Back in Episode 320, we covered the preliminary peace agreement that the delegations from Britain and the US reached in the fall of 1782. That preliminary agreement resulted in a cessation of hostilities and great celebration. But the war would not actually be over until that preliminary agreement became a final treaty.
One of the big impediments to the final treaty was the fact that the US could not sign off on a final peace until Britain and France also did so. France could not sign off on a peace until Spain also agreed to a peace with Britain.
Gibraltar
Spain had entered the war back in 1779 with the primary goal of taking back Gibraltar. Spain had ceded Gibraltar to Britain in 1713, as part of an agreement to get Britain to end its role in the War of Spanish Succession. Ever since then, Spain had been trying to get back this small rocky outcropping at the southern tip of Spain.
Spain and France had been besieging Gibraltar since 1779. While the attacks had greatly damaged the area, the highly defensible position and several successful resupply missions prevented the British garrison from being dislodged. The final push by France and Spain to recapture the rock failed in October, 1782.
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| Unfinished painting showing US peace delegation |
The two sides worked out a complicated series of land swaps that touched on the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, which would result in a return of Gibraltar to Spain. The French negotiator, Gerard de Rayneval returned to Paris in late November with a preliminary deal in hand. French foreign Minister Vergennes summoned the Spanish Ambassador, Conde de Aranda, to discuss the deal. The men agreed to the terms.
When Gerard de Rayneval returned to Britain with the good news, he learned that Shelburne could not finalize the deal. Shelburne’s own cabinet revolted at the idea of turning over Gibraltar to Spain. The recent heroic defense of Gibraltar had captured the popular mood in London. The only way this was going to work was if Spain and France offered more valuable sugar islands to compensate Britain.
The talks appeared on the verge of collapse, then Spain blinked. The Conde de Aranda told Vergennes he had been authorized to negotiate on letting Britain keep Gibraltar if Spain could get a valuable price of other real estate. If Spain could get both East and West Florida, as well as Minorca, it might be willing to forgo its demand of Gibraltar.
The debates went back and forth into December. By this time, the terms of the peace deal with the Americans were known to all. Prime Minister Shelburne was facing a possible vote of no confidence in Parliament, which could throw all of this work back to square one.
There was also another deadline. Recall a few episodes back that I mentioned that Spain and France were putting together an Armada at Cadiz, led by the Admiral d’Estaing and General Lafayette. This armada planned to sail to recapture Jamaica, expel the British from New York and recapture Canada. The ships were ready to leave port. Once they left, they could not be recalled. Those attacks would pretty much guarantee that the war would continue for at least another year, and that the final treaty terms would be greatly impacted by the success or failure of that mission.
As a result, even if Spain was ultimately agreeable to the deal currently on the table, the lack of a quick answer might be as good as a no. Fortunately, the Spanish Ambassador Aranda approved the deal without demanding to consult with leaders in Madrid.
The powers still quibbled over a few other details, but by January 20, 1783, Britain, France, and Spain all agreed on terms for a final peace. Although the agreement was provisional and had to receive final approval from all governments, that seemed likely.
In Cadiz, the Armada had been scheduled to depart on January 16, but after d’Estaing received word that a peace treaty was imminent, he delayed his departure. After receiving word of the treaty on February 2, d’Estaing shut down the mission.
The Netherlands had largely been left out of the negotiations. With all of its allies agreeing to peace terms, the Dutch had to give the British acceptable terms. The Netherlands agreed to the general cease fire that became effective in January 1783. They would eventually sign a treaty with Britain more than a year later.
Peace Terms
The US received just about everything the Commissioners wanted. Britain acknowledged the US as free, sovereign, and independent states. It recognized the US boundary reaching west to the Mississippi and agreeable boundaries with Canada and Florida. There was also a secret provision, setting the border between Georgia and Florida, depending on where Spain or Britain ultimately claimed Florida. The British army would leave US territory and turn over all land within US borders. Any British property in the US would be forfeited to the US. The treaty also granted Americans fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland.
Britain received a clause that British creditors would be allowed to pursue lawful debts. The US would not confiscate property in the future from loyalists, but would only “recommend” to the states to provide restitution for property already taken from loyalists.
The Treaty between France and Great Britain permitted France to keep several islands in the West Indies, including St. Lucia and Tobago. France gave up Grenada, the Grenadines, St. Vincent, Dominica, St. Kitts, Nevis, and Montserrat. Britain ceded Minorca and east and west Florida to Spain, but took the islands of Providencia, and the Bahamas, as well as retaining Gibraltar.
Waiting for Approval
With the diplomats having completed their work, they next had to wait for the various governments to confirm the agreements that they had reached. For the American diplomats in Paris, this meant that they had to remain in Europe to finalize the treaty. Even so, the peace agreement seemed so established that Benjamin Franklin considered making a trip to England in the spring of 1783. Six months earlier, such a visit probably would have resulted in his imprisonment in the Tower of London. He ended up not making the trip, but it had nothing to do with any fear from British authorities.
Another of the delegates, Henry Laurens, who actually did serve time as a prisoner in the Tower of London, returned to Britain after the preliminary peace agreement. He wanted to relax and recuperate in Bath.
Franklin occupied himself by returning to printing. He printed a bound copy of all the state constitutions, in French, to be distributed to diplomats and other government officials throughout Europe. He also began working on a treaty of Amity and commerce between the US and Sweden, and started similar initiatives with Denmark and Portugal.
Franklin had been willing to abandon his obligations under the treaty with France, and agreed with the other American delegates to sign a preliminary peace treaty with France. Despite Franklin's willingness to be flexible, John Adams still believed that Franklin was too captivated by French interests. Adams did not let up on his criticisms of Franklin as the delegates waited in France.
Just as the delegation was finalizing its negotiations on the preliminary peace treaty, another rift began to divide Adams and Franklin. Adams wanted to appoint a man named Edmund Jenings as the secretary to the diplomatic mission in France. Adams introduced Jenings to Henry Laurens, who at first seemed to like the idea, but then quickly grew cool to the idea. Jenings was an American who had been living in Europe during the war and had published a number of pamphlets. Several of these seemed designed to divide the American peace commissioners.
Meanwhile, Franklin had someone else in mind to be secretary. He wanted his grandson, William Temple Franklin. Now 21 years old, Temple had been serving as his grandfather’s personal secretary for seven years. He spoke French and had developed his own relationships in the French Court at Versailles.
Franklin wrote to Congress’ Secretary for Foreign Affairs, recommending Temple for the position, and suggesting that if Temple did not get the job, that Franklin was considering leaving his post to take his grandson on a grand tour of Europe.
Having completed the preliminary treaty, Franklin decided on his own to make Temple the secretary of the Peace Commission near the end of 1782. Franklin got John Jay to agree to the appointment, but did not even bother to ask, or even notify John Adams.
When he found out, Adams was livid. It wasn’t just that Franklin was handing out a lucrative position to a family member. After all, John Quincy Adams was serving at the time as an aide to the American delegation in Russia, thanks to his father’s efforts. Edmund Jenings, the man Adams wanted for secretary, was a cousin of his wife Abigail.
Adams disliked Temple for many of the same reasons that he disliked Temple’s grandfather. The puritanical New Englander was disgusted by the lavish lifestyle, punctuated by drinking and womanizing, in which the Franklins engaged. Adams’ mindset was probably not helped by the fact that he was trying to fight a battle via correspondence to Massachusetts, trying to convince his daughter Nabby not to marry an aggressive suiter.
Adams was also open to the criticisms levied by Arthur and William Lee. These men had opposed Franklin for years, and levied all sorts of accusations. They turned their wrath on Temple. Arthur Lee called Temple a “young insignificant boy” implying that only his Grandfather’s status gave him any chance at a government position. William Lee referred to Temple as a bastard, twice over, referring to his illegitimate birth, as well as his father’s. Adams himself wrote in a letter regarding Franklin: “His whole Life has been one continued Insult to good Manners and to Decency.”
The fact that Temple’s father was an infamous Tory, by this time living in London, and the fact that Temple had only lived in America for 18 months of his life, led to concerns about whether he had America’s true interests at heart.
Adams had already expressed concerns that Benjamin Franklin had seemed too pro-French. In several letters to America, Adams expressed the belief that France had actually delayed a peace with Britain by several years and that Franklin was a pawn that Vergennes was using to promote French interests. Since Temple spoke fluent French and had served in Versailles, Adams believed that Temple also had become more French than American.
Adams also came to believe that Franklin was setting up Temple to replace his grandfather on the peace commission in France so that Franklin could take a position as Ambassador to Britain in the Court of St. James. In truth, Franklin had zero interest in serving in London. Adams, however, did want that position and worried that Franklin was a rival.
When Temple met with Adams in January 1783, to request that Adams sign a document approving his appointment as secretary retroactive to the previous October, Adams exploded. Temple already had the commission signed by the other three commissioners. Franklin had written the document. Jay apparently signed some time in October, when the commission was finalizing the preliminary treaty and Franklin was sick in bed. Temple was the active courier for Franklin during this time. Henry Laurens did not arrive in France until late November, and returned to Britain in January. He signed the commission just before crossing the channel, in hopes of spending some time relaxing at Bath.
After receiving Laurens’ signature, Temple went to see Adams. Because Adams had originally been appointed the sole peace commissioner, he considered himself the head of the delegation and thought it an effrontery that Franklin had gotten all the other commissioners to agree to the appointment without even discussing the matter with Adams. Temple used his best efforts with humility and respect to win over Adams, but nothing seemed to work. Since Temple had the approval of three of the four commissioners, he continued to serve as secretary. Adams eventually came around and signed the document nine months later, in September, 1783.
Debating Ratification
The Peace Commissioners had little to do but bicker with each other for months after sending the preliminary treaty to Congress in November, 1782. In early 1783, Congress was still debating whether to give the commissioners more latitude in negotiating a treaty without France when the preliminary treaty arrived.
The pro-French delegates in Congress were outraged by the fact that the commissioner had negotiated a separate peace with Britain, cutting France out of the negotiations. They saw this as a betrayal of the French alliance and something that would hurt the US in international relations. There was particularly intense debate about a secret clause that set a border between the US and Florida if Britain held Florida, but a different border if Spain ultimately took control of Florida.
Of course, the delegates in favor of giving the delegates more latitude were very pleased with the favorable terms that the treaty gave to the US, based on those in France taking the initiative. Congress continued to debate before receiving word in March, 1783 that France and Britain had also come to terms on a preliminary treaty. At that point, the matter seemed settled.
Secretary Livingston finally wrote a response to the delegates in late March, congratulating them on the provisions in the preliminary treaty but also criticizing them for negotiating without France’s involvement. In April, he confirmed to the Commissioners that Congress had ratified the preliminary treaty. By May, Livingston was complaining that he had not heard any further progress on the final treaty.
David Hartley
There was reason for concern. At the end of March, the Shelburne Ministry in London fell after only eight months. In April, a coalition under Charles James Fox and Lord North took control of Parliament. The new Prime Minister was William Cavendish-Bentinck, the Duke of Portland, but everyone knew that Fox and North were the real powers in Parliament. The two factions could not have been more different. Fox’s liberal coalition has supported American independence for years. North, of course, continued the war longer than almost anyone else wanted and held the very conservative positions that King George had espoused. The two factions disagreed on just about any issue, and were together only because of their shared hatred of Shelburne as Prime Minister.
For the Americans, there was real cause for concern. Without a final treaty, Britain could back out of the preliminary agreement and resume the war. It did not help that North pushed for a vote condemning the peace treaty that the Shelburne government had already negotiated and approved.
The new government sent David Hartley to negotiate the final terms of a treaty. Although Hartley was a liberal in Parliament, and had been outspoken for years about ending the war with the colonies, he was also a close ally of Lord North and had voted against the Shelburne Peace Plan in Parliament.
The Commissioners were relieved when Hartley revealed that Britain was still willing to sign a final treaty largely based on the terms spelled out in the preliminary treaty. Franklin had know Hartley since the 1760’s and the two men got along quite well. Hartley and the Commissioners debated a few more issues, mostly related to trade. The Commissioners agreed that US ports would be open to British trade following the final evacuation of the British Army from New York. Much of their discussion at this time was the details on getting the British Army evacuated.
After a few weeks, Hartley sent the terms to London for final approval. He and the delegates then waited most of the summer with no word from the government. In fairness the coalition was a mess. The King, who loathed Fox, refused to cooperate with the coalition in any way. The two factions agreed on very little. It was a matter of debate whether this divided government would even survive much longer.
After nearly two months of waiting for a decision from London, Hartley decided on his own to just finalize the official treaty. Although the two sides had discussed a few changes, Hartley proposed they simply sign a final treaty based on the preliminary one without any substantive changes. He could at least justify that without any further word from London.
The Signing
The parties agreed to meet on September 3 for the formal signing. Franklin, Jay, and Temple rode to Paris where Adams joined them. Laurens, still in Britain, did not participate. The secretaries reviewed four copies of the treaty. The only substantive changes were an added provision spelling out a ratification process, and the removal of the provision related to the Florida border since Spain by this time had set the border based on its own treaty with Britain.
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| Treaty of Paris Signatures |
Traditionally, the two countries exchanged gifts following a treaty. The King had suggested a cash gift. Hartley discussed the matter, offering a £500 cash gift to each of the four delegates. Since the delegates had nothing to give in return and were concerned about insulting the king by refusing his gift, there was some discussion about the matter. In the end, no gifts were exchanged and the matter was just dropped.
The commissioners sent a copy of the treaty to Versailles, where Vergennes signed the peace treaty, along with the Spanish Ambassador that same day, ending the war with Britain. The Dutch had reached a preliminary treaty with Britain the day before, but that final treaty would not be finalized for several more months. That afternoon, Vergennes hosted a dinner for everyone involved in the treaties. There were 31 people who attended.
Following the event, Franklin commented to Jay that this treaty would probably be the most notable achievement for which they would be remembered. He then referenced the Bible “blessed are the peacemakers. Jay responded that he would be proud of his role. Adams, ever the pessimist, worried that the treaty could have been better and hoped they would not see another war in their lifetimes.
As far as all the government leaders were concerned though, the war was over and it was time to start living in the new peace.
Next week: The British Army Evacuates New York.
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Next Episode 330 British Evacuation New York
Previous Episode 328 Cuddalore, The Last Battle
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Further Reading
Websites
“The American Peace Commissioners: Commission for William Temple Franklin, [1 October 1782],” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-38-02-0125
“From John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, 22 January 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0126
“From John Adams to Edmund Jenings, 28 January 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0135
“From John Adams to James Warren, 13 April 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0253
“Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners, 25 March 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0233
“Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners, 21 April 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0269
“Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners, 28 May 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0317
“Definitive Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain, 3 September 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-40-02-0356
Free eBooks
(from archive.org unless noted)
The Treaty of Paris (1783) in a changing states system: papers from a conference, January 26-27, 1984 (borrow only).
Bemis, Samuel F. The Diplomacy Of The American Revolution, Indiana Univ. Press, 1935.
Pellew, George John Jay, Boston, New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Co. 1890.
Perkins, James B. France in the American Revolution, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co. 1911.
Books Worth Buying
(links to Amazon.com unless otherwise noted)*
Dull, Jonathan A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution, Yale Univ. Press, 1985.
Hoffman, Ronald and Peter Albert (eds) Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty of 1783, Univ. Press of Va., 1986 (borrow on archive.org).
Hutson, James H. John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution, Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1980 (borrow on archive.org).
Morris, Richard B. The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence, Harper & Row, 1965 (borrow on Archive.org).
Renehan, Edward The Treaty of Paris: The Precursor to a New Nation, Chelsea House, 2007 (borrow on archive.org).
Schiff, Stacy, A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America, Henry Holt and Co. 2005.
Smith, Page John Adams, Vol. 1, Doubleday & Co. 1962.
Stinchcombe, William C. The American Revolution and the French Alliance, Syracuse Univ. Press, 1969 (borrow on archive.org).
Stockley, Andrew Britain and France at the Birth of America: The European Powers and the Peace Negotiations of 1782-83, Liverpool Univ. Press, 2001.
* As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.
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