Showing posts with label Pennsylvania. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pennsylvania. Show all posts

Sunday, January 10, 2021

ARP183 Doan Brothers & Crooked Billet


By the spring of 1778, General Washington had fought off the political attempts to replace him and was ready to put the training of his new army, which had drilled under General Von Steuben all winter, to challenge the British in occupied Philadelphia.

Pennsylvania Militia

The news had arrived in April that France had joined the war against Britain.  Hopes ran high that perhaps French supplies, and soldiers would arrive soon to assist the Continentals.  As a result, Washington did not want to risk his army on an all-out assault on Philadelphia, like Germantown.   Many wanted to wait and see if the French would arrive to supplement an attack that would have a greater chance of victory.  If the British remained in Philadelphia until a French fleet arrived at the Delaware, the British might be trapped.  At that point, a combined American and French attack on the city would have far more impact.  Until the French arrived, that could not happen.

At the same time, Washington was not a man to sit around and do nothing.  British supplies in Philadelphia were dwindling.  Washington focused on efforts to prevent people from the countryside from selling food or other supplies to the British in Philadelphia.  A French fleet in the Delaware Bay might even help to starve out the British.  The Americans left small units near the city to interdict any attempts to bring in food or anything else into the British lines.

Much of the control of these soldiers around Philadelphia was left to the local militia.  The Continentals were struggling to survive at Valley Forge.  The local militia knew the area better and were most useful in such missions as blocking civilians, rather than going into combat against the British.

John Lacey

The man in charge of the Pennsylvania militia north of Philadelphia was General John Lacey.  The young militia general, a Quaker from Bucks County, was not very experienced.  He had been only twenty years old when the war began.  

Gen. John Armstrong

Shortly after fighting broke out at Lexington, Lacey had set aside his Quaker principles to join the local patriot militia.  Coming from a pacifist community, there was little enthusiasm for the military, nor much of a militia tradition.  In January of 1776, Lacey raised a company of 64 men from his community.  That was enough to confer upon him the rank of captain.

Lacey’s company served in the regiment under the command of then-Colonel Anthony Wayne.  The regiment joined the Continental Army and Lacey received a continental commission.  He served under Wayne during the Quebec campaign as the Americans were forced to retreat back to New York.  It is not clear exactly what happened, but Lacey and Wayne had some sort of dispute.  Lacey ended up resigning his commission and returning to Pennsylvania. There, Lacey took a position as a lieutenant colonel in the local militia.  

The war returned to the area as General Howe began his Philadelphia campaign at the end of the summer of 1777.  Colonel Lacey took command of a regiment of militia draftees to go to the support of the state.  Pennsylvania raised about 3000 militiamen for the campaign.  Lacey fought at Germantown and in some smaller skirmishes that fall.  Another militia commander, General John Armstrong, led the militia army during this campaign.  You may recall that Armstrong had command of one of the four divisions that Washington deployed at Germantown.  Lacey also fought under Armstrong at Whitemarsh.

Gen. James Potter
At the end of the fighting season, after the Continentals retreated to Valley Forge, Armstrong received an appointment to serve as one of the Pennsylvania delegates to the Continental Congress.  He turned over command of the militia to General James Potter.  General Potter served as commander for only a few weeks before he requested leave to go home to care for his sick wife.

Potter’s decision to return home was not unusual.  Militia were not expected to remain in the field after an immediate danger had passed.  That was what the Continentals did. With the British now in their winter quarters in Philadelphia and the Continentals settled into Valley Forge, the Pennsylvania militia mostly went home for the winter.  This made perfect sense.  There was no food or shelter to keep an army in the field.  The officers and men could return home, rest up over the winter and feed themselves, then turn out again in the spring when the fighting season began again.

Even so, some militia needed to remain in the field during this time.  In January 1778, the Pennsylvania executive council promoted John Lacey to brigadier general and put him in command of the militia.  Lacey was just 23 years old at the time.  There was, however, not much militia to command.  The militia on active duty had dwindled to under 600 by the time Lacey took command.  The primary mission of those still on duty was interdicting supplies that civilians were attempting to take to Philadelphia for sale.

Lacey received word of his promotion and got word from General Potter to report to his camp.  By the time Lacey arrived, Potter had already left for home and no one was in charge.  There were only sixty men in the camp, guarding guns and equipment for an army of 3000.  Lacey took command and received instructions from General Washington to focus on interdicting commerce into the city.  The state had promised Lacey that he would receive another 1000 militia to support these efforts.  Those promised reinforcements never came.  His total force of about 600 actually fell to under 250 over the next few weeks.

The Doan Brothers

In addition to interdicting food, Lacey’s militia had to deal with emboldened Tories who still roamed through the greater Philadelphia area.  Although the British Army did not venture into Bucks County, many loyalists who lived in the area assumed that the arrival of the British would mean that the patriots would soon be gone.  Many of Tories were either out for revenge for the way they had been treated, or were seeking benefits from the British for showing their loyalty.

Some good examples of these types are a group known as the Doan Gang.  Almost every element of the Doan’s story is disputed.  Some view them as heroic Robin Hood types while others portray them as bloodthirsty outlaws.  As with many things the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.  I want to tell their story because it is interesting.  But my version is simply based on reading the versions of others, many of which have a sketchy provenance.  So please don’t take my interpretation as definitive.

Five Doan brothers, Moses, Aaron, Levi, Mahlon, and Joseph, as well a cousin Abraham formed the core of what became known as the Doan Gang.  Before the war, in 1770, Moses got into a fight with his father and left the family farm in Bucks County, Pennsylvania.  For some time, he lived with a local Indian tribe.  There, he learned to live off the land and got to know the unsettled areas of the county rather well.

According to Doan family lore, the father of the family, Joseph Doan, was a Quaker and a loyalist.  When the patriots took control of Pennsylvania, they demanded that he pay taxes to them.  Doan refused to recognize the taxing authority of these rebels and would not pay.  As a result, the patriots threw the family off of their land and reduced them to poverty. 

Others dispute this story, saying that Pennsylvania records show that it did not seize the farm until near the end of the war.  However, it is possible that the eviction took place years before and the paperwork was filed much later.  

Whatever the reason, Moses opposed the patriot cause and enlisted his brothers and his cousin into a group that would wreak havoc against the patriots.  In July of 1776, shortly after the British landed at Staten Island, Moses and his brother Levi met with General Howe on Staten Island and offered their services as spies.

By some accounts, it was Moses who discovered the failure of the Americans to secure the Jamaica Pass on Long Island and provided the British with that intelligence.  This allowed the British to move behind the Continental lines and easily flank the Americans at the Battle of Brooklyn.  The British nicknamed Moses as “Eagle Spy” for the accuracy of his intelligence.

Another story says that Moses learned of Washington’s crossing of the Delaware on Christmas night, 1776 and rode to see Hessian Colonel Rall in Trenton.  The colonel refused to see Doan, who instead left a note for him about the attack.  According to that story, Rall put the note into his vest pocket and continued playing cards

The Doans also may have worked to free British prisoners.  After British prisoners began disappearing from Lancaster and not being found again, the Americans put an officer into the prison, pretending to be a captured British officer.  After several weeks, he was spirited away from the prison, traveling at night and hiding in the secret rooms of loyalists during the day.  The officer identified the leader of this escape mission as Abraham Doan.  As the group prepared to cross the Delaware River into British-occupied New Jersey, Abraham confronted the officer whom he suspected of not being a real prisoner.  The two men fought, and the officer escaped.  Later, the undercover officer identified the safe houses and arrested 15 people who cooperated in the escape of the British prisoners.  The Doans, once again, escaped capture.

In addition to serving as scouts and agents for the British, the Doans mostly made a living by engaging in home invasions and stealing horses.  There are stories of the gang breaking into houses at night, then beating and threatening the homeowner to give up whatever gold he had hidden on the property.  Those who want to portray the Doans as loyalist heroes say they only went after the property of known supporters of the patriot cause and particularly targeted tax collectors. Others say the attacks were more indiscriminate.

Whatever the truth, the Doans developed a reputation among locals in Pennsylvania as ruthless outlaws.  After the British took Philadelphia, the group focused primarily on stealing horses to sell to the British.  By some accounts, the group stole over 200 horses in the region.  The Doans, whose faces were well known to locals, tended to move only at night, and spent days living in caves or other remote sites where they could avoid detection.

In February 1778, officials in Bucks County raised a posse to capture the Doan gang.  The posse came up empty.  The group was too effective at avoiding detection.

There are many stories that paint Moses Doan as a local hero. One story from this time says that Moses Doan came across a woman from Philadelphia who had snuck out of the city to purchase some flour for her starving family.  Her husband was a patriot who was serving in Valley Forge at the time.  On her return to the city, she encountered Moses Doan and explained her plight.  Despite the fact that she was the wife of a patriot, Moses gave her a purse full of money and warned her that a British guard was just up the road.

Although the woman tried to avoid the British guard, he discovered her and attempted to confiscate the flour.  Doan then reappeared and appealed to the soldier to let her go with her flour.  When the soldier refused, Doan grabbed him by the throat and told the woman to run.  When she was out of sight, he shot the soldier in the head with a pistol and disappeared back into the night.  The death of the soldier brought out a guard to hunt down the killer.  Doan allegedly killed another pursuing soldier and an officer that night as he made his escape.

Another story puts Doan in more of a mixed light.  The gang engaged in a home invasion.  Although the Doans made up the core of their group, many times the gang grew as large as several dozen men.  On this night, one of their company was man by the name of “Foxy Joe”. As the group threatened the life of the homeowner, demanding that he turn over his gold, Foxy Joe made advances on the man’s wife, presumably an attempt to rape her.  Moses discovered the man, beat him nearly to death, and threw him down a flight of stairs.  Afterward Moses apologized to the husband for the incident.  His men were thieves, not rapists.

The Doan Gang continued to harass the people of Bucks County for years after the British left the area.  As I said, some considered them to be loyalists simply stuck on the wrong side of the war.  Others saw them as nothing more than brutal criminals, taking advantage of the chaos of war.  But the legend of the Doans is one that remains a part of local history.

Loyalist Conflict

The Doans, of course, were not the only Tories in the area.  While many were pacifist Quakers, there were others who were willing to resort to violence for King and country.  A key target of the loyalists were patriot leaders and their families. 

When John Lacey became commander of the state militia, loyalists threatened to attack his family and burn his farm. Lacey had to protect, not only his own family but those of other prominent patriots, as well as other potential targets.

Captain Richard Hovendon, who had raised a loyalist group called the Philadelphia Light Dragoons, raided a mill in Bucks County in February.  The group stole or destroyed material that was expected to be made into 500 uniforms for the Continental Army.  The raid also led to the death or capture of several dozen Continental soldiers who were guarding the mill.  Hovendon would go on to serve under Banastre Tarleton during the southern campaign.

General Lacey’s lack of experience contributed to his problems.  There is one letter from General Washington, advising the young General Lacey to keep his guards on the move and not stationed in a fixed location.  Doing so would give the British an easy target and would also allow smugglers to know to avoid that location.  On another occasion, Lacey had to write Washington to inform him that his men accidentally mishandled some cartridges, leading to an explosion, which destroyed six or seven thousand cartridges and injured five of his men.

Also during his first weeks as general, the militia continued to return home.  At one point Lacey reported that he had only 160 men left on duty in the entire region.  This was not entirely Lacey’s fault.  Not only did bad weather keep the men at home.  Pennsylvania had failed to pay the militia that had turned out the prior fall.  This failure to provide promised compensation did nothing to encourage men to turn out again for additional winter duty.

The men who did continue to serve got most of what they needed from the goods they confiscated from people smuggling goods into the city.  This also led to complaint that men were claiming goods were being smuggled, that they simply stole from local farms.

You may recall back in Episode 178 I talked about General Wayne and Commodore Barry distracting the British so they could drive a herd of cattle from New Jersey back to Valley Forge.  As they passed through Bucks County, Lacey was directed to provide a guard.  He did not have the manpower and failed to do so.  The British under Captain Hovendon’s Royal Dragoons managed to steal most of the herd and redirect it to the British in Philadelphia.

By spring, Lacey at least had a few months of experience, and militia began to return to duty in greater numbers.  

Crooked Billet

On April 27th General Lacey was in command of about 400 militia which encamped near Crooked Billet Tavern.  This is near the present town of Hatboro, about sixteen miles north of Philadelphia.  It was close enough to British lines to invite an attack.  The British had frequently raided into this area over the winter.  

Robert Abercromby
Despite this, Lacey kept his militia in camp for several days.  Local Tories informed the British of their location.  Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe of the Queen’s Loyal Rangers organized an attack party made up primarily of loyalist militia, but also including some regulars.  Simcoe divided an attack force of about 850 men.  The two groups marched out of Philadelphia on the night of April 30th.  Simcoe would attack from the northeast, while a second group under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Abercromby would attack from the southwest.

The militia had put out pickets, who discovered the attackers just before dawn on May 1.  The pickets, however, refused to fire a warning shot, instead hiding to avoid capture themselves.  The two groups descended on the main camp, opening a ruthless attack on the surprised militia.  Lacey attempted to mount a defense, but quickly realized that his men would not stand.  The majority of the outnumbered and surprised militia fled into the woods, abandoning everything to their attackers.

The militia lost about 20% of its force, with 26 killed, 8 wounded and 58 captured.  According to the Americans, the British massacred many of the wounded, including setting men on fire and watching them burn to death.  

Crooked Billet Monu-
ment (Hatfield, PA)
After the battle, Washington ordered an investigation in the murder of prisoners and wounded in order to make a complaint to General Howe.  The lieutenant who had been in command of the pickets was discharged for failure to follow orders.

A little over a week after the battle, General Potter returned from his winter at home, relieving General Lacey of command.  Lacey would continue to hold his militia title as general, but did not seem to serve in any active capacity after that.  A year later, he would turn to politics and served the last three years of the war as the Bucks County Representative to Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council.

The Battle of Crooked Billet largely became forgotten, just another example of the incompetent local militia defeated by professionals.

Bordentown Raid

About a week after the attack at Crooked Billet, the British sent another small expedition across the Delaware River into New Jersey.  The Americans still had several ships and smaller boats upriver in Bordentown, New Jersey.  They also had some small supply depots there. On the night of May 7, the British sent a small raiding party upriver, landing at White Hill, New Jersey (today called Fieldsboro) which landed the next morning. 

This was a search and destroy mission.  The British burned any boats that they found as well as the houses of several leading patriots, as identified by local loyalists.  The Americans got word of the raid and scuttled several boats to prevent them from falling into British hands.  

The local militia also turned out and faced down the British raiders as they marched north to Bordentown.  According to local accounts the militia fired one volley, then turned and ran.  The British continued on into Bordentown.  There, they burned more houses, including that of Joseph Borden, son of the town’s namesake, as well as any ships that the patriots had not already destroyed.

Having satisfied themselves that they had destroyed any enemy property that they were going to find, the British returned to their ship and sailed back to Philadelphia before the end of the day.

The Bordentown raid, sometimes called the battle of Crosswicks Creek, was another minor raid that simply showed again that militia could not stop the regulars, but they still were not afraid to turn out and take pot shots at them.

Next week, The British throw a going-away party for General Howe, and General Lafayette almost gets captured at the Battle of Barren Hill.

- - -

Next Episode 183 Mischianza & Barren Hill 



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Further Reading

Websites

Mulcahy, Peter The Doan Outlaws of Bucks County: The Life and Times of the Plumstead Cowboyshttp://haygenealogy.com/hay/sources/gibson/doans.html

Hay, Donna “Moses Doan and Robert Gibson and the Immortality of a Reputation” SAR Magazine, Vol 111, No. 4, Spring 2017 https://www.massar.org/2017/07/19/moses-doan-and-robert-gibson-and-the-immortality-of-a-reputation

Rowe, G. S. “Outlawry in Pennsylvania, 1782-1788 and the Achievement of an Independent State Judiciary.” The American Journal of Legal History, vol. 20, no. 3, 1976, pp. 227–244. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/845115

Lacey, John. “Memoirs of Brigadier-General John Lacey, of Pennsylvania.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 25, no. 1, 1901, pp. 1–13. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20085948

Lacey, John, et al. “Memoirs of Brigadier-General John Lacey, of Pennsylvania (Concluded).” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 26, no. 2, 1902, pp. 265–270. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20086030

Smith, Charles Harper. "General Lacey's Campaign in 1778", Bulletin of the Historical Society of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, Volume II (1941), No. 4, pp. 261–296 https://hsmcpa.org/images/thebulletin/1941vol2no4.pdf

Radbill, Kenneth A. “QUAKER PATRIOTS: THE LEADERSHIP OF OWEN BIDDLE AND JOHN LACEY, JR.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, vol. 45, no. 1, 1978, pp. 47–60. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27772496

Zanine, Louis J. “BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN LACEY AND THE PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA IN 1778.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, vol. 48, no. 2, 1981, pp. 129–142. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27772737

Verenna, Thomas THE FOLLIES OF GENERAL JOHN LACEY AND THE PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA IN 1778” Journal of the American Revolution, April 8, 2015. https://allthingsliberty.com/2015/04/the-follies-of-general-john-lacey-and-the-pennsylvania-militia-in-1778

Zellers-Frederick, Andrew A. Close Call at Crooked Billet: https://www.historynet.com/close-call-crooked-billet.htm

Revolutionary War Sites in Bordentown, New Jersey: https://www.revolutionarywarnewjersey.com/new_jersey_revolutionary_war_sites/towns/bordentown_nj_revolutionary_war_sites.htm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Brooke, Henry K. Annals of the Revolution: Or, A History of the Doans. John B. Perry, 1843 (Google Books).

Davis, W. W. H. The History of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, Philadelphia: Grant, Faires, & Rodgers 1876. 

Rogers, John P The Doan Outlaws, or, Bucks County's Cowboys in the Revolution, Doyelstown Democrat, 1895. 

Lacey, John “Memoirs of Brigadier-General John Lacey, of Pennsylvania” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 1901: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5, & Part 6

Simcoe, John Graves A Journal of the Operations of the Queen's Rangers: from the end of the year 1777, to the conclusion of the late American War, Exeter, 1789. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Drury, Bob & Clavin, Tom Valley Forge, Simon & Schuster, 2018.

Jackson, John W. With the British Army in Philadelphia 1777-1778, Presidio Press, 1979. 

Rogers, Jennifer Hidden History of Bucks County, The History Press, 2019

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.



 

Sunday, January 3, 2021

ARP182 Occupied Philadelphia


As I mentioned back in Episode 160, General Howe’s British Army entered Philadelphia on September 26, 1777.  Prior to the occupation, Philadelphia had been not only the seat of the Continental Congress, it was also the largest city British North America.   It had a population of about 40,000, compared to 25,000 for New York City and 15,000 for Boston.  General Howe hoped that its capture would finally bring the rebels to their senses, or at least win him some praise in London.

In the end, the capture accomplished not much of anything beyond being a career-ender for the British commander of North America.  The army found itself surrounded by a hostile enemy, with a great deal of difficulty keeping its own army properly supplied.  Benjamin Franklin’s comment about Philadelphia having captured General Howe must have rung true for many British leaders.

Defending the City

Having occupied the city, the British began setting up defenses.  The British had slipped past the Continental Army to enter the city without having a major battle after Brandywine.  The Continentals, however, were still in the field. An attack on the city was not out of the question.

Captain John Montresor, Howe’s engineer, took responsibility for the defenses.  He proposed building a series of ten redoubts along a line north of the city, connected by defensive lines which stretched from the Delaware River on the east to the Schuylkill River on the west.  Each redoubt sat along a road that led into the city.  Montresor later added two additional redoubts just north of the main defensive line to serve as outposts which could alert the main body in the event of an attack.  Montresor surveyed the proposed defensive line with General Cornwallis, who gave final approval.

The next problem was actually building the defenses.  The soldiers had to be ready for combat, so the work fell on the civilian population.  The call for laborers led to almost no volunteers.  Most of the city’s remaining population was Quaker, which had religious proscriptions against working on military projects.  Beyond that, the work was hard and the pay was terrible.  General Cornwallis had to threaten to conscript the locals before he could finally get about 200 men to work on the project.  That was only about half of the amount they wanted.  As a result, the construction took many weeks before any of the defenses were even close to ready for a garrison.

Further slowing the project was that Captain Montresor was also tasked with helping to open up the Delaware River.  For weeks after the British occupation, the Americans still held forts below Philadelphia.  This prevented the navy from reaching the city.  Howe could not bring any supplies up the river until the British took control.  So, in addition to defending against a land attack from the north, the British still had to assist the navy to the south in removing the forts along the Delaware.

John Montresor
The British initially left the bulk of the army in and around Germantown where most of the soldiers slept in tents.  General Howe personally made his first headquarters at the home belonging to the family of James Logan.  This was about one mile south of Germantown.  Several weeks after the Battle of Germantown the British pulled back so that almost all of the army was in or near the Philadelphia city limits.  General Howe took up residence within the city as well.

Even after the failed Continental effort to capture Germantown, American attacks on the British lines continued.  Americans would send in small forces at night.  The men would get within range of a British camp and fire on them at dawn.  The men would then retreat before the British could deploy a detachment to capture them.  The purpose of this was not to take any ground.  It was simply to keep the British and Hessian soldiers nervous and on edge.

Washington encamped his army at Whitemarsh, only a few miles from Germantown. He remained there until December, meaning the British could never really let down their guard.  The main Continental army was only a few hours’ march away.  Once the Continentals pulled back to Valley Forge, there was a little more relief.  However, the Continentals and militia still sent raids on occasion to keep the pickets on edge.

Housing the Soldiers

With the city secured militarily, the next important issue was housing.  Howe’s regulars and Hessians totaled about 15,000 men.  There were a few thousand more camp followers: women and children who were families of the soldiers.  Even so, over 25,000 people had fled the city before the British had entered.  Overcrowding was not the problem, at least not like it had been in New York City when the British occupied it a year earlier.

Ball at Gen. Howe HQ 1777
Most homes, however, remained occupied.  While many men had left to fight with the Continental army, their wives and children often remained behind.  About three-fourths of the civilian population were women and children.  Housing soldiers among the civilian population was always a delicate issue.

Officers took the best houses downtown.  The families would be relegated to a few rooms in the house while the officer and his staff made use of most of it.  Most officers were relatively polite and paid rent to the owner.  The benefit of having an officer also meant that soldiers were less likely to vandalize or rob the home.  Even so, many residents only took in these boarders reluctantly and without having much choice it the matter.

Initially, most soldiers stayed in tents or huts that they constructed. However, the occupation moved into winter, most enlisted soldiers were moved into houses, primarily those vacated by patriot families who had fled the city.  Units were billeted together so that officers could keep tabs on their men and form up the companies and regiments quickly if needed.

The army also took charge of any public buildings and churches.  In New York, most churches other than Anglican churches, became stables or hospitals.  In Philadelphia, much the same thing happened, with the exception that Quaker Meeting Houses were respected as part of the attempt to retain local support.  There was a Catholic Church and a Lutheran Church remained in operation for Hessian soldiers.  The State House, what we today call Independence Hall, became a prison for captured officers as well as a hospital for enemy prisoners

While there were conflicts and disputes over housing, the army settled into the city with relative comfort.

Feeding an Army

In addition to housing, food was an immediate concern for the army occupying Philadelphia.  The army took the city in late September.  It took another two months before the navy could clear the Delaware River.  Until that happened, the army had no source for food or other supplies other than what it could obtain locally.

General Howe had experience in New York fighting the forage wars with patriots in New Jersey over supplies.  But in New York, the British controlled Long Island, which provided much of the food they needed. They also had easy access to anything that ships could bring to the city.

In Philadelphia, the British only controlled an area a few miles around the city.  As I mentioned in an earlier episode, one of the first things the British did was send a large raiding party out toward Darby.  Soldiers collected food and hay, sufficient to last them through most of the winter.  With these supplies secured, there was little danger of going hungry.

The British also had another important tool to obtain food.  They had specie, that is gold and silver.  Although the Americans tried to surround the city and prevent farmers from bringing anything into the city, the lure of gold and silver payment in these particularly hard times, led many farmers to sneak their products into the British lines for sale.  The Continental paper money was becoming more and more worthless each day.  Farmers were not willing to rely on it.  Sales to the British meant payments with real money.

Patriots disparaged these activities as greed.  Farmers were being unpatriotic by letting the Continental Army starve at Valley Forge, while trying to feed the British in exchange for money.  Sure, in one sense, this was greed, and certainly was unpatriotic.  But these farmers were not wealthy men.  They had their own families to feed.  Many of them were hit hard by the war and were suffering deprivation themselves.  The desire to be compensated for the intense labor it took to grow and harvest crops, or to raise animals is not an unreasonable one.  Whatever we think of the morality of it, the reality is that most people tend to act out of self-interest, and that British gold provided the incentive that the farmers needed.

As a result, the British army did not really suffer from serious food shortages during the occupation, at least not when compared to the deprivations of the Continental soldiers at Valley Forge.  For the British, there was some tightening of rations before the navy could get up the Delaware, and again in late spring when supplies became tight again.  

The civilian population in Philadelphia did not fare as well.  Civilians did not have access to military stores, and did not always have the money to buy things at market. Prices often soared as people tried to profit from shortages due to the difficulties in bringing food into Philadelphia.  As a result, the civilian population tended to go hungry, rather than the soldiers. 

One area that was a constant source of need was firewood.  This was the main way to heat the buildings in the city. It was also a necessity for cooking.  The army burned through 800 cords of wood each week.  Soldiers could earn extra pay by volunteering for wood-cutting crews that wiped out virtually all the trees near the city by the end of the winter.  By April, hay also fell into short supply as well.  Again though, this was felt most harshly by the civilian population still in Philadelphia.

Local Support

A big part of capturing Philadelphia was the British hope that it would convince most Americans of the hopelessness of the patriot cause.  Public opinion mattered.  The British needed to recruit local loyalists to rebuild government and local militias to hold an area once the regulars were ready to move on.

Joseph Galloway
In December of 1777, General Howe appointed Joseph Galloway as Superintendent of Police.  Now, like other colonial cities, Philadelphia did not have a police force as we understand that term today.  That was a mid-19th century invention.  This was more of a city supervisor job.

Galloway was a Philadelphia native.  He had served as speaker of the Pennsylvania Assembly and had been a political ally and friend of Benjamin Franklin.  He had attended the First Continental Congress, but never supported independence.  When things moved too radically in that direction, Galloway threw in his lot with the loyalists.  In December, 1776, he traveled to British-occupied New York and offered his assistance to General Howe.  Galloway worked with Howe to bring the British army from New York to Philadelphia.  His reward was becoming the civilian commander of the city.  This gave Galloway the responsibility to enforce military edicts within Philadelphia. 

Part of his duties were keeping a tight control on all imports into the city.  Of particular importance were potential black market items such as liquor.  Any imports of liquor or even storage of large amounts of liquor had to be reported.  Anything not reported could be seized as contraband.  The sale of large amounts of liquor was banned. 

Other items in short supply were similarly limited.  Salt in large quantities had to be registered and could not be sold, except in small quantities for personal use.  Prices for the sale of food were set at fixed rates to prevent profiteering.  Attempts to sell above those rates could result in confiscation of one’s stock and arrest.  Merchants had to be licensed to sell food or tobacco.  Part of the reason the army kept track of such goods was that it enabled the leadership to compel the owners to deliver goods to the army as needed.  

Regulations also prohibited buying produce, meat, or other goods for purposes of resale.  Many enterprising merchants tried to meet farmers outside of town to purchase their goods and sell them at inflated prices.  To prevent this, purchases for the purposes of resale were banned.  Farmers had to sell their own goods at market. While there were great restrictions on commerce, at least the merchants could count on payment in specie for their goods, not paper like the Continentals offered.

The British also hoped to raise local regiments to supplement the army.  General Howe offered enlistment bonuses, plus a promise of fifty acres of land for two years’ service.  Local military recruiters tried to encourage young men to enlist.  Once again though, efforts met with disappointment.  Most of those in the area who still opposed the patriot movement were pacifists who would not enlist under any terms.  In fact, as I already mentioned, the army even had trouble finding workers to provide labor as civilian contractors. 

Andrew Allen
One attempt was to raise the Provincial Loyalist Corps of Pennsylvania.  To give some support to the regiment, General Howe agreed to serve personally as the regimental colonel.  However, the practical command went to William Allen, a son of the former Chief Justice of Pennsylvania.  Allen had some military command experience, but it came in a way you might not expect. He had served as a lieutenant colonel in the Continental Army.  His brother Andrew had served in the Continental Congress and on the Pennsylvania Committee of Safety.  Like others, though, the Allen brothers thought the movement had gone too far when Congress declared independence.  William Allen resigned his commission and traveled to New York to offer General Howe his services.

Allen was raising a loyalist regiment from locals around Philadelphia.  The regiment hoped to raise 400 soldiers.  This was not an optimistic number since most regiments began with a strength of at least 500.  In the end, they did not even raise half of the number hoped for.  Within months, about one-fourth of the 172 men who had first mustered had already deserted.  There were several other attempts to raise regiments.  Some recruits came from captured prisoners who agreed to serve.  Others were Continental deserters who were tired of starving at Valley Forge. Still others were escaped slaves who hoped that military service might improve their position within society.

The end result, however, was nowhere near the force that could be left behind to keep control of Philadelphia once the regulars had pacified the region and moved on.  Once again, promises of a loyalist army to rise up once regulars showed the flag proved to be a wishful fantasy.  In the end, the failure to recruit locals is what doomed the campaign to becoming a strategic failure.

Prisoners of War

Another large portion of the city’s population was prisoners of war.  The British had captured hundreds of prisoners at Brandywine, Germantown and in other engagements.  These, combined with deserters who abandoned the Continental army, led to thousands of prisoners.  Along with the military prisoners, were civilians who had been arrested in the city under suspicion of having engaged in activities in support of the patriot cause.

Walnut Street Prison
To oversee the prisoners, General Howe brought in William Cunningham.  This is the same man who had a reputation for abuse of prisoners in New York. Cunningham continued his sadistic abusive operations on a new group of victims in Philadelphia.  After receiving many complaints, Cunningham did leave Philadelphia, only to resume his post in New York. This was, at least, a relief for Philadelphia prisoners who saw much of the more open abuse leave with Cunningham.

Even if abuse slackened, deprivation still took its toll.  The primary housing for these prisoners was at the Walnut Street Prison just behind Independence Hall.  As in New York, the conditions were terribly overcrowded. Food rations were often at starvation levels.  Of course, disease broke out among the prisoners leading to many deaths from the deplorable conditions.

Thousands of men died and are buried across the street in what is now called Washington Square.  Today, only a few memorial stones serve as a reminder of the thousands of soldiers buried in mass graves beneath the park.

Elizabeth Graeme Fergusson
Perhaps one reason the death rate was not higher was that a number of civilians took an active effort to bring food and supplies to the prison.  There is one newspaper article of a person identified only as a “free negro woman” who used two of her hard-earned dollars as a laundress to buy the ingredients to make a pot of broth and buy some bread which she distributed to the prisoners.  Another local woman Elizabeth Graeme Fergusson who was married to a British officer, also led efforts to provide for the prisoners. After the Americans recaptured Philadelphia, Fergusson would face charges of treason and have her property confiscated.  However the numerous witnesses that attested to her support of the prisoners allowed her to recover her confiscated property eventually. 

Another reason more did not die was that the Americans had agents on hand for the prisoners in Philadelphia almost right away.  Thomas Franklin, a local Quaker (and no relation to Benjamin) served as an effective advocate for the prisoners during the British occupation.

A final explanation for why more did not die in Philadelphia, was that the British were only in  the city for less than a year. Sadly for the prisoners, most of them were shipped to New York when the British left, only to die in New York prisons or prison ships..

Many officers were held as prisoners in the State House, or what we call today Independence Hall.  Although conditions were a little better there, men were still crowded, left underfed, and without basic needs.  The British also used the hall for wounded Americans, who were left there with minimal medical treatment.

The British were reluctant to grant parole to most officers because they were so close to the American lines.  Escape was a great temptation. At one point, the army had to hire women to search females leaving the city.  It seems that some Americans were attempting to escape from Philadelphia dressed in women’s clothes.  Guards were given orders to shoot to kill anyone attempting to escape.  

One officer was released after a local Quaker, John Roberts, put up a £100 bond to guarantee his good behavior.  When the officer fled the city, Roberts was forced to pay the bond.  After the British left the city Roberts was unable to recover his money because the radicals had him executed for treason.

The British would remain in Philadelphia until June 1778.  And I’ll cover that departure in a future episode.  

Next week though, I want to talk about a group of loyalist outlaws known as the Doan Gang, as well as a skirmish that took place in May: the Battle of Crooked Billet.

- - -

Next Episode 183 The Doan Gang & Crooked Billet 



Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

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Further Reading

Websites

The British in Philadelphia https://www.ushistory.org/march/phila/britishphila_1.htm

Sullivan, Aaron “In but not of the Revolution: Loyalty, Liberty, and the British Occupation of Philadelphia” Dissertation, Temple Univ. 2014: https://digital.library.temple.edu/digital/api/collection/p245801coll10/id/276077/download

Coleman, John M. “Joseph Galloway and the British Occupation of Philadelphia” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, July, 1963, pp. 272-300 https://journals.psu.edu/phj/article/download/22953/22722

Secrest, Jeremy "British Policy Towards Loyalists in the Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778" School of Advanced Military Studies, 2017: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1039927.pdf

Mishoff, Willard O. “Business in Philadelphia during the British Occupation, 1777-1778.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 61, no. 2, 1937, pp. 165–181. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20087037

Fisher, Darlene Emmert. “SOCIAL LIFE IN PHILADELPHIA DURING THE BRITISH OCCUPATION.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, vol. 37, no. 3, 1970, pp. 237–260. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27771875

Rightmyer, Nelson Waite. “Churches under Enemy Occupation: Philadelphia, 1777-8.” Church History, vol. 14, no. 1, 1945, pp. 33–60. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3161021

Wiener, Frederick Bernays. “The Military Occupation of Philadelphia in 1777-1778.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 111, no. 5, 1967, pp. 310–313. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/986047

A History of the Royal Provincial Corps of Pennsylvania Loyalists:  http://royalprovincial.com/military/rhist//paloyal/pal1hist.htm

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Cuthbert, Anthony "Assessment of Damages Done by the British Troops during the Occupation of Philadelphia, 1777-1778" The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 1901.

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965 (borrow only).

Trussell, John B. B. Jr. The Battle of Germantown, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1974. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Buchanan, John The Road to Valley Forge: How Washington Built the Army that Won the Revolution, Wiley, 2004

Drury, Bob & Clavin, Tom Valley Forge, Simon & Schuster, 2018.

Harris, Michael C. Germantown: A Military History of the Battle for Philadelphia, October 4, 1777, Savas Beatie, 2020.

Jackson, John W. With the British Army in Philadelphia 1777-1778, Presidio Press, 1979. 

Johnson, Donald Occupied America: British Military Rule and the Experience of Revolution, Univ. of Penn Press, 2020. 

McGuire, Thomas J. The Philadelphia Campaign, Vol. 2, Stackpole Books, 2007.

McGuire, Thomas J. The Surprise of Germantown: Or, the Battle of Cliveden, October 4th, 1777, Thomas Pubs, 1996.

Sullivan, Aaron The Disaffected: Britain's Occupation of Philadelphia During the American Revolution, Univ. of Penn. Press, 2019 (book recommendation of the week).

Reed, John Ford Campaign to Valley Forge, July 1, 1777-December 19, 1777, Pioneer Press, 1980 (orig. Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

Taaffe, Stephen R. The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777-1778, Univ. Press of Kansas, 2003

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, December 13, 2020

ARP179 Prisoner Exchanges


Over the winter of 1777-1778, both sides had captured large numbers of prisoners.  Some men had been imprisoned for many years.  Some were recent casualties of the Saratoga and Philadelphia campaigns. One big focus for the Continentals was the return of the man many regarded as the best officer in the Continental Army, Charles Lee.

Charles Lee

Back in 1754 Lieutenant Lee served under General Edward Braddock, along provincial Captain George Washington, at the battle of the Monongahela.  Lee fought in America throughout the French and Indian War, rising to the rank of major.  When the war in America ended, he transferred to the European theater, where he fought in Portugal under General John Burgoyne.  

When that war ended, he did what many ambitious officers did in peacetime.  He joined another army to get experience as a more senior officer.  Although he rose to Lieutenant Colonel in the regular army, he took a commission as a major general in the Polish army, serving as an aide to King Stanislaus II.  There, Lee gained more combat experience as a commander in the Russo-Turkish War.

Charles Lee
In 1773, the 41 year old Lee opted to retire from active military service.  He moved to America. Lee spent a couple of years traveling around North America before purchasing a large estate in 1775 in what is today West Virginia, near his old war buddy Horatio Gates. 

Despite his recent arrival, Lee had made clear his support for colonial rights and the patriot cause. He even published a pamphlet in 1775 in opposition to British policies, and opining the Americans could defeat the British regulars. 

When the war began, there was some serious consideration to making Lee the Commander-in-Chief.  He clearly had more command experience than anyone else.  The main concerns against him were that he had very recently been a British regular officer, and indeed was still on half-pay with the British Army until he joined the Continentals.  It was also not entirely clear that he would respect Congress and the civilian rule of government.

Even with any concerns, Major General Lee became the third ranking general in the Continental Army, behind only General Washington and Artemas Ward, who had been commander of the New England army before the Continental Army took over.  Washington encouraged the appointment and relied on Lee to make up for his own deficiencies in command experience.

When the British captured Lee in December 1776, the British leadership rejoiced. They thought that Lee was the only continental general who had any chance of leading the Continentals to a credible defense.  Many officers thought his capture presaged the collapse of the Continental army since the remaining amateurs would have no chance against professional and experienced British officers.  Regular officers had long dismissed colonial militia as nearly useless amateurs.  Few believed the rest of the continental leadership, who had all been civilians a year earlier, could do anything without the leadership of experienced regular officers, like Lee.

Among the many people who believed that Lee was far superior to anyone else in the Continental Army was -- Lee himself.  Lee had an ego that would not quit.  At the time of his capture, he was corresponding with other officers about the need to replace General Washington, presumably with himself.

As a British prisoner, Lee’s ego did not diminish.  After a brief period where the British leadership debated hanging Lee for desertion and treason, they opted to treat him as a prisoner of war, giving him access to good lodgings and permission to dine with his former fellow British officers.  They even permitted him to bring his servant and his dogs to join him in his confinement.  The one permission they would not allow was parole.  He was too valuable a prisoner to risk his escape and return to the Continental Army.

In truth though, Lee’s record did not really live up to his reputation.  He was credited with defeating General Clinton’s attempt to capture Fort Sullivan in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina in early 1776.  In fact, the Americans won that battle by defying Lee’s orders.  Later, Lee provided a valuable service to the Continentals by convincing Washington to get out of New York City before the British could trap him there.  While this was good advice, counseling retreat is not usually what we think of as the mark of a great general.  

Lee’s capture put an end to his attempts to keep the Continental Army divided.  Lee had seemed to be waiting for the British to defeat Washington in New Jersey in late 1776, at which point Lee could take command of the Continental Army.  He had refused Washington’s repeated requests to join forces to fight the attacking British.  After his capture, the rest of Lee’s army did join with Washington, giving him the manpower to attack Trenton and Princeton, and retake New Jersey.

As a prisoner, Lee openly discussed with British leadership weaknesses in the Continental Army.  He proposed strategies on how to defeat the Americans by taking the army south and then attacking northward, similar to the strategy that General Howe eventually employed.  This treasonous activity was only discovered decades later, long after all the parties were dead and gone.  Historians speculated that Lee’s immense ego compelled him to show that he could lead either army to victory.  As one historian put it: few of his contemporaries would have surprised that Lee committed treason.  Most would have been shocked that he had managed not to brag about it during his lifetime.

As I said though, Lee’s reputation as a great commander and possible savior of the Continentals remained intact.  Washington, and many others, were eager to secure his return.  Recall that back in Episode 147, I discussed the capture of British General Richard Prescott in Rhode Island for the primary purpose of trading him for Lee.  Ever since the Americans had captured Prescott, they had been trying to make a trade.

No Cartel

Prisoner exchanges, however, between the two armies had never gone well.  In the Eighteenth Century, it was common for European armies to institute standing agreements, known as cartels, for the exchange of prisoners.  These cartels spelled out how prisoners would be exchanged, based on rank.  For example, a colonel would be exchanged for an enemy colonel.  There might be other agreements for officers of different ranks, such as one major was worth two captains or four lieutenants.  There were also rules such as the officers held the longest would be traded first.  The details of such cartels differed between different countries and different time periods, but the general idea was that it would allow for the return of prisoners on an equitable basis.  

Walnut Street Prison, Philadelphia
In the case of the Revolutionary War, there was no cartel.  The creation of a cartel would have been a recognition by the British of American sovereignty.  Britain could not view America as a separate country with an army at war with Britain.  Rather, it viewed events as colonies in rebellion.  Those fighting were not enemy combatants.  They were British subjects committing treason by levying war against the King and Parliament.

Many British wanted to try and hang captured rebels for treason.  However, the Americans made clear that captured British officers would suffer the same fate in retaliation.  Even if Britain could not openly concede American sovereignty, it had to respect the power of the enemy to capture its soldiers and treat them as they wished.  If the British did not want to see their own captured officers hanged, they would have to refrain from doing so with captured Americans.

The result was a standoff.  There were occasions when field officers would agree to an exchange on an ad-hoc basis.  The two sides, however, could not agree to a cartel.

It did not help that the Continental Congress did not seem willing to abide by agreements that its officers had made.  For example, back in 1776 General Arnold made a deal for the release of 500 American prisoners at the Battle of the Cedars on the promise of release of 500 British prisoners (see, Episode 90).  The Continental Congress refused to release the prisoners, even though the Americans prisoners had already returned.  More recently, General Burgoyne’s northern army had agreed to a convention that promised they would be returned to England, on the promise not to come back to America.  Congress did not outright reject that convention, but did manage to keep the Army as prisoners for years by demanding certain assurances from the King before their release.

While there may have been good reasons for refusing to comply with these agreements, it also meant that the British believed they could not trust the word of the rebels.  It played into their world view that these were not gentlemen who could conduct diplomacy.  Rather they were a criminal mob, albeit a very powerful one, that needed to be defeated totally.

Congress Objects

Whatever British sentiment was as to the honor of Congress, the reality was that there were many thousands of British and Hessian soldiers being held as prisoners over the winter of 1777-1778.  At the same time, the British were holding thousands of American prisoners in New York and Philadelphia.  Even though the British gave them very little care, even that minimal care was more of a burden than they preferred to have. Further, since captured British soldiers were much harder to replace than captured American soldiers, the British had great incentive to agree to some sort of large scale exchange.

Similarly, Congress was under pressure to do something about the thousands of American prisoners who were suffering and dying in British hands.  In August 1777, Congress authorized Washington to conduct negotiations for a prisoner exchange.  At the time, Washington was more focused on the imminent British campaign to capture Philadelphia.  So, while he accepted the authorization, he did little about it for the next few months.

In early February 1778, with the British settled into Philadelphia and the Americans in Valley Forge, General Howe sent a letter to General Washington, opening up discussions for a prisoner exchange.  Washington responded that he thought it best for the two armies to send negotiators for a face to face meeting on March 10 at Germantown to discuss an exchange.  Washington also made clear that he hoped the two armies would adopt a larger ongoing agreement for future exchanges, in other words, a cartel.

General Howe agreed to the meeting in Germantown, but did not address the idea of a cartel.  He was more focused on a practical exchange of existing prisoners.  Remember, Howe had already submitted his resignation to London.  Although he had not heard back at this time, he expected to be gone within months.  He did not want to tie his successor to an agreement that might prove disadvantageous to the British war effort.

Elias Boudinot
Although Congress had granted General Washington authority for an exchange, that was before the capture of Burgoyne’s army.  The situation had changed drastically and Congress felt it had a stronger hand to play.  On February 26, after the two generals had agreed to the March 10 conference, Congress passed a resolution that any prisoner exchange would require that the British pay for the upkeep costs that the states had incurred for holding their prisoners, and that such payments would have to come in the form of gold or silver.  Congress, not only desperate for hard money, reasoned that the British had forced them to pay for the upkeep of American prisoners held by the British because the British were allowing them to starve to death.  The Americans had to use an agent, Elias Boudinot to get even small amounts of food to the prisoners being held in New York to prevent starvation deaths.

However good the conditions sounded to those debating the issue in York, Washington was greatly annoyed by the new conditions.  He knew that the British would never agree to such a thing and that Congress was effectively scuttling the negotiations before they could begin.  

To follow up on this issue, Congress dispatched a committee headed by Francis Dana to Valley Forge to meet with Washington directly on this issue.  Delegates made clear that they did not want a cartel with the British.  The British prisoners were more valuable than the American prisoners who could be more easily replaced.  Returning large numbers of British and Hessian soldiers to their armies would only undercut the successes of removing those soldiers from the field and shrinking the overall size of the enemy in America.

Washington struggled to contain his anger.  Not only was Congress undercutting his authority and requiring him to go back on the terms of negotiations he had already started with General Howe, it was also condemning thousands of American prisoners to more suffering and death.  Washington expressed a sense of responsibility to these men and the need to save them, if at all possible.  While he clearly disagreed with Congress, Washington, also always acceded to Congress' will.  

On March 9, the day before negotiations were to begin in Germantown, Washington wrote to General Howe to ask for a delay until March 31.  Howe’s response reflected his confusion and annoyance at this sudden change, which meant continued suffering for prisoners on both sides.  He had no choice, however, but to accept the delay.

With the additional time, Washington began a campaign to convince Congress that an exchange and a cartel were not against American interests.  On March 18, Congress agreed not to require upfront payment before the exchange of prisoners.  It passed more vague instructions that gave Washington more room to begin negotiations.

Germantown Negotiations

With Congress backing down for the moment, Washington could focus on negotiations with the British.  He and Howe agreed to send four negotiators each.  Among the American negotiators were Elias Boudinot, who was the Commissary General for prisoners, as well as Washington’s personal aide, Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton.  The British sent three colonels and a captain.  The agreement would allow the parties to meet in Germantown and that neither side would send any soldiers there, other than a fourteen member guard for each negotiating team.  

American Prisoners
Then on March 30, the day before the negotiations were scheduled to begin, Congress passed another resolution.  One was to demand the release of General Charles Lee and another to release Lieutenant Colonel Ethan Allen.  Both of these officers had already been the topic of separate negotiations.  Both parties had agreed to release Charles Lee in exchange for General Richard Prescott.  By this time, the Americans had already released Prescott who was back in British-occupied New York City.  General Howe had responded that he had planned to ship Lee by sea to Philadelphia, but would see what he could do about hurrying up the process.  

The dispute over Ethan Allen was his rank.  The Americans had sent a British Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell.  Howe responded that he would be happy to send an American Lieutenant Colonel in exchange, but they did not consider it a fair trade for Colonel Ethan Allen.  Washington had to make clear that Allen was, in fact, a lieutenant colonel.  So both of these were ongoing negotiations before the Germantown meeting began.

Congress’ other limitation was that the negotiators would have no authority to conclude anything.  Washington himself would need to sign off personally on any final agreement.  Washington rushed these instructions via messenger to catch up with the negotiators who were already en route to Germantown.

On March 31, both delegations arrived late morning.  Things did not get off to a good start.  The Americans objected that the British team could not agree to anything legally binding.  Rather, everything would be done based on the word of the commander, General Howe.  Since everyone suspected Howe would be gone shortly, any agreement would disappear along with the general.  

At the end of the day, the British returned to Philadelphia while the American delegation remained overnight in Germantown.  The next day, the British delegation returned.  They informed the Americans that General Howe had not intended for them to remain behind enemy lines overnight, and that they could not just live there.  With that, and with the two side unable to reach even a legal basis to begin negotiations, the Americans packed up and returned to Valley Forge.

Newton Negotiations

After an exchange of letters between the generals, the parties agreed to resume discussions at Newton (aka Newtown) which was about 20 miles northeast of Germantown, and further away from British lines.

Both delegations arrived on the evening of April 6.  The British had failed to bring provisions with them, so the Americans invited them to share their dinner.  The officers enjoyed a pleasant evening and left negotiations for the following day.

The friendly dinner and the new location did nothing to break the impasse in negotiations.  The Americans insisted they wanted a permanent cartel.  The British countered that they had no authority to do anything other than a partial exchange of existing prisoners.  After two days of pointless debate, several of the British officers returned to Philadelphia to see if there was any chance of getting more authority to establish a cartel.  On April 9, the same day they returned to Philadelphia, General Howe received word that London had accepted his resignation.  With that, Howe’s position hardened since he did not want to leave his successor with an agreement that the successor might not want.

The British negotiators returned to Newton with the bad news.  After several more days of attempting to get the Americans to accept a partial exchange, the American delegation withdrew.  Both parties returned home without an agreement.

Charles Lee Returns

The failed negotiations, however, did not prevent the return of Charles Lee.  After receiving Washington’s letter, General Howe rushed Lee to Philadelphia, where he arrived on March 25.  On April 5, while the prisoner exchange negotiations were ongoing, he received parole and was permitted to travel to York where he could address the Continental Congress.  A couple of weeks later, on April 22, the two sides reached a final agreement to complete the exchange.  General Lee rode into Valley Forge, met by General Washington and an honor guard made up of all the top Continental leadership.  Washington offered Lee command of the right wing of the army.

Lee, however, quickly spoiled the enthusiasm for his return. On his first night back, Washington offered him a bed in the same house where he and Martha lived, with his bedroom right next to Martha’s. Overnight, Lee smuggled his mistress into the house and spent the night enjoying his new found freedom with a little more excess than the Washingtons found acceptable.  When he showed up the next morning for breakfast, rather disheveled, they made clear he would need to find new accommodations.

That was just fine with Lee.  Rather than assume command immediately, he asked for an opportunity to return to York to address Congress again.  There, he met with President Henry Laurens.  He raised his criticisms of Washington being an unfit commander and suggested that the Continental Army was in no shape to take on the British.  He suggested that the Continentals retreat out west of Pittsburgh and give up on contention for the eastern seaboard. 

Apparently Laurens thought his suggestions sounded just as insane as they do to the modern ear.  He opted not to pass along Lee’s comments and suggestions to the rest of the Congress.  At this time, Congress had just put to bed the Conway Cabal, and was not ready for another general to try to usurp Washington’s Command.  Further, Lee’s complete lack of faith in the Continental Army showed just how out of touch he was with the rest of the American leadership.  

With that, Lee returned to his home in Virginia.  He would rest and recuperate for a few weeks at home on his plantation before rejoining the army and Valley Forge and resuming his command.

Allen Exchanged

A few weeks later in May, Ethan Allen finally received his exchange.  Allen, had been one of the longest held American officers, following his capture in September 1775.  The British had sent Allen to London where he languished in the Tower of London for some time, awaiting execution for treason.  After being returned to New York as a prisoner of war, Allen remained a prisoner until May 1778.  

Upon his exchange, Congress offered him a command as a full colonel.  Allen, however, returned to his home in Vermont.  There, he took a position as a major general in the Vermont militia.  Since the war never again returned to Vermont, Allen sat out the rest of the war.  Instead, he devoted his time to advocacy for Vermont Independence.

Next week, we will take a look across the Atlantic where a young naval captain named John Paul Jones attacks the British mainland.

- - -

Next Episode 180 John Paul Jones Raids Whitehaven 


Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

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Further Reading

Websites

Lee, Charles Strictures on a pamphlet, entitled "A friendly address to all reasonable Americans, on the subject of our political confusion." Addressed to the people of America, 1775 https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N11179.0001.001/1:2?rgn=div1;view=fulltext

Knight, Betsy. “Prisoner Exchange and Parole in the American Revolution.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 48, no. 2, 1991, pp. 201–222. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2938068

Bowman, Larry G. “THE PENNSYLVANIA PRISONER EXCHANGE CONFERENCES, 1778.” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies, vol. 45, no. 3, 1978, pp. 257–269. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27772537 or https://journals.psu.edu/phj/article/download/24051/23820

Baker, William S. “Exchange of Major-General Charles Lee.” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 15, no. 1, 1891, pp. 26–34. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20083406

“To George Washington from John Hancock, 8 August 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-10-02-0550

“To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 20 December 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-12-02-0591

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 5 February 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-13-02-0377

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 8–14 February 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-13-02-0395

“From George Washington to General William Howe, 10 February 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-13-02-0416

To George Washington from General William Howe, 14 February 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-13-02-0450

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 21 February 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-13-02-0530

“To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 1 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0010

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 2 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0020

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 7–8 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0068

“George Washington to Sir William Howe, 9 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0396

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 10 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0094

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 12 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0127

 “From George Washington to General William Howe, 12 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0126

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 14 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0142

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 15 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0155

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 19 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0199

“To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 21 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0226

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 21 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0222

“George Washington to Sir William Howe, 22 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0402

“From George Washington to General William Howe, 22 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0242

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 27 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0301

“From George Washington to General William Howe, 29 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0323

“To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 30 March 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0333

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 3 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0366

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 4 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0380

“From George Washington to General William Howe, 4 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0378

“To George Washington from Major General Charles Lee, 13 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0460

“To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 14 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0470

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 16 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0485

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 18 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0504

“From George Washington to General William Howe, 19 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0512

“To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 24–25 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0559

“To George Washington from General William Howe, 10 May 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0081

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 11 May 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0090

“To George Washington from Henry Laurens, 11 May 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0091

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 12 May 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0100

“From George Washington to Henry Laurens, 18 May 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0153

“From George Washington to General William Howe, 23 May 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0200

“From George Washington to General William Howe, 27 May 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0243

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Baker, William Spohn (ed) Exchange of Major-General Charles Lee. From a manuscript of Elias Boudinot, Philadelphia: Lippincott Co. 1891.

Langworthy, Edward (ed) The Life and Memoirs of the Late Major General Lee, Richard Scott, 1813.

Moore, George H. The Treason of Charles Lee, New-York Historical Society, 1860.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Alden, John R. General Charles Lee,: Traitor or patriot?, Louisiana St. Univ. Press, 1951.

Drury, Bob & Clavin, Tom Valley Forge, Simon & Schuster, 2018.

Fleming, Thomas Washington's Secret War: The Hidden History of Valley Forge, Smithsonian, 2005.

Jones, T. Cole Captives of Liberty: Prisoners of War and the Politics of Vengeance in the American Revolution, Univ. of Pa. 2019 (book recommendation of the week). 

Mazzagetti, Dominick Charles Lee: Self Before Country, Rutgers Univ. Press, 2013.

McBurney, Christian M. Kidnapping the Enemy, The Special Operations to Capture General Charles Lee and Richard Prescott,  Westholme Publishing, 2014.

McBurney, Christian M. George Washington’s Nemesis: The Outrageous Treason and Unfair Court-Martial of Major General Charles Lee during the Revolutionary War, Savas Beatie, 2020. 

Papas, Phillip Renegade Revolutionary: The Life of General Charles Lee, New York NYU Press, 2014.

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.