Sunday, August 18, 2024

ARP324 Newburgh Conspiracy


Last week, we covered the effective end to the war in the south, when the British evacuated Charleston, South Carolina in December 1782.  After that, the only significant British presence in the United States was the main army in and around New York City.  

General Washington’s greatest foe in 1782 was the fight against the idea that the war was over.  Over the course of that year, all Americans waited for word from Europe about the peace negotiations.  Officers and men wanted to go home and Congress and the states were sick of paying for an army.

Despite this, Washington faced a very real British army in New York that consisted of thousands of Regulars, Hessians and loyalists.  He needed to have an army that was ready to confront this enemy.  Washington continued to conduct regular drills, rejected most requests for furloughs, and continually hounded Congress for more uniforms, shoes, food, and supplies.

With the British still reeling from the surrender at Yorktown, Washington, and many others, believed that one final blow would end the war more quickly.  In early 1782, Washington was pushing for another joint campaign with the French army under Rochambeau against New York City, or even  possibly Charleston.  

Rochambeau’s Army

In July, Washington received word that the French army that had been encamped near Yorktown since the battle the previous fall, was marching up to New York.  He also received word that a French naval squadron was sailing to North America from the West Indies. 

Washington met with Rochambeau in Philadelphia to discuss a possible fall campaign.  He was disappointed to learn that Rochambeau had no plans for another campaign.  Instead, he simply planned to move the French Army into New York and await word on the peace negotiations.  Still hopeful, The Continental Army moved to Verplanck’s Point, on the east bank of the Hudson River, about a day’s march from the British lines at the northern tip of Manhattan.

Word of the Evacuation of Charleston and the expected evacuation of New York meant that Rochambeau had no interest in sending his army into a fight to take ground that would be given away in a few months.  After a few weeks, the French army marched to Boston. There, the army awaited transports to take them to the West Indies, where they would either invade Jamaica, or perhaps cooperate with Spain on another target.  The French army would depart from Boston on Christmas Day, 1782, headed for the West Indies.

Winter Quarters

Without any military campaign that year, keeping the soldiers busy was critical for other reasons.  Men left with little to do typically turned to drinking and fighting with each other.  A fair percentage of soldiers simply deserted. 

By late 1782, it was not only the enlisted soldiers, but also the officers, who voiced greater discontent.  Unlike enlisted men, officers could resign their commissions and go home.  The ability to keep an army in the field depended on a reliable officer corps.

Earlier in the war, when things were desperate and Congress had no way to pay anyone, Congress passed resolutions offering pensions, eventually offering all officers a pension of half-pay for life if they served until the end of the war.  Many officers were still holding out for that promise.

The growing concern, though, was that Congress would simply refuse to honor that promise, much like it had refused to honor the promises of pay and adequate support while the army was in the field.

The Continental Army went into winter quarters in October of 1782.  The bulk of the army moved north from Verplanck’s Point to an area around the towns of Newbergh and New Windsor, two relatively small communities on the western bank of the Hudson, a few miles north of West Point.  

Enlisted men had to build their own quarters.  Timothy Pickering, the Quartermaster General, procured the use of 1600 acres west of New Windsor to build the winter encampment.  The men would build log huts with 1100 square feet of living space divided among two rooms.  Each cabin would house 16 men ,with one fireplace for heat.  

Those rooms must have been pretty miserable, especially when you consider you were bunking with 15 other men who probably had not had a bath in months.  The men also had a bad habit of urinating inside the house much of the time.  Even if they did not appreciate the health aspects, you would think the stench alone would be enough to discourage that behavior.  Yet it appears to have been a common practice.

Gates Returns

While many soldiers wanted to return home, one officer was returning to duty.  Major General Horatio Gates had left service after his embarrassing performance at the Battle of Camden, South Carolina, in 1780.  After his army’s defeat and Gates fleeing his own army, Congress had suspended his service pending an inquiry.

That inquiry or court martial never materialized, so Gates sat at home in Virginia awaiting a new assignment.  Many in Congress hoped the general would simply resign.  But Gates had no intention of that.  In February 1782, Gates wrote to Washington to congratulate him on Yorktown and to ask about what role he might play in the next campaign.  Washington brushed off Gates with a letter saying that the Secretary of War Benjamin Lincoln, would be responsible for any new assignments.  

That was actually good for Gates because Lincoln and Gates got along well.  Lincoln had served under Gates at Saratoga, and after surrendering an army at Charleston in 1780, Lincoln appreciated a general’s need for rehabilitation.  Lincoln recommended that Gates be returned to active duty.  Gates traveled to Philadelphia to lobby for his new assignment.  A congressional committee made up of Richard Henry Lee, John Rutledge, and Ezekiel Cornell, held hearings with General Gates over several days in August.  Gates managed to round up several officers who supported his return to duty.  

On the committee’s recommendation, Congress repealed its resolution that Gates face a court enquiry and that he return to duty with the main army.  Based on his seniority, Gates was second in command of the Continental Army, behind only George Washington.  After Congress cleared his name, Gates returned home to Virginia for a few weeks.  He then traveled to New York where Washington gave him command of the right wing of the army, in charge of the New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut lines.

Almost as soon as he arrived, Gates started complaining about housing.  Officers typically took over local homes, often forcing the residents to cram themselves into one or two bedrooms.  Gates wanted a house owned by John Ellison.  General Henry Knox had lived there for a while, but it was currently  being used by the Director of the military hospital, Dr. John Cochran.  The doctor refused to vacate, even threatening to challenge Pickering to a duel over the matter.  Pickering, as Quartermaster General, was responsible for procuring Gates’ quarters.  Gates wrote to several delegates in Philadelphia about the matter, before Pickering was finally able to evict Cochran and move Gates into the house.

Petitions and Grievances

While Gates was pleased with his return to duty, other officers remained deeply concerned about the coming end of the war.  Officers were owed back pay.  Many of them had fronted their own money to pay for the needs of those under their command and expected Congress to provide reimbursement.  Many of them had also given up years of service, meaning they were personally bankrupt and had no jobs to return to when the war ended.

Many were relying on the promises of a pension that they had received years earlier. But they already saw that some officers who already retired due to illness or injury, were not receiving their promised pensions.  Many saw that their years of service and sacrifice might be rewarded simply by being discarded, and possibly even facing debtors’ prison.

The officers of the Massachusetts line began working on a strategy to demand their pensions.  They initially planned to send a delegation to Congress, but learned that Congress had already tabled any discussion of pensions until at least January, 1783.  

Instead, they opted to petition the Massachusetts state legislature.  They were pretty confident that Massachusetts would deny their petition.  But that at least meant that when they could petition Congress, that Congress could not give the expected response of "go speak with their state government first."

The officers sent a delegation to Boston in September.  They got the runaround for several months.  Eventually they learned that Samuel Osgood, a Massachusetts delegate to the Continental Congress, had written state officials to inform them that if they offered any pensions, they would not get any credit toward the state’s share of war expenses.  The Massachusetts legislature then tabled their own discussion of pensions in order to wait and see what Congress would do.

After returning to camp, the Massachusetts officers recruited General Henry Knox to voice their concerns.  They also reached out to officers from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and New Hampshire .  The officers of the Rhode Island line, who were stationed in Albany, would join the group later.

The Knox Committee asked officers to submit their complaints.  Most of the complaints centered around the obvious: lack of pay, poor living standards, and the lack of confidence that they would receive their promised pensions.  Most officers noted that they planned to resign soon if these matters were not addressed to their satisfaction.

The Committee met at Hortons Tavern in New Windsor during late November and early December, in an attempt to summarize the complaints into a single petition.  The committee documents essentially said that in joining the Army, they had made a contract. The government was not keeping up its obligations.  As they continued to work on drafts, the focused more on the frustration and misery that the men were feeling.

In December, the committee finalized its Memorial to Congress. The point of the document the level of desperation that the army was reaching.  One famously quoted paragraph reads: 

We have borne all that men can bear; our property is expended, our private resources are at an end, and our friends are wearied out and disgusted with our incessant applications. We therefore most seriously and earnestly beg that a supply of money may be forwarded to the army as soon as possible. The uneasiness of the soldiers, for want of pay, is great and dangerous; any further experiments on their patience may have fatal effects.

Fourteen officers, including Henry Knox and three other generals, signed the document on December 7th.  The committee appointed three officers, Major General Alexander McDougall from New York, Colonel John Brooks from Massachusetts, and Mattias Ogden of New Jersey to carry the Memorial to Philadelphia.  Before leaving, committee members had to take up a collection to try to help the three officers cover their travel expenses.

The group arrived in Philadelphia on December 29.  By that time, Congress had already ended its session until January.  The officers still met with Robert Morris, superintendent of finance, and with other key delegates who were still in town.

When Congress reconvened on January 6, it received the officers and their Memorial, and appointed a grand committee, with one delegate from each of the 13 states, to consider the problem.  Three days later, McDougal wrote to Knox that Congress had received the memorial positively, but the fact remained that it simply did not have the money to keep its promises.

The following day, the officers met with the grand committee.  The basic gist was that Congress didn’t have the money they owed to the army and asked the officers what they thought would happen if the demands were not met.  The officers essentially said that the army was on the verge of mutiny, that officers had already put down several, and that with officers’ morale so bad, it was not clear that they could stop another one.  Colonel Brooks warned “a disappointment might throw them blindly into extremities.”  There was some discussion about eliminating the pension and giving a lump sum payment for a few years instead. But since Congress had no money for a lump sum, it didn’t seem like a useful solution.

The grand committee formed a subcommittee to work with Morris to come up with some response.  Morris could not make any promises on just about anything  Instead he focused on just trying to pay the army their pay for one month, January.  Morris offered payment to the soldier of 50 cents per week.  Since a private was supposed to make $6.67 per month. Offering to actually pay that out that one month's pay over four months seems rather pathetic.  Yet it was more than the men were used to receiving.  For the officers, Morris offered a choice. Either they could accept pay in the form of his paper Morris Notes, or they could wait until after the enlisted men got paid, and then receive specie  for one month, some time after that. Essentially, Morris was only offering to pay their January salaries some time in April, with no promise of back pay, front pay, or anything else.

As Congress considered the matter, those in winter camp continued to suffer.  A local sheriff arrested the Quartermaster General, Timothy Pickering for unpaid debts.  Pickering’s signature was on just about every promissory note issued by the army.  Since New York did not provide any immunity for officers engaged in official duties, one creditor attempted to use this local collection practice to collect what the army owed him.  This was another sign of disrespect to the army.  To the officers, they were giving everything, and the public simply did care.

Temple of Virtue

To keep the army busy, Washington ordered the construction of a new building.  This new building could be used for larger meetings or other events.  It was 110 feet long by 30 feet wide.  Washington simply called it  the “New Building”.  Others began to call it the “Temple of Virtue.” A reference to some Masonic literature from the time.  The Temple opened on February 6, 1783 occasioned by a parade, after which officers listened to a sermon preached by Reverend Israel Evans.  Washington used the celebration as an opportunity to pardon several prisoners and ordered the issuance of an extra half-cup of rum to each soldier.

Around this same time rumors of peace began to arrive.  The King’s November address to Parliament, where he recognized that they colonies in North America were now "free and independent states” was falling on delighted ears.  While this was a cause for celebration, it also made clear that a need for a resolution to the problem of paying the army was closer than ever.

On March 8, Colonel Walter Stewart returned from Philadelphia after several months of sick leave.  Stewart was the inspector general for the northern department, and also a former aide to General Horatio Gates.  The night after his return to camp, Stewart met with about a dozen officers at Gates' headquarters to give them the latest news from Philadelphia.  He brought word that Congress was still dithering on how to respond to the memorial and that Congress was not even paying the interest on its debts anymore.  

The officers decided to call a larger meeting at the Temple of Virtue two days later, to consider what next steps the army should take to get what it was owed.  Gates’ aide de camp, Major John Armstrong, wrote a notice for the meeting - although it was circulated anonymously.

The notice simply said that a fellow soldier wanted to address the officers.  But the tone of the notice made clear this was going to focus on the frustration that had been building over Congressional inaction.  Here is a short snippet from the notice:

After a pursuit of seven long years, the object for which we set out, is at length brought within our reach.—Yes, my friends, that suffering courage of yours, was active once; it has con­ducted the United States of America, through a doubtful and a bloody war—it has placed her in the chair of independency, and peace returns again to bless—Whom? A country willing to redress your wrongs, cherish your worth, and reward your services?—A country courting your return to private life, with tears of gratitude and smiles of admiration?—Longing to divide with you that independency which your gallantry has given, and those riches which your wounds have preserved?—Is this the case? Or is it rather a country that tramples upon your rights, disdains your cries, and insults your distresses?

The following morning, this anonymous pamphlet began spreading all over camp.  The mutinous language of the notice was of concern enough. But of similar concern to General Washington was the fact that he was not even notified of this army-wide meeting of officers.  It seemed clear that this was an effort to bypass Washington’s efforts to keep the army under control. 

Hours before the meeting was supposed to begin, Washington issued his general orders for March 11, condemning the meeting as disorderly, and instead notified the army that there would be a meeting four days later on March 15 for the Committee that had met with Congress to provide a report on progress to the officers.

Washington then dashed off letters, including one to the President of Congress, Elias Boudinot, urging Congress to come up with a solution to the pay and pension issues right away.. He also wrote to Alexander Hamilton, where he was more direct about his concerns of an uprising, and his suspicion that Colonel Stewart had consulted with others in Philadelphia about stirring up the army in order to get Congress to act.

Everyone seemed well aware that the army was at a precipice. Frustrated officers seemed sick of Congress’ failure to live up to its promises.  With a peace treaty expected any day, the army might be disbanded without getting any of the things it was promised.  Many wanted to refuse any orders to disband and to use the military’s power to take what they were owed.

In the days leading up to the meeting, officers argued with one another about whether to remain patient and respect the civil authority, or whether it was time to act.  Washington met with many officers over these days.  Although meetings were private and we don’t have a record of what was discussed, we can be confident Washington was trying to both calm the situation and probably also determine which senior officer were still with him.

Washington’s orders from the 11th only said that a senior officer would address the officers on Saturday.  When the meeting began, General Horatio Gates called the meeting to order, with over 100 officers present.

Everyone was shocked when Washington personally entered the Temple of Virtue shortly after the meeting began.  Washington never spoke to large groups, and rarely even ever spoke at length.  His presence underscored the importance of this moment.

As he spoke to the men, Washington essentially condemned the attempt to reject military discipline.  The anonymous letter calling a meeting without going through the commander, the threats to refuse lawful orders to disband, the distrust of Congress as the lawful government, seemed to go against everything they had fought for and sacrificed.

To back up his views, Washington tried to read from several documents, including a recent letter he had received from a member of congress.  After stumbling over the first few lines, he paused and put on his glasses.  Most of the men were shocked because they had never seen him wear glasses before. He commended in doing so “Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my Spectacles, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in the service of my country.”

With that line, the audience burst into tears.  Washington had underscored his own sacrifice to the cause of liberty and was begging his men to not let all of that be thrown away.

After Washington completed his address, the officers resolved unanimously thank the commander for his address, to express continued confidence in the justice of Congress, that they would rely on Washington to continue discussions with Congress, and would reject with disdain the propositions of the anonymous pamphlet. With that, the Continental Army's flirtation with mutiny was set aside, at least for now.

Next week, we’ll take a look at why Congress was having so much trouble addressing the concerns of the army.

- - -

Next Episode 325 Threat of Peace

Previous Episode 323 Evacuation of Charleston

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Further Reading

Websites

“General Orders, 29 August 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-09301

Head, David “The Officers’ Spirited Memorial: A Prelude to the Newburgh Conspiracy” Journal of the American Revolution, Nov. 14 ,2019. https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/11/the-officers-spirited-memorial-a-prelude-to-the-newburgh-conspiracy

“General Orders, 11 March 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-10811

Wensyel, James W. “The Newburgh Conspiracy” American Heritage Magazine, April/May 1981. https://www.americanheritage.com/newburgh-conspiracy

The Newburgh Incident: https://research.colonialwilliamsburg.org/foundation/journal/Autumn14/civilian.cfm

Newburgh Conspiracy: https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/newburgh-conspiracy

Washington Newburgh Address: https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/t-2437.09443.pdf

Kohn, Richard H. “The Inside History of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d’Etat.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2, 1970, pp. 188–220. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1918650

Nelson, Paul David. “Horatio Gates at Newburgh, 1783: A Misunderstood Role.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1, 1972, pp. 143–58. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1921331

Skeen, C. Edward, and Richard H. Kohn. “The Newburgh Conspiracy Reconsidered.” The William and Mary Quarterly, vol. 31, no. 2, 1974, pp. 273–98. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1920913

Haggard, Robert F. “The Nicola Affair: Lewis Nicola, George Washington, and American Military Discontent during the Revolutionary War.” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 146, no. 2, 2002, pp. 139–69. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1558199

Washington, George THE LAST OFFICIAL ADDRESS, OF HIS EXCELLENCY General WASHINGTON, TO THE Legislatures of the United States. TO WHICH IS ANNEXED, A COLLECTION OF PAPERS RELATIVE TO HALF - PAY, AND COMMUTATION OF HALF - PAY, Granted by CONGRESS to the OFFICERS of the ARMY. HARTFORD: PRINTED BY HUDSON AND GOODWIN. M.DCC.LXXXIII (1783) (from Oxford Text Archive). https://ota.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/repository/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12024/N14414/N14414.html

Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)

Cutler, William Parker Life, Journals and Correspondence of Rev. Manasseh Cutler, LL. D, Cincinnati, R. Clarke & Co. 1888. 

A Collection of papers, relative to half-pay and commutation of half-pay, granted by Congress to the officers of the army. Compiled, by permission of His Excellency General Washington, from the original papers in his possession.  Fishkill, NY: Samuel Loudon, 1783. 

Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*

Head, David A Crisis of Peace: George Washington, the Newburgh Conspiracy, and the Fate of the American Revolution, Pegasus Books, 2019.

Martin, James Kirby & Sean Hannah Leading with Character: George Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy, George Washington Leadership Inst. 2017. 

Richards, Dave, Swords in Their Hands: George Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy, Pisgah Press, 2015. 

* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.


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