Sunday, March 2, 2025

ARP344 Northwest Ordinance of 1787

The last few weeks we’ve talked about some of the economic crises that the states faced in the years following the end of the war.  The big hope to end many of those crises was wrapped up in selling western lands to raise money.  This made opening up the lands that came to be known as the Northwest Territory a critical event.  This week we’ll take a look at the final major legal step needed to make that happen: the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.

That land that today makes up the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin.  For people at the time, this was the land that was northwest of the Ohio River, reaching as far west as the Mississippi River, and as far north as the border with British Canada.

The Continental Congress’ first two legislative efforts to establish a legal framework for this territory came in the form of the Land Ordinances of 1784 and 1785, which we discussed in Episodes 334 and 336.

Land Cessions

The first step in this process was for Congress to get various states to give up their personal claims to this land.  France, Spain, and Britain had already ceded their claims to the land in the peace treaty that ended the war in 1783.  But that treaty did not specify anything more than that those foreign powers would not assert claims on the land.  It did not settle who was the undisputed owner of such lands within the US.

Different states had conflicting claims to western lands, based on various colonial charters.  Britain had granted contradictory charters during the colonial era for a variety of reasons.  Beyond those disputes between states, even if only one state could claim the land, Congress wanted to take that to form new states.  Congress put pressure on the states to give up land claims on these western lands.  It did so by coming up with plans to assess taxes on states based on the land they owned.  By giving up the land, which did not generate revenue for the state, the state could avoid owing more taxes to Congress.

The first cession came back in 1783, when Virginia formally ceded its claims to this area.  Virginia had agreed to do that in order to get Maryland to agree to the Articles of Confederation in 1781.  Virginia’s cession was conditional in that it called for the territory to be formed into new states that would join the Union.  Virginia did not want to give up its claims, just so some other eastern state could assert its claims to the land.  This put further pressure on the other states to give up their claims.

New York had a more questionable claim to some of the land, which it gave up early as well.  Several New England states also had claims based on their colonial charters.  Massachusetts and Connecticut had claims that stretched all the way to the Pacific Ocean.

The original point of granting such broad charters was to encourage the colonies to challenge land claims by other European powers to those inland areas.  At the time Britain wrote these charters, there was no Pennsylvania colony, and New York was under the control of the Dutch.  Further to the west, France and Spain had made land claims.  

The New England states had not made any effort to act on these claims to the far inland areas during the colonial era.  Connecticut had tried to claim some lands that eventually became part of New York and Pennsylvania, but never moved further west during the colonial era.  Similarly, Massachusetts agreed to a western border with New York early in the colonial era.  Pennsylvania’s western border was set by its colonial charter.

Massachusetts ceded its claims to western lands in 1785 without much fuss.  Connecticut was more reticent.  The state had only recently given up on its claims to what is today northern Pennsylvania.  Connecticut colonists and Pennsylvania colonists actually fought over these claims before and during the Revolutionary war, and I mean literally went to war and shot at each other.  The most recent flare up of the Pennamite-Yankee War took place in July 1784, after the Revolutionary war had ended, when a group of Connecticut Yankees burned a Pennsylvania fort and attempted to occupy land around what is today Wilkes-Barre.  Pennsylvania militia soon captured and arrested the trespassers, but the conflict would simmer for many more years.

Connecticut also still hoped to claim the land west of Pennsylvania.  Finally, in 1786, Connecticut gave up on most of these claims, but still claimed what it called the “western reserve,” an area of land that makes up most of what is today northern Ohio, along the southern bank of Lake Erie.  In total, the reserve made up nearly 3.3 million acres, nearly the size of Connecticut itself.

There was also the issue of the Indians who actually lived on this land.  Many of these tribes had been pushed into this land after having been pushed out of Pennsylvania and Virginia.  But given the relative power of the United States, the tribes were not in a position to put up an effective resistance. As we discussed back in Episode 336, representatives of these tribes ceded much of the land in the Treaties of Fort Stanwix, Fort McIntosh, and Fort Finney.  While many Indians did not recognize the legality of those treaties, it settled the matter legally as far as Congress was concerned.  Even so, those treaties reserved large swaths of land for the Indians to remain in central Ohio, as well as further west.

Finally, there was the issue of settlers who already had taken some of this land.  Virginia had carved out a district in what is today southern Ohio, to make good on its promises of land to Revolutionary War veterans.  Thousands of acres had already been settled under the guidance of George Rogers Clark.  There were also several settlements along the Mississippi River that Virginia had taken during the war.  French settlers moving south from Quebec had established most of these little villages, and had land claims to them.  While this posed no threat to Congress’ sovereign control of the land, it did have to respect the private property ownership claims on some parts of the territory.  Those areas, however, were rather small and could be handled.  

The bigger issue for Congress was squatters.  These were private citizens who simply moved onto land and claimed it as their own, without paying for it and without registering it.  In some cases, they made private deals with neighboring Indians to acquire their claims.  In other cases, they just moved into an empty area and began developing the land. This was rough country with rough people settling the land.  Without any government, squatters could use brute force to retain possession of their land claim.  If Congress settled the land too slowly, squatters would simply move in ahead of them and take the land  for themselves.

Yet, Congress could not move too quickly.  The vast area of land available would have to be populated over many years.  It would take several years just to survey the area.  After that, trying to sell the land all at once would simply create a land glut that no one would be able to purchase.  The result would be unsettled land simply going into private hands.

Speculators

Under the 1785 land ordinance, tracts of land were supposed to be sold in parcels of 640 acres.  The plan was to sell the land at auction, but with a $1 per acre minimum.  Of course, most private citizens could not come up with that kind of money, $640 for a parcel.  Congress wanted all sales in specie, that is gold or silver. It was not going to accept paper dollars at face value.  It required payment in full at the time of the sale.

Also, all of the land had to be surveyed before land sales could begin.  The time for the surveys meant that land auctions did not begin until 1787. 

There were groups of speculators who formed to take advantage of buying in bulk and then selling to individual families at a profit.  As early as 1785, Nathaniel Sackett offered to take all the land which currently makes up most of the state of Ohio off Congress’ hands for nothing.  Sackett’s plan was to serve as an administrator of the land, making sure that the land would go to families who would actually settle on the land that they bought from him, and that the land could not be resold for several years.

Some of you may recall the name Nathaniel Sackett.  He was the Continental Army’s head of intelligence under General Washington during an early part of the war.  Benjamin Talmadge later took over his role.  Sackett, like Talmadge,  was a character on the TV show, Turn.  After leaving intelligence, Sacket made a fortune as a sutler for the army.  He hoped to spend his post-war years creating and settling a new western state.  

Sackett’s request for an entire state to be handed over to him for free might seem a bit outrageous.  But you have to remember that in the colonial era, governors often gave away very large tracts of land to men who they thought would be capable of settling the territory, thus preventing foreign claims to the land from taking hold and keeping settlements organized. That said, Congress needed money and was not prepared to give anything away.

A serious effort to make bulk purchase of land came from the newly-formed Ohio Company of Associates.  You may remember some discussions in really early episodes of this podcast of an Ohio Company that formed in the 1760s, when Virginia was pushing British officials to open up this same territory.  That company folded when the Revolutionary War began.  This new Ohio Company is a completely different one.

This new organization was founded by a group of investors, all veteran Continental Officers from New England. Major General Samuel Holden Parsons had several key commands in New York and Connecticut during the war.  General Rufus Putnam, who helped to build West Point, and other important engineering projects.  He only became a brigadier general at the very end of the war.  Benjamin Tupper served throughout the war, with notable service at Saratoga and Monmouth. He received a brevet to brigadier general at the end of the war.  The fourth founder was Manasseh Cutler, a New England minister who had served as a chaplain for several years during the war.

These four former officers who had served together during the war, met at Bunch of Grapes Tavern in Boston in March of 1786.  If they could create a company that could front a large amount of money and offer some services in helping individuals to settle the territory, they could make a fortune. 

During its first year, the Ohio Company sold shares to 250 investors.  Meanwhile, Cutler traveled to New York on behalf of the company to lobby the Congress to purchase a large portion of the new territory.  Initially, the company hoped to purchase 600,000 acres along the Ohio River.  Congress rejected this offer.

The Scioto Group

Cutler began working with William Duer, who briefly served as a Continental colonel, also had served in both Congress and the New York state legislature during the war, and had sat on several congressional boards involving government finances. He had also amassed a small fortune through government contracts and the purchase of loyalist properties during the war.  Duer was serving as secretary of the Congressional Board of Treasury when Cutler arrived in the summer of 1786.

Duer advised Cutler that Congress might find the deal more attractive if there was a larger offer for more land. Duer formed his own land company called the Scioto Group, which would take a much larger land claim further north and west of the land sought by the Ohio Company.  This land would go as far west as the Scioto River, in what is today Central Ohio. Duer promised to raise a much larger investment group, taking in large investors from across America and Europe.

The two companies worked together to create an acceptable offer to Congress. Many investors put money into both companies, so they tended to work together in getting Congress to go along with a deal. Essentially the offer to Congress was an agreement for the Ohio Company to purchase 1.5 million acres, with an option to buy an additional 3.5 million acres.  The Ohio Company turned over that option to the Scioto group.  The buyers also insisted that the government assume the cost of governing these newly settled lands, offering military protection from Indians, as well as courts and law enforcement.

The Ordinance

The main problem with this offer is that Congress had no legal authority to accept it.  The Land Ordinance of 1785 said that all land was supposed to be sold at auction, meaning one group could not just buy a really large chunk of land without giving anyone else a chance.  The law also required minimum purchases at $1 per acre.  The offer from the Ohio Company came to 67¢ per acre.  They wanted to buy 1.5 million acres for $1 million dollars.  

On top of that, the company was only offering paper money, Continental dollars and certificates from veterans that were currently trading at about 12¢ on dollar.  So really, the company was offering the equivalent of about $120,000 in specie for the 1.5 million acres, or about 8¢ per acre.  The company also was not willing to pay all of this up front, as was required under the law.  They would pay half up front and half when the surveys were completed.  The larger option for 3.5 million more acres would not require a purchase for several years, after which time that land would become much more valuable. This all meant that government insiders were getting a massive sweetheart deal on land that would enrich themselves as they sold off all the land at retail.

Since the offer did not comply with the current law, Congress had to vote on whether to create a new law to allow this deal to go forward. Over a period of more than a year, in late 1786 and early 1787 Congress debated the terms of a new ordinance for the territories.

One of the biggest changes was that Congress would initially assume governance of the new territories directly.  Earlier laws had been written with the assumption that those who moved to the territories would govern themselves.   Investors did not like the idea that they might have to go before locally elected judges and juries to assert their legal claims.  Juries made up of locals would likely support the interests of locals.

Instead, the new ordinance established that the territory governed in three separate stages.  In the first stage, a secretary, and three judges, all appointed by Congress, would govern.  The second state would kick in once the population exceeded 5000 adult males.  At that point, locals could vote for a lower house, but Congress would still appoint the governor and the rest of the executive and judicial branches, as well as an upper house in the legislature.  Once the population reached 60,000, the people’s representatives could write a state constitution and petition Congress for statehood.  Only when Congress agreed to the constitution would statehood be granted and the local population would have the full rights as states on an equal footing with the original 13 states.

The ordinance also guaranteed certain basic rights for all inhabitants.  This included the freedom of religion, habeas corpus, trial by jury, due process of law, a prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, protection of private contracts, and the free use of the waterways. There was an assurance that the government could not take private property without compensation, other than normal taxes that were similar to those paid by people in the original states.  The law also provided for free public education, banned slavery and involuntary servitude, and guaranteed that the new states would have a republican form of government.

The new law retained the grid system that had been set up in 1785, where each township would be divided into 36 grids of 640 acres each.  However, it did not attempt to set up territorial or state borders within the territory.  Instead, it simply decreed that the whole territory eventually would be divided into at least three, but no more than five states.  Until it was large enough to be subdivided, it would be governed as a single territory.

After considerable debate, Congress finally passed the Northwest Ordinance on July 13, 1787.  Only one member of Congress voted against it. Abraham Yates was concerned that the movement into this territory would set off a series of wars with the Indians.

Congress further authorized the Board of Treasury to negotiate with the Ohio Company to come up with acceptable terms.  This eventually led to the sale of 1.5 million acres for $1 million in depreciated currency, with only half paid up front, along with the 3.5 million acre option, just as the Company wanted.

Even with the deal in place, Congress did not receive the Ohio Company’s first payment until October, 1787. The Ohio Company began selling preferred lots of land, at first to insiders, for $10 per acre.

Settlement of the land would begin in 1788 when Rufus Putnam led a group of 48 New England settlers to establish what would become Marietta, Ohio. This settlement, on the north side of the Ohio River, directly across from a military outpost built on the southern bank.  

Arthur St. Clair, who had been president of Congress when the ordinance passed, received appointment as the first governor of the Northwest Territory in October, 1787.  He made his way to Marietta to assume governance of the new territory.  The initial settlers arrived in April 1788. St. Clair arrived in July.  The following month, the town of Cincinnati was established. That was where St. Clair made his home.

Next week, the nation’s leaders begin the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.

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Next Episode 345 Constitutional Convention Begins (coming soon)

Previous Episode 343 Shays' Rebellion

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Further Reading

Websites

Northwest Ordinance https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/northwest-ordinance

Northwest Ordinance (1787) [full text of ordinance]: https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/northwest-ordinance

Berkhofer, Robert F. “Americans versus Indians: The Northwest Ordinance, Territory Making, and Native Americans.” Indiana Magazine of History, vol. 84, no. 1, 1988, pp. 90–108. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27791142

HEGRENESS, MATTHEW J. “An Organic Law Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Northwest Ordinance as the Source of Rights, Privileges, and Immunities.” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 120, no. 7, 2011, pp. 1820–84. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41149580

Hill, Robert S. “Federalism, Republicanism, and the Northwest Ordinance.” Publius, vol. 18, no. 4, 1988, pp. 41–52. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3330332

Hulbert, Archer Butler. “The Methods and Operations of the Scioto Group of Speculators.” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, vol. 2, no. 1, 1915, pp. 56–73. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1889105

Witgen, Michael. “A Nation of Settlers: The Early American Republic and the Colonization of the Northwest Territory.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 76, no. 3, 2019, pp. 391–98. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.5309/willmaryquar.76.3.0391

Background Information: Historical Information: Ohio Company of Associates https://library.marietta.edu/c.php?g=693159&p=4910822

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

The records of the original proceedings of the Ohio company, Marietta Historical Commission, 1917. 

Laws of the territory of the United States northwest of the river Ohio: adopted and published at a session of the legislature begun in the town of Cincinnati, Edmund Freeman, 1798. 

Cutler, Julia P. The founders of Ohio: brief sketches of the forty-eight pioneers, Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1888. 

Cutler, William P. Life, Journals and Correspondence of Rev. Manasseh Cutler, LL. D, Vol. 1, Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co. 1888. 

Dawes, E.C. The beginning of the Ohio Company, Cincinnati: Peter G. Thompson, 1882. 

Hulbert, Archer B. “The Methods and Operations of the Scioto Group of Speculators” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. Part 1 and Part 2, 1915.

Jarrold, Rachel Marian Arthur St. Clair: Governor of the Northwest Territory 1787-1802, Univ. of Illinois (Master’s Thesis) 1909. 

Phillips, Philip Lee The first map and description of Ohio, 1787 by Manasseh Cutler, Washington: W.H. Lowdermilk & Co. 1918. 

Taylor, Robert M. (ed) The Northwest Ordinance, 1787: A Bicentennial Handbook, Indiana Historical Society, 1987.

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Alexander, Robert The Northwest Ordinance: Constitutional Politics and the Theft of Native Land, Mcfarland, 2017. 

Lindley, Harlow (ed) History of the Ordinance of 1787 and the Old Northwest Territory, Kesseinger Publishing, 1937 (borrow on archive.org). 

Onuf, Peter S. Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance, Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1987 (borrow on archive.org

Sakolski, Aaron Land Tenure and Land Taxation in America, Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1957 (available on cooperative-individualism.org).

Taylor, Robert M. The Northwest Ordinance, 1787: A Bicentennial Handbook, Indiana Historical Society, 1987 (borrow on archive.org). 

Williams, Frederick D. (ed) The Northwest Ordinance: Essays on its Formulation, Provisions, and Legacy, Michigan State Univ. Press, 1989 (borrow on Archive.org). 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

Sunday, February 23, 2025

AR-SP30 Defending Fort Stanwix, with Larry Kidder



The following is an AI assisted summary of my live discussion with Larry Kidder, author of the book Defending Fort Stanwix.  The discussion took place on Zoom and was open to all member of the American Revolution Podcast.

Key points from the discussion include:

  • Background on Fort Stanwix The fort was originally built by the British in 1758 during the French and Indian War and later abandoned. It was rebuilt by the Americans in 1776 when the revolution broke out due to the presence of loyalists in the Mohawk River Valley. The fort was strategically important as it was built in the middle of the Oneida nation, in a portage area that served as a key transportation route between the Mohawk River and Lake Ontario.
  • The Siege of Fort Stanwix In August 1777, General Barry St. Leger led a British force, including loyalists and Iroquois warriors, to besiege Fort Stanwix as part of a larger strategy to divide the colonies. The fort was defended by the Third New York Regiment under Colonel Peter Gansevoort, aided by Oneida allies. St. Leger's army was supposed to divert American troops from Burgoyne, but Burgoyne never made it. The fort did not surrender despite being under siege.
  • Key Events During the Siege St. Leger demanded the fort's surrender, but the Americans refused. An attempt to relieve the fort led to the Battle of Oriskany, a deadly civil war battle between local loyalists and patriots. A sortie by American forces under Lieutenant Colonel Marinus Willett resulted in the looting of British camps, which angered British Indian allies.
  • The Relief of Fort Stanwix Benedict Arnold spread word of a large relief force, leading St. Leger and his forces to retreat on August 22, 1777. Benedict Arnold's actions and the defense of Fort Stanwix played a crucial role in the failure of the British campaign and contributed to Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga.
  • Aftermath Fort Stanwix continued to be used for military purposes and as a site for conferences and treaties, including the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. The fort was eventually abandoned in 1781 due to weather damage. The fort was reconstructed in Rome, New York, during the Great Depression and became a national monument.
  • Civil War nature of the Revolution The podcast emphasizes the civil war aspects of the conflict, with communities and families divided, particularly in the Mohawk Valley.
  • The role of the Oneida The Oneida's support for the Americans was vital, and they played a key role as scouts and messengers.
  • Discussion of St. Ledger St. Ledger's background, motivations, and actions are examined, including his limited experience in wilderness warfare and his overconfidence.

- - -


Order the book: Defending Fort Stanwix, by William "Larry" Kidder.


Other books by Kidder:


The Revolutionary World of a Free Black Man: Jacob Francis: 1754-1836, 2021


Ten Crucial Days: Washington's Vision for Victory Unfolds, 2019.


Crossroads of the Revolution: Trenton 1774-1783, 2017.


Visit Larry's website at wlkidderhistorian.com,


- -


To receive invitations to future live events, join my mailing list, https://mailchi.mp/d3445a9cd244/american-revolution-podcast-by-michael-troy


or become a member on Patreon.com: https://www.patreon.com/amrevpodcast

Sunday, February 16, 2025

ARP343 Shays' Rebellion


Last week we looked at the severe economic crisis caused by the post war economic depression.  Money shortages and the demands to repay war debts were making life difficult for almost everyone.

Massachusetts Money Problems

With the Revolutionary war at an end, Massachusetts was dealing with the problems on peace.  The economy was in a post-war depression that pitted the merchant creditors, who mostly live in or around Boston, against the debtor farmers in the western part of the state.

Fight during Shays Rebellion
Part of the economic problem was an inability to engage in much of the pre-war trade.  Merchants were able to import British goods, but could not export most of their products to Britain or its colonies.  British merchants, which had trouble collecting on old debts, insisted on cash payments, leading to a drain on what little gold and silver remained in the state.

In the western part of the state, farming was the prime economic engine.  While the farms were rather productive, no one had any money to buy any of the farm products.  Most exchanges were done through barter.  Many farmers had borrowed in order to increase production during the war.  It was part of the effort to feed the army.  With the war over and demand for crops down, prices plummeted.

Many farmers who had returned from the war had been issued paper money or certificates, which were not worth anything close to face value.  Most of them sold their paper at 10 to 15 percent of face value.

By the middle of the 1780’s a financial crisis was developing.  Eastern merchants were getting squeezed for cash by British merchants.  They were unable to sell most of their goods outside of Massachusetts.  Merchants began to put the squeeze on farmers for repayment of debts, in cash, so that the merchants could pay their debts to suppliers in London.

On top of that, state debt was about 15x the size of the debt before the war, at about £1.5 million, at a time when the states annual tax receipts were about £60,000.

John Hancock had served as governor of Massachusetts since the adoption of the state constitution in 1780.  He won reelection overwhelmingly each year.

Open Protest

Political protests, of course, were nothing new in Massachusetts. The patriot leaders had been protest leaders themselves before the war.  

Even before the war ended, western farmers began protesting economic conditions.  Minister Samuel Ely led a revolt in Hampshire county.  In 1782, shortly after Massachusetts passed the Tender Act, requiring all taxes  be paid in cash, farmers found themselves unable to pay.  Much like protesters had done during the colonial era, Ely led a mob that shut down the county courts, preventing them from seizing properties or jailing debtors.

Ely had been an itinerant preacher during the war.  He roamed around Connecticut, Massachusetts,and Vermont.  While he did not formally join the army, he served as a volunteer at the battle of Bennington.  He became an early leader of the protest movement in western Massachusetts, where he called for the overthrow of the Massachusetts Constitution.

After Ely’s mob shut down the courts, authorities arrested him and brought him to Springfield for trial.  A court fined him £50 and sentenced him to six months in jail.  About fifty local militia men formed up, marched on the jail, and forced Ely’s release.  Ely fled to the wilderness in Vermont, where he evaded capture.

Ely soon got involved in land disputes in Vermont, getting himself arrested there, charged with being a “pernicious and seditious man” who was disturbing the peace.  Vermont had its own problems, still fighting to be an independent state.  It did not want to involve itself in Massachusetts’ tax fights.  Officials banished Ely and turned him over to authorities in Massachusetts.  He ended in Castle William in Boston Harbor, where his friends could not conduct another jailbreak.  

Realizing Ely represented a political movement, politicians did not want to make him a martyr. After he requested clemency, citing the conditions of his imprisonment, the legislature voted to have him released on bond. More than 500 farmers had engaged in the illegal actions.  Only three were arrested and those were soon released.

The Ely revolt in 1782 brought attention to the plight of western farmers.  Despite this, many believed this sort of lawlessness needed to be treated as a criminal matter.  The law and order crowd would not tolerate disruption of the courts and legal process.  Even Samuel Adams, who had led mobs in the colonial era, made a distinction between the colonial protests which he led, and protests against a democratically elected government with laws made by representatives of the people, including himself.

Adams, along with former Continental General Artemas Ward, travelled to western Massachusetts in the summer of 1783 to meet with local officials.  They heard complaints about high taxes and the money shortages that threatened farmers’ property.  

The state government eventually reduced taxes by deferring the repayment of some state debt.  Governor John Hancock also pushed for the creation of more paper money, which increased the money supply, but also led to inflation.

Hancock v. Adams

As I discussed last week, the debtor farmers loved inflation since it made it easier to repay their debts.  The merchants in the east, however, objected to policies that allowed repayment of debts in depreciated currency.

Hancock had served as governor of the state since the implementation of the Constitution in 1780.  He was elected with over 90% of the vote, and re-elected each year with overwhelming numbers.  Hancock did have his detractors though.  Among them was Samuel Adams.

Hancock and Adams had worked well together before and during much of the war.  Adams had been happy to use Hancock’s money for the movement and allow Hancock to serve in high ceremonial positions.  However, when Adams expected to be elected governor in 1780, and the people chose Hancock instead, the two men became more adversarial.  Hancock wanted to be loved by all, and refused to take any controversial positions that might hurt him with the voters. By contrast, Adams wanted to take action to pay down the state war debts and to crack down on protesters like Ely who threatened the state’s law and order.

Adams and Hancock also had different visions for the state.  Adams had a rather puritanical view of society.  He believed that people should live simply and frugally.  He opposed the payment of pensions to Continental officers and the creation of the Society of the Cincinnati as these would create a privileged class within the republic  Adams blamed the economic problem, not on an unfair economic system that imposed high taxes on farms and restricted the money supply, but rather on “the habits of luxury contracted  in the late war, from the vast quantity of goods imported” as well as “receiving and giving unlimited credit.”  For Adams, reforming economic and tax policies was not the answer.  People had to “lay aside the destructive fashions and expensive superfluities of the day; be sober, temperate, and industrious.”

Despite the fact that Hancock was a rich merchant, he refused to support the political demands of the merchant class, and Adams.  The merchants wanted to pay down state debt.  Many of them held that state debt and would get paid when the state collected the money.  They also greatly opposed paper money policies that meant they would be repaid with depreciated money.  

Adams backed the merchants.  Hancock backed the farmers. Another issue that divided the men was a new social club in Boston that allowed card playing and dancing in the evening.  Adams saw this as part of the moral collapse of society, while Hancock seemed to enjoy such distractions.

James Bowdoin

One of the leading merchants that allied himself with Adams’ harsher economic policies was James Bowdoin.  Bowdoin had been a prominent official in the colonial era, even sitting on the Governor's Council before that became controversial.  He eventually got kicked off the Council for his support of the patriot cause.  Bowdoin had been named a delegate to the First Continental Congress, but declined the appointment citing the poor health of both his wife and himself.  For a time, early in the war, he served as president of the executive council of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, and later as President of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention. 

In 1780, Bowdoin ran against Hancock for governor.  He lost in a landslide.  This trouncing was repeated for several more elections. Hancock always won in a landslide with Bowdoin failing to get even 10% of the vote in any election. Hancock’s support dwindled with each election, but remained strong.  His weakest showing in 1784 still gave him over two-thirds of the popular vote.

Congress’ Requisition Act of 1785, which we discussed last week, made the fight between the merchants and farmers even more contentious.  The only way the state could meet the demands, was by greatly increasing taxes on its citizens.  Feeling the pressure, Hancock offered to resign.  By some accounts, this was a political ploy, expecting most of the establishment to beg him to stay in office.  When that did not happen, Hancock did resign, citing health problems.

Lieutenant Governor Thomas Cushing took up the role and ran in the 1786 elections.  Cushing generally supported Hancock’s positions, but lacked any real political charisma.  He had only become lieutenant governor in 1780 after Bowdoin and James Warren both rejected the position.

With Hancock off the ticket, Bowdoin made another real effort to win election as governor.  Samuel Adams backed Bowdoin.  Former Continental General Benjamin Lincoln also allowed himself to be put forward as a candidate.

Bowdoin received the most votes with about 44%.  Since no candidate received a majority, the legislature made the choice, selecting Bowdoin.

With Adams’ support, Governor Bowdoin put in place a number of policies that the eastern establishment had been demanding for years.  He raised taxes in order to pay off debt, and also increased enforcement for the collection of back taxes.  He refused to loosen the money supply to help anyone pay these taxes.

The result was that many farmers, even those with extremely productive farms, faced the possibility that their land could be seized for non-payment of taxes or other debts.  The farmers themselves faced the possibility of debtors' prison.

Taxes in 1786 were more than ten times what they were before the Revolutionary War began.  Poll taxes required everyone to pay the same amount.  So a wealthy merchant like John Hancock owed the same $1.75 that was also paid by a laborer earning 20 or 30 cents a day.  In addition, property taxes were based on acres of land, not the land’s value.  Western farmers often had large farms with land that was not particularly valuable as it was not suited for farming.  Their tax burden was a far larger portion of the value of their land than someone who owned a smaller but more valuable property in the east.

In some towns, the number of lawsuits for debt collection quadrupled during this time.  The number of men in debtor’s prison increased tenfold.  In Worcester, for example, debtors made up more than three-quarters of all prisoners.

Rebellion

The western farmers sent petitions and demanded relief to these policies.  They needed a fairer tax system and the issuance of more paper money..  After the legislature adjourned in July without taking action on these petitions, the petitioners turned into protesters.

On August 29, 1786, a group of protestors prevented the Northampton County Court from sitting.  The protesters called themselves Regulators, a reference to the Regulator movement of North Carolina, where western farmers had fought against unfair eastern tax policies in that state in the 1760s.

A week later, on September 5, similar protests shut down the courts in Worcester.  Officials attempted to call out the local militia to restore order and open the courts, but the militia failed to turn out.  Most of the militia were either sympathetic to the cause of the protesters, or were themselves protesters.

Daniel Shays

As the protesters organized themselves, many leaders, often militia officers, commanded the men and kept the protests organized.  Over time, Daniel Shays emerged as the leader of the movement. 

Shays had been born in Massachusetts to Irish immigrants.  He was a militia sergeant before the war.  His war service began on the day of Lexington and Concord.  Although he did not see combat personally that day, his company joined the siege of Boston.  He saw action at Bunker Hill and was soon commissioned a lieutenant for his actions on that day.  In 1776, joined the Continental Army and served in the New York campaign.  By 1777 he was serving as a captain in a Massachusetts regiment.  He served at Saratoga under General Benjamin Lincoln.  In 1779 he participated in the much celebrated raid on Stoney Point under Anthony Wayne.  In 1780. Shays served under the Marquis de Lafayette, and helped fend off a British landing in New Jersey.  It was around this time that Lafayette honored Shays with a sword.  Later that year Captain Shays was one of the officers assigned to guard Major John Andre after Arnold’s betrayal.  All of this is to say that Shays had a long and honorable record during the war.

Almost two weeks after Andre’s execution, Shays resigned his commission and returned home.  Like most Continental officers, Shays had not been paid during most of his service and was broke.  In 1777, he was forced to sell a farm in New Hampshire.  Shortly before his resignation, He also sold the sword that Lafayette had given him, a very controversial act among his fellow officers. 

After he returned home to Pelham, Massachusetts, in October, 1780, he was hit with a lawsuit for unpaid debts.  He was forced to sell more land to repay his debts.   

Despite his money problems, Shays was a prominent member of the community and well respected for his military service.  He sat on the local committee of safety. When the 1786 mass meeting decided to shut down the Northampton Courts, Shays accepted appointment to a committee to raise and equip a force of regulators.  His bearing and experience as an officer made him a natural leader.  By some accounts, Shays sent men to request that Ethan Allen take command of the rebellion, but Allen refused.

Although most people on both sides saw Shays as the leader, he himself rejected that title.  Shays was reluctantly drawn into the fight but did command those who joined to serve under him.  When the courts tried to resume business at the end of September, Shays led men again to keep the Northampton courts closed.

Response

This time, officials were prepared for the protests. William Shepard was also a veteran of the Continental Army.  By this time (1786) he was serving in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and as a general in the state militia.  Shepard took 300 friendly militia to the courthouse in Springfield.  When others arrived to shut down the courts, they found themselves pretty evenly matched.  While the protestors demonstrated, they did not attempt to seize the building.  Even so, the judges adjourned without hearing any cases.

After this incident, Shepard was able to recruit more militia and moved to the Springfield Armory as a defensive position.

The government in Boston condemned these attacks on law and order.  Governor Bowdoin called on the legislature to "vindicate the insulted dignity of government." Samuel Adams claimed that the British were behind these plots and were inciting treason.  Even though these tactics were very similar to those Adams had used against the British years earlier, Adams believed this case was different. Such protests, in his view, were appropriate against a colonial government appointed by outsiders.  But going against the elected government of the people was deserving of the death penalty.  Adams helped push through a new Riot Act, and a resolution to suspend habeas corpus so that authorities could more easily take on the rebellion.  

Governor Bowdoin did not have enough money to call out a full militia army.  He also could not call on the Continental Army since there no longer was one.  Even so, the government issued arrest warrants for leaders, and managed to capture a few of them in November.

In January, 1787, Governor Bowdoin suggested raising a privately financed army.  Eastern merchants who supported the effort to collect on the debts owed to them were happy to pay.  Bowdoin raised over £6,000 from 125 wealthy merchants. With the money the government raised an army of 3000 men from the eastern part of the state.

While Shays and the other leaders had organized their forces, they needed more weapons to contest the new army being brought against them.  The only source of such weapons in the area was the Springfield Armory, where Congress had stored weapons from the Revolutionary war.  As I mentioned, the pro-government militia under Shepard had already taken possession of the armory and now had a force of about 1200 men.

Three different groups of rebels agreed to attack the armory on January 25.  One of the groups later sent a note saying they could not make it.  The second leader, Eli Parsons, got the note and paused his attack.  But Shays did not get the notice and marched his column toward the armory.

Shapard first attempted to discourage the attackers by firing over their heads.  When that did not work, he ordered cannons to fire grapeshot into the advancing line.  With that, the attack collapsed and the attackers fled.  

General Benjamin Lincoln had taken command of the 3000 man militia army that was tasked with crushing the rebellion.  Shays sent a messenger to his old commander, requesting a short truce until the legislature could act on their petition.  Instead, Lincoln took his army on a night march that raided Shays’ camp on February 4, and scattered the rebels.  Some were captured, but many escaped.  Shays managed to make his way to Vermont where he remained in hiding.

Lincoln’s militia army returned home.  After that, there was one final raid in late February in Sheffield Massachusetts.  Local militia put down the raid, but at a loss of one man killed on each side, and dozens wounded.

Aftermath

With the rebellion at an end, Gov. Bowdoin remained vengeful.  He offered a reward for the capture of Shays and got the legislature to pass the Disqualification Act that prevented any of the rebels from running for office.

Despite those efforts, anger at state policies caused Bowdoin to be thrown out of office in the next state elections two months later.  John Hancock returned as governor.  He cut taxes and placed a moratorium on debts.  This seemed to calm the crisis.

Two rebel leaders, John Bly and Charles Rose, were hanged in December.  Shays remained in hiding in Vermont until he received a pardon in 1788.

Next week, we’ll return to the Continental Congress, as it attempts to solve many of the country’s economic problems with passage of the Northwest Ordinance.

- - -

Next Episode 344 Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (coming soon)

Previous Episode 342 Paper Money Riot

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

 Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast

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Further Reading

Websites

The Requisition of 1785 and Shays’s Rebellion, 1786–1787 https://digfir-published.macmillanusa.com/tap6e/tap6e_ch8_19.html

Shays’ Rebellion: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/shays-rebellion

The Events and Impact of Shays’s Rebellion: https://csac.history.wisc.edu/document-collections/confederation-period/shays-rebellion

Griffiths, Bruce D. “Samuel Adams and John Hancock: The Relationship that Determined the Formation of America” University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, Masters Thesis, 2018. https://scholarworks.utrgv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1275&context=etd

Vaughan, Alden T. “The ‘Horrid and Unnatural Rebellion’ of Daniel Shays” American Heritage: June 1966, vol. XVII, no. 4. https://www.americanheritage.com/horrid-and-unnatural-rebellion-daniel-shays

“Shays’s Rebellion.” The American Historical Review, vol. 36, no. 4, 1931, pp. 776–78. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1838006

“Documents Relating to the Shays Rebellion, 1787.” The American Historical Review, vol. 2, no. 4, 1897, pp. 693–99. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1833986

Feer, Robert A. “Shays’s Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 3, 1969, pp. 388–410. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/363616.

Moody, Robert E. “Samuel Ely: Forerunner of Shays.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, 1932, pp. 105–34. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/359493

Parker, Rachel R. “Shays’ Rebellion: An Episode in American State-Making.” Sociological Perspectives, vol. 34, no. 1, 1991, pp. 95–113. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1389145

Pencak, William. “Samuel Adams and Shays’s Rebellion.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 62, no. 1, 1989, pp. 63–74. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/366210

Pressman, Richard S. “Class Positioning and Shays’ Rebellion: Resolving the Contradictions of ‘The Contrast.’” Early American Literature, vol. 21, no. 2, 1986, pp. 87–102. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25056617

Smith, Jonathan. “The Depression of 1785 and Daniel Shays’ Rebellion.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 1, 1948, pp. 77–94. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1920948

Warren, Joseph Parker. “The Confederation and the Shays Rebellion.” The American Historical Review, vol. 11, no. 1, 1905, pp. 42–67. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1832364

A sermon, preached in Lenox in the county of Berkshire, and Commonwealth of Massachusetts, December 6, 1787; at the execution of John Bly and Charles Rose: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=evans;cc=evans;rgn=main;view=text;idno=N16785.0001.001

Video: Daniel Bullen: Shay's Honorable Rebellion, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zIcyDT1aqik

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Holland, J. G. History of Western Massachusetts, Springfield: S. Bowles and Co. 1855. 

Noble, John A Few Notes on the Shays Rebellion, Worcester, MA: C. Hamilton, 1903. 

Rivers, George R. R. Captain Shays, a populist of 1786, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1897. 

Vaughan, Alden T. “The ‘Horrid and Unnatural Rebellion’ of Daniel Shays” American Heritage: June 1966, vol. XVII, no. 4, p. 50-53 (borrow only).

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Bullen, Daniel Daniel Shays's Honorable Rebellion: An American Story, Westholme Publishing, 2021.  

Condon, Sean Shays's Rebellion: Authority and Distress in Post-Revolutionary America, Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2015. 

Richards, Leonard L. Shays's Rebellion: The American Revolution's Final Battle, Univ. of Pa. Press, 2002. 

Szatmary, David P. Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian Insurrection, Univ. of Mass Press, 1980. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.

 

Sunday, February 9, 2025

ARP342 Paper Money Riots


Last week we discussed the efforts by several national leaders to address the ongoing economic crisis caused by trade and commerce issues.  This week, I want to take a closer look at some of the problems that people were actually facing.

Paper Money

Money in the 18th century typically consisted of specie.  That is a precious metal such as gold or silver, or copper, which could hold its value simply based on the fact that there was a limited supply of it.  During the colonial era, Britain’s economic system encouraged the extraction of specie from the colonies back to Britain.  As a result, money shortages were a common problem.

Rhode Island Ten Shilling Note, 1786
The colonial solution to this was to issue paper money.  These were essentially notes that carried with them some promise that they could eventually be exchanged for certain other items, such as specie, or other items of value.  For example, in Virginia some notes were tied to the value of tobacco.  In many cases, the notes were never exchanged but simply traded like regular money.  Governments would often accept this paper money for payment of taxes as a way to remove it from circulation.

The obvious problem with paper money was that the holder could never be 100% certain that it could be exchanged as promised for something with real value.  These were essentially IOU notes that were only as good as the word, and the economic viability, of whoever was issuing the notes.  Notes from the Bank of England retained their value because people had faith that the bank would exchange the notes and was in no danger of bankruptcy.

Many colonies had issued notes at various times.  Problems arose when people were not confident of full repayment.  Notes would then trade at a discount.  For example, if there was a 50/50 chance of repayment, someone might accept the notes at fifty cents on the dollar.  So if you wanted to buy something for a shilling, you might have to pay for it with a two shilling note.  This was known as a discount rate.  The discount rates of notes went up and down all the time, and even might vary from vendor to vendor.  You would have to negotiate the value of your money.  

During the colonial era, this often became an issue when colonists tried to pay debts to merchants in Britain with colonial notes.  Merchants wanted to be paid in pounds sterling and did not want to have to deal with these weird colonial notes.  They brought their complaints to the government, which often restricted the ability of colonial governments to issue paper money.

During the revolutionary war, the Continental Congress, and the states, were free of any such restrictions from London.  They freely issued paper money to fund the war and other government expenses.  Since there was no guarantee that they would win the war, or that they would pay off these notes even if they did win, the notes almost immediately began trading at a deep discount, which got even worse as the governments printed even more money.  Officials sometimes tried to force merchants to accept the paper at face value, and also often accepted it at face value for payment of taxes.

These mandates often led merchants to ruin.  Let’s say you owed someone £100.  If you could go out and buy £100 worth of notes for £1 then pay off your debt with them, you came out ahead. The poor creditor who lent you  £100 worth of real money essentially lost 99% of it.  This led to the obvious result that no one wanted to lend money or credit of any kind.  Merchants who were forced to sell their goods and accept paper at face value simply stopped selling their goods.  During the war, this was treated as being unpatriotic and against the war effort, but patriotism was not a good enough reason for merchants to allow themselves to go bankrupt.

Some of the notes issued during the war operated more like war bonds.  In an effort to get people to accept them, some notes would come with a date certain when they could be exchanged for specie, and some even offered interest on the money.  Even with these though, their value depended on how much you trusted the issuer to keep its promise.

When the war ended, the army was largely paid off with paper.  Soldiers needed money right away so they often spent their paper money at deep discounts, perhaps getting only ten cents on the dollar, or even less.  The bulk of these notes ended up in the hands of speculators.  These were men who thought they had a pretty good idea of their chances of being able to redeem these notes. Some speculators were government officials themselves who would have a say in how and when these notes would get redeemed.

This situation deeply divided people in many states.  For the merchants, they had taken great risk by buying up the notes offering at least some money to people who would otherwise have nothing.  Their willingness to accept this risk meant that they should be rewarded by having the government pay off its notes to them in full as had been promised when it issued the notes.

For the farmers, many of whom had gone to war for years, receiving almost none of their promised pay and having given up years of labor on their farms when they could have been building up their own wealth, the idea that they should have to hand over everything they owned in order to pay off already wealthy merchants seemed to be the height of injustice.  Many farmers had borrowed money during the war to produce food for the army.  When the war ended and the army stopped buying food, they had trouble selling their crops, while the lenders wanted those loans paid off.

For most farmers, the solution was to have the government issue more paper money.  This would allow them to pay off their debts and taxes in depreciated currency, much like the currency they had been receiving for their labor for years.  Merchants obviously opposed this idea since they wanted to get paid with real money and stop carrying all these notes of dubious and speculative value.

Requisition Act of 1785

The post-war recession and money shortages were causing problems everywhere.  To make matters worse, Congress passed the Requisition Act of 1785.  During the war, and desperate for cash, Congress had been borrowing money wherever it could find any.  Much of it came from European governments and banks, who wanted to be paid back.  Defaulting on such loans could result in loss of trade or seizure of property. In some cases during this time period, default by a government could result in war.

While things had not reached that state yet, Congress was obligated to make payments.  Its hope to sell some western lands was still several years away.  It attempted to set up federal tariffs, but the states refused to approve this plan. The only revenue source it had was to requisition money from the states.  Congress had been trying to do this for years, with limited success.  In 1784, the state requisitions totaled about $750,000.  In 1785, this amount quadrupled to $3 million.  About 30% of the money was needed to run the government.  Another 30% was required for repayments to foreign lenders.  This portion had to be paid in specie.  The other 40% would go to repay Americans who held government bonds.  Much of these bonds were interest payments on Commutation certificates, those papers issued to officers at the end of the war in exchange for having to give up their promised pensions.

Up until this time, many states had been paying interest on commutation certificates issued by Congress directly to the certificate holders in their states, and deducting that amount from what they paid to Congress in the Requisition.  The 1785 Requisition explicitly banned this practice.

The Requisition was like throwing gasoline on an economic fire.  The economic burden divided Americans, and resulted in a variety of responses.  New Jersey responded with a “I got your requisition right here” and refused any payment.  Connecticut similarly refused payment.  Congress could not force the issue.  After all, it had no courts, no police, no army.

In other states, where influential merchants held a great deal of bonds that were due to be repaid through these taxes, support for paying the requisition was much stronger.  Funds would have to be raised through higher taxes.  This made the already almost-bankrupt farmers even madder, but the merchants who would be paid through this scheme saw it as a necessary step to repay debts.

Rhode Island Response

The case of Rhode Island is a good example of the problem.  The state debt from the war was massive.  Interest payments alone were over £10,000 per year.  By comparison, the entire government budget before the war was only about £2000.  The state had no western lands to sell and largely had to rely on taxes to repay both state debts and Congress’ requisitions.

The majority of the Rhode Island government was controlled by supporters of the merchants who had speculated heavily on notes and wanted to see these repaid in full.  It had approved an impost in 1783, which made all imports much more expensive for its citizens.  It even agreed to send two delegates to the Annapolis convention that I discussed last week, but the delegates did not arrive until after the convention had ended.

Like everyone else, Rhode Island was suffering from the post-war depression.  The economic demands on the state divided them into two parties, the merchants who wanted full debt repayment using specie, and indebted farmers who wanted to get out of debt by having the state issue heavily devalued paper money.

Beginning in 1784, town meetings began sending petitions to the legislature, demanding the issuance of more paper money.  The merchant controlled Assembly rejected these demands.  In 1786, they responded to petitions by calling for all town meetings across the state to send their views on the issue.  Ninety percent of the meetings responded with a demand for more paper money.  The pro-merchant legislators were shocked by this outcome and, in March, 1786 still overwhelmingly rejected a plan to issue more paper.

The next month, Rhode Island held its annual elections.  The pro-paper voters tossed out most of the legislature and replaced them with officials willing to carry out their demands.  When the new Assembly met in May, it suspended the last tax collection and authorized the emission of £100,000 of paper money.  The money would flood into the economy through loans given to land owners.  The law further mandated that the paper was legal tender.  The state set up a system where if you owed someone money, you could just leave the money with the court.  If the creditor refused to accept it, the government would keep the money and consider the debt paid.  This forced creditors to accept the money.  Later, the legislature added a £100 fine for refusal to accept the paper.  That was roughly two years wages for the typical laborer.  Multiple violations could result in a creditor losing the right to vote.  It also created a special court to rule on paper money issues, with no jury and no appeal.

Despite these efforts, merchants did everything they could to avoid having debts repaid in paper that they knew would trade at depreciated levels.  Congress refused to accept the paper money for payment of its requisition.

At one point with merchants threatening to abandon the state entirely, the government considered a plan to take over most private businesses: ships, warehouses, waves, shipyards, etc. and run it on its own.  It also considered requiring an oath to support paper money.  Refusal could result in a loss of voting rights or the right to run for office.  One newspaper reported a proposed bill that would simply cancel all debts and redistribute all wealth equally among the people, with the process taking place every 13 years.  While that did not happen, the legislature did force the repayment of one-fourth of all state debt with paper money.

The indebted farmers were happy with the plan and overwhelmingly reelected the legislators the following year.  The plan managed to greatly reduce both state debt and private debt at the expense of wealthy merchants who most people didn’t like anyway. Over time, however, the paper money began to drag down the economy as merchants left the state or found ways to avoid the paper.  In 1789, the legal tender mandate was dropped and the paper money traded at a depreciated rate of about seven cents on the dollar.

Exeter Riot

Several neighboring states looked at Rhode Island’s solution with great interest.  Wealthy merchants realized they could be effectively stripped of their property if a majority of voters decided to do so.  By contrast indebted New England farmers thought this was a great solution to correct massive problems and inequalities that prevented them from making a living as productive farmers.  

No other state was as extreme as Rhode Island.  North Carolina also issued a currency that quickly depreciated.  New Jersey and Georgia also issued paper which saw substantial, but not crazy levels of depreciation.

New York, Pennsylvania and South Carolina issued paper currencies that depreciated a little, but largely worked.  They were largely used to provide loans to cash strapped farmers.  New York and Pennsylvania even used their money to buy Continental securities held by their citizens, thus making those states creditors of Congress.  

The divisions between creditors and debtors were still very real, and getting worse with the continuing economic hardships.  In New Hampshire, the dispute nearly led to civil war.  As in other states, farmers, feeling the pinch, first tried to address the issue at town meetings and through petitions to the legislature.  In many cases, debtors were recently returned veterans who found themselves being thrown into debtor’s prison for debts they or their family had incurred while in the army.  As early as 1782, armed rioters in the town of Keene shut down a courthouse to prevent the court from hearing detb cases.  The state’s attorney general rode to the scene personally.  The AG at the time was former Continental General John Sullivan, who had left the army in 1780.  He served a few years in Congress, but returned to New Hampshire in 1781, shortly after having to take a personal loan from the French Ambassador to cover his own debts.

Sullivan showed up at the Keen riots in 1782 wearing his Continental Army uniform.  Many of the rioters were former soldiers who had served under him.  He was able to use their respect for him to get the protesters to disperse.  The following day, he personally handled all the debt cases before the court, agreeing to continue any case where both parties were not ready to proceed.  

That resolved the immediate crisis, but the larger problem only grew.  Debts forced many farmers to sell their farms.  Many also faced debtor’s prison.  While they sent multiple petitions for relief, primarily in the form of requesting more paper money, the legislature, controlled by the supporters of merchant creditors, ignored the petitions.

In September, the legislature was meeting in Exeter locals in nearby Kingston hatched plan to march on the legislature and force them to pass a bill for paper money.  The men, former war veterans, formed a column of 200 and marched to Exeter. There, they surrounded the building where the legislature normally met.  On this day, however, a judge was holding court there.  So when the men surrounded the building the court simply ignored them and continued with its business.  Eventually, the protesters discover the legislature was meeting in a nearby church.  As they marched over, they were confronted by a growing mob of locals who sought to defend the legislature.

The men managed to surround the church and refused to let anyone in or out.  Once again former General Sullivan, by this time President of New Hampshire, came out to engage the protesters.  While he was in negotiations, the locals, militiamen themselves, formed up their own military column.  They managed to convey the false idea that they were bringing artillery, which caused the protesters to withdraw, but only across the river, where they set up camp.

Using the respite, Sullivan sent out messengers to call out militia in other towns in the area.  By the next morning, about 2000 militia marched to Exeter, then surrounded the protesters’ camp.  A few shots were fired, but it appears no one was killed or seriously injured. 

The three leaders of the protest were indicted on charges of treason.  However, they were immediately pardoned.  Several militia officers who had participated were stripped of their commissions.

The militia sent a request for towns to vote on the issue of paper money.  Perhaps after seeing the chaos such policies were creating in Rhode Island, the majority voted against paper money.  Sullivan banned the use of conventions to petition the legislature, and sought authority to call out the militia when needed.

While the crisis in New Hampshire ended without bloodshed, that would not be the case in Massachusetts.

Next week: we will take a look at the situation in Massachusetts, where Daniel Shays starts a rebellion.

- - -

Next Episode 343 Shays' Rebellion (coming soon)

Previous Episode 341 Annapolis Convention

 Contact me via email at mtroy.history@gmail.com

 Follow the podcast on Twitter @AmRevPodcast

 Join the Facebook group, American Revolution Podcast 

 Join American Revolution Podcast on Quora 
 
Discuss the AmRev Podcast on Reddit

American Revolution Podcast Merch!

T-shirts, hoodies, mugs, pillows, totes, notebooks, wall art, and more.  Get your favorite American Revolution logo today.  Help support this podcast.  http://tee.pub/lic/AmRevPodcast


American Revolution Podcast is distributed 100% free of charge. If you can chip in to help defray my costs, I'd appreciate whatever you can give.  Make a one time donation through my PayPal account. You may also donate via Venmo (@Michael-Troy-20) or Zelle (send to mtroy1@yahoo.com)


Click here to see my Patreon Page
You can support the American Revolution Podcast as a Patreon subscriber.  This is an option making monthly pledges.  Patreon support will give you access to Podcast extras and help make the podcast a sustainable project.

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Help Support this podcast on "BuyMeACoffee.com"


Visit the American Revolution Podcast Bookshop.  Support local bookstores and this podcast!





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Further Reading

Websites

The Requisition of 1785 and Shays’s Rebellion, 1786–1787 https://digfir-published.macmillanusa.com/tap6e/tap6e_ch8_19.html

Introduction to Ratification in Rhode Island https://csac.history.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/281/2023/12/DC9-13-00-01_R.I.-Essay.pdf

Gross, Robert A. “A Yankee Rebellion? The Regulators, New England, and the New Nation.” The New England Quarterly, vol. 82, no. 1, 2009, pp. 112–35. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20474709

The Paper Money Craze of 1786: https://cdn.theatlantic.com/media/archives/1886/09/58-347/131865758.pdf

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Belknap, Jeremy The History of New Hampshire. Dover: S.C. Stevens and Ela & Wadleigh.

Bell, Charles H. History of the Town of Exeter, New Hampshire. Boston: J.E. Farwell & Co. 1888. 

McClintock, John Norris History of New Hampshire, Boston: B.B. Russell, 1888. 

Sanborn, Franklin B. New Hampshire: An Epitome of Popular Government. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1904. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Conley, Patrick T. First in War, Last in Peace : Rhode Island and the Constitution, 1786-1790, Rhode Island Bicentennial Association, 1986 (borrow on archive.org).

Holton, Woody Unruly Americans and the Origins of the Constitution, Hill and Wang, 2007. 

Stephens, Karl F. Neither the Charm Nor the Luck: Major-General John Sullivan, Outskirts Press, 2009 (borrow on archive.org).

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.