Showing posts with label American Revolution Diplomacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label American Revolution Diplomacy. Show all posts

Sunday, January 5, 2025

ARP338 Adams Goes to London

This week we look at diplomatic relations between the US and Europe after the Revolutionary War.

The big issue for the United States was trade.  Under the colonial system major powers generally only allowed trade between their own colonies and the mother country.  This was known as mercantilism.  Trade rules were regularly set up to benefit the mother country, who got a monopoly on the raw materials from the colonies and had a monopoly selling finished goods back to them.

When the American colonies had been part of the British system, they were free to trade within that system. As independent states, Britain had largely cut them out of trade.  British ships still came to America with goods to sell, but Britain largely blocked or placed heavy tariffs on American exports to Britain.  During the years leading up to the Revolutionary War, British merchants, upset by various trade boycotts by the colonies, began finding other sources for raw materials, and were able to operate without American resources.  Many officials in London deliberately sought a policy of punishing the US for leaving the British Empire and the numerous trade benefits that went along with it.

New Secretary for Foreign Affairs

The continental Congress had created the office of Secretary for Foreign affairs back in 1780, but did not actually fill the position until more than a year later. Robert Livingston of New York took the job around the same time that the British were surrendering at Yorktown in late 1781. In that role, Livingston found himself to be acting pretty much as a secretary.  He was handling correspondence with the peace commissioners in Paris, and trying to keep Congress up to date with what was happening.  He didn't really have any role in making foreign policy.

Livingston found the role frustrating and rather powerless.  It also did not pay him enough to cover his expenses.  Livingston was also the Chancellor of New York. In December of 1782, local political opponents in New York were trying to remove him as Chancellor, arguing that he could not hold both jobs at the same time.  In response, Livingston tendered his resignation as Secretary of Foreign Affairs.  This was a critical time since the commissioners were concluding the preliminary peace treaty with Britain about this same time.  

Several members of Congress begged Livingston to stay on.  He agreed to remain until May, 1783, but did have to return to New York for a short time to attend to his duties as chancellor.  He hung around for a few months after that, leaving the position some time during the summer of 1783.

Despite still being in the middle of negotiations over the final peace treaty, Congress left the position unfilled when Livingston left..  The following year, on receiving word that John Jay was returning from Paris after concluding the peace treaty, Congress appointed him to serve as the new Secretary. 

Jay received notification of his appointment two months later, when he returned to America in July 1784.  Jay was not particularly interested in the job though.  He had private matters to attend to in New York.  I also considered running to replace George Clinton as Governor of New York.  In the end, the New York legislature appointed Jay as a delegate to the Continental Congress. Jay traveled to Trenton in that capacity.  After a couple of months, probably after seeing the mess that Congress had made of the foreign affairs department, Jay finally agreed to serve as Secretary beginning in December, 1784. Jay may have found the position more palatable since Congress moved to his home town of New York City in early 1785.

Jay seemed to spend most of his time working with his clerks to organize the department’s papers, making sure the critical diplomatic correspondence of the peace treaty was organized and preserved.

Jay handled all foreign correspondence on behalf of the government, but with the war over, and efforts to establish treaties in Europe largely stalled, there was not much correspondence.  Even Congress itself was doing little.  It struggled to gather a quorum most of the time.  Congress had appointed John Hancock to return to the presidency in late 1785.  Hancock, however, who was suffering various ailments, never left Boston for New York and resigned in the summer of 1786 without ever having left home.  Following Hancock's resignation, Nathaniel Gorham took up the office.

European Politics

With the war over, Americans showed little interest in Foreign Affairs, or the Continental Congress for that matter.  Parochial state interests were the main focus of anyone who showed interest in government at all. 

Americans generally had no interest in European relations.  Francis Dana, had served as the American minister to Russia during the war, and returned to Congress in 1784.  He wrote to John Adams that he opposed having any American ministers in Europe.  They just cost money that America did not have.  Dana also feared that foreign countries sending ministers to America would simply get America involved more in the intrigues of Europe.  With the war over, Americans like Dana were content to keep the Atlantic Ocean as a great divide and simply ignore the affairs happening an ocean away.  Dana was not unique in this outlook.  Elbridge Gerry, serving in the Continental Congress at the time, wrote Adams with similar sentiments.

Adams personally recognized the importance of foreign policy.  He had originally planned to return home after the treaty of Paris had been finalized.  Recognizing that this was a longer term appointment, Adams finally convinced his wife Abigail and his daughter Nabby to join him and his two sons in Europe.

Abigail leased out all their properties in Massachusetts, leaving her home in the care of a woman named Phoebe Aldee.  Phoebe had been a slave of Abigail’s father, William Smith.  When William died in 1783, Phoebe was freed in his will.  She had recently married a free man named William Aldee.  Abigail trusted her home to the newlywed couple.  In the summer of 1784, Abigail and Nabby, along with two servants and a cow, set sail for London.

Upon her arrival, Abigail learned that John was still in the Hague, trying to manage some financial matters.  She wrote to him to announce her arrival.  Adams had to remain in the Hague for a short time, but sent their son, John Quincy Adams, to meet them.  A couple of weeks later, John also arrived, but then took the whole family to Paris to deal with other diplomatic matters.  

Benjamin Franklin was still in Paris, as was Thomas Jefferson, who was expected to replace Franklin as Minister to France at some point when Franklin returned home.

While Americans seem to have lost interest in foreign affairs, Adams, Franklin, and Jefferson remained busy.  One big issue for them was managing debt.  All of those desperate loans taken during the war had to be repaid.  France, dealing with its own war debts, was pushing hard for repayment of the loans it had made to America.  Since neither France nor any other European power had any continuing interest in underwriting the government in America, the only place that could continue to provide loans was private bankers in the Netherlands.  Adams and the others were essentially taking out more loans to pay interest on the old loans.  If America failed to make its payments, then it would be impossible to get any additional loans and the whole thing would collapse.

Barbary Pirates

Another diplomatic issue developed with the Barbary states.  During the Revolutionary War, American shipping had the tacit protection of the French Navy.  Barbary states left American shipping alone.  When the war ended, American vessels no longer had any protection.  For centuries, these north African states had made a living by capturing and ransoming foreign shipping.  Most European powers had established agreements that would protect their own shipping in exchange for an annual payment to these states or threat of retaliation by their navies.  The US, however, had no such deal and no such navy.

In October 1784, Moroccan ships seized the Betsey, an American merchant ship.  It took several months with news to arrive that the ship and crew was being held for ransom.  Spain, which had a good relationship with Morocco, was able to negotiate the release crew.  But with that came a message that the Americans should send an envoy to Morocco with presents for the Emperor, otherwise, future crews would be treated more harshly.  

Jefferson sent an envoy to Morocco.  The problem was that the US had no navy, having sold off its ships at the end of the war.  It could not threaten Morocco.  Further the cash-strapped Americans could not afford to pay the annual tribute demanded by the Moroccan Emperor.

While negotiations were ongoing, the situation got worse when neighboring Algeria captured two American schooners, the Maria and the Dauphin in the summer of 1785.  Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were semi-independent provinces affiliated with the Ottoman Empire.  Along with Morocco, these provinces made a living by capturing ships for ransom, or collecting tribute from countries that wanted their shipping left alone.

Barbary negotiators demanded a total of about $2.6 million in order to return the ships and establish a treaty with the US.  The American negotiators had received authorization from Congress to spend up to $40,000 to come to an acceptable peace with these groups.

While negotiations continued, the crews of the captured ships were enslaved and placed on starvation diets.  The American negotiators had to use part of the $40,000 allocation just to provide food for the enslaved crews.  

Most American shipping avoided the region.  Insurance rates made it nearly impossible.  Pirates captured several more ships off the coast of Portugal.  

After more than a year of negotiations, in 1786, the US was able to establish a treaty with Morocco, but not the three other provinces.  The American sailors would remain in slavery for more than a decade.

Jefferson and Adams met personally with the Tripoli Ambassador to London, Sidi Haji Abdrahaman.  The minister was unapologetic for the attacks on American shipping.  Citing the Koran, the minister argued that all unbelievers in the prophet Muhammud  were subject to capture and enslavement.  The only way for the attacks to end would be the payment of ransom and tribute that the Americans did not have.

Adams and the Court of St. James

Negotiations with the Barbary provinces were ongoing while the American diplomats in Europe struggled to secure other treaties.  Adams managed to secure trade agreements with Prussia and Sweden.  Those countries, however, had little economic impact.  Trade with France was somewhat open, in part thanks to the work of Lafayette, but again not providing much in the way of economic opportunity for American traders.  

Everyone knew that trade with Britain was the key to a return of the successful trade that existed before the war.  Britain had debated granting the US a broader trading status in hopes of restoring a closer relationship with its former colonies.  But a large portion of the British government wanted to exclude the US from trade, as a way of teaching the Americans that independence came with a price.  While British merchant ships happily sold goods to the Americans, the American merchant ships were largely blocked from entering British ports.

There were other issues that continued to separate Britain and the US.  The British army still occupied outposts in the Northwest Territory, in violation of the Treaty of Paris.  Americans also still complained of the slaves the British removed from the continent, also in violation of the peace treaty.  In response, Britain complained that the treaty also promised reimbursement to Tories who had their property confiscated.  That was not happening either.

America had to establish an ambassador to Britain to negotiate these and other matters.  The question was, who would be the ambassador.  Adams wanted the role, but he had his detractors in Congress.  One of the leading detractors was our old friend Arthur Lee, who had been a long time critic of any foreign ambassador who was not himself.  Adams also had enemies on the other side of the political spectrum because of his conflicts with Benjamin Franklin and Silas Deane.  Many delegates also feared that Adams’ anti-slavery sentiments would prevent him from negotiating the return of stolen slaves.

Adams did not help his case by sending a letter to then Secretary Livingston, outlining his qualifications for the job.  Opponents saw this as vanity and a man who was too full of himself to represent the US.  British officials would just play on his vanity and prevent him from promoting US interests effectively.

In the end, Congressional debate focused on Adams and John Rutledge of South Carolina.  Rutledge had served as Governor of South Carolina during much of the war, and had served again in the Continental Congress before returning to take a position as head of the South Carolina Court of Chancery.  Rutledge was the favorite among southern delegates.  Other states somewhat skeptical of New Englanders, or Adams personally made the race a difficult one.

During these ongoing debates, a third choice arose.  Robert Livingston, the former Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and current Chancellor of New York came under consideration.  Livingston from New York got support from the middle states.

Despite some personal dislike of Adams and distrust of New Englanders, Adams’ years of experience in Europe convinced a majority of delegates to support him.  John Jay, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs had worked alongside Adams in the final peace treaty negotiations, and supported him.  In the final vote, nine states supported the motion to send Adams to the Court of St. James in London.

Having received word of his appointment, Adams prepared to move his family from Paris to London.  His son, John Quincy, returned to America to take up studies at Harvard.  The rest of the family crossed the Channel in May 1785.

On June 1, days after his arrival, Adams presented his credentials to King George III.  The meeting could have been an awkward one.  After all, Adams had spent the previous decade calling the king a tyrant, while the king saw this colonial upstart as a traitor who likely would have been hanged for his actions under other circumstances.

That said, both men were focused on improving relations between their two countries.  Adams expressed a “desire to cultivate the most friendly and liberal Intercourse between your Majesty’s Subjects and their Citizens.” The king responded:  

I was the last to consent to the Separation, but the Separation having been made and having become inevitable, I have always said, as I say now, that I would be the first to meet the Friendship of the United States as an independent Power. . . let the Circumstances of Language; Religion and Blood have their natural and full Effect.

After the formal comments, the king chatted up Adams, commenting that even though he had spent quite some time in France, that he was a big fan of the French. Adams simply responded that he had no attachment but to my own country.  The king replied, “An Honest man will never have any other.”

The next day, Adams was in court again, along with all the other ambassadors, to celebrate the king’s birthday.  Once again, Adams and the king struck up a conversation and seemed to get along well.

Despite hitting it off well with the king, Adams had to wait weeks before gaining an audience with the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Carmarthen.  Congress had instructed Adams to press the government on issues of trade, the return of slaves, and the removal of British forces from the Northwest Territory

When he finally got the meeting, Adams made the argument to Lord Carmarthen that opening British ports to US trade would allow American merchants to get the money required to repay British merchants for prewar debts.  So would the repayment of property stolen by the British army.  Allowing the Americans to move into the Northwest Territory would also improve the US economy.  If Britain wanted its debts repaid, the US would have to be allowed to make some money.

Carmarthen listened politely to Adams’ concerns and asked that they be put in writing.  But the British minister was noncommittal and refused to put forward any possible resolution to these issues.

With little movement on diplomatic issues, the Adamses settled into a rented house on Grosvenor Square in London.  Across the street lived former Prime Minister, Lord North.  Two men who sought the destruction of each other for so many years, now found themselves to be neighbors.  The Adamses hired a domestic staff and received visitors regularly.  The following summer, Jefferson visited Adams in London.  It was during this time the two men met with the Tripoli Ambassador, as I discussed earlier.  Adams also spent much of his time visiting the English countryside and visiting historic sites.

While Adams’ time in Britain was a pleasant one for him and his family, he never reached any resolution with the British government over the issues that separated the two countries.  Britain and the United States could not establish a treaty on trade issues.  The issues over reimbursements for the patriot’s slaves or for Tory property would never be resolved to anyone’s satisfaction.  

Adams spent three years in London, patiently working on these issues to no avail.  Finally, in 1788, after the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia increased his desire to return home and get more involved in domestic politics, Adams departed London left for home.

Next Week, we return to the southern US as officials make treaties with the Cherokee and begin westward movement.

- - -

Next Episode 339 Hopewell Treaties

Previous Episode 337 Mount Vernon Conference

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Further Reading

Websites

BATTISTINI, ROBERT. “Glimpses of the Other before Orientalism: The Muslim World in Early American Periodicals, 1785—1800.” Early American Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2010, pp. 446–74. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23546653 

ROJAS, MARTHA ELENA. “‘Insults Unpunished’: Barbary Captives, American Slaves, and the Negotiation of Liberty.” Early American Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 2003, pp. 159–86. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23546474 

Treaty with Morocco June 28 and July 15, 1786 https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/bar1786t.asp

“To John Jay from John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, 28 March 1786,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-04-02-0147

John Adams - Audience with King George III, 1785: https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/eyewitness/html.php?section=19

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Jefferson American Minister in FranceAtlantic Monthly, Vol. 30, Iss. 180, Oct. 1872. 

Varg, Paul A. Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers, East Lansing: MSU Press, 1963. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Abrams, Jeanne E. A View from Abroad: The Story of John and Abigail Adams in Europe, NYU Press, 2021. 

Graebner, Norman A., Richard Dean Burns, & Joseph M. Siracusa Foreign Affairs and the Founding Fathers: From Confederation to Constitution, 1776–1787, Praeger, 2011. 

Kilmeade, Brian and Don Yaeger Thomas Jefferson and the Tripoli Pirates: The Forgotten War That Changed American History, Sentinel, 2015. 

Lambert, Frank The Barbary Wars: American independence in the Atlantic World, Hill and Wang, 2005. 

McCullough, David John Adams, Simon & Schuster, 2001. 

Montross, Lynn The Reluctant Rebels, Harper & Brothers, 1950. 

Morris, Richard B. The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence, Harper & Row, 1965 (borrow on Archive.org). 

Smith, Page John Adams, Vol. 2, Doubleday & Co. 1962. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, September 29, 2024

ARP329 Signing the Peace Treaty


Back in Episode 320, we covered the preliminary peace agreement that the delegations from Britain and the US reached in the fall of 1782.  That preliminary agreement resulted in a cessation of hostilities and great celebration. But the war would not actually be over until that preliminary agreement became a final treaty.

One of the big impediments to the final treaty was the fact that the US could not sign off on a final peace until Britain and France also did so.  France could not sign off on a peace until Spain also agreed to a peace with Britain.

Gibraltar

Spain had entered the war back in 1779 with the primary goal of taking back Gibraltar.  Spain had ceded Gibraltar to Britain in 1713, as part of an agreement to get Britain to end its role in the War of Spanish Succession.  Ever since then, Spain had been trying to get back this small rocky outcropping at the southern tip of Spain.

Spain and France had been besieging Gibraltar since 1779.  While the attacks had greatly damaged the area, the highly defensible position and several successful resupply missions prevented the British garrison from being dislodged.  The final push by France and Spain to recapture the rock failed in October, 1782.

Unfinished painting showing US peace delegation
The following month, at the same time Britain was negotiating terms with the Americans, it was also in negotiations with France.  Gerard de Rayneval came to London to negotiate directly with Prime Minister Shelburne.  France was treaty obligated to help Spain regain control of Gibraltar, so this was critical to any final peace.  In these discussions, Shelburne suggested that Britain might consider giving up Gibraltar, if France and Spain could compensate it with other properties.  These might include Minorca in the Mediterranean, which France had recently taken from Britain.  Shelburne also wanted West Florida, which would give Britain access to the Mississippi River.  Britain was also considering several valuable sugar islands in the West Indies.

The two sides worked out a complicated series of land swaps that touched on the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, which would result in a return of Gibraltar to Spain.  The French negotiator, Gerard de Rayneval returned to Paris in late November with a preliminary deal in hand.  French foreign Minister Vergennes summoned the Spanish Ambassador, Conde de Aranda, to discuss the deal.  The men agreed to the terms.

When Gerard de Rayneval returned to Britain with the good news, he learned that Shelburne could not finalize the deal.  Shelburne’s own cabinet revolted at the idea of turning over Gibraltar to Spain.  The recent heroic defense of Gibraltar had captured the popular mood in London.  The only way this was going to work was if Spain and France offered more valuable sugar islands to compensate Britain.

The talks appeared on the verge of collapse, then Spain blinked.  The Conde de Aranda told Vergennes he had been authorized to negotiate on letting Britain keep Gibraltar if Spain could get a valuable price of other real estate.  If Spain could get both East and West Florida, as well as Minorca, it might be willing to forgo its demand of Gibraltar.

The debates went back and forth into December.  By this time, the terms of the peace deal with the Americans were known to all. Prime Minister Shelburne was facing a possible vote of no confidence in Parliament, which could throw all of this work back to square one.

There was also another deadline.  Recall a few episodes back that I mentioned that Spain and France were putting together an Armada at Cadiz, led by the Admiral d’Estaing and General Lafayette.  This armada planned to sail to recapture Jamaica, expel the British from New York and recapture Canada.  The ships were ready to leave port. Once they left, they could not be recalled.  Those attacks would pretty much guarantee that the war would continue for at least another year, and that the final treaty terms would be greatly impacted by the success or failure of that mission.

As a result, even if Spain was ultimately agreeable to the deal currently on the table, the lack of a quick answer might be as good as a no.  Fortunately, the Spanish Ambassador Aranda approved the deal without demanding to consult with leaders in Madrid.

The powers still quibbled over a few other details, but by January 20, 1783, Britain, France, and Spain all agreed on terms for a final peace.  Although the agreement was provisional and had to receive final approval from all governments, that seemed likely.  

In Cadiz, the Armada had been scheduled to depart on January 16, but after d’Estaing received word that a peace treaty was imminent, he delayed his departure.  After receiving word of the treaty on February 2, d’Estaing shut down the mission.

The Netherlands had largely been left out of the negotiations.  With all of its allies agreeing to peace terms, the Dutch had to give the British acceptable terms.  The Netherlands agreed to the general cease fire that became effective in January 1783.  They would eventually sign a treaty with Britain more than a year later.

Peace Terms

The US received just about everything the Commissioners wanted.  Britain acknowledged the US as free, sovereign, and independent states.  It recognized the US boundary reaching west to the Mississippi and agreeable boundaries with Canada and Florida.  There was also a secret provision, setting the border between Georgia and Florida, depending on where Spain or Britain ultimately claimed Florida.  The British army would leave US territory and turn over all land within US borders.  Any British property in the US would be forfeited to the US. The treaty also granted Americans fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland.

Britain received a clause that British creditors would be allowed to pursue lawful debts.  The US would not confiscate property in the future from loyalists, but would only “recommend” to the states to provide restitution for property already taken from loyalists.  

The Treaty between France and Great Britain permitted France to keep several islands in the West Indies, including St. Lucia and Tobago.  France gave up Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Kitts, Nevis, and Montserrat.  Britain ceded Minorca and east and west Florida to Spain, but took the islands of Providencia, and the Bahamas, as well as retaining Gibraltar.

Waiting for Approval

With the diplomats having completed their work, they next had to wait for the various governments to confirm the agreements that they had reached.  For the American diplomats in Paris, this meant that they had to remain in Europe to finalize the treaty.  Even so, the peace agreement seemed so established that Benjamin Franklin considered making a trip to England in the spring of 1783.  Six months earlier, such a visit probably would have resulted in his imprisonment in the Tower of London.  He ended up not making the trip, but it had nothing to do with any fear from British authorities. 

Another of the delegates, Henry Laurens, who actually did serve time as a prisoner in the Tower of London, returned to Britain after the preliminary peace agreement.  He wanted to relax and recuperate in Bath.

Franklin occupied himself by returning to printing.  He printed a bound copy of all the state constitutions, in French, to be distributed to diplomats and other government officials throughout Europe.  He also began working on a treaty of Amity and commerce between the US and Sweden, and started similar initiatives with Denmark and Portugal.

Franklin had been willing to abandon his obligations under the treaty with France, and agreed with the other American delegates to sign a preliminary peace treaty with France.  Despite Franklin's willingness to be flexible, John Adams still believed that Franklin was too captivated by French interests.  Adams did not let up on his criticisms of Franklin as the delegates waited in France.

Just as the delegation was finalizing its negotiations on the preliminary peace treaty, another rift began to divide Adams and Franklin.  Adams wanted to appoint a man named Edmund Jenings as the secretary to the diplomatic mission in France.   Adams introduced Jenings to Henry Laurens, who at first seemed to like the idea, but then quickly grew cool to the idea.  Jenings was an American who had been living in Europe during the war and had published a number of pamphlets.  Several of these seemed designed to divide the American peace commissioners.

Meanwhile, Franklin had someone else in mind to be secretary.  He wanted his grandson, William Temple Franklin.  Now 21 years old, Temple had been serving as his grandfather’s personal secretary for seven years.  He spoke French and had developed his own relationships in the French Court at Versailles.

Franklin wrote to Congress’ Secretary for Foreign Affairs, recommending Temple for the position, and suggesting that if Temple did not get the job, that Franklin was considering leaving his post to take his grandson on a grand tour of Europe.

Having completed the preliminary treaty, Franklin decided on his own to make Temple the secretary of the Peace Commission near the end of 1782.  Franklin got John Jay to agree to the appointment, but did not even bother to ask, or even notify John Adams.

When he found out, Adams was livid.  It wasn’t just that Franklin was handing out a lucrative position to a family member.  After all, John Quincy Adams was serving at the time as an aide to the American delegation in Russia, thanks to his father’s efforts.  Edmund Jenings, the man Adams wanted for secretary, was a cousin of his wife Abigail.

Adams disliked Temple for many of the same reasons that he disliked Temple’s grandfather.  The puritanical New Englander was disgusted by the lavish lifestyle, punctuated by drinking and womanizing, in which the Franklins engaged.  Adams’ mindset was probably not helped by the fact that he was trying to fight a battle via correspondence to Massachusetts, trying to convince his daughter Nabby not to marry an aggressive suiter.  

Adams was also open to the criticisms levied by Arthur and William Lee.  These men had opposed Franklin for years, and levied all sorts of accusations.  They turned their wrath on Temple. Arthur Lee called Temple a “young insignificant boy” implying that only his Grandfather’s status gave him any chance at a government position.  William Lee referred to Temple as a bastard, twice over, referring to his illegitimate birth, as well as his father’s.  Adams himself wrote in a letter regarding Franklin: “His whole Life has been one continued Insult to good Manners and to Decency.” 

The fact that Temple’s father was an infamous Tory, by this time living in London, and the fact that Temple had only lived in America for 18 months of his life, led to concerns about whether he had America’s true interests at heart.  

Adams had already expressed concerns that Benjamin Franklin had seemed too pro-French.  In several letters to America, Adams expressed the belief that France had actually delayed a peace with Britain by several years and that Franklin was a pawn that Vergennes was using to promote French interests.  Since Temple spoke fluent French and had served in Versailles, Adams believed that Temple also had become more French than American.

Adams also came to believe that Franklin was setting up Temple to replace his grandfather on the peace commission in France so that Franklin could take a position as Ambassador to Britain in the Court of St. James. In truth, Franklin had zero interest in serving in London. Adams, however, did want that position and worried that Franklin was a rival.

When Temple met with Adams in January 1783, to request that Adams sign a document approving his appointment as secretary retroactive to the previous October, Adams exploded.  Temple already had the commission signed by the other three commissioners.  Franklin had written the document.  Jay apparently signed some time in October, when the commission was finalizing the preliminary treaty and Franklin was sick in bed.  Temple was the active courier for Franklin during this time.  Henry Laurens did not arrive in France until late November, and returned to Britain in January.  He signed the commission just before crossing the channel, in hopes of spending some time relaxing at Bath.

After receiving Laurens’ signature, Temple went to see Adams.  Because Adams had originally been appointed the sole peace commissioner, he considered himself the head of the delegation and thought it an effrontery that Franklin had gotten all the other commissioners to agree to the appointment without even discussing the matter with Adams.  Temple used his best efforts with humility and respect to win over Adams, but nothing seemed to work.  Since Temple had the approval of three of the four commissioners, he continued to serve as secretary.  Adams eventually came around and signed the document nine months later, in September, 1783.

Debating Ratification

The Peace Commissioners had little to do but bicker with each other for months after sending the preliminary treaty to Congress in November, 1782.  In early 1783, Congress was still debating whether to give the commissioners more latitude in negotiating a treaty without France when the preliminary treaty arrived.

The pro-French delegates in Congress were outraged by the fact that the commissioner had negotiated a separate peace with Britain, cutting France out of the negotiations.  They saw this as a betrayal of the French alliance and something that would hurt the US in international relations.  There was particularly intense debate about a secret clause that set a border between the US and Florida if Britain held Florida, but a different border if Spain ultimately took control of Florida.

Of course, the delegates in favor of giving the delegates more latitude were very pleased with the favorable terms that the treaty gave to the US, based on those in France taking the initiative.  Congress continued to debate before receiving word in March, 1783 that France and Britain had also come to terms on a preliminary treaty.  At that point, the matter seemed settled.

Secretary Livingston finally wrote a response to the delegates in late March, congratulating them on the provisions in the preliminary treaty but also criticizing them for negotiating without France’s involvement.  In April, he confirmed to the Commissioners that Congress had ratified the preliminary treaty. By May, Livingston was complaining that he had not heard any further progress on the final treaty.

David Hartley

There was reason for concern.  At the end of March, the Shelburne Ministry in London fell after only eight months.  In April, a coalition under Charles James Fox and Lord North took control of Parliament.  The new Prime Minister was William Cavendish-Bentinck, the Duke of Portland, but everyone knew that Fox and North were the real powers in Parliament.  The two factions could not have been more different.  Fox’s liberal coalition has supported American independence for years.  North, of course, continued the war longer than almost anyone else wanted and held the very conservative positions that King George had espoused.  The two factions disagreed on just about any issue, and were together only because of their shared hatred of Shelburne as Prime Minister.

For the Americans, there was real cause for concern.  Without a final treaty, Britain could back out of the preliminary agreement and resume the war.  It did not help that North pushed for a vote condemning the peace treaty that the Shelburne government had already negotiated and approved.

The new government sent David Hartley to negotiate the final terms of a treaty.  Although Hartley was a liberal in Parliament, and had been outspoken for years about ending the war with the colonies, he was also a close ally of Lord North and had voted against the Shelburne Peace Plan in Parliament.

The Commissioners were relieved when Hartley revealed that Britain was still willing to sign a final treaty largely based on the terms spelled out in the preliminary treaty.  Franklin had know Hartley since the 1760’s and the two men got along quite well.  Hartley and the Commissioners debated a few more issues, mostly related to trade. The Commissioners agreed that US ports would be open to British trade following the final evacuation of the British Army from New York.  Much of their discussion at this time was the details on getting the British Army evacuated.

After a few weeks, Hartley sent the terms to London for final approval.  He and the delegates then waited most of the summer with no word from the government.  In fairness the coalition was a mess.  The King, who loathed Fox, refused to cooperate with the coalition in any way.  The two factions agreed on very little.  It was a matter of debate whether this divided government would even survive much longer.

After nearly two months of waiting for a decision from London, Hartley decided on his own to just finalize the official treaty.  Although the two sides had discussed a few changes, Hartley proposed they simply sign a final treaty based on the preliminary one without any substantive changes.  He could at least justify that without any further word from London.

The Signing

The parties agreed to meet on September 3 for the formal signing.  Franklin, Jay, and Temple rode to Paris where Adams joined them.  Laurens, still in Britain, did not participate.  The secretaries reviewed four copies of the treaty.  The only substantive changes were an added provision spelling out a ratification process, and the removal of the provision related to the Florida border since Spain by this time had set the border based on its own treaty with Britain.

Treaty of Paris Signatures
At 10:30, the three delegates signed and affixed their seals to the treaty, as did Hartley, acting on behalf of the King.  Hartley also assured the commissioners that they would continue to negotiate a treaty on trade once this peace treaty had been resolved.  

Traditionally, the two countries exchanged gifts following a treaty.  The King had suggested a cash gift.  Hartley discussed the matter, offering a £500 cash gift to each of the four delegates.  Since the delegates had nothing to give in return and were concerned about insulting the king by refusing his gift, there was some discussion about the matter.  In the end, no gifts were exchanged and the matter was just dropped.

The commissioners sent a copy of the treaty to Versailles, where Vergennes signed the peace treaty, along with the Spanish Ambassador that same day, ending the war with Britain.  The Dutch had reached a preliminary treaty with Britain the day before, but that final treaty would not be finalized for several more months.  That afternoon, Vergennes hosted a dinner for everyone involved in the treaties.  There were 31 people who attended.

Following the event, Franklin commented to Jay that this treaty would probably be the most notable achievement for which they would be remembered.  He then referenced the Bible “blessed are the peacemakers.  Jay responded that he would be proud of his role.  Adams, ever the pessimist, worried that the treaty could have been better and hoped they would not see another war in their lifetimes.

As far as all the government leaders were concerned though, the war was over and it was time to start living in the new peace.

Next week: The British Army Evacuates New York.

- - -

Next Episode 330 British Evacuation New York 

Previous Episode 328 Cuddalore, The Last Battle

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Further Reading

Websites

“The American Peace Commissioners: Commission for William Temple Franklin, [1 October 1782],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-38-02-0125

“From John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, 22 January 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0126

“From John Adams to Edmund Jenings, 28 January 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0135

“From John Adams to James Warren, 13 April 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0253

 “Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners, 25 March 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0233

“Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners, 21 April 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0269

“Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners, 28 May 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0317

 “Definitive Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain, 3 September 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-40-02-0356

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

The Treaty of Paris (1783) in a changing states system: papers from a conference, January 26-27, 1984 (borrow only). 

Bemis, Samuel F. The Diplomacy Of The American Revolution, Indiana Univ. Press, 1935. 

Pellew, George John Jay, Boston, New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1890. 

Perkins, James B. France in the American Revolution, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1911. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Dull, Jonathan A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, Yale Univ. Press, 1985.

Hoffman, Ronald and Peter Albert (eds) Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty of 1783, Univ. Press of Va., 1986 (borrow on archive.org). 

Hutson, James H. John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution, Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1980 (borrow on archive.org).  

Morris, Richard B. The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence, Harper & Row, 1965 (borrow on Archive.org). 

Renehan, Edward The Treaty of Paris: The Precursor to a New Nation, Chelsea House, 2007 (borrow on archive.org). 

Schiff, Stacy, A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America, Henry Holt and Co. 2005. 

Smith, Page John Adams, Vol. 1, Doubleday & Co. 1962. 

Stinchcombe, William C. The American Revolution and the French Alliance, Syracuse Univ. Press, 1969 (borrow on archive.org).

Stockley, Andrew Britain and France at the Birth of America: The European Powers and the Peace Negotiations of 1782-83, Liverpool Univ. Press, 2001. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


Sunday, February 28, 2021

ARP190 French Arrive in America


Weeks after the British evacuated Philadelphia, the French fleet arrived in the Delaware Bay.  On July 6, 1778, Charles Henri Hector, the comte d’Estaing dropped anchor of his flagship, the Languedoc.  The massive ship was armed with 90 cannons and had a crew of 900 sailors.  Passengers aboard the ship included Conrad Alexandre Gérard, the new French minister to America, as well as returning American minister Silas Deane.

Following Deane’s recall, the French government had offered Deane accommodation with the French fleet.  Congress had demanded Deane return to Philadelphia to answer questions about suspicious financial transactions, mostly the results of lies propagated by his fellow commissioner Arthur Lee.  French foreign minister Vergennes hoped that Deane’s return to America aboard a massive French military vessel, along with a fleet, and at the side of the new French Minister to America, would underscore just how well the French government thought of Deane’s diplomatic work and that it would help to impress the members of Congress.

Upon arrival, the French commander, d’Estaing, received word that the British fleet had evacuated to New York.  The British ships in New York Harbor were inferior to his fleet of seventeen massive ships of war, armed with over 1000 cannons and supported by nearly 10,000 sailors.  Rather than allowing Dean and Gérard to make an impressive entry into Philadelphia aboard the French fleet, d’Estaing dropped off his passengers at the shore in the Delaware Bay, and then set sail for New York to do battle.  Deane and Gérard had to make their way to Philadelphia aboard far less impressive local transport ships.  Despite a quiet entry, the arrival of the first foreign ambassador in the newly-recaptured seat of Congress was cause for celebration.

Conrad Alexandre Gérard

The new French Minister, Conrad Alexandre Gérard de Rayneval, was a lifelong diplomat.  He did not come from nobility.  He was the eldest son of the secretary to a French noble family.  Gérard attended college and studied law at the University of Strasbourg.  By 1754, at the age of 24, he had entered the diplomatic service.

Conrad Alexandre Gérard
His duties sent him throughout Europe and introduced him to much of the political leadership on the continent. The life of a career diplomat can be delicate and tricky, if not terribly exciting.  Gérard developed a good reputation within the diplomatic corps.  His career grew, along with his responsibilities.  During and after the Seven Years War, he served in the French Embassy at Vienna.  Among his duties was ensuring proper protocol during the engagement and marriage of the Austrian Archduchess Marie Antoinette to the Dauphin of France, the future King Louis XVI.

After Louis XVI ascended to the throne in 1774, the comte de Vergennes took over French foreign affairs.  Vergennes appointed Gérard to increasingly important positions within the ministry.  The two men developed a close friendship and mutual trust. When Vergennes entered into treaty negotiations with the American delegation, it was Gérard who conducted those negotiations.  When it came time to send a diplomatic delegation to America, Gérard received the appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary to America.

French Strategy in America

With France having committed to an alliance with America and war with Britain, the diplomatic tables between France and America had somewhat turned.  For the past few years, America had done everything it could to bring France into the war.  At the same time, France was comfortable watching events from the sidelines, taking its time to decide whether war was in its best interests.

Once it entered the war, France became much more dependent on America to stay in the war.  If Britain managed to establish a peace with its colonies, it could then turn its full wrath against France and likely capture more French colonies.  It would drive France deeper into debt, fighting a losing war that it could not well afford.

When French officials learned that Britain had repealed many of the laws that had started the rebellion in the first place, and had sent a peace commission with real negotiating power to end the hostilities, France knew that it would have to make sure the Continental Congress did not back out of the new treaty of alliance and leave France to face the British alone.  Americans were already exhausted from fighting several years of war.  They had age-old social, political, and cultural ties to Britain, and a long history of hostility with France.  It would not be hard to imagine the Americans accepting the generous terms offered by London and throwing their new ally under the bus.

comte de Vergennes
(from Wikimedia)

Gérard’s mission was to cement the Franco-American alliance.  He needed to make sure the US remained independent and at war with Britain.  Despite Gérard’s decades of diplomatic experience, navigating the political waters of a republic required a different set of skills from those used in Europe.  There was no foreign sovereign, nor any individual who could set policy for the United States.  The Continental Congress was an unstable mix of state representatives who came and went.  It was not even clear if all of the states would adhere to the same policies and remain united.

A diplomat usually focuses on establishing some personal relations with leaders of the foreign power.  There was no prior relationship of French nobility who had intermarried with Americans in order to establish some sort of connection.  The US itself had never received a diplomatic party before.  Differences of language, religion, and customs all created potential hazards for France in making this relationship work.

Despite these potential problems, Gérard arrived in Philadelphia on July 12, 1778 to find the alliance strong.  Delegates showed no interest in any peace that would return them to colonial status.  Gerard found that the Americans were still very much willing to fight, and needed France’s active support if they had any hope of keeping the war going.

When the new minister entered Philadelphia, Congress had only just returned to the city days earlier.  It was still cleaning up the mess left by the British less than a month prior.  Even so, Philadelphia received the new minister with great enthusiasm.  A committee of members of Congress rode to Chester, to escort Gérard into the city.  An honorary guard of Continental dragoons accompanied them.  They honored him with a 15-gun salute, one for each state, plus the King of France and the King of Spain.

In a report written a week later, Gérard told Vergennes that people had cheered him from the banks of the Delaware River as he made his way to the city.  Once there, members of Congress paid him calls, even before he had presented his credentials to Congress.  They invited him to a banquet and celebrated the new alliance between France and the Americans.

French Cartoon d'Estaing bringing
supplies to America
While receiving a warm welcome, Gérard had his concerns about the new alliance.  His traditional European view was that there was no way these people could govern themselves.  At some point, they would either return to British rule, or permit French rule over them.  Perhaps it would not be a blatant colonial relationship, but the Americans would need the continuing support, guidance, and protection of a European power.  The notion of a truly independent United States that could remain neutral in European affairs simply did not seem possible to Gérard.

Gérard sent a series of candid reports back to France.  He reported his enthusiastic welcome and the apparent resolve of Americans to remain independent at all costs.  At the same time, he noted that some of Congress’ best delegates from its first years had left for various reasons, and that their replacements were not really of the same caliber.  Gérard also made note of the divisions between supporters of George Washington and Horatio Gates, observing that northerners generally preferred Gates, while southerners backed Washington.  This, he noted, was a possible source of future rupture between the new union of states.

Gérard also mentioned, with regret, that several French officers had taken sides in this dispute.  Although his report did not name names, we know that General Conway was a key backer of Gates, while General Lafayette outspokenly supported Washington.  As a diplomat, this concerned Gérard as he did not want France supporting one American faction over another.  Backing the wrong faction could prematurely end the alliance.

Throughout his tenure in America, Gérard remained focused on maintaining the alliance at all costs.  He simply could not allow a pro-British faction or peace faction to seek a negotiated settlement between American and Britain, leaving France to fight a dangerous and undistracted British military.  Gérard had to make sure that the war in America continued.  Even an American victory with independence at this time went against French interests.

During his first few months in Philadelphia, the Carlisle Commission, which I discussed a few weeks ago, was still trying to negotiate an acceptable peace, one that would permit Britain to focus on France.  The Commission had retreated to New York, along with the British Army, but remained hopeful in its mission to end hostilities. 

Gérard worked to ensure that the Americans did not settle with Britain. He strongly advocated that Congress should settle for nothing less than full independence, something he was pretty sure Britain would not accept. Most members of Congress did not need much convincing on that point, but Gérard had to make sure the situation did not change.  If Britain won a few military victories, American hopes might falter. Assuring the Americans of French military support to help continue the war effort kept American morale high and away from talk of political compromise with Britain. 

Beyond that, Gérard hoped to forge a more durable political alliance between France and the United States.  This proved more frustrating.  A great many Americans still distrusted France.  While they needed France’s assistance in the war effort, France was the traditional enemy of the former British colonists.  They viewed the absolute monarchy in France as worse than the constitutional monarchy of Britain.  

Just because the Americans did not want a closer military alliance with France than they already had, that did not mean they wanted to submit to Britain again either. They wanted no political entanglements. Gérard, however, took their reluctance to form a closer political alliance with France as an indication that some faction in Congress wanted to return to a relationship with Britain.

Privately, Gérard viewed the American experiment in republicanism as doomed.  Without a unifying leadership of a monarch, he did not see how the government could remain united. Legislators who were regularly replaced in office, offered no consistency of policy or alliance.  Gérard was confident that the American states would eventually fall under either the political control of Britain or France.  He wanted to make sure that it was the latter.

Gérard would remain in Philadelphia as the French minister for about 15 months, helping to establish the new alliance and doing what he could to create more political connections between the two countries.  He returned to France in October 1779.

Admiral d’Estaing

Even before France had signed the treaties of alliance and commerce, Paris had been planning its own military strategy.  One reason France had delayed any sort of alliance was that they had needed a few years to build up the French navy to a point where it could compete with the British.  By 1778, France had a new fleet of warships that it thought was ready to compete with the British.

As early as January, French leaders had been organizing a fleet under the comte d’Estaing to send to America.  Admiral d’Estaing, who brought Gérard to America, was an accomplished officer with connections to the highest offices of French government.  He had only joined the navy sixteen years earlier in 1762.  

Admiral d'Estaing
d’Estaing’s father had been a lieutenant general in the French Army. The wealthy and powerful family was close to the crown.  d’Estaing and the future King Louis XVI were about the same age and attended school together.  They became lifelong friends.

At age nine, d’Estaing joined the army as a musketeer.  Influential families often helped their young children receive commissions so that they would have some seniority by the time they were actually old enough to do any real military work.  By age 16, he was a lieutenant.  That same year, he married the daughter of a French field marshal. During the War of Austrian Succession, he served as an aide to Field Marshal Maurice de Saxe. d’Estaing did see combat and was wounded in battle. By the war’s end, he had risen to colonel.  

After the war, the twenty year old colonel oversaw a military reform commission that the King had wanted.  The commission’s goal was to emulate some of the successes of the Prussian Army.

During the Seven Years War, d’Estaing wanted to go to serve in Canada under General Montcalm.  However, his family discouraged that.  Instead, they helped him receive a promotion to general with service in India. During the siege of Madras in 1758, a British attack wounded d’Estaing and left him a prisoner.  As a captured general, d’Estaing was held by British Governor George Pigot, brother of British General Robert Pigot, who I have discussed in earlier episodes. As was common for captured officers, d’Estaing received parole and returned to France.

While still on parole, d’Estaing took up service as the captain of a privateer ship working for the French East India Company.  He spent nearly a year attacking British ships and outposts in India.  As he was returning to France, the British captured his ship and imprisoned him in London for violating the terms of his parole.  He eventually returned to France near the end of the war.

In 1762 d’Estaing received promotion to lieutenant general.  He also took a commission as rear admiral in the French navy that same year.  If it seems strange today that one person could hold commands in both the army and navy, it did at that time too.  The king eventually had to remove him from office in the army, leading to his career exclusively in the navy, starting at the rank of admiral.

Admiral d'Estaing then spent several years as governor general of the French Leeward Islands in the Caribbean.  By 1772, he was naval inspector of France, living in Brest, and by 1777 he was the Vice Admiral of the Asian and American seas.  

French Fleet in America

In 1778, even before the treaties with the Americans were made public, d’Estang organized his fleet at Toulon in preparation for a voyage to America.  In April, the fleet departed France.

When d’Estaing led the first French fleet to America, he received pretty broad discretion to take advantage of whatever opportunities he found.  The general plan was to attack British ships and bases in North America during the summer and fall.  Later in the year, after hurricane season had passed, d’Estaing had orders to sail down to the West Indies and look for targets among the British island colonies there.

As I said, the French fleet landed in Delaware Bay where the Admiral learned that the British fleet was in New York Harbor.  After dropping off his VIP charges, d’Estaing sailed his fleet to New York to confront the British.

New York Harbor

On July 11, 1778, d’Estaing’s fleet of twelve ships of the line and five frigates arrived just off of Sandy Hook at the southern end of New York Harbor.  The remainder of Admiral Howe’s fleet in the harbor found itself vastly outgunned and was in no mood for a fight.

French Map of NY Harbor, 1778
Howe’s fleet had arrived in New York Harbor only about two weeks prior. They had returned with the last of the ships from the evacuation of Philadelphia.  As soon as Admiral Howe arrived, he received notice from General Clinton that the army had just fought the battle of Monmouth and then retreated to Sandy Hook, New Jersey.  The navy then had to ferry the entire army and all of its baggage across the harbor to Manhattan Island, as well as Staten Island and Long Island.  They completed all that by July 5, only six days before the arrival of the French fleet.  

While sailing from Philadelphia to New York, Admiral Howe had received intelligence that a French fleet under d’Estaing was on its way to America, but did not have much more details.  He did not even know if d’Estaing was headed for Philadelphia, New York, Newport, or Halifax.  A few days before the arrival of the French fleet, Howe received word that it had been spotted off the coast of Virginia and then sailed up to the Delaware Bay.  Howe had only twelve small frigates and six ships of the line in New York, including his flagship, the Eagle.

The outnumbered British scrambled to put their ships into a defensive line off of Sandy Hook, New Jersey. The army deployed 1400 men with artillery at Sandy Hook as well.  They feared the French might capture the hook, then force the fleet to withdraw.  If they did that, the French would have time to work their way over the sandbar and take New York Harbor.  If the French took the harbor, and if the Continentals continued their advance from Monmouth, the British might have to abandon New York entirely and escape to Halifax.  If escape was impossible, and British Naval reinforcements could not arrive in time, General Clinton might be looking at the need to surrender his army.

This worst case scenario for the British, of course, never happened.  The depth of the water over the sandbar at Sandy Hook would have prevented the two largest French ships from entering the harbor at low tide. The others would have had to enter one at a time, and be subject to attack from shore, and from the British ships of the line in place to oppose them.  You might ask, why not enter at high tide? The concern there was you could not know how long the battle would last.  The French might find their fleet stuck and unable to withdraw. The risk of losing the fleet for this fight was just not worth it. 

The French fleet remained just outside the harbor for eleven days.  During that time, d’Estaing evaluated the situation in the harbor and the British defenses. He also conferred with General Washington via messenger about other options.  In the end, they decided the British had a much better defensive position and that they would look for a battle elsewhere. On July 22, the French Navy hoisted its sails and moved north toward Newport, Rhode Island.  The potential battle for New York was averted and the British breathed a sigh of relief. 

I’ll take up the story with the attack on Newport in a future episode.

In the meantime, next week we head south to Florida for the Battle of Alligator Bridge.

- - -

Next Episode 191 Battle of Alligator Bridge 


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Further Reading

Websites

“John Thaxter to Abigail Adams, 17 July 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-03-02-0052 

Kite, Elizabeth S. “CONRAD ALEXANDRE GERARD AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE.” Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia, vol. 32, no. 4, 1921, pp. 274–294. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/44208561

Adelberg, Michael "Almost Yorktown" Journal of the American Revolution, March 14, 2014: https://allthingsliberty.com/2014/03/almost-yorktown

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Challice, Annie Emma Armstrong Heroes, Philosophers, and Courtiers of the Time of Louis XVI, Vol. 1 & Vol. 2 London: Hurst and Blackett, 1863.  

Kite, Elizabeth S. "Conrad Alexandre Gérard and American Independence" Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia, vol. 32, no. 4, 1921, pp. 274–294

Perkins, James Breck France in the American Revolution, Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1911. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Dull, Jonathan R. The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787, Princeton Univ. Press, 1976. 

Hardman, John The Life of Louis XVI, Yale Univ. Press, 2016. 

Hudson, Ruth Strong The Minister from France: Conrad-Alexandre Gerard, 1729-1790, Lutz, 1994 (book recommendation of the week).

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.