Last week we left off with all parties looking to move along negotiations for peace. Both the French Foreign ministry under Vergennes and the American Peace Commissioners had begun separate talks with Britain to negotiate peace terms. After Spain and France failed to prevent the British from breaking their siege at Gibraltar, British positions seemed to harden.
As France and Spain considered this new military offensive, the American Peace commissioners resumed talks with British negotiators. Up until this time, most of the negotiations had been between British negotiator Richard Oswald, and American Commissioner John Jay. Benjamin Franklin had been bedridden for many critical weeks with a case of bladder stones. John Adams was still in the Netherlands, and Henry Laurens was still in London. By this time, however, Franklin was in a better condition to join Jay in negotiations, and Adams was on his way from the Netherlands.
Henry Strachey
On the British side, Shelburne sent Henry Strachey to join with Oswald as part of the British peace negotiation team in France.
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| The Treaty of Paris |
Strachey traveled to America for the first time in 1776, as Admiral Richard Howe’s secretary. Strachey assisted the admiral in his role as a peace commissioner. He spent time in both New York and Philadelphia. He then returned to England after more than two years in America. In London he took a government position as The Storekeeper of Ordnance. Throughout this time, Strachey retained his seat in Parliament.
In 1782, he took a role in the Rockingham ministry. Then, when Shelburne took over, the Prime Minister tapped him to serve as Undersecretary of the Home Department. He also asked Strachey to join Oswald in France to assist with the peace negotiations. Despite his extensive government experience, Strachey was only in his mid 40’s, contrasting with Oswald who was in his 70’s.
By the time Strachey arrived, Jay and Oswald had already agreed to borders between Georgia and Florida, and had agreed that the American western border would stretch to the Mississippi River. The border between what is today Maine and Canada was still a matter of negotiation. Oswald had also conceded American fishing rights off Newfoundland.
These covered most of the main issues that the Americans had outlined as necessary for a final treaty. All of them had been resolved by September, 1782, before Strachey arrived in October and before John Adams arrived around that same time..
Strachey had come to be the “bad cop” after the British were emboldened by the victory at Gibraltar. The ministry instructed Strachey, not to undue issues that had already been agreed, but to take a harder line on other matters that seemed to be close to compromise between Oswald and Jay.
Negotiations
Around the same time Adams and Franklin joined Jay at the bargaining table. Before they all came together, Adams held a separate meeting with Jay to get up to speed on the negotiations. He left Franklin out of the meeting because Adams was still concerned that Franklin was too close to France. Adams was impressed with the hard line Jay had taken with Oswald and with the concessions that the New Yorker had already obtained.
On November 2, the three American Commissioners, Franklin, Jay, and Adams sat down to dinner with the British negotiators, Oswald and Strachey, to get a better idea of where negotiations needed to go. Strachey was adamant that America had to reimburse loyalists for their losses. Britain would not agree to any peace that deprived loyal British subjects of their property, even in an independent America. He also wanted an assurance that British creditors would be permitted to collect private debts that they held in America.
Adams suggested that this was a state issue, not something The Continental Congress had the power to do. He suggested that Congress recommend to the states that they provide just compensation for the loyalists.
Around this same time another player entered the negotiations. The Marquis de Lafayette had left America with a commission from the Continental Congress to assist in the peace negotiations. While Lafayette did not take a direct role, he tried to hold together relations between the French ministry and the American Commissioners by holding a dinner with Vergennes and Adams.
The relationship between these two men was chilly at best. Adams had already written to Livingston, the Continental Congress’ Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that “It is not [in France’s] interest that we should become a great and formidable people, and therefore they will not help us become so.” Adams believed that American and French interests were across purposes by this time and acted accordingly.
At the dinner with Vergennes and Lafayette, Adams, in his broken French, told the French minister that the American negotiators had already come to an agreement on most of the matters with Britain. He noted that the main areas of contention were fishing rights, the border with Canada, and reparations. Vergennes seemed to side with the British on the issue of reparation for loyalists, but overall the dinner was cordial. Vergennes even offered that France would be willing to provide another loan of 6 million livres for the Americans.
During this time Strachey returned to London to discuss the American position. He came back with the message that the ministry refused to accept the American position on the borders and on the issue of fisheries. London was also insistent on the reparations for loyalists.
Negotiations continued through November. Over time, Oswald and Strachey both seemed willing to concede to most of the American positions were going to be what they already agreed, and would take the matter back to London for further consideration. The fighting over the details remained difficult but it also appeared that the British wanted to get this matter resolved.
Despite their internal disagreements, the three American commissioners continued to present a united front. Jay focused on maintaining the Mississippi as the western border. Adams focused on the northern border with Canada. Franklin focused on the issue of reparations.
None of the commissioners had a good handle on the fishing rights issue. As a New Englander, Adams knew it was important to the regional economy, but had no real idea what issues were most important. Franklin sent a courier to Nantes to find some American sailors who could provide information on the fishing issue. The sailors explained that it was important not only that ships could fish on the waters off the coast, but they also needed the right to land on the shore to dry the cod for shipment back to New England. The drying process was necessary so that ships could carry far more fish back to port and that the fish would not spoil along the way.
On the issue of debts, Franklin and Adams both agreed that British merchants could sue in American Courts for debts owed to them by Americans, as long as those debts were incurred prior to American independence in 1776. The Americans also insisted that Americans have the right to collect debts from British debtors on the same terms. This was essentially meaningless since almost all debt involved British creditors and American debtors, but they thought it was important as a matter of honor to make things even in both directions.
Reparations
By the end of November, the one outstanding issue was over loyalist reparations. Britain had no desire to cover the losses of all loyalists from British funds, but also did not want them to suffer financially out of their loyalty to the king.
Franklin was particularly obstinate on this point. Politically, Franklin could be attacked at home for giving in on loyalist reparations. If he did, one of the first men to request payments would be his son William, the former Royal Governor of New Jersey. Similarly John Jay’s brother James had fled to Britain as a loyalist and actually came to Paris around this time. The encounter led to a fight, after which the two brothers never spoke to each other again for the rest of their lives. Like Franklin, Jay did not want to be seen giving in on a point that might benefit his traitorous family members.
Passions ran particularly high on this point. Recall that the Huddy-Asgill Affair was still going on at this time. Loyalists had murdered militia Captain Joshua Huddy, resulting in outrage throughout America. General Washington had chosen a British officer at random, Charles Asgill, to be hanged in retaliation.
By November of 1782, the loyalist who had hanged Huddy, Captain Lippencott, and the loyalist who had apparently approved the hanging, Governor Franklin, had both fled New York and were living comfortably in London. Asgill was still in America awaiting his fate. The idea of providing reparations to men like these killers was emotionally a hard no for Americans.
For Americans, coming to terms with their former friends, neighbors and family members who had forsaken the cause of America was just too much. During the war, the loyalists had taken up arms against their countrymen, and had joked about how the rebels would all be hanged. On this issue, there seemed to be no acceptable compromise.
Pressure to Complete Negotiations
Despite their feelings, growing pressure pushed negotiators to complete their work. In the last week of November, two messengers arrived in Paris with news. Richard Vaughn, who had been corresponding with Franklin and Jay for months, and discussing matters with Prime Minister Shelburne, came to town to inform the Americans that if the deal was not finalized that week, there might not be any deal.
Shelburne was worried that without at least a preliminary treaty, his government might fall. The Prime Minister had already delayed the opening of Parliament twice for fear that the opposition would call a no confidence vote and remove him. If that happened another government might come to power that would be willing to continue the war in an effort to win better terms.
The second messenger who came to Paris was Edward Bancroft, the secretary for the American mission in France. On a trip to London, he had received word that Shelburne had made an offer to Vergennes that would end the war between France and Britain. If that happened, America would have no choice but to accept whatever terms they were given, or to try to continue the war without France. If the Americans wanted the Treaty they had negotiated, a final agreement was needed right now.
What the peace commissioners did not know was that both of these messages had been sent deliberately from London to pressure the Americans to give in on the reparations issue.
That evening, Franklin wrote a letter to the British negotiators outlining the final American position. Franklin argued that if the US had to provide reparations for loyalists, then Britain would have to pay reparations to Americans for the slaves that the British army had taken, for the cities they burned, and for the property they had looted. Franklin noted that his own home in Philadelphia had been looted by British officers during the occupation.
He proposed that both Britain and America total up the costs inflicted on them by the enemy and the country with the higher damages would pay the difference to the other. The British negotiators could not agree to this. It was almost certain that Americans had suffered far more damage at the hands of the loyalists and the British Army than the total worth of all loyalist properties in America. Further, the years of trying to account for all the British destruction, looting, and pillaging in America would do nothing to put this matter behind the two countries and return to a friendly trading relationship as the British wanted.
In the end, the British agreed to gut the reparations clause by simply putting in a request that states compensate loyalists who had not made themselves obnoxious to the cause of independence, and explicitly barring compensation for any loyalists who took up arms against the United States.
Just as the negotiations were coming to an end, on November 29, a fourth American Commissioner arrived in Paris. Henry Laurens traveled from London, now completely free from any parole limitations with the completion of the agreement to exchange him for General Charles Cornwallis.
By the time Laurens arrived a tentative outline of an agreement had already been established. Laurens only insisted on only one addition. The large slave owner from South Carolina wanted assurance that any British reparations would include payments for slaves that the British had lured away or taken from their owners. The other commissioners agreed to this addition.
The next day, November 30, Oswald and Strachey agreed in principle to the terms. They signed the treaty and sent the agreement to London for approval.
The French Dilemma
With a preliminary treaty signed, the next problem was that the Americans had to tell French officials that they had signed a peace agreement with Britain in violation of the treaty that they had with France. The Americans had given themselves some legalistic wiggle room by including a provision that the treaty would not take effect until France had also settled with Britain. That, however, was essentially meaningless. The whole point of the guarantee to France not to sign a separate peace was to keep Britain from coming after France once it was no longer tied down in America. This preliminary agreement meant that Britain already knew the terms of peace with America and could now focus on France and Spain.
Since Franklin had the best relationship with the French government, the other commissioners told him to inform Vergennes. Franklin sent a copy of the treaty to Vergennes. For several days he heard back nothing. While Vergennes did not respond to the Americans, he commented to others that the terms were extremely generous for the Americans. It seemed clear that the British wanted to buy the American defection. Vergennes was also frustrated that he could no longer use any of these terms as bargaining chips in agreeing to his own peace treaty with Britain.
When Franklin called on Vergennes a few days later, the Foreign Minister told him there was very little in the treaty that the King of France would approve of. In other words, it was very much against French interests. He asked Franklin not to send it to Philadelphia for the moment. Franklin did not respond to the request, but a few days later, on December 15, Franklin sent a letter saying that a ship would be carrying the treaty to America, and would it be possible to get some of the cash that Vergennes had promised Adams for the Continental Congress to take over with the treaty?
This was too much for Vergennes who responded with an angry letter saying that the failure to consult with France on the treaty was itself a problem. Vergennes essentially said this was a slap in the face of the king, and he certainly wasn’t going to hand over more cash after this treatment.
Franklin wrote a semi-apologetic response, saying that this was only a preliminary document, which was still contingent on France and Britain establishing their own peace treaty. He then dropped a semi-veiled threat that if the Americans did not get money to keep going, they might just drop out of the war based on these terms and leave France hanging. When the ship sailed a few days later, it included 600,000 French livres - part of a loan from the King of France.
Britain Considers The Treaty
If France was not happy about the treaty, neither was most of Britain. Shelburne refused to reveal the terms of the treaty, even to members of his own cabinet. On December 5, Parliament finally reconvened. George III had to address the House of Lords. Spectators noted that the King looked troubled. He unrolled the speech that Shelburne had written for him and announced that the war with the colonies was over. The King continued “Finding it indispensable to the attainment of this object, I did not hesitate to go to the full length of the powers vested in me, and offer to declare them - “ at this point the king’s voice dwindled to a whisper and he had to pause to regain his computer. He continued: “and offer to declare them free and independent states by an article inserted in the treaty of peace.” The King called for an end to all military operations in America. He prayed that Americans might escape the calamities that England had suffered when it tried to govern without a king. The speech then ended with a hope that their common language and religion would keep a permanent union between the two countries.
Even with the king’s unenthusiastic support, Parliament was largely unhappy with the treaty. Both the Fox and North factions in Parliament opposed it and attacked Shelburne. Words like “preposterous” “imbecility” and “humiliating” were thrown around in the debates. The Fox faction, which supported independence, was upset that the concession was provisional based on a French treaty. After all, their goal was to establish independence with America so that they could go after France. The North faction, of course, was upset by any concession on independence at all. The destruction of the British Empire was all Shelburne’s fault.
Defending the government in the House of Commons, was a young 23 year old member named William Pitt. You may recall that name from many early episodes of this podcast. This was the son of the former Prime Minister who was such a big part of the government during the Seven Years War. Pitt the younger simply ignored the treaty qualifications and simply stated that American independence was the policy of the Administration.
Parliament was not quite ready to bring down the government on this issue, but neither were they ready to approve it. Despite the preliminary agreement of terms, the final treaty approval would drag on for another year.
Next week: As peace commissioners wrap up the war on paper, the war continues in the American west.
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Next Episode 320 Treaty of Paris (Available July 21, 2024)
Previous Episode 318 Peace Negotiations
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Further Reading
Websites
Treaty of Paris, The American Negotiators https://teachingamericanhistory.org/blog/the-treaty-of-paris-the-american-negotiators
Treaty of Paris https://www.history.com/topics/american-revolution/treaty-of-paris
John Adams’ Diplomatic Missions https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/adams-diplomatic-missions
Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)
The Treaty of Paris (1783) in a changing states system: papers from a conference, January 26-27, 1984 (borrow only).
Bemis, Samuel F. The Diplomacy Of The American Revolution, Indiana Univ. Press, 1935.
Jay, John The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. An address delivered before the New York Historical Society on its seventy-ninth anniversary, Tuesday, November 27, 1883, New York Historical Society, 1884.
Pellew, George John Jay, Boston, New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1890.
Perkins, James B. France in the American Revolution, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1911.
Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*
Brown, Marvin Luther American Independence Through Prussian Eyes: A Neutral View of the Peace Negotiations of 1782-1783 - Selections from the Diplomatic Correspondence, Duke Univ. Press, 1959 (borrow on Archive.org).
Dull, Jonathan A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, Yale Univ. Press, 1985.
Fleming, Thomas The Perils of Peace: America's Struggle for Survival After Yorktown, Harper Collins, 2007.
Hoffman, Ronald and Peter Albert (eds) Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty of 1783, Univ. Press of Va., 1986. (borrow on Archive.org).
Hutson, James H. John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution, Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1980. (borrow on Archive.org).
Morris, Richard B. The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence, Harper & Row, 1965 (borrow on Archive.org).
Smith, Page John Adams, Vol. 1, Doubleday & Co. 1962.
Stockley, Andrew Britain and France at the Birth of America: The European Powers and the Peace Negotiations of 1782-83, Liverpool Univ. Press, 2001.
* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.
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