Showing posts with label diplomacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label diplomacy. Show all posts

Sunday, July 5, 2026

ARP392 Treaty with Spain

On October 7, 1795, the Ambassador Thomas Pinckney agreed to the first treaty between the US and Spain.  During the Revolutionary War, Spain had used the American rebellion against Britain to attack British colonies and territories.  Spain, however, was not interested in independence.  Spain controlled a vast system of colonies that controlled the western portion of North America and all of central and South America other than Brazil and a few other small colonies.  It also controlled the largest and wealthiest colonies in the Caribbean. 

King Carlos was in no hurry to join the spirit of revolution and liberty that had infected France and eventually led to the overthrow of King Louis. He was also in no hurry to encourage the colonies under Spanish control to think that fighting for independence was a good idea.

Spanish Louisiana

When Spain first received the Louisiana Territory from France at the end of the Seven Years War, it really wasn’t sure what to do with it.  Most of the territory was inhabited by Indian tribes, with very few colonists from any European power.  Almost all the colonists that were there were French.  Spain mostly ignored the colony, leaving many French officials in power for years, even after it took ownership.  

Thomas Pinckney
New Orleans was the one town of any significant size in the territory.  When the first Spanish commander, Alejandro O’Reilly came in 1769, a census revealed a population of about 3200.  About 40% of those were African slaves.  The remainder were primarily French speaking colonists.  The New Orleans population was about one-third of the entire non-Indian population in all of Louisiana.

O’Reilly had come to crush a rebellion against Spanish rule.  Spain, however, was not interested in displacing the French-speaking colonists.  It had no one who really wanted to settle there.  Instead, the French population and the Spanish government reached an accommodation, much like the French colonists in Quebec did with their new British leaders.

After Spain joined the war with Britain in 1779, Louisiana became vulnerable to attack, and also useful as a staging area for Spanish offensives into British territory along the Gulf Coast.  Bernardo de Gálvez took command there and pushed Spanish control as far east as Pensacola. Gálvez also encouraged more Spanish immigrants to move to Louisiana, pushing many people from the Canary Islands to move there.

When the Revolution ended, Spain found its interests in direct conflict with those of the United States.  Spain retook control of East and West Florida, which it had held until the end the Seven Years War, then received back when Britain ceded it at the end of the Revolutionary War.  This resulted in Spanish borders pushing up against US borders in Georgia.  

America’s peace treaty with Britain also gave the US control of all lands east of the Mississippi River, meaning that the US bordered directly against Spanish Louisiana along a more than 2000 mile border. 

Colonization and Trade

Spain’s concern was that the US was growing in power and in size, and aggressively expanding its population westward into new territories.  It was only a matter of time before US growth would threaten control of Spanish territories.

Spain needed a larger population to counter this American pressure.  After the Revolution, officials encouraged a new wave of immigrants.  In 1785 it was the Acadians.

Recall that the Acadians were French colonists who had lived in what is today called Nova Scotia in Canada.  When Britain took control of that region at the beginning of the Seven Years War, it expelled the Acadians.  Some of them moved to Louisiana at that time.  A great many others moved to French Guyana or the Falkland Islands.  Some moved back to France, settling in Poitou.  These refugees were generally unhappy, so when Louisiana welcomed them, more than 1500 Acadians moved there.

Moving French colonists into this former French colony may have created concerns that France might someday reclaim the colony.  But at the time. Spanish officials were more concerned about the American threat.  Having fellow Catholics as colonists was better than uncontrolled land that might get snatched up by American frontiersmen.

By this time Galvez had moved on to other commands, becoming governor of Cuba for a time and then to serve as Viceroy of New Spain, what is today Mexico and most of the American Southwest.  Esteban Miró took over in Louisiana, but he asked to return to Spain in 1791.  He was succeeded by the Baron de Carondelet.

Governor Carondelet continued the efforts to attract more colonists.  In the era of the French Revolution, Carondelet invited French royalists to find refuge in Louisiana.  These invitations came with generous land grants, and even paid for transportation costs and basic supplies to help them get started.  One agreement granted every family 400 acres plus a cash bonus of one hundred pesos.  Invitations went out to all Europeans, particularly Catholics.  Flemish, German, and Italian immigrants took up these offers.

Spain wanted to keep the Americans away.  This is why they kept the Mississippi River closed to American commercial traffic.  American frontier communities had no other feasible way to get their products to market.  By shutting down the option of the Mississippi River, Spanish authorities hoped to discourage western expansion in America and therefore slow down the eventual border disputes that would inevitably arise.

New Orleans continued to grow at a rapid rate.  In 1788, however, a fire swept through New Orleans destroying virtually every building in the town.  The fire also destroyed all of the food, meaning the population was homeless and starving.  Governor Miro, dropped his orders to block American commerce.  He sent out word that trade was welcome from American shipping, both from the east coast and down the Mississippi.  He pardoned those currently in prison for illegally bringing American products to town, and sent them off trying to request that they bring more.

By 1794, the city had recovered, when another fire struck.  This one took out only around 15%-20% of the city since many of the buildings had been rebuilt with brick or stone instead of wood.  Still, the fire’s devastation created more need for American trade.

Governor Carondelet also installed the city’s first street lighting, added night watchmen for security, and divided the city into four wards that were used to organize police and fire departments.

New Orleans came to accept that it needed more trade to survive and thrive.  Even after opening free trade to all French colonies, New Orleans was still suffering.  As much as officials wanted to discourage American growth by blocking trade with them, they eventually determined that they could not survive without it.

Officials mostly tried to control this with tariffs for any vessels using the Mississippi River.  Spain controlled both banks of the Mississippi below the Ohio River and imposed a fee on any boats or rafts carrying cargo.  These fees could be up to 25% of the cargo’s value. Attempts to evade these tariffs could result in fines, jail, and confiscation of all cargo.

I should also mention that King Charles III of Spain died in 1788, leading to the reign of his son, Charles IV.  The younger Charles was not as active in leading Spain as was his father, and did not demand such a confrontational policy against America.  However, he mostly left his policies up to his ministers, particularly relying on Foreign Minister Manuel de Godoy for matters involving America.

James Wilkinson

Spain liked having the benefits of trade with frontier settlements along the Mississippi.  What they did not like was the fact that these settlements represented US expansion and a long term threat to Spanish control of Louisiana.  To break this threat while keeping the trade benefits, Spain embarked on a plan to break off the western states from the eastern states so that these western areas would become dependent on Spain. 

The key to their plan was an American, James Wilkinson.  I’ve talked about Wilkinson’s history in past episodes.  He was an up and coming Continental officer in the Revolutionary War.  By 1777, he was a 20 year old colonel, breveted as a brigadier general.  But his role as an aide to Horatio Gates came to an end when his gossip revealed the Conway Cabal.  Later, Congress appointed him clothier general, but his poor performance forced his resignation from that role in 1781.

Wilkinson briefly served as a general in the Pennsylvania militia, but then moved to Kentucky after the war.  He played an active role in separating Kentucky from Virginia, and also was a leading voice against ratifying the US Constitution.

Before the Constitutional Convention completed its work, and the Confederation Congress was falling apart, America’s future looked bleak.  Over 1785 and 1786, John Jay as the Confederation’s secretary for foreign affairs, tentatively agreed to a treaty with Spain that would have prevented American use of the Mississippi River for 25 years.  

Spain was demanding this concession for the same reason that the US frontier hated it.  Blocking use of the river would kill western settlements.  Jay seemed willing to sell out western interests in exchange for benefits that would help eastern merchants.  Ultimately, the US refused to ratify any treaty at that time, but the ill feelings of westerners remained raw.

It was in this environment that Wilkinson travelled to New Orleans in 1787 to meet with Governor Miró.  He offered his services as a Spanish agent, and took a secret oath of allegiance to the King of Spain.  Wilkinson encouraged Spain to deny American frontier towns access to the Mississippi River, believing that this would eventually force Kentucky to abandon the US and join with Spain.  

He arranged for special exceptions for himself and some of his friends to use the Mississippi, essentially giving himself a trade monopoly on the river that would enrich him.  On top of that, he received pay from Spain and negotiated for lifetime pensions for himself and others who would help bring Kentucky under Spanish influence.  Spain authorized a $200,000 bribe fund to encourage the leaders of Kentucky to separate from the Union and form an alliance with Spain.

In addition to enriching himself, Wilkinson envisioned himself as the leader of a new buffer country between the US and Louisiana, controlling what is today the states of Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi.

After Kentucky ratified the Constitution, Spain largely gave up on the idea that this would happen anytime soon, but still kept Wilkinson on the Spanish payroll as Agent 13.  Wilkinson would go on to play important roles in suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion and Indian resistance in Ohio, all while remaining a Spanish agent. While some Americans suspected Wilkinson’s duplicity, he remained a senior officer in the US Army.

Pinckney Treaty

In 1795, Spain finally decided it needed a treaty with the US.  Spanish minister Godoy sent word that they would like to discuss the matter.

Thomas Pickney, the US ambassador to Britain ended up being tasked with the negotiations..  Pinckney came from a prominent South Carolina family. His mother, Eliza Lucas Pickney introduced indigo as a cash crop in South Carolina.  His father moved the family back to England when he was three, so Thomas grew up there.  After studying law at Oxford and Middle Temple, he returned to America in 1774, just before the war began.  He received a commission as a captain in the Continental Army and served as an aide-de-camp to Horatio Gates.  He was captured at Camden and spent more than a year on parole.  After being exchanged, he fought under Lafayette in Virginia.

Pickney got elected Governor of South Carolina in 1787.  In 1792, he accepted an appointment from President Washington to serve as ambassador to Britain.  During the disputes with Britain, Pinckney was unable to reach any agreement. That was when Washington sent Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate with British leaders.  Pinckney assisted Jay with those negotiations.

It was the results of these negotiations, the Jay Treaty, that finally got Spain’s attention.  To Spain, the Jay Treaty marked the establishment of a new Anglo-American alliance that would probably work to Spain’s detriment.  Officials even feared that there might be secret articles in that treaty that agreed to a joint British and American invasion of Spanish colonies in America.

Following word of the Jay Treaty, Spain saw itself in a difficult situation.  Spain had joined Britain in the war with Revolutionary France in 1793.  Spain suspected that France would be weak and disorganized after the execution of King Louis.  France was also at war with Prussia, the Netherlands, several German states, and had just gone to war with Britain.

Spain looked on the situation as would any European power at the time; their neighbor was weak, so this was a good time to attack and take some territory from them.  Spain joined the coalition against Revolutionary France and went to war.  The war did not go as Spain had hoped, resulting in the ministry wanting to bail and end the war with France.

During treaty negotiations with France, Spain wanted the return of certain border regions that the French Army had taken from them.  In return, French negotiators demanded the return of Louisiana, but Spain refused.  Instead, Spain gave France its claims on Santo Domingo, where French Haiti shared the island with Spanish Dominica in the West Indies. France would now control the entire island. 

The negotiations, which took place in Basel, Switzerland, not only ended the war between Spain and France. Prussia and Hesse-Kassel also reached agreements with France.  This left Britain without its major allies in its war with France.  These peace agreements angered Britain, which began attacking Spanish shipping.  The result was that Spain was in an even weaker position, especially if America was allying itself with Britain.  So Spanish officials were motivated to get on America’s good side by signing an agreeable treaty.

Even before the Basel treaty between Spain and France was signed, Spanish minister Godoy invited Secretary of State Pinckney to Madrid to begin talks.  Pinckney arrived in Spain at the end of June, 1795, just days before Spain completed its peace treaty with France.

Godoy hoped to join the US into a triple alliance with France and Spain to fight against Britain.  Pickney would not agree to anything like that.  President Washington’s policy was to remain neutral and to stay out of all European alliances that might drag the US into war.

Pinckney wanted a treaty that would establish the borders between Spain and the US, and which would guarantee free US navigation of the Mississippi River.  For the first month or so of negotiations, neither side seemed willing to cede much.

One of the big disputes, other than use of the Mississippi River, was over the southern US border.  East of the Mississippi, Spain controlled all the land along the gulf coast.  Spain had established military outposts as far north as Vicksburg, on the Mississippi River, about 170 miles north of New Orleans.  This area between the Mississippi and Chattahoochee Rivers covers about one third of the modern day states of Mississippi and Alabama.  Spain claimed that all of this was Spanish territory.  Britain had made it part of East and West Florida, which it had ceded to Spain after the Revolution.

US negotiators countered that Britain had set the southern border at 31 degrees parallel in its peace treaty with the US.  This was about 100 miles south of the border that Spain wanted.  At first, neither side seemed willing to budge on this issue.

Once the Treaty of Basel became public in August though, everything seemed to change. Godoy was ready to agree to just about any treaty with the US, just hoping to keep them from acting in an alliance with Britain.

Spain gave in on just about everything.  It set the east-west border in the center of the Mississippi River and guaranteed free navigation of the river out to the Gulf of Mexico.  The only limitation would be that free navigation would only be for Americans and Spanish.  Third parties were still prohibited from using the river.

Spain accepted the US southern border at 31 degrees parallel.  It abandoned all claims north of that line and agreed to evacuate all of its forts in the territory within six months after treaty ratification.

Finally, Spain dropped its demands for any sort of military alliance with the US.  The US would not be under any obligation to protect any Spanish land claims against third parties, not even in America.

There were a few other minor disputes to be worked out, such as the requirement that US merchants pay government fees for goods stored in New Orleans.  The two parties agreed that there would be no such fees for at least three years.  There was also a dispute over US merchant ships that Spain had already seized.  The parties agreed on the establishment of a commission to hear those claims.

US Reaction

The two parties signed the treaty at the end of October, 1795 at San Lorenzo el Real, the summer residence of the Spanish Court.  

Some Spanish officials were aghast at the terms that Spain had given away.  Louisiana Governor Carondelet was convinced the treaty would never be finalized when the king saw the terms to which Godoy had agreed.  Spanish colonial leaders saw the treaty as a complete sellout of everything they had worked for, for years.  Despite these feelings, King Carlos approved the treaty.

In the US, the feeling was quite different.  News of the treaty reached Philadelphia in January, 1796 and a copy arrived a few weeks later.  The treaty gave the US everything it wanted, especially the long sought-after use of the Mississippi River, and required almost no concessions.  It mostly sought the good will of America, which was happily given. 

There was virtually no opposition or concerns expressed about the terms. The Senate unanimously ratified the treaty in March, 1796. The final formal ratifications were exchanged in Spain on April 25.  Pinckney became the toast of America.

Next Week: The Yazoo Land Scandal in western Georgia

 - - -

Next Episode 393 Yazoo Land Scandal 

Previous Episode 391 Washington Admin Scandals and Resignations

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Further Reading

Websites

Treaty of San Lorenzo/ Pinckney’s Treaty, 1795 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/pickney-treaty

Pinckney Treaty 1795 - Transcript https://www.emersonkent.com/historic_documents/pinckney_treaty_1795_transcript.htm

Whitaker, Arthur Preston. “New Light on the Treaty of San Lorenzo: An Essay in Historical Criticism.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 15, no. 4, 1929, pp. 435–54. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1897880

Young, Raymond A. “Pinckney’s Treaty-A New Perspective.” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 43, no. 4, 1963, pp. 526–35. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2509900

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Bemis, Samuel F. Pinckney’s Treaty: A Study of America’s Advantage from Europe’s Distress, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1926. 

De Pedro, Jose The Spanish in New Orleans and Louisiana, Gretna: Pelican Publishing, 2000. (borrow only) 

Din, Gilbert C. (ed) The Spanish Presence in Louisiana 1763-1803, Center for Louisiana Studies, 1996 (borrow only). 

Gayarre, Charles History of Louisiana: The Spanish Domination, New York: Redfield, 1854. 

Holmes, Jack D.L. A Guide to Spanish Louisiana, [self-published] 1970 (borrow only). 

Monette, John W. History of the discovery and settlement of the valley of the Mississippi, by the three great European powers, Spain, France, and Great Britain, and the subsequent occupation, settlement, and extension of civil government by the United States, until the year 1846. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1848. 

Pickney, Charles C. The Life of General Thomas Pinckney, Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co. 1895. 

Robertson, James A. Louisiana Under the Rule of Spain, France and the United States 1785-1807, Vol. 2, Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co. 1911. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Elkins, Stanley M. and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800, Oxford Univ. Press, 1993 (borrow on archive.org). 

Linklater, Andro An Artist in Treason: The  Extraordinary Double Life of General James Wilkinson, Walker Publishing, 2009.

Roderiguez, John E. Spanish New Orleans: An Imperial City on the American Periphery, 1766–1803, LSU Press, 2021. 

 * As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, September 1, 2024

ARP325 Threat of Peace


Last time, we covered the struggles of the Continental Army in late 1782 and early 1783 to deal with the fact that the war was coming to an end, and that Congress seemed inclined to break every promise that it had made to the officers and men who had sacrificed so much to end the war.  Washington had to snuff out a potential mutiny by the officers at Newburgh, NY.  This week, we take a look at the crisis from Congress’ point of view.

Financial Breaking Point

A big part of the problem was the Congress was broke. This was nothing new.  Congress had financed the first few years of the war based on printing paper promissory notes that would somehow be reimbursed later.  Those reimbursements never came and Congress just needed more and more money to fund the war.  By 1779 hat paper money, the Continental dollar, was worthless and Congress could not issue more.  By 1780, most of its money came from French loans, and a handful of other European loans.  Even those loans, however, were not enough to cover the costs of the war.  

In 1781, Congress had appointed Robert Morris as Superintendent of Finance.  Morris created the Bank of North America to receive loan money from abroad, and issued paper notes against that money to circulate as currency.  These so-called “Morris Notes” carried Morris’ personal guarantee of payment, meaning that people who might no longer trust Congress to repay might trust one of the wealthiest merchants in North America instead.

While Morris could play some financial games to keep things going, there also had to be some permanent solution to pay for the war.  Congress had tried to compel the states to provide funds, based on the relative wealth of each state.  The states, however, simply refused to pay.  Congress could do nothing about it.  

In late 1782, Morris received part of the final French loan. With it came word that this was the last loan the US would receive.  France only provided this last loan to ensure the US remained in the war until France finalized its peace treaty with Britain. Once that happened, France had zero interest in pouring more money into US coffers.  In fact, it wanted the US to start repaying its older loans.

With debts continuing to pile up, and no future revenue in sight, Morris decided to up the ante.  In June 1782, he just stopped making interest payments on all government debt.  Many of the creditors who relied on these interest payments were local merchants who had supported the cause for years, eventually hoping to be repaid.  The failure even to pay the interest on the debt made clear to all that Congress was reneging on its financial promises.  When creditors began to accost Morris about their money, he pointed out that he was one of the largest creditors who was being cut off.  He recommended that the creditors unite and petition Congress and the states to do something about repaying their debts.

Proposed Tariff

In July, Morris issued his Report on Public Credit essentially saying that the US had massive debts from the war and no way to repay them.  Morris suggested a number of options to raise revenue.  The main source would be a 5% tariff on all imports.  Unlike earlier efforts, this would be a direct tax collected by Confederation agents at all major ports.  The problem was that any revenue act needed the support of all 13 states.  Congress got twelve states voted to support the tariff, but Rhode Island refused.  

The leaders there thought that a tariff on imports was unfair since most of their revenue came from imports. Rhode Island wanted to raise revenue from some other source, such as a property tax instead, or funding the war from the sale of western lands.  Also, the whole Revolutionary war had been fought over the idea that states should be the only entity allowed to collect taxes.  Giving that power to an outside entity seemed to run against that whole premise of the war itself.  

Morris and others in Congress pressured Rhode Island for months to agree to the tariff.  Morris even hired Thomas Paine to publish a series of articles in support of the tariff.  At one time, years earlier, Morris and Paine had been political foes.  But Paine needed the money and seemed to support the idea that a national tariff would help to bind the union together.

In December, Congress sent a delegation to Rhode Island to put some in-person pressure on the state to accept the tariff as an absolute necessity.  While on their way, the delegation learned that Virginia decided to repeal its approval of the tariff.  With that, the delegation simply returned to Philadelphia.  Rhode Island was no longer the only hold out.

Virginia’s change of heart was largely the result of Arthur Lee.  You may recall that Lee had been a diplomat in Europe for many years.  There, he made enemies of Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams. Lee seemed to see conspiracies wherever he went, and was not shy about spreading misinformation about them.  As a delegate to Congress, Lee set his sights on Robert Morris.   Lee simply did not trust the financier and figured there had to be some corruption if the man had access to so much money.  Lee got Virginia legislators to kill the tariff bill simply as an effort to cut Morris’s power. I think its also telling that Lee wanted Morris to resign and probably wanted to replace Morris as Superintendent of Finance sot hat he could be in charge of all that money.

Army Demands Money

About the same time the Congressional delegation returned to Philadelphia to face a dead tariff bill, the Continental Army delegation headed by General Alexander McDougall showed up, demanding answers on pay and pensions.  

A few weeks later, in January of 1783, Morris delivered more bad news.  Congress had already overdrawn against its loans from France, and essentially had no choice but to keep over drawing those accounts as it was the only source of funds available.  Congress’ counter offer, via Morris, was a promise to provide just one month’s pay in specie to help tide them over.

Around this same time, after Morris promised one month's pay, he received a note from General Nathanael Greene saying that Greene had to promise his men two month’s pay to keep them from walking away. Morris knew that if he gave one month’s pay to the northern army and two month’s pay to the southern army the northern army was going to be particularly unhappy.

Even coming up with that one month of pay would be nearly impossible. Morris hoped to continue to overdraw his French credit.  He received a note from French Minister Luzerne ordering him to stop drawing on his French credit.

Morris was also counting on the sale of Morris Notes in Cuba in exchange for specie that he could use to pay the army.  Morris was constantly shuffling around money to do whatever he could to make money available.  Morris also agreed to pay the two months pay to the southern army, but sent one month for pay and the remainder of the money on the books as repayment for supplies.  He hoped this would prevent the northern army from finding out the southern army got more pay.  

Even if the money from Cuba arrived to pay the army, Morris saw no hope beyond that of continuing.  With ever mounting debts and no hope of revenue, Morris did not see anything he could do.  He submitted notice of his resignation to the President of Congress, effective May 31.  Some historians have argued that Morris announced this privately and several months in advance, hoping to get Congress to approve some sort of revenue bill.  That was certainly a possibility, but Morris had grown frustrated and was fed up with trying to find new ways to juggle credit for money they did not have and never would have.  Morris confided in his diary that he believed that failure to repay debts was simply unjust and if that was the road Congress was going to take, he did not want to be a part of that.

Congress Argues

Congress remained divided. Delegates like Alexander Hamilton and James Madison strongly advocated for revenue measures to pay the army and government creditors.  Others, like Arthur Lee feared giving Congress any power over money, seeing it as a threat to states' rights.

Hamilton took the initiative in Congress, rising to introduce four resolutions.  The first supported providing the one month’s pay to the army that the committee had promised.  Second was a resolution that the state would be responsible for all back pay of their soldiers up until August 1, 1780.  From that point on, Congress would be responsible for all the back pay.  The third resolution called on Congress to make every effort to obtain the necessary money, either through state requisitions or direct revenue measures, but that it needed to raise the money to pay off its creditors.  It was vague on how to make this work.  Finally, Congress needed to confirm its half pay pensions for life for Continental officers as promised, or come up with some lump sum payment for a certain period of years in lieu of that promised pension.

With the army on the verge of mutiny Congress approved the payment of one month’s pay.  The other resolutions ran into considerable debate.  Some states wanted to move up State responsibilities from August to December, 1780, but eventually the August 1 date passed.  That was when Morris had taken over the Department of Finance and wanted to deal with costs during his tenure.  Debate over the third resolution, actually raising money, ground into a debate over which forms of revenue were constitutional under the Articles of Confederation.  That never went anywhere.

The debate over pensions was a larger one.  It wasn’t just the money.  Opponents of pensions believed that making men dependent on government pay was a blow against freedom.  It would make them lazy and dependent on government handouts.  It would also create political support for a stronger central government that had to be there to make those payments, something many delegates opposed.

Much of the debate at this time centered around how much of a lump sum to provide instead of that lifetime pension.  Hamilton proposed six years.  Congress rejected that. Other proposals ranging from 5 to 6 ½ years were also rejected.  It became clear that many New England delegates would not support any pay at any level.  Congress ended up tabling discussion until the states could consider whether to send new delegates.

By February 1783, word arrived from Europe that the two sides had reached a preliminary peace treaty.  While most people took this as good news, it also made it difficult for Congress to do anything for the army since the soldiers would no longer be needed. There was also a pressing concern that when the Congress ordered the army disbanded, the men might not return home until they got what they were promised.  In short, the end of the war created a deadline for Congress to decide how it would keep its promises for when the war ended.

Congress continued to debate a funding scheme that would allow them to pay back the debts that they owed.  It also debated who should be paid back.  A new argument developed among some who thought the army should get priority for payment and that other creditors would just have to wait.  Another faction thought all creditors deserved repayment.  Making the other creditors wait behind the army might mean they never get repaid at all since the real political pressure was coming from the army.  Also, many of the creditors were some of the most powerful men in each state.  If these men saw little or no hope of repayment, they would likely oppose the taxes that Congress had to raise to pay off all the debts.

Tempers flared in Congress, but neither side could get anything done.  The nationalists, led by delegates, such as Alexander Hamilton, believed it to be a moral duty for Congress to repay everyone who had lent money or property to the cause, as well as the soldiers who had sacrificed so many years.  

Another supporter of the nationalists was Gouverneur Morris who was an assistant to Robert Morris in managing the nation's finances.  Although the two men shared a last name, they were not related.  Robert was from Pennsylvania.  Gouverneur had come to Philadelphia as a delegate from New York and was now working in the Department of Finance.  

Gouverneur wrote to General Henry Knox, warning the general about plans to force states to pay the army rather than having Congress make sure everyone got paid.  He also warned about the idea of Congress paying the army first.  While officers might find that tempting, Morris told him that the plan would destroy any effort to implement a tax that could begin to pay everyone.  He urged the army to express support for the nationalist plan to raise direct revenue to pay both the army and other creditors.  A few days later, Morris wrote a similar letter to Nathanael Greene in Charleston on these same matters.

The officers were reluctant to support either side.  They did want to alienate any delegates and were open to just about any solution the delegates adopted that meant they would get their pay and benefits.  Exactly how that would happen was up to Congress and not up to them to say.

Unable to come up with a solution, some delegates in Congress proposed another solution: don’t allow the army to disband and go home, even after the peace treaty was final.  The army would remain intact until it was paid its benefits.  This put off the concern that soldiers would riot if sent home without their promised pay and benefits.  It would allow the soldiers to remain under control.  Some Continental officers, including General Knox, approved of this idea.  It would keep pressure on the Congress to resolve the pay issue quickly.  It would also mean the men would not mutiny on their own and march on Congress.

This option, of course, came with more problems.  For starters, most of the soldiers were more than ready to go home. They needed to get back to work and wanted to be with their families.  They had enlisted for the length of the war.  The government had no authority to hold them to service once the war was over.  Such a solution also meant that Congress would be obligated to pay for food, clothing, and pay for additional months.  Standing armies in peacetime had been argued as a sign of tyranny. Most delegates believed that Congress should never support such an idea.  On the other hand, trying to disband the army and have the army refuse the orders to disband could be even worse.

No good solution seemed in sight.  Hamilton wrote to general Washington about the impasse in Congress, and recommended that the army, probably through Knox, put more pressure on Congress to find a resolution.  Some historians have taken these letters to mean that Hamilton wanted to let the Army mutiny and march on Philadelphia.  Of course, the correspondence does not say that explicitly, but they argue Hamilton had to be circumspect about what he really wanted.  To me, the letter indicates that Hamilton wanted more efforts by the army to petition and have top officers meet with Congress to lobby them, but no suggestion of mutiny seems even implied.

Around this same time, Hamilton put more pressure on delegates by spreading his view that General Washington was losing popularity within the army because Washington was standing by Congress.  In a discussion with several other delegates in a private setting, Hamilton suggested that the officers might overthrow Washington and follow a new leader who would fight for their interests.  Although the name of this alternative leader was not recorded, it appears that he was talking about General Horatio Gates.

At the end of February, Congress once again took up debate over pensions. The delegates finally agreed to offer a lump sum payment of five years salary in lieu of half pay pensions for life. While they finally agreed on a number, that still did nothing to settle where the money to pay those lump sums would come from.

In March things reached a boiling point in Newburgh.  As we covered last week, the officers met with an apparent intent of taking action, but General Washington was able to talk them down and await further action by Congress.

Once Washington resolve the matter, he wrote to President Boudinot and other members of Congress, telling them the crisis was calmed for now, but that Congress had to do something soon to keep its promises to the army.  Around this same time, Robert Morris doubled down on his threat to resign in may, telling Congress he planned to make his decision public.  This would have created complete financial panic.  Congress called his bluff and granted the request.  Almost immediately delegates began attacking Morris in the press for being the cause of all of America’s financial woes.

Meanwhile Congress also got serious about coming up with a funding plan. To allay the fears about a permanent national tax, some members suggested limiting the tax to 25 years.  Opponents argued they could not do this unless they could also guarantee that all the debts would be paid off in that time.

Several months earlier the states had been asked to survey their lands and report back on their value.  Congress looked at a number of possible formulations for taxes, taking into account the various state populations, wealth possession of western lands, how much they had already paid to the war effort, etc.  One point of contention was how to count slaves.  Northerners wanted to count slaves in the population.  Southerners objected on the basis that slaves would be counted twice. They were counted for population, but also for property value.  Benjamin Harrison proposed a compromise where slaves would be counted as ½ of a person.  A delegate from New England suggested a compromise of ¾.  Finally, on a proposal by James Madison, the delegates finally agreed to count a slave as ⅗ of a person.

News of Peace

Debate was interrupted on March 12, when a ship arrived with the preliminary peace treaty between the US and Britain.  While this was preliminary, the ship had left France three months earlier.  By the time it arrived, most people assumed that everything had been finalized in Europe.  Less than two weeks later, another message arrived reporting a general peace agreement that resulted in the cessation of all hostilities.

These messages came at the same time that Washington’s reports of his Newburgh address, and his urgent petitions for Congress to act also arrived.  Amidst all this pressure, Congress finally agreed to a commutation of officer pensions into a lump sum.

Meanwhile Washington’s letters to friends in Philadelphia, including Hamilton, revealed his suspicion that the nationalists in Congress were using the army as a pawn in order to create a larger source of Continental currency.  He suspected that delegates were willing to refuse to disband the army and provide separation pay in a scheme to force Congress to adopt a stronger national economic plan.

In one if his letters, Washington famously warned Hamilton that “the Army (considering the irritable state it is in, its sufferings & composition) is a dangerous instrument to play with.”

Next week, although the war is coming to an end, not everyone has received word. The British attack the Spanish Fort Carlos in what is today Arkansas.

- - -

Next Episode 326 Fort Carlos 

Previous Episode 324 Newburgh Conspiracy

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Further Reading

Websites

Schoderbek, Michael P. “ROBERT MORRIS AND REPORTING FOR THE TREASURY UNDER THE U.S. CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.” The Accounting Historians Journal, vol. 26, no. 2, 1999, pp. 1–34. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40698202

Nuxoll, Elizabeth M. “The Bank of North America and Robert Morris’s Management of the Nation’s First Fiscal Crisis.” Business and Economic History, vol. 13, 1984, pp. 159–70. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23702711

Report on Restoring Public Credit, [6 March] 1783: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-06-02-0100

Robert Morris to the President of Congress, 15 January 1782: https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-07-02-0151-0002

Wensyel, James W. “The Newburgh Conspiracy” American Heritage Magazine, April/May 1981. https://www.americanheritage.com/newburgh-conspiracy

The Newburgh Incident: https://research.colonialwilliamsburg.org/foundation/journal/Autumn14/civilian.cfm

Newburgh Conspiracy: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/newburgh-conspiracy

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

A Collection of papers, relative to half-pay and commutation of half-pay, granted by Congress to the officers of the army. Compiled, by permission of His Excellency General Washington, from the original papers in his possession.  Fishkill, NY: Samuel Loudon, 1783. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Head, David A Crisis of Peace: George Washington, the Newburgh Conspiracy, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Pegasus Books, 2019.

Martin, James Kirby & Sean Hannah Leading with Character: George Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy, George Washington Leadership Inst. 2017. 

Richards, Dave, Swords in Their Hands: George Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy, Pisgah Press, 2015. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, March 21, 2021

ARP193 Deane Hearings


A few weeks ago, I mentioned that Silas Deane returned to America with the French fleet that arrived in July 1778.  Congress had recalled him, sending a letter in December 1777 to report on the affairs in Europe.  Deane had received the letter in March, then took a few weeks to wrap up his affairs and plan his return to Philadelphia.

Deane in France

By the time he returned, Deane had spent about two years in France.  Congress requested that he go there to serve as an advocate before the French Court in March, 1776.  The inexperienced merchant from Connecticut took up the task without knowing a word of French or even having any personal contacts in France  Despite these limitations, Deane had managed to make personal contact with key leaders at Versailles and to begin a partnership with Pierre Beaumarchais to begin sending arms and supplies back to America.  He accomplished all this despite being on his own in France for nearly a year.  

Silas Deane

At the end of 1776, Congress appointed Benjamin Franklin and Arthur Lee to work with Deane in France.  Together, the Commissioners had not only sent shiploads of arms and supplies, dozens of French officers, but also managed to finalize two treaties with France and bring their new ally into the war with Britain.  Deane’s mission had been a success and any return home should have been in triumph.

That, however, was not the case.  Almost since Deane’s arrival in Europe, Arthur Lee waged a campaign to attack Deane’s character and behavior in the hopes of having him recalled. Arthur Lee had been living in London when the war began.  He was a member of the powerful Lee family of Virginia, with two brothers sitting in the Continental Congress.  His legal practice in London helped to establish him as a colonial agent.  

Lee had attempted to work with Pierre Beaumarchais to get French military supplies to America after the war began.  But Beaumarchais ended up forming a partnership with Deane to further those ends.  That seems to have been the origin of Lee’s hostility toward Deane. Lee began a covert letter-writing campaign to powerful people in America, asserting that Deane was defrauding Congress by demanding payment for aid that the government of France intended to be given free of charge.  This was not the case. France did provide several generous loans to get the project started.  However, French officials expected the assistance program to become self-sustaining as America paid back those loans with the delivery of tobacco.

All of these deals were secret, of course. Congress only got information on them from Deane. Lee, and Franklin.  Since the commissioners were sending back Contradictory reports, Congress wasn't sure who to believe.  Congress, always desperate for cash, was receptive to accusations that one of its agents was unjustly enriching himself on these secret agreements.  

Deane Loses Allies

Deane also lacked political allies in Congress.  Deane had been a member of the Continental Congress before his appointment.  At the time of his appointment, the members of the Secret Committee who entrusted him with the mission to France were:  Benjamin Franklin, John Dickinson, Benjamin Harrison, Thomas Johnson, John Jay, and Robert Morris.

Franklin in Paris 

Franklin, of course, had left Congress to serve alongside Deane in France.  Franklin still supported Deane, but was no longer in Congress to be his advocate there.

John Dickinson famously left Congress shortly after passage of the Declaration of Independence.  He took a commission in the army, but his opposition to independence in Congress and his expressed doubts about the war effort had damaged his reputation.  By 1778 he was living as a private citizen in Delaware.

Benjamin Harrison had left Congress shortly after passage of the proposed Articles of Confederation.  Harrison had opposed equal representation, which left a large state like Virginia greatly under-represented.  He had also opposed General Washington over the appointment of Lafayette to a command position.  He had engendered the anger of many radicals by supporting the rights of Quakers to avoid compulsory military service.  As a result of all this, he had resigned his seat and returned to Virginia.

Thomas Johnson had left Congress and was by this time Governor of Maryland.  John Jay had left to become Chief Justice of the New York Supreme Court.

The only member of the committee that supported Deane when he departed for France, who was still in Congress, was Robert Morris.  Even Morris had been on a leave of absence at the time Congress recalled Deane. However, he had returned in May 1778.  But Morris was no ally of Deane.

Morris had secured the appointment of his half-brother Thomas Morris as an American agent in France. Thomas was supposed to deal with prize ships that were captured, and other financial matters.  Unfortunately, Thomas did not share his brother’s business acumen or attention to duty.  Thomas Morris spent most of his time in France drinking and partying.  Deane had reported this behavior to Congress.  While Congress was still trying to sort out this mess, Thomas Morris fell ill and died in January 1778 at the age of 26.

Robert Morris took great offense, in part not believing the accusations that Deane levied against his brother, and also that Deane had made the issue public to Congress rather than writing to Morris privately.  The result was that Morris was hostile to Deane and Franklin at this time.

Arthur Lee had levied charges against both Deane and Franklin. But Franklin was seen as a success in France and still had many supporters in Congress.  Because of this, Deane, rather than Franklin, became the focus of concern. So, after two years abroad, and without any support among the delegates.  Congress recalled Deane to answer questions about the accusations against him.

In its letter to Deane, however, Congress did not mention the charges of financial mismanagement and fraud.  Instead, Deane simply received a letter saying he was being recalled for consultation about the situation in Europe. Deane was savvy enough to realize this was more than just fact-finding, that Congress would not be recalling him unless they had reason to question his performance. However, he had no idea what the details of those questions would be.

France Supports Deane

Before he left France, Deane consulted with Franklin, with Beaumarchais, and with Vergennes about his recall and let everyone know that he was returning to Philadelphia. Franklin’s letter to Congress gives the best description of what Deane did or didn’t know about the situation.  Franklin gave Deane a letter dated March 31, 1778 to the President of Congress.  

My colleague, Mr. Deane, being recalled by Congress, and no reasons given that yet appeared here, it is apprehended to be the effect of some misrepresentations from an enemy or two at Paris and at Nantes. I have no doubt that he will be able clearly to justify himself; but having lived intimately with him more than fifteen months, the greatest part of the time in the same house, and a constant witness of his public conduct, I cannot avoid giving this testimony, though unasked, that I esteem him a faithful, active, and able minister, who to my knowledge has done in various ways great and important services to his country, whose interests I wish may always by every one in her employ be as much and as efficiently promoted.

Lafayette, Dekalb & Deane in Paris

At the same time, after discussing the matter with Deane, Beaumarchais wrote a blistering confidential memo for the French foreign ministry critical of Lee’s attacks on Deane.

By character and by ambition Mr. Arthur Lee was first jealous of Mr. Deane. He finished by becoming his enemy, which always happens to small minds, more occupied in supplanting their rivals than in surpassing them in merit.

The connections of Mr. Lee in England, and two brothers whom he has in Congress, have made him recently an important and dangerous man.

His plan has always been to prefer between France and England the power which would most surely bring him to fortune. England has some advantages for him. He has often explained himself on the subject in his libertine suppers. But to succeed, it was necessary to get rid of a colleague so formidable by his patriotism as Mr. Deane. This he has accomplished by causing him to be suspected in several points of view by Congress. 

Beaumarchais’ memo went on to outline Lee’s attacks on Deane’s appointment of French officers, and Lee’s accusation that the covert military aid was a gift from France, not a sale.  Beaumarchais concludes by noting: 

To-day Mr. Deane, loaded with grief, finds himself suddenly and harshly recalled. He is ordered to go to give an account of his conduct and to justify himself from many faults which they do not designate.

Also in support of Deane, Foreign Minister Vergennes sent a letter to Deane in late March attesting to France’s appreciation of his work as a diplomat.  In part, it read:

The king, desirous of giving you a personal testimony of his satisfaction with your conduct, has charged me to inform M. the president of Congress of it; this is the object of the letters which M. Gerard will deliver you for Mr. Hancock. He will also deliver you a box with the portrait of the king.

The box, which was a gift to Dean, had a portrait of the King, and was made of gold and encrusted with diamonds.  It was a show of gratitude and support for Deane’s service in France.  Further, the King of France directed that Deane be a guest aboard the French fleet that would sail to America, along with the new French Minister to America, Conrad Alexandre Gerard.

In the view of France and of Deane’s personal views, he was returning to America in success.  He had secured the French alliance, sent many successful officers and had been the source of much needed military aid sent over the previous year.

Arrival in Philadelphia

Upon his arrival in Philadelphia in July, Deane met with President Henry Laurens.  Laurens was cordial and congratulated Deane on his many successes.  Deane made clear he was eager to make his reports to Congress and return to France and his diplomatic work.

Congress, however, was in no hurry.  Deane sat in Philadelphia for over a month, waiting for an audience with Congress. He finally received orders to appear several times in mid-August.  Then again, nothing.  Finally on September 8, Deane wrote that he was growing impatient and that if Congress did not want to hear from him further, that he would like to return to France. Ten days later, a Congressional committee reported that Arthur Lee and Ralph Izard had accused Deane of financial mismanagement and misappropriation of public money.  Congress began calling witnesses, but did not call Deane.

Titus Hosmer
Shortly after that, Connecticut delegate Titus Hosmer, who had been in Congress for only a few months and who was returning home, informed Deane that he had overheard other delegates sought to destroy Deane.  Since they had no evidence, they did not want to bring specific charges against him.  Instead, they would simply drag out the matter and allow the cloud of accusation to hang over Deane’s head for as long as possible.

Again, Deane wrote to Congress, asking for the charges against him and to see the letters of his accusers so that he could respond. He said that after spending more than three months in Philadelphia, he needed to get back to France to manage his financial affairs there.  

Deane never got to see the letters containing accusations against him, but he did learn more generally of some of the charges.  Lee had accused Deane of giving offense to everyone he worked with in France.  There is no doubt that Deane offended Lee, but Deane argued that his success spoke for itself.

Deane noted that in 1777 he had shipped 30,000 small arms, a similar number of uniforms, over 250 pieces of brass artillery and numerous other supplies that were critical to the cause and which had been vital to opposing the Burgoyne campaign.  There were also all those letters of support from Franklin and various French officials which Deane had delivered to Congress.

Lee also made some minor accusations like that Deane had opened and read all of Lee’s correspondence, which Deane simply denied.  Lee accused Deane of leaving him out of negotiations, to which Deane responded that Lee was too querulous and that they did not always trust him with confidential matters under negotiation.

The more significant charge was that Congress had spent millions but that almost everything sent to America still had to be paid for. The obvious implication was that Deane had used that money for other purposes and that Congress will still have to repay all of those loans.

Deane could deny those charges generally, but all of his financial records were still in France.  He had no idea that he would be called to answer these specific charges and had left the financial records with his associates who were trying to continue these business dealings in France. Instead, Deane had to cool his heels in Philadelphia, living at his own expense, waiting for Congress to continue its investigation.

Arthur Lee
Meanwhile, back in France, Arthur Lee, having successfully removed Deane from Europe, then turned his attention toward Franklin.  Lee continued to write to Congress about how Deane was guilty of all sorts of financial crimes, that he had grown rich on embezzling government money and that his calls for a hearing were just a bluff.  Lee also wrote that Franklin was similarly guilty of wasting government funds to support a lavish lifestyle.

Congress was still receptive to Lee’s accusations.  At one point, they came within one vote of voting to recall Franklin from France as well.  Lee wanted to remove both of his fellow commissioners so that he could take control of the American delegation in France.

One of Deane’s greatest defenders was French minister Gerard.  Gerard was concerned about openly supporting one political faction against another in America.  After all, his job was to maintain good relations between France and America regardless of who was in charge in Philadelphia.  But Gerard did speak with delegates when he could, defending the motivations and actions of both Franklin and Deane.

In a letter to Vergennes, Gerard wrote: "The stories of Arthur Lee are but an absurd tissue of falsehoods and sarcasm, which can only compromise those who have the misfortune of being obliged to have anything to do with him."

Dispute Goes Public

Despite all this support, the Deane hearings dragged on.  By December, Deane had grown increasingly frustrated with Congress. He had left Europe in a hurry expecting to be gone for only a few months.  He had left many matters incomplete in France, and had even left his thirteen year old son there in the care of others.  After spending nine months waiting for Congress to decide anything about his case, he wrote a public letter outlining his situation, attacking Arthur Lee and Lee’s political allies, and which was highly generally critical of Congress.

This public revelation of the infighting between the American Commissioners and the internal disputes within Congress set off a political firestorm.  Virginia delegate Francis Lightfoot Lee responded in the press to defend his brother Arthur Lee.  This led to follow up articles by Deane.  Then, a couple of weeks later, Thomas Paine entered the fray.

Thomas Paine

Paine published a series of articles savaging Deane.  His first article primarily criticized Deane for making this whole matter public and revealing divisions among the leadership.  That, Paine, believed, damaged the war effort and the patriot cause generally.  Over the next few weeks and months, Paine published articles attacking Deane for his failure to bring his financial records with him and for what Paine seemed to believe were unsubstantiated attacks on Arthur and William Lee.  Paine strongly implied that Deane was corrupt, or at least hopelessly naïve in the way he managed affairs in Europe. 

Paine’s attacks largely reflected the views of a faction, possibly a majority of Congress who distrusted Deane and thought that his publicizing this dispute only made things worse.

Over the winter, as the articles raged back and forth, Deane remained in Philadelphia without Congress making any effort to continue its investigation or hold hearings.  In April, and again in May of 1779, more than a year after Congress first recalled him, Deane wrote to Congress to say that he planned to depart the city.  He wrote to the President of Congress that “it was the design of those who wished to sacrifice me to family interests to wear me out, by delays, and, without any direct charges, to ruin me in the opinion of my countrymen by insincere hints and innuendoes.”  Upon receiving the letter, President Laurens’ comment was only that “If Deane goes in defiance of Congress, it will be a confession.

Finally in August 1779, Congress discharged Deane from further attendance and requested that all the commissioners submit their accounts and vouchers for final settlement.  Congress reached no ruling on the charges against Deane or anything else. It simply announced that the investigation had ended.

Congress finally offered to pay for his costs for the more than a year that Deane had remained in Philadelphia, but the amount offered was so small, and to be paid in nearly worthless Continental paper dollars, that a disgusted Deane refused to accept the payment entirely.

Perhaps his one small victory was that Robert Morris once again supported Deane.  Morris, upon receiving the full information about his brother Thomas’ failures in Europe, accepted that Deane had only been trying to resolve a problem, not attack him politically.  Morris commented that Deane had rendered essential services for his country and that he had been “ill-used” by his enemies.  In a letter after everything had ended, Morris wrote, “I consider Deane to be a martyr in the cause of America” and that the attacks on him were “shameful.”  

Deane finally did return to France in 1780 where Franklin greeted him as a friend.  Deane returned, though, as a private citizen.  Having so many enemies in Congress, he would not receive another appointment to anything.  French officials also received him warmly in appreciation of his past service.  

Deane was also reunited with his son Jesse, by this time a young man of sixteen.  Deane was also heartened to learn that just weeks before his arrival in France that Arthur Lee had departed for America, to be called to account for his own activities while abroad.

Even with the matter behind him though, Deane would carry a resentment toward Congress for the rest of his life.  His experience also left him with serious doubts that the American cause would succeed when led by the conspiring politicians with whom he had interacted during his time in Philadelphia.

Next week, the French and British fleets have their first major encounters at the battle of Ushant.

- - -

Next Episode 194 Battle of Ushant 


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Further Reading

Websites

The Rise and Fall of Silas Deane, American Patriot: https://connecticuthistory.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-silas-deane-american-patriot

Hoadley, Charles J. “Silas Deane.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 1, no. 1, 1877, pp. 96–100. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20084263

Abernethy, Thomas P. “Commercial Activities of Silas Deane in France.” The American Historical Review, vol. 39, no. 3, 1934, pp. 477–485. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1840146

Covart, Elizabeth “Silas Deane: Forgotten Patriot” Journal of the American Revolution, 2014: https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/07/silas-deane-forgotten-patriot

The Affair of Silas Deane, Thomas Paine Historical Society: https://thomaspaine.org/essays/american-revolution/the-affair-of-silas-deane.html

Address of Silas Deane to the Free and Virtuous Citizens of America, https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vQrAIUZiKFv5_cKX4NCwqayfFIftj_3BJeHjFxlrOm6Y_6iOR46CAStc3LfVTRQtZ80LCBzc3nvap1i/pub

Parton, James The Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin, Boston: James R. Osgood, 1864, (excerpt) Part 6, Chapter 3, Beginning of Arthur Lee’s Mischief: http://www.public.coe.edu/~theller/soj/ttl/franklin/b603.htm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Clark, George L. Silas Deane, New York: G.P. Putnam's sons, 1913. 

Deane, Silas The Deane Papers, Vol. 3, New York Historical Society, 1889. 

Ingraham, Edward D. Papers in Relation to the Case of Silas Deane, Philadelphia: Seventy-Six Society, 1855. 

Lee, William Reply of William Lee to the charges of Silas Deane, 1779, Brooklyn: Historical Printing Club, 1891.  

The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 1: Silas Deane’s Correspondence, Boston: Hale, 1829. 

Sparks, Jared The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 2: Arthur Lee’s Correspondence, Boston: Hale, 1829. 

Stillé, Charles J. Beaumarchais and the "Lost Million" A chapter of the secret history of the American Revolution, Philadelphia, Priv. print, 1887. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

James, Coy Hilton Silas Deane, Patriot or Traitor, Michigan State Univ. Press, 1975

Paul, Joel Richard Unlikely Allies: How a Merchant, a Playwright, and a Spy Saved the American Revolution, Riverhead, 2009. 

Van Vlack, Milton C. Silas Deane, Revolutionary War Diplomat and Politician, McFarland, 2013 (book recommendation of the week). 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.