summer and fall building his fleet and fighting the British, men like Colonel James Easton and Major John Brown spent months in Philadelphia doing everything they could to disparage Arnold. The fact that Arnold had lost at Quebec, then lost Canada, and now lost Lake Champlain, did not exactly make for a winning general, despite the good excuse of being outmanned and outgunned at every step.

In late November, after it became clear that Carlton really was gone for the winter and that his withdrawal was not some sort of ruse, Arnold decided to return home to Connecticut for the first time in a year and a half. Before doing so, he returned to Albany to meet with Generals Schuyler and Gates. There, the generals convinced Arnold that he should probably go to Philadelphia and attempt to clear up all the stories about him being told to members of Congress. But unable to stay away from battle, Arnold ultimately accompanied Gates with some of the forces from Fort Ticonderoga. He eventually met up with General Washington in New Jersey.

Fort Ticonderoga remained under the command of Generals Gates and Schuyler. Both generals, however, remained in Albany. Direct command at the fort itself fell to lesser officers simply holding it as winter quarters.

Next Week: We return to southern New York where General Howe slowly but surely pushes Gen. Washington’s army out of New York.

- - -

Next Episode 112: Battle of White Plains

Previous Episode 110: The Battle of Valcour Island

Click here to donate

Click here to see my Patreon Page

You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber. This is an option for people who want to make monthly pledges. Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project. Thanks again!

Further Reading

Websites

Ray, Stephen, The Battle of Lake Champlain: http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/essays/before-1800/the-battle-of-lake-champlain

Barbieri, Michael "The Battle of Valcour Island" Journal of the American Revolution, Jan. 2, 2014: https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/01/battle-valcour-island

Barbieri, Michael "The Fate of the Royal Savage" Journal of the American Revolution, May 2, 2014:
https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/05/the-fate-of-the-royal-savage

Gadue, Michael "The Thunderer, British Floating Gun Battery on Lake Champlain" Journal of the American Revolution, April 4, 2019: https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/04/the-thunderer-british-floating-gun-battery-on-lake-champlain

Gadue, Michael "The Liberty, First American Warship Among Many Firsts" Journal of the American Revolution, June 10, 2019: https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/06/the-liberty-first-american-warship-among-many-firsts

Valcour Bay Research Project: http://www.historiclakes.org/vbrp/vbr1.htm

Pippenger, C.E. "Recently Discovered Letters Shed New Light on the Battle of Valcour Island" Journal of the American Revolution, Oct. 11, 2016: https://allthingsliberty.com/2016/10/recently-discovered-letters-shed-new-light- battle-valcour-island

Seelinger, Matthew Buying Time: The Battle of Valcour Island, 2014: https://armyhistory.org/buying-time-the-battle-of-valcour-island

Hubbard, Timothy W. "Battle at Valcour Island: Benedict Arnold As Hero" American Heritage Magazine, Vol. 17, Issue 6, Oct. 1966: http://www.americanheritage.com/content/battle-valcour-island-benedict-arnold-hero

Videos

C-Span: author James Arnold discusses his book, Benedict Arnold’s Navy (2006): https://www.c-span.org/video/?193388-1/benedict-arnolds-navy

Benedict Arnold's Legacy: Tales from Lake Champlain, Center for Research on Vermont (2016): https://archive.org/details/Benedict_Arnold_s_Legacy_-_Tales_from_Lake_Champlain

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Carrington, Henry B. Battles of the American Revolution, 1775-1781, A.S. Barnes & Co, 1876.

Digby, William The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals Carleton and Burgoyne from Canada, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1887.

Force, Peter American Archives, Series 5, Vol 3, M. St. Claire Clarks, 1837.

Hill, George Benedict Arnold: A Biography, Boston: E.O. Libby & Co. 1858.

Kingsford, William The History of Canada, Vol. 6, Toronto: Roswell & Hutchinson, 1887.

Palmer, Peter Battle of Valcour on Lake Champlain, October 11th, 1776, Lake Shore Press, 1876.

Smith, Justin Our Struggle for the Fourteenth Colony: Canada, and the American Revolution, Vol. 2, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1907.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Atkinson, Richard The British Are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777, Henry Holt & Co. 2019.

Darley, Stephen, The Battle of Valcour Island: The Participants and Vessels of Benedict Arnold's 1776 Defense of Lake Champlain, CreateSpace Independent Publishing, 2013.

Fleming, Thomas 1776: Year of Illusions, W.W. Norton & Co., 1975.

Hatch, Robert Thrust for Canada, Houghton-Mifflin, 1979.

Martin, James Benedict Arnold: Revolutionary Hero, NYU Press, 1997.

Randall, Willard Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor, William Morrow & Co. 1990.

Philbrick, Nathaniel Valiant Ambition: George Washington, Benedict Arnold, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Viking, 2016 (book recommendation of the week).

Wheeler, Richard Voices of 1776: The Story of the American Revolution in the Words of Those Who Were There, Plume Publishing, 1997.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.