ARP312 Huddy-Asgill Affair

By the spring of 1782, the main Continental Army under George Washington had settled back into defensive lines around British occupied  New York City.

Following their loss at Yorktown, the British had given up on all offensive operations in America.  Britain had begun discussing peace terms with American commissioners in Europe.  Many believed the war would soon be over and British rule in America at an end.

Charles Asgill

There was one group who feared this result even more than the leaders in Britain.  They were the loyalists.  American colonists who had stood by the King.  They had also risked their lives, their fortunes, and their honor in this dispute.  As it was coming to an end, that was proving to be a bad bet. They stood to lose everything, including possibly their lives if convicted of treason in the newly independent United States.  They were living as outlaws or under British protection that might soon go away.

The loyalists, also called Tories, continued the war from British occupied New York by continuing raids into New Jersey.  Many of these loyalists were New Jersey natives who had taken refuge in New York.  Leading the effort was the royal governor of New Jersey, William Franklin.  Benjamin Franklin’s son remained a committed loyalist, still fighting to bring the colonies back under crown rule.

Even after Yorktown, the loyalists continued their raids, by some accounts becoming even more brutal.  British General Henry Clinton noted that he believed these loyalist refugees in New York intended to prevent “all future reconciliation between Great Britain and the revolted colonies.”

Capture of Huddy

In late March 1782, the loyalists conducted a raid on the town of Toms River, New Jersey.  They targeted the town’s salt works.  About 80 loyalists took whaleboats to make the 50 mile journey to the patriots down on the New Jersey coast.  The Patriots at Toms River were commanded by Joshua “Jack” Huddy.

Captain Huddy was an active patriot and a longtime leader in the New Jersey militia.  He had spent much of the early war fighting his loyalist neighbors, forcing many of them to take refuge in New York.  Many loyalists asserted that Huddy was a murderer who had no compunctions about executing loyalists when discovered in New Jersey.  One particularly notable event happened in 1777. Huddy was involved with a group that captured and hanged an alleged spy named Stephen Edwards, who was taken from his bed at night, given a quick trial and then hanged.

Later in the war, Huddy received a letter of marque from the Continental Congress, authorizing him to use his whaleboat to target British boats and settlements along the New Jersey coast. Huddy had some successful seizures, which he had sold at auction in Toms River.

Huddy’s reputation made him a target to be killed or captured.  In September of 1780, a loyalist force led by an escaped slave named Titus tried to capture Huddy.  Titus was an active loyalist, given the nickname of Colonel Tye for his efforts on behalf of the loyalists during the ongoing guerilla war in New Jersey.

Colonel Tye surrounded Huddy’s home with several dozen loyalists.  Huddy managed to hold out for some time with the help of only a servant girl, who reloaded muskets as he fired from multiple locations inside the house.  Apparently, he had a whole cache of muskets that he had confiscated from loyalists in the area.  Eventually, the loyalists set the house of fire, forcing Huddy to surrender.

The loyalist tied up Huddy and put him aboard a whaleboat for return to New York as a prisoner.  The local militia, however, turned out in time to attack the loyalists.  They got into a firefight, killing six of the enemy.  During the fight, Huddy was shot in the hip, probably by his would be rescuers.  He still managed to escape his captors and swim back to freedom.

The following summer, Huddy had largely recovered from his wound and took command of the blockhouse in Toms River.  When the loyalists attacked in March 1782, Huddy commanded about 25 patriot militia, who took refuge in the block house.  Eventually, they ran out of ammunition and had to surrender to the larger attacking force.  The raiders burned the town and carried Huddy back to New York in a whaleboat - this time successfully.  There, the militia captain was held in the notorious Sugar House Prison for a time and aboard a prison ship in New York Harbor.

The British then transferred Huddy to William Franklin’s loyalists, believing they wanted to trade him for a loyalist prisoner being held in New Jersey.

Up Goes Huddy for White

Instead, other events intervened.  About the same time the loyalist captured Huddy, another loyalist, Philip White also crossed enemy lines into New Jersey.  There are conflicting accounts of what White was doing in New Jersey.  By some accounts, he was conducting a raid. By others, he was just visiting his wife.

Capt. Huddy led to his hanging

In any event, White was a wanted man.  As a member of Franklin’s Associated Loyalists, White had participated in the past in numerous raids in New Jersey, killing and wounding several patriots.  Two years earlier, White had been part of an attack on the home of a patriot named John Russell.  In the attack, Russell was wounded and his father killed.

When White returned to New Jersey in late March 1782, Russell managed to capture the man who killed his father.  Exactly what happened next was also a matter of dispute, but the undisputed part is that White was killed.  The patriots claimed that White was shot and killed while trying to escape while being transferred for trial. The loyalists in New York believed that the patriots, specifically Russell who was avenging his father, had killed White in cold blood, then mutilated his body, then buried him in a shallow grave.

Huddy, of course, had nothing to do with the death of White.  He was in British custody at the time of White’s death.  But when word of White’s death reached the loyalists in New York, they were outraged.  White’s brother in law, Loyalist Captain Richard Lippincott, took custody of Huddy.  He and his men promptly took him to a tree on Sandy Hook, New Jersey and on April 2 unceremoniously hanged him without trial.  They put a placard on his body that read “Up goes Huddy for Philip White.”

The New Jersey militia, friends of Huddy, recovered his body, and the placard.  The militia called on Washington to take action regarding this outrageous murder of a prisoner of war.  Otherwise, the militia would stop taking any prisoners when they were capturing loyalists.  New Jersey was in danger of becoming like the southern colonies, where prisoners were routinely murdered after battle.

Washington’s Response

The execution of an American prisoner was something Washington had to take very seriously.  Since the war began, Britain had threatened to treat American prisoners as captured criminals - guilty of treason and subject to hanging.  The only reason this did not happen was likely due to threats by Washington and others in the American leadership that if American prisoners were hanged, they would begin hanging British prisoners.

Less than a year before this incident, the British had called the American’s bluff by hanging Colonel Isaac Hayne in Charleston (See Episode 293).  The Americans had threatened retaliation then, but ended up doing nothing.  Now the Continental leadership was faced with a second execution.  There had to be some sort of response.

Washington received word of Huddy’s hanging in a letter from the Monmouth, NJ Militia.  He was staying in Newburgh, New York at the time.  Within days, he convened a council of general officers and regimental commanders at West Point.  Twenty four officers participated in the deliberations, among them Major Generals William Heath was the senior officer. Robert Howe, and the Baron Von Steuben also participated.

Washington submitted all the documentation he had, and asked the council to answer four questions: 

• 1st Upon the State of Facts in the above Case, is Retaliation justifiable & expedient?
• 2d If justifiable, Ought it to take place immediately? Or should a previous Representation be made to Sir Henry Clinton & Satisfaction be demanded from him?
• 3d In Case of Representation & Demand, who should be the person or persons to be required?
• 4 In case of Refusal & Retaliation becomg necessary, of what Discription shall the officer be on whom it is to take place; & how shall he be designated for the purpose?

Each officer wrote out his own answer to each question.  On the first, they unanimously agreed that yes, retaliation was justifiable and expedient.  On the second question, the vast majority thought a demand of satisfaction to General Clinton would be appropriate, although a minority argued for immediate action - just hang someone, right now.  To the third question the majority believed they should demand Captain Lippincott, the loyalist officer in command of hanging Huddy, should be turned over for trial and execution.  To the fourth question, if the demand for Lippincott should be refused, the majority answered that a British captain should be selected at random and executed.  Several officers qualified this by saying the selected captain should be one who was captured in battle, not one such as those captured at Yorktown or Saratoga, who were promised certain guarantees of good treatment in exchange for surrender.

Washington acted on the answers, writing to President John Hanson to let Congress know what he was planning, then to British General Clinton to demand that Lippincott be turned over, or that a British Captain would be selected by lot and hanged.  Hanson did not respond, but Congress voted unanimously to support Washington’s plans in this matter.

Even before receiving Congress’s response, Washington wrote to General Clinton to demand Lippincott, or whoever was responsible, be turned over.  If not, Washington would order a British captain to be executed in his place.  Washington told Clinton “To save the innocent, I demand the guilty.”  

Clinton’s Departure

Clinton’s  response expressed “Surprise & Displeasure” at the tone of Washington’s letter and its “improper language”.  He assured Washington that he had only become aware of Huddy’s hanging a few days before he received Washington’s letter.  This was about a month after the incident took place.  Clinton assured Washington that such an act of cruelty was not the policy of the British Government nor his personal standards.  He had ordered an inquiry into events and would bring those responsible to trial.  He then scolded Washington for even considering hanging an innocent British officer.  He called it an act of barbarity.  Clinton went on to say it was up to each army to punish the wrongdoing of their own officers and men.

What Clinton left out of his letter to Washington, was the fact that this was not going to be his problem for much longer.  On March 27, about two weeks before Huddy’s hanging, Clinton had received a letter from Lord Germain that his resignation as Commander of North America had been accepted.  The following day, Clinton received a second letter that had been written several weeks after Germain’s letter.  The second letter was from Germain’s replacement Wellbore Ellis.   It informed Clinton that General Guy Carlton was on his way to replace Clinton.  Until Carleton arrived, Clinton should turn over command to General James Robertson.

Recall that Clinton hated Robertson.  The general simply refused to turn over command.  Robertson, who was also the Royal Governor of New York, protested, but there was not much else he could do.  Clinton outranked Robertson within the military.  Both men were also probably well aware by this time that the North Government had probably fallen or was still in the process of falling so that getting any clear direction from London for a while would probably be impossible.

Clinton did actually take some action in the matter. After receiving Washington’s letter, he ordered Lippincott arrested and held for court martial.  William Franklin, who was the head of the loyalists, objected that Lippincott was not a soldier and should not be tried by court martial.  Clinton ignored the objection and convened a court martial of 16 officers headed by General Robertson. Clinton was pretty confident this was not going to be resolved before he left.  He was right.  The Court martial convened, but was still considering the matter when General Carleton arrived on May 5.

Clinton hung around for another week before departing for London aboard a ship with the departing Hessian commander General Wilhelm von Knyphausen.  Clinton would return to begin his public feud with Cornwallis over who was responsible for Yorktown.  Knyphausen was simply headed home for retirement.

Unfortunate

With no satisfactory response forthcoming, Washington continued with the selection of a British captain to become the victim of American retaliation.  Washington wrote to Colonel Moses Hazen, who was responsible for the British prisoners of war being held in western Pennsylvania and Maryland.  He ordered that a British captain be selected by lot and sent to Philadelphia.  Washington initially requested that an officer be selected from those who had been captured unconditionally in battle, not those who had surrendered and were given terms of protection as part of their surrender.  However, when it turned out that there were not captains that met that former criterion, Washington permitted lots to be selected among thirteen captains who has surrendered with the Army at Yorktown.

Day Tavern in Chatham, NJ
where Asgill was held awaiting execution

Remember that most officers at Yorktown had been paroled and allowed to return home.  The only officers being held were those who had been retained to keep the enlisted prisoners in order.  The prisoners were gathered at the Black Bear Inn in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.  When informed the captains refused to draw lots.  They viewed this how process as immoral and illegal, and would play  no part in it.  In response, the Americans simply put their names in a hat.  In another hat, they placed 12 blanks and one marked “unfortunate.”  A drummer boy then drew a slip from each hat.  On the eleventh draw, Captain Charles Asgill’s name came up, along with the slip “unfortunate.”

Asgill was the youngest captain, having just turned 20 years old a few weeks earlier.  He was from an important family.  His father had been Lord Mayor of London.  Asgill joined the army at age 16, against the wishes of his father.  He had been promoted to captain less about a year earlier, a promotion he probably regretted by this point.  Upon hearing his fate, his commanding officer told him only “For God’s sake, don’t disgrace your colors.”

The unfortunate prisoner was carried first to Philadelphia, then to Chatham, New Jersey, the area where Captain Huddy had lived.  He was kept under close confinement, amid particularly hostile neighbors who had erected a gallows with a sign that said “up goes Asgill for Huddy.”

Delay

While there had been a pretty strong call for blood among the Americans after Huddy’s hanging. Once Asgill became the face of American vengeance, opposition to his execution became more vocal. Even Colonel Alexander Hamilton wrote to Washington, saying that murdering an innocent man would greatly damage Washington’s reputation.  Washington may have had second thoughts, but at this point he could not back down.  He feared that doing so would mean that neither the British leadership, nor anyone else, would trust his resolve.  

Washington delayed final execution, perhaps waiting for a determinative response from the British army.  General Carleton had suspended the Lippincott court martial almost as soon as he arrived, and debated simply turning over Lippincott, who he regarded as a criminal.  Turn him over to the Americans and make this whole thing go away.  That, of course, would have greatly angers the loyalists.  In June, Carlton also disbanded William Franklin’s Association of Loyalists, which had taken Huddy from British custody. Around this same time, Franklin left New York for London.

The court martial reached its decision in late June - not guilty. The court concluded that Lippincott had only been following orders given to him by William Franklin and that he believed his actions were in the line of duty, and not out of malice. 

Carleton then seemed to embark on a policy of procrastination to avoid any action against Asgill.  He wrote to Washington about the court decision in July, two weeks after the verdict, but failed to include the court records.  

Then, after more than a month, Carleton announced that the records were ready and asked for permission for Chief Justice William Smith to carry those records to Washington.  Carleton said Smith could provide further explanation.  A frustrated Washington responded that he was sending General Heath to meet with an officer at the British front lines and that any explanation could be in writing.  Carleton then responded he would just mail the records and Washington could get them soon.  In this case, the mail took another two weeks to arrive, far longer than normal.

Having received the court records, Washington still hesitated to act. Instead, he forwarded the records to Congress and asked them again what it wished to do. By this time, it was late August, almost five months had passed since Huddy’s hanging.

The delay gave Asgill’s advocates time to act.  Most specifically, his mother, Lady Asgill, wrote to the French Foreign Minister Vergennes pleading for her son’s life.  Lady Asgill argued that her son had surrendered to the French at Yorktown under their word that he would be protected and not subject to reprisals.  She called upon French honor to request her son’s life be spared.

Vergennes sent the letter to the King and Queen of France, resulting in a request from Queen Marie Antoinette requesting the release of Captain Asgill.  Meanwhile for months, Congress dithered and failed to reach a decision.  A majority still wanted to hang Asgill.  Finally, in November 1782, after receiving the letter from Vergennes it changed its determination.  It voted to release Asgill as a gift to the King of France.

In late November, Asgill was released.  He rushed to New York, only to find that a British packet ship had just left.  Anxious to return home, Asgill abandoned his luggage, commandeered a row boat and sailed after the ship.  He managed to catch it, boarded it and returned home in time for Christmas.

The Americans never took vengeance for Huddy’s murder.  However, the dispute, which lasted for about eight months, maintained a particular state of bitterness between the two countries.  Carleton had hoped to ease relations as the British reduced resources in America.  He also hoped to reach some plan for the exchange of prisoners.  The Americans had about 12,000 British prisoners by this time.  The result of this ongoing dispute kept the two sides at a higher level of hostility and prevented any large-scale prisoner exchange.

Next week: we head west again, as the Americans push into the Ohio Territory, hoping to stop continuing Indian raids into the area around Fort Pitt.

- - -

Next Episode 313 Crawford Expedition

Previous Episode 311 Battle of the Saintes

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Further Reading

Websites

Asgill Affair: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/asgill-affair

Damon, Allan L. “A Melancholy Chase” American Heritage, Feb. 1970. https://www.americanheritage.com/melancholy-case

Duke, Clair To Save the Innocent, I Demand the guilty: The Huddy-Asgill Affair, Kansas State Univ. 2017. https://krex.k-state.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/7d90c8dd-3162-4d92-9795-8f83d02d283f/content

Documents of the American Revolution, Joshua Huddy Era: https://www.monmouthcountyclerk.com/archives/archives-and-history-day/2004-documents-of-the-american-revolution-joshua-huddy-era

Ward, Matthew H. “Joshua Huddy: The Scourge of New Jersey Loyalists” Journal of the American Revolution, Oct. 8, 2018. https://allthingsliberty.com/2018/10/joshua-huddy-the-scourge-of-new-jersey-loyalists

“To George Washington from John Covenhoven, 14 April 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08154

“From George Washington to John Brooks, 19 April 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08204

“From George Washington to John Hanson, 20 April 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08207

“From George Washington to Henry Clinton, 21 April 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08216

“To George Washington from Henry Clinton, 25 April 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08256

“From George Washington to Moses Hazen, 3 May 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08319

“From George Washington to Moses Hazen, 18 May 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08451

Washington Came this Close to Killing an Innocent Man: https://www.historynet.com/washington-came-thisclose-to-executing-an-innocent-man

Video: Discussion of Joshua Huddy with Author Robert Mayers: https://vimeo.com/350964315

Video: Prof. Peter Enriques on The Asgill Affair (Prince William Public Libraries): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKChmpuHDRQ

Video: Charles Asgill, Setting the Record Straight (Anne Ammundsen): https://www.family-tree.co.uk/how-to-guides/expert-blogs/charles-asgill-setting-the-record-straight

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Humphreys, David The Conduct of General Washington: Respecting the Confinement of Capt. Asgill, New York The Bollard Club, 1859. 

Mayo, Katherine General Washington’s Dilemma, Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1970 (originally published 1938) (borrow only).

Paine, Thomas The American crisis, and a letter to Sir Guy Carleton, on the murder of Captain Huddy, and the intended retaliation on Captain Asgill, of the Guards, London, Daniel Isaac Eaton, 1796. 

Stryker, William S. The Capture of the Block House at Toms River, New Jersey, March 24, 1782, Trenton: Naar, Day & Naar, 1883. 

 Vanderpoel, Ambrose E. History of Chatham, New Jersey, New York: Charles Francis Press, 1921. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Ammundsen, Anne The Charles Asgill Affair: Setting the Record Straight, Heritage Books, 2023. 

Fleming, Thomas The Perils of Peace: America's Struggle for Survival After Yorktown, Harper Collins, 2007.  

Fowler, Willam H. Jr. American Crisis: George Washington and the Dangerous Two Years after Yorktown, 1781-1783, Walker & Co. 2011. 

Glickstein, Don After Yorktown: The Final Struggle for American Independence, Westholme Publishing, 2015. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

ARP276 Mutiny in the Continental Army

This week we are going to take a look at one of the darkest hours of the American Revolution.  I’ve spoken before about the miserable neglect and living conditions of the soldiers throughout most of their enlistments, but especially during winter encampments.

Over the winter of 1780-81, most of the attention was going to Nathanael Greene’s efforts to recover control of the southern states.  Even Greene could not get the food and equipment he needed for his soldiers in the field.

Up north, the Continental Army remained in a stalemate.  General Washington could not get enough men together to make a credible attack on the British in New York.  He continued to beg Congress and the states for food, uniforms, and munitions so that his army could do more than slowly starve and rot away.  Many of the men had to share clothing in order to go outside, as their clothes had long worn out and fallen apart.  They did not receive enough food to survive, and many showed signs of long term malnutrition.

It was no surprise that men who had sacrificed years of suffering for the cause, felt like they were being ignored and their efforts unappreciated by a civilian population.  Washington had only 5000 or 6000 men under his command during the winter encampment.  To help spread out the logistical needs of his army, he kept about half of his army up around New Windsor, New York, just a few miles upriver from West Point.  Most of these forces were from New England.  The other half of the army camped in and around Morristown, New Jersey.  These were mostly soldiers from the Pennsylvania and New Jersey lines.  The senior officer at Morristown was General Anthony Wayne.

New Year’s day 1781 was treated as a holiday. General and Mrs. Washington received visitors at his temporary headquarters.   The officers organized parties for themselves.  The enlisted men were released from drill and most other regular duties.  They received a half pint of rum or other liquor to celebrate the new year.  

Deprivation

Many soldiers, however, were not in a celebratory mood.  The lack of adequate food, clothing, and shelter was nothing new.  But the new year also brought a new point of contention.

Most of the army had signed up for long-term enlistments at Valley Forge over the winter of 1777-1778.  These enlistments were for three years or the duration of the war.  Most men interpreted that as meaning that they would serve for the duration, unless the war lasted more than three years, in which case their enlistment would be done at the end of those three years.  Congress, however, decided to interpret the enlistments as meaning they would serve for the duration of the war, no matter how long that was, and that if the war ended early, they could still be held in service for up to three years.

Cabins at Jockey Hollow

On top of that, many soldiers had not received their promised enlistment bonuses from when they had enlisted years earlier, nor the pay that they were supposed to receive, meager as it was.  At the same time, new enlistees were receiving $27 in silver as well as a promise of 200 acres of land when the war ended.  It was only through these generous benefits that Congress could attract any new men to enlist.  The men who had fought for years were not offered anything comparable. 

Many of those who had served for more than three years felt that they had done their part for the effort and were ready to go home.  Some of them were willing to continue fighting for the cause, but believed they had the right to reenlist and receive the same signing benefits that new enlistees were receiving.

The men had taken up these issues with their officers, who had passed the complaints up the chain of command.  As commander, Washington had received these complaints and repeatedly warned Congress and the states that leaders needed to offer something to these men who continued to sacrifice so much on behalf of their country.  Congress and the states offered almost nothing.  Instead, they continued to put off the issue, citing lack of resources.

The Pennsylvania Line 

Unlike the modern US Army, the Continental Army tended to keep its regiments grouped by state and locality.  The Pennsylvania Line consisted of recruits from Pennsylvania, which had provided 13 regiments to the army.  Over the years, these regiments had shrunk to the point where they were considered hollow, not enough men to constitute a real regiment. In 1780, officials decided to consolidate the line into just six regiments.  That consolidation was scheduled to take place on January 1, 1781.

On New Year’s day, the men of the Pennsylvania line gathered together to drink and discuss their problems.  Their officers were mostly off attending parties, leaving the men to themselves.  Since their officers had been unable to address their grievances for years, the soldiers decided they needed to take up the issue directly with government officials.  They would abandon their officers, march to Philadelphia, and take up their concerns directly with the Continental Congress and the Pennsylvania state government.

The men agreed to follow the authority of their sergeants who, in turn, formed their own chain of command under the leadership of a Board of Sergeants.  The goal was to maintain order and discipline during the march, without the leadership of any officers.

That night, officers reported a skyrocket was fired as a signal for the men to turn out and prepare to march.  Lieutenant Francis White attempted to stop a group of soldiers. They shot him in the thigh and continued on their way.  Captain Samuel Tolbert took a more aggressive approach, using his sword to attack a non-compliant soldier.  The soldier Absalom Evans, responded by shooting Captain Tolbert.  Another officer, Captain Adam Bettin, attempted to stop a soldier and was shot in the gut.  There were other accounts like this with in juries listed on both sides. Captain Bettin, however, would be the only officer to die from his wound.

With the officers cowed, the soldiers seized their artillery and tried to encourage their more reluctant comrades to join them.  According to some later accounts, some men, or even entire regiments, were forced at bayonet point to join the march. Soon the Pennsylvania line was on the march toward Philadelphia.

General Anthony Wayne heard the gunfire and left his 36th birthday party to rush to the camp.  Along the way, he encountered some of the mutineers marching down the road. Wayne tried to appeal to the men, promising to raise their concerns himself.  But the men had heard such promises before and were unconvinced the general could do anything to relieve their condition.

Soon, one of the men fired a shot over Wayne’s head.  In response, Wayne opened his coat and said “If you mean to kill me, shoot me at once - here at my breast!”  A spokesman for the group responded that they had nothing against General Wayne, and wished him no harm, but that they were determined to bring their complaints directly to Philadelphia.  

By 2:00 AM, more than one thousand soldiers of the Pennsylvania line were in formation and marching away from camp.  Wayne returned to his headquarters to write to Washington about what had happened.  Washington received the letter the following day, and immediately wrote back to urge Wayne to stay with his troops and to urge them to stop and negotiate with him before reaching Philadelphia.  Washington also warned Wayne not to use force against the mutineers, for fear of driving them to the British in New York.

By the evening of January 3, Wayne caught up with the army, now 1500 strong, camped at Middlebrook, New Jersey.  Wayne got an agreement to meet with a group of the board of sergeants to discuss the situation, but the men rose the following morning and continued their march anyway.  By afternoon, the column reached Princeton and stopped again for the night.

Washington was not the only officer who thought the mutiny might help the British in this fight.  British commander General Henry Clinton received news of the mutiny about the same time as Washington.  Clinton, of course, had spies throughout New Jersey. They were able to bring him a report by January 3.  The following day, Clinton deployed several agents to catch up with the mutineers.  He promised all of them a full pardon and the protection of the British government, as well as promising to pay the men all of the back pay they were owed for their Continental service, with no obligation to serve in the British army.  Essentially was going to reduced the enemy forces by about one-fourth, for the cost of a few thousand dollars.

The same day Clinton deployed his agents, January 4, Wayne received a list of demands from the Board of Sergeants.  The primary demand was that the three year enlistments be honored and that no soldier be forced to serve beyond three years unless he reenlisted voluntarily.  The men also wanted their promised back bay and bounties, as well as clothing allowances.  Essentially, they were asking the government to keep the promises that it had already made.  The sergeants demanded that all of these demands be met in full within six days, or they would continue their march to Philadelphia.

Wayne agreed the demands were reasonable, but also knew that he personally had no authority to grant these demands.  Any agreement to these demands had to come from Congress or the Pennsylvania Assembly.  Wayne proposed a meeting of the sergeants with a representative of the Pennsylvania Council in Trenton.

As the army awaited a response from Philadelphia, the British agents reached Princeton.  Two New Jersey Tories, John Mason and James Ogden delivered the British offer to the Board of Sergeants.  The President of the Board of Sergeants, John Williams, immediately took the two men into custody and informed General Wayne.  The mutineers wanted no suggestion that they were betraying their country or the cause for which they had been fighting for so many years.  They merely wanted the government to fulfill the promises made to them when they enlisted.

Joseph Reed 

Back in Philadelphia, politicians took word of the approaching mutineers very seriously.  The President of Pennsylvania, Joseph Reed, agreed to ride out to Trenton and negotiate with the men directly.  

Reed is someone I’ve mentioned many times before.  He was a Philadelphia lawyer before the war.  When Washington first received his commission in 1775, Reed accompanied Washington to Boston and ended up serving as the General’s first aid-de-camp.   The two officers had a falling out when Washington accidentally read a letter from General Lee to Reed in late 1776, where it became clear that Reed supported Lee replacing Washington as commander-in-chief.

Reed stopped serving as Washington's aide-de-camp, but never formally resigned his commission, but he left active duty and went into politics.  He served in the Continental Congress for a time before being elected President of Pennsylvania.  Reed was considered a radical patriot.  He was Benedict Arnold’s main nemesis when Arnold served as military commander of Philadelphia, and Reed was the man primarily responsible for Arnold’s court martial.

When Reed arrived in Princeton on Sunday, January 7, he was surprised not to find an unruly mob of mutineers, but an organized military camp, where the army met him with a ceremonial formation and salutes, with the sergeants acting as regimental officers.  The men presented their demands for discharges, back pay, and compensation for the depreciation of pay that was to be given years earlier.

Reed balked at the idea of a blanket discharge for all the soldiers.  He countered that some men had already re-enlisted or extended their enlistments voluntarily.  He did agree, however, that those men who had served at least three years without agreeing to additional time, should be discharged.  He also demanded that the loyalist agents who had come with General Clinton’s offer be turned over for trial.

The mutineers turned over the agents, who were tried and hanged the following day.  Reed’s demand that each enlistment be reviewed individually bought him a few weeks.  The army needed time to get all the enlistment records and check through them.  In the end, more than 1300 soldiers were discharged, more than half of the Pennsylvania line. The remainder were redeployed to Pennsylvania where they could engage in recruitment for a possible spring offensive. By the end of January, the Pennsylvania Line mutiny was over.

The New Jersey Line

Pennsylvania, however, was not the only line that felt frustrated by its treatment.  One important concern Washington had over negotiating with the mutineers was that it would only encourage more mutinies.  On that point, he was not wrong.

The New Jersey Line was in winter quarters at Pompton, New Jersey.  The soldiers there had many of the same complaints, and quickly became aware of the Pennsylvania mutiny.  They decided to march from their camp at Pompton to meet with New Jersey Commissioners at Chatham a few miles to the south.   This began on January 20th, while the Pennsylvania mutiny was still being resolved. This group was much smaller than the Pennsylvania mutiny, only a few hundred men.

The mutineers met with the New Jersey Commissioners at Chatham on January 23.  The commissioners offered the men a pardon and updated the men on resolving their grievances. The men demanded discharges for those whose enlistments were complete.  On this point, the Commissioners refused to grant any relief, and demanded that the soldiers return to camp.  The mutineers then marched back to their camp at Pompton.

For Washington, however, this second mutiny confirmed his fears that the army might fall apart unless he made an example of them.  Washington received news of the New Jersey mutiny on January 21.  

Robert Howe

He ordered General Heath to assemble a force of five or six hundred New England Continentals to quash this mutiny.  Once Heath had assembled the force, Washington showed up at West Point and gave command of the brigade to General Robert Howe.  

Recall that Howe was from North Carolina.  He has once commanded the southern army but was sent north after engaging in a duel with the Vice President of South Carolina, Christopher Gadsden.

Washington’s orders to Howe called for him to put down this mutiny in a way that would serve as an example to others.  He was not to negotiate with the mutineers at all, but to demand unconditional submission.  If he succeeded in compelling their submission, Washington ordered Howe to try and hang several of the ringleaders immediately.

Despite the fact that the New Jersey line had already marched back to their camp and were back where they were supposed to be, General Howe marched his men on a night march and surrounded the camp.  By January 25, Howe had most of his men in place, but sought to get an update on the situation.  Officers reported that the men had returned to barracks, but were still demanding their discharges, refusing to obey most orders, and even threatened to run through one officer with a bayonet.

Before dawn on the 26th, after surrounding the camp with infantry and artillery, Howe ordered the mutineers to turn out and assemble without arms.

The men complied.  Howe then ordered the officers of the New Jersey line to identify those they believed to be the leaders of the mutiny.  The officers identified fifteen men who were brought forward.  Next, Howe had the New Jersey officers identify three of those men for immediate court martial.  Those three men were brought forward, tried and convicted. 

Howe then ordered the other twelve leading mutineers to be given firearms and ordered them to execute their three comrades.  When the men understandably balked at executing their friends, Howe informed them that any man who failed to participate in the execution would be added to the list of men being executed.

Sergeant David Gilmore was forced to his knees.  On Howe’s order his comrades fired six shots at his head and six at his heart, killing the man instantly.  Sergeant John Tuttle was next forced to kneel in the snow and suffered the same fate.  Sergeant George Grant was then forced to kneel, but at the last moment, with guns pointed at him, the court martial issued a pardon and spared his life.  Sergeant Grant, and his would-be executioners broke down and sobbed openly.

The New Jersey Line returned to duty, and the mutinies, at least for 1781, came to an end.  Washington continued to write letters to Congress and the states, pleading that they provide more food and supplies to prevent anything like this from happening again.

Conclusion

One might ask why the mutinies of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey lines were treated so differently.  Most of the Pennsylvania Line was either discharged or permitted to return to camp without punishment while two leaders of the New Jersey line were rather summarily executed, and no real bargaining of any sort took place.

Many experts have argued that the main reason for the different treatment was that the Continental Army decided it had to take a firm hand after the second mutiny in order to prevent more regiments from doing the same.  That certainly is true, but officers also expressed similar concerns when they gave the Pennsylvania mutineers a light touch. 

I think there are several factors that account for the change.  One is that the first mutiny caught the commanders off-guard.  They needed time to assemble enough troops to put a stop to the mutiny.  This could take time that they did not have.  Thus, persuasion and negotiation was all they could do.  Given the size of the first mutiny, over 1500 men, it would have been difficult for Washington to confront them with an overwhelming force, especially without completely abandoning their defenses against a British attack from New York.  Also, the mutineers’ decision to turn over the British agents, assured the leadership that these men were still loyal to the cause.

By contrast, the New Jersey mutiny was much smaller, only about 300 men.  This, along with the fact that Washington had been calling in troops by the time this mutiny happened, allowed him to present an overwhelming force to crush this mutiny in a way that would discourage others.  Washington needed to establish that the army was not a democracy and that disobedience to the chain of command would not be tolerated, regardless of the reasons.  His response seemed to have the intended effect, and the rest of the winter remained quiet.

Next Week, we return south as Colonel Banastre Tarleton attacks the Continental Army at the Battle of the Cowpens.

- - -

Next Episode 277 Cowpens

Previous Episode 275 The War Goes Dutch

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Further Reading

Websites

Continental Army Mutinies At Jockey Hollow and Pompton https://marcliebman.com/continental-army-mutinies-at-jockey-hollow-and-pompton

Yordy, Charles S. The Pennsylvania Line Mutiny, its Origins and Patriotism https://libraries.psu.edu/about/collections/unearthing-past-student-research-pennsylvania-history/pennsylvania-line-mutiny-0

Schellhammer, Michael “Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line” Journal of the American Revolution, January 14, 2014 https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/01/mutiny-pennsylvania-line

Schellhammer, Michael “Mutiny of the New Jersey Line” Journal of the American Revolution, March 19, 2014 https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/03/mutiny-of-the-new-jersey-line

St. Rock, Joseph "Breaking Points: Mutiny in the Continental Army" Univ. of Conn. Honors Thesis, 2008. https://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=srhonors_theses

Maurer Maurer. “Military Justice Under General Washington.” Military Affairs, vol. 28, no. 1, 1964, pp. 8–16. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1984718

“To George Washington from Anthony Wayne, 2 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04417

“From George Washington to Anthony Wayne, 3 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04428

“From George Washington to Anthony Wayne, 3 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04428

“From George Washington to John Hancock, 5 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04439

“To George Washington from William Heath, 6 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04449

“From George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 6 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04452

“From George Washington to William Heath, 7 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04454

“To George Washington from Arthur St. Clair, 8 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04469

“From George Washington to Anthony Wayne, 8 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-0447

“To George Washington from Anthony Wayne, 8 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04474

“To George Washington from John Sullivan, 10 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04499

“To George Washington from Anthony Wayne, 11 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04507

“From George Washington to Arthur St. Clair, 12 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04524

“To George Washington from Anthony Wayne, 12 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04526

“From George Washington to Samuel Huntington, 15 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04549

“To George Washington from Israel Shreve, 20 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04594

“From George Washington to Israel Shreve, 21 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04609

To George Washington from Anthony Wayne, 21 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04612

“From George Washington to Meshech Weare, 22 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04613

“From George Washington to Robert Howe, 22 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04615

“To George Washington from Frederick Frelinghuysen, 23 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04621

“To George Washington from Robert Howe, 25 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04653

“From George Washington to Commissioners for Redressing the Grievances of the New Jersey Line, 27 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04664

“General Orders, 30 January 1781,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-04697

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Shreve, John “Personal Narrative of the Services of Lieut. John Shreve of the New Jersey Line of the Continental Army” The Magazine of American History with Notes and Queries, Vol 3, 1879 (pp 564-579) (Google Books). 

Bolton, Charles K. The Private Soldier Under Washington, Port Washington, N.Y., Kennikat Press, 1902. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Carp, E. Wayne, To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783, Univ. of NC Press, 1984 (borrow on archive.org).

Ferling, John Winning Independence: The Decisive Years of the Revolutionary War, 1778-1781, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021. 

Nagy, John A. Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies of the American Revolution, Westholme Publishing, 2007. 

Tonsetic, Robert L. 1781: The Decisive Year of the Revolutionary War, Casemate, 2011 (borrow on archive.org). 

Van Doren, Carl Mutiny In January, The Viking Press, 1943. (borrow on archive.org). 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

ARP211 Winter at Middlebrook

By December of 1778, the Continental Army settled into its winter quarters around Middlebrook, NJ.  The British were already behind their fixed defenses in New York City, the departure in late fall of so many regulars to other parts of the empire made it unlikely that the British would attempt any more major offensives like the grand forage into Bergen county that I discussed in an earlier episode (Episode 198).

William Tryon

Although the lines between the two armies that winter were relatively quiet, both sides did send out raiding parties from time to time.

British Major General William Tryon was one of the more active officers.  Tryon, you may recall, had been royal governor of North Carolina, and then New York before the war.  Prior to that, he had been a career officer in the regular army and was no stranger to combat.  As Governor, Tryon had developed a reputation as a tough leader, taking on the rebels at Alamance in 1771, and then against the Green Mountain Boys in the years just before the war.

William Tryon

Tryon had taken a commission as a major general of provincial forces in the early part of the war.  He was also still a colonel in the regular army.  By 1778, he had received a commission as major general in America, in the British army as well.  The rank of an officer “in America” is a bit strange.  It came with all the authority of a regular officer, but the commission only lasted in that theater of war and for the duration of the war.  If the officer transferred to another theater, or returned to Britain, he would revert back to his permanent rank.

Tryon was also still governor of the colony New York, although this meant little by 1779 since most of the state was under rebel control, and the area around New York City was under martial law.  Tryon’s rule was effectively limited to his authority as military commander of Long Island.  

Tryon was also among the most hard core of British officers who believed that the army was being too soft on the rebels.  Tryon had advocated for a complete war of destruction.  He wanted to go on raids that would burn down civilian towns, destroy food and supplies, and generally make life miserable enough that the people would demand an end to the war and once again accept crown rule.  Even though some leaders back in London also seemed to support this tough policy, to Tryon’s frustration, General Howe, and then General Clinton both rejected such a campaign of terror against civilians.

As the war continued on without any real end in sight, Tryon had petitioned the ministry to end his position as New York Governor and allow him to return to London. Tryon hoped to get a permanent military commission that would replace his compensation as colonial governor but which would also allow him to return to his family in England.  He pleaded both health and family reasons for his desire to end his term in America.

Again, Tryon would be frustrated.  Secretary of State Lord Germain wrote Tryon in late 1778 requesting that he remain in New York until the British reestablished rule, or as Germain put it “all hope is lost.”  The fact that the American Secretary in London was even articulating the possibility in 1778 that Britain could lose the war is rather telling.

General Clinton offered Tryon command of the campaign that he deployed in late 1778 to capture Savannah Georgia.  Tryon declined.  He complained of continuing ailments brought on from diseases he picked up while Governor of North Carolina years earlier in his career.  He believed that a return to the south might make his illness even worse.  Instead, the command of that mission went to Colonel Archibald Campbell.

Horseneck Landing

In February, 1779, General Tryon got approval from General Clinton to lead a raid into Connecticut.  Tryon assembled a force of mostly provincial militia, along with some regulars and Hessians, to raid a community known as Horseneck, which is in present day West Greenwich Connecticut.  On the night of February 25, his brigade marched out under cover of darkness, from the British lines at Kingsbridge.  They completed the twenty mile march to Greenwich by the following morning.

General Israel Putnam was in Greenwich at the time.  He managed to assemble a group of about 150 local militia to meet the raiders.  The Americans had three small field cannons to support their lines.  The British, however, so outnumbered the men that there was no realistic chance of sustaining a defensive line.

Putnam at Horseneck Landing

According to local lore, General Putnam ordered his men to flee into a nearby swamp where the dragoons on horseback could not follow.  Putnam remained with the cannons to distract the British attackers as his men fled.

As the enemy got close, Putnam turned his horse and rode down a steep embankment.  According to some accounts it was a set of stone steps.  Others believe it was a dirt cow path.  Whatever the exact route, the steep path down the hill was so dangerous that the British dragoons did not pursue.  Instead, they fired at the general, one of them managing to shoot Putnam’s hat, but failing to wound the man.

Again, according to unconfirmed accounts, the general stopped at the bottom of the hill, waved his sword at his attacks, and some say swore at them.  Putnam then rode to safety, where he met up with more militia and some of the men from his first assault, who had escaped and then found their way back to the general.

The British destroyed the three American field cannons. They also burned several buildings in Greenwich, along with a saltworks, and a few boats.  By 2:00 PM, the British had finished their work.  General Tryon had driven the men without sleep the previous night, but opted to begin their march back right away.  He feared the Americans might be able to rally a larger force to assault them, if they delayed too long.  

As the British began to withdraw from Greenwich, General Putnam returned again with the militia that he had been able to rally over several hours.  The Americans still did not have the numbers to challenge the British, but did continue to lay down a harassing fire on the British rear of the column.  Putnam managed to catch 38 enemy stragglers who did not keep up with the retreating column.  They also recaptured some of the ammunition and supplies that the British had seized and were trying to haul back to their lines.

By that night, the British had managed to make it out of Connecticut, but were still not back to their lines in Kingsbridge.  Tryon approved a few hours of rest for his exhausted troops, but then got the column moving again early, finally returning to their lines by the afternoon of the 27th.  The entire raid had lasted less than 48 hours, most of that time marching to and from Greenwich.

Following the battle, General Putnam sent an officer under a flag of truce with his captured prisoners to General Tryon’s lines.  He proposed a prisoner swap with some of the prisoners the British had captured in their raid.  Tryon agreed and made the trade.  He even sent General Putnam a new hat with the returning prisoners, to replace the one his officers had shot a hole through.  

Although the raid seemed to be a British victory, it did not seem to improve General Tryon’s standing with General Clinton.  The British commander criticized the raid as a pointless adventure, which led to the deaths of two British soldiers and nine others wounded.  Clinton also attacked Tryon for using his authority as governor to issue several pardons without the approval of the military commander.

Tryon, I think with some justification, returned criticism of the commander for not doing much of anything.  He claimed that, if given 3000 soldiers, he could visit devastation along the New England coast.  Tryon’s criticisms against Clinton seem reminiscent of Clinton’s complaints against General Howe three years earlier when Howe as North American commander was continually reigning in and slowing down General Clinton.

Clinton’s Plans for 1779

A few months later, General Clinton would lead his own offensive and would leave General Tryon cooling his heels in New York City. 

The British had significantly reduced their ranks in North America.  London had issued orders to Clinton not to embark on any major campaigns like the Saratoga Campaign or the Philadelphia Campaign.  The main military action was taking place in Georgia and moving into South Carolina.  Even so, Clinton would not simply sit idly and do nothing with his forces in New York and Newport.  

The British commander spent the winter developing his plans for a series of spring actions.  All of them had limited goals, making use of the limited manpower that was left to him.  He outlined three separate actions for the spring and summer:

Gen. Sir Henry Clinton

The first was a renewed assault up the Hudson River.  He would not attempt to establish a connection all the way to Quebec.  Rather, he would only move upriver to cut off the use of King’s Ferry as a point of transport between New England and the rest of the colonies.  He also planned to move further upriver and threaten the American defenses at West Point.

A second series of raids would assault ports in Connecticut. Assuming Britain could retain control of the waters around Long Island, they could attack the Connecticut coast with impunity.  A large enough raid might even provoke the Continentals into a larger battle, fought on Clinton’s terms, giving him an opportunity to use his superior strategic abilities to defeat them.

A third offensive would make use of a series of raids into the Chesapeake Bay area, destroying commerce and military stores in Maryland and Virginia.  This would not only remove much-needed supplies from the Continental Army.  It would also distract the enemy’s focus on the southern campaign, where British forces in Savannah hoped to capture South Carolina, and possibly move into North Carolina as well.

Long Island Sound

Even while making longer-term strategic plans, Clinton’s forces around New York had to defend against continual raids, particularly from Connecticut, which was just a short boat ride to British-occupied Long Island.  Because Long Island was so large, the British did not have men to defend the entire island.  Particularly isolated was the eastern end of the island, which was more than 100 miles from New York City but only a 10 mile boat ride from the Connecticut coast.

While British vessels patrolled the sound, it remained a pretty wild no-man’s land where smugglers and privateers operated with impunity.  Even posts on western Long Island, near New York City were subject to attack.  Shortly after Tyron’s raid at Horseneck Landing, Connecticut Captain Andrew Meade led a small fleet of Connecticut whaleboats.  The men rowed across the sound at night and seized a small sailing ship at Ferry Point, loaded with supplies.  The raiders sailed the ship back to Greenwich before the British could react.

James Rivington

The British sailed after the stolen vessel.  As they attempted to enter the harbor at Greenwich, they came under fire from cannons that the local militia had mounted on the hill overlooking the harbor.  The British were forced to withdraw without recapturing their lost prize.

A few days later, Captain Meade led another group of men determined to destroy the printing offices of the Royal Gazette, a Tory newspaper in British-occupied New York.  This time they infiltrated downtown Manhattan, seizing the newspaper’s type and carrying it back to Greenwich for destruction.  The newspaper’s owner was a notorious Tory named James Rivington.  The raiders, of course, did not know it, but Rivington was also an American spy, working for the Culper Spy Ring.

Occupied New York

New York City had become an increasingly difficult place to live over the winter of 1778-79.  The city had become more crowded than ever.  Although thousands of British regulars had departed, loyalists from all over the country were taking refuge there.  Thousands of Philadelphia loyalists were attempting to secure the necessary food, clothing, and shelter.  

Without limited access to crops and cattle, food became limited.  To help ease the food demands, Clinton permitted the release of 430 American prisoners in January.  He transported the prisoners to New London, Connecticut for release on parole.  The men were in such poor condition from cold, hunger, and disease that fifteen of them died during the short trip across Long Island sound.  Of those who survived the journey, many more died over the next few weeks, and almost all of them required care.  Many could not even walk.  

The Connecticut Assembly ordered depositions taken from surviving prisoners in order to document the treatment they had suffered as prisoners of war.  Most of the thousands of prisoners who had been held aboard prison ships or at the Sugarhouse left their prisons feet first.  Untold thousands died under horrific conditions.  By the end of February, there were only about 700 prisoners held in the city, including about 200 men on the prison ship Good Hope.  By mid-April, the Good Hope, reported holding only 144 prisoners.  None had been released, but 25% of the ship’s prisoner population had died in only a few weeks.

Continental Army at Middlebrook

General Washington had located the bulk of the Continental Army around Middlebrook, New Jersey, generally the same location they occupied when the British under General Howe were in New York before leaving for Philadelphia.  The Continentals had encamped there in May - July of 1777. Washington was familiar with the terrain, which he believed provided effective defenses against a British assault.  The Continentals could observe the British in New York from the mountaintops, but were also a good day’s march from the enemy, making a surprise attack unlikely.  It also provided good roads in any direction the army might need to pivot in order to counter a British offensive.

George Washington was not with his men for much of the early winter months because he had travelled to Philadelphia.  There he was trying to convince Congress that the army did not have the resources to launch a new offensive into Philadelphia.  Washington’s main focus was putting together a campaign to wipe out the hostile Iroquois and Tories that continued to bring suffering to New Yorkers throughout much of the state.  For most of December and January, Major General William Alexander, Lord Stirling, commanded the main army.

Wallace House, Washington HQ

After Washington returned from Philadelphia, he and Martha stayed at the home of John Wallace.  It was a four bedroom home.  George and Martha occupied one room, a second was shared by Washington’s aid.  The Homeowner, Wallace and his wife occupied a third, and the owner’s mother-in-law, the fourth.

Other generals took up residence at other private homes in the area. Nathanael Greene stayed at the home of Derrick Van Veghten House about one mile east of the Wallace House. Anthony Wayne and his staff occupied the home of Abraham Van Nest.  There, a confrontation with the homeowners eventually resulted in a lawsuit. Lord Stirling stayed at the Philip Van Horne House about two miles east of the Wallace House.  Von Steuben took up residence with local Abraham Staats, about four miles east of the Wallace House. Henry Knox stayed at the home of Jacobus Van Der Veer House six miles north of the Wallace House.

The main army divided into three divisions, camping separately so that the collection of local resources like wood and water would not be too concentrated. What became known as the Pennsylvania camp was laid out south of the Raritan River, to the west of the road to Princeton. The Virginia and Maryland camps deployed on the other side of the Raritan River, about four miles to the northeast, near roads leading toward New York City and the New Jersey coast. To the north of the crossroads village of Pluckemin, about seven miles from the Virginia and Maryland camps, General Knox erected an artillery park for his soldiers and guns.

The winter in New Jersey was not as cold as prior winter at Valley Forge, not nearly as bad as the following winter would be at Morristown. Deprivations continued as the army lacked sufficient food, clothing, and shelter for the men.  Again though, the deprivations do not seem to be quite as bad as the year before.  Reforms by the new quartermaster, Nathanael Greene, seemed to be having some positive effect.

Middlebrook Encampment

The winter at Middlebrook does not seem to get the same attention as the prior winter at Valley Forge, but it was quite difficult for many of the soldiers who endured there.   Most of the men, though, were spread out in the rural mountainous area around Middlebrook, near modern day Boundbrook, New Jersey.  There were not nearly enough buildings to house the men.  The army tried to build crude wooden huts 16’ by 14’ with a single fireplace that would hold a dozen soldiers each.  Even so, many of the soldiers had to endure much of the winter in tents.

One reason the deaths were not as great as at Valley Forge, was that the army had inoculated against smallpox during its stay at Valley Forge.  The inoculated soldiers did not have to suffer with that dreaded and deadly disease the following winter.  Washington first encamped in December with between 10,000 and 12,000 Continentals.  Deaths and desertions left the army with only 8000 survivors by spring.  Of the survivors, another third were unfit for duty due to illness, often brought on by the cold weather and deprivation. The army benefitted from some new uniforms provided by their French allies.  In March, the French Ambassador Gerard visited the camp and received a grand review of the army.  

Compared to other winter encampments, the winter at Middlebrook was not so bad.  Like Washington, many of the general officers had their wives join them at camp.  General Greene held a dance at his quarters in mid-march, where he noted that General Washington and his wife Catherine danced for three hours straight. The men also held a larger celebration on February 18, to mark the first anniversary of the French alliance.

As I said, the winter passed relatively quietly until the British began to deploy for their spring operations in April.  In May, the Continentals left Middlebrook to defend against attacks in the Hudson Valley.  By June, the winter camp was empty and abandoned.

Next week, we return south again as the British attempt to expand on their success in capturing Savanna, Georgia, but find patriot resistance surprisingly resilient.

- - -

Next Episode 212 Port Royal & Kettle Creek (Available August 8, 2021)

Previous Episode 210 Fort Vincennes

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Further Reading

Websites

Horseneck Landing https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/horseneck-landing-west-greenwich-connecticut

General Putnam’s account of the Battle of Horseneck: http://www.historycarper.com/1779/02/26/general-putnams-account-of-the-battle-of-horse-neck

Tryon’s Descent on Horseneck (British account): http://www.historycarper.com/1779/03/03/tryons-descent-on-horse-neck

Melillo “The Meaning of Memorial Day in Greenwich” Greenwich Free Press, May 26, 2019: https://greenwichfreepress.com/around-town/holiday/melillo-the-meaning-of-memorial-day-in-greenwich-123124

“To George Washington from Major General Israel Putnam, 28 March 1779,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-19-02-0624

1779 Campaign:  https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/1779-campaign

The Middlebrook Winter Encampment: http://www.doublegv.com/ggv/battles/midbrk.html

“General Orders, 6 February 1779,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-19-02-0135

Middle Encampment (map) http://zitthere.com/nyc-nj/mdlbrk-angelakos-map.html

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Hill, George C. Gen. Israel Putnam, Boston: E. O. Libby and Co. 1858. 

Irving, Washington The Life Of George Washington, Vol. 3, London: George Bell and Sons, 1905.  

Tarbox, Increase N. Life of Israel Putnam ("Old Put"), Major-General in the Continental Army, Boston: Lockwood, Brooks, and Co, 1876. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Burrows, Edwin Forgotten Patriots: The Untold Story of American Prisoners During the Revolutionary War, Basic Books, 2008.

Chernow, Ron George Washington, A Life, Penguin Press, 2010.

Hubbard, Robert E. Major General Israel Putnam: Hero of the American Revolution, McFarland & Co. 2017. 

Nelson, Paul David William Tryon and the Course of Empire: A Life in British Imperial Service, Univ of NC Press, 1990.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.